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ABSTRACT 
CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE? 
ECOSYSTEM BASED GOVERNANCE IN THE BAY OF 
FUNDY/GULF OF MAINE REGION 
By 
John R.Coon 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2012 
Decades, even centuries, of resource extraction and exploitation by humans have 
taken a toll on the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystems. The very real threats posed 
by population growth and coastal development, climate change, habitat loss, 
overharvesting, chemical pollution, nutrient overloading, and invasive species invasions 
show no sign of abating. Traditional methods of managing the human activities that 
impact the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine are proving unable to keep pace with the 
growing threats. The Gulf of Maine Council and others have joined in the chorus calling 
for a broader, more holistic ecosystem approach to the governance of the human activities 
that that impact the coastal margin. This study uses the framework of the Policy Sciences 
to suggest a model of Problem Orientation, Social Process, and Decision Process 
characteristics indicative of an ideal ecosystem-based approach to governance. The 
model is first used to analyze the governance regime that existed in the Great Lakes 
Basin during the first two decades under the International Joint Commission's oversight 
of activities under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. The framework model is 
xi 
then used to analyze the current governance regime in the Gulf of Maine/Bay of Fundy 
region. Using this analysis, the study concludes that an ecosystem-based approach to 
governance is not possible in the region as currently configured. The study further 
concludes that it will not be possible to transition to an ecosystem-based approach 
without the education and significant outreach necessary to create a knowledgeable and 
activist public able to understand the issues and threats and willing to press governance 
for improvement. Further, ecosystem-based governance will require the creation of an 
overarching and accountable entity that, with significant input from public and 
stakeholder partnerships can collect reliable ecosystem indicator data from both sides of 
the border, analyze the data, and direct the implementation of policy solutions, and 
change course as necessary. 
xii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v 
LIST OF TABLES vi 
TABLE OF FIGURES ix 
ABSTRACT xi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
From the Status Quo to Ecosystem-Based Governance 5 
Research Focus 10 
II. RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS 12 
The Policy Sciences Analytical Framework 13 
Methods 22 
Phase 1: Literature Review and Identification of Comparative Case Study 24 
Phase 2: Data Collection 27 
Phase 3: Analysis 36 
III. THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH ANDTHE PUBLIC GOOD 40 
Introduction 40 
Ecosystem Dynamics and Managing for Surprise 42 
xiii 
Institutional Efficiency and the Legacy of Scientific Management 52 
Resilience and Adaptive Cycles 60 
Changing Course: An Ecosystem-Based Approach to Adaptive Governance 64 
The Ecosystem-based Approach and the Policy Sciences Analytical Framework 74 
Problem Orientation 76 
Goal Clarification. 76 
Describing Trends. 84 
Analyzing Conditions. 87 
Projecting Developments. 89 
Inventing, Evaluating, and Selecting Alternatives. 91 
















IV. THE GREATLAKES BASIN 157 
xiv 
Introduction and Background 157 
Ecosystem-based Governance and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement ..165 
Problem Orientation 166 
Goal Clarification. 167 
Describing Trends. 179 
Conditions. 193 
Projecting Developments. 207 
Inventing, Evaluating, and Selecting Alternatives. 213 
















V. THE BAY OF FUNDY/GULF OF MAINE WATERSHED 314 
Introduction and Background 314 
Problem Orientation 321 
xv 
Goal Clarification. 321 
Describing Trends. 337 
Conditions. 360 
Projecting Developments. 381 
Inventing, Evaluating, and Selecting Alternatives. 396 
















CHAPTER VI DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS — 513 
Introduction 513 
Discussion: The Framework, Ecosystem Based Governance, and Case 
Comparison 516 
Management for resilience 517 
Significant, meaningful public participation 529 
xvi 
Integrated, collaborative government involvement 531 
Governance is adaptive 535 
Mobilizing local knowledge 540 
Conclusions 547 
Recommendations and Next Steps 553 
LIST OF REFERENCES 568 
APPENDICES 592 
APPENDIX A: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APROVAL 593 
APPENDIX B: INFORMED CONSENT FORM 595 
APPENDIX C: FOCUSED INTERVIEW QUESTION OUTLINE 597 
xvii 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This study involves the governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
watershed and whether governance regime in the region has the capacity to implement a 
more ecosystem-based approach to governance. When research and preparation for this 
study commenced some 8 years ago I was prepared to learn about the human activities 
and natural resource exploitation in the region, how those activities impacted the 
environment, and how those activities might be moderated to permit some "sustainable" 
level of impact through better governance. After a career as a trial lawyer, involved 
mostly in complex litigation in environmental, toxic tort, and labor/management cases I 
was prepared to find that governance could be improved through broader citizen 
participation and greater institutional collaboration. 
I was unprepared, however, for the magnitude and complexity of threats that 
confront not only the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, but the planet Earth in general. I have 
also been numbed by the significant and complex challenges that confront governance 
regimes. Issues involving the environment and natural resources simply cannot be 
viewed in isolation. Economics, culture, domestic and geopolitics, public attitudes and 
opinion, and notions of equity and justice all weave their way through our society's 
tapestry. 
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This study is an attempt to examine, from the perspective of one person the 
overwhelming number and impact of the interactions of some of the decision-makers and 
institutions whose activities are pertinent to the threats extant in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
Maine. As part of this process I have attempted to identify the values and perspectives of 
many, but not nearly all, of the policy actors in the region. The level of complexity in 
these areas prohibits any in-depth or broad-based inquiry by one person acting alone. 
There is much to be evaluated, both in terms of the ecosystems in the region and with 
respect to the multi-level governance scheme. Human impacts on ecosystems may not be 
examined or regulated without an understanding of the social and economic 
interconnections. One thing is clear: The ecosystems in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
are under siege by human-driven forces and existing governance is doing little, if 
anything, to stem the activities responsible for the harm. With this in mind, we can begin 
to focus on the ecosystem dynamics, economics, sociocultural status, and policies that 
impact the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. 
From a physical standpoint, the high tides and cold, nutrient rich waters of the 
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, a semi-enclosed sea extending from Cape Cod to the Bay of 
Fundy, support several thriving ecosystems which are both complex and diverse (Smith 
1997). Economically the market value of the goods and services derived from the overall 
ecosystem, measured in traditional economic terms, to the economies of the federal, state, 
and provincial jurisdictions that border the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, totals in the 
billions of dollars. In addition, ecosystem functions and services that are vital to the 
region and the planet that do not appear on the ledgers of traditional economics include 
carbon sequestration, nutrient cycling, waste recycling and storage, recreation, aesthetic 
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value, educational opportunities, and countless others (GOMCc 2007). Despite the 
importance of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, however, the integrity and resilience of 
its ecosystem functions are threatened by anthropogenic factors (Pesch and Wells 2004). 
Conditions in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine should not be viewed in isolation. 
Indeed, largely land-based human activities have now been found to have adversely 
affected nearly all of the world's oceans (Halpem, Selkoe et al. 2007; Halpern, Walbridge 
et al. 2008). It is not surprising, therefore, that human activities in and around the Bay of 
Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed and beyond have led to increasing ecosystem alterations 
in a variety of forms due chiefly to overextraction of marine organisms, invasions of 
nonindigenous (exotic) species, chemical pollution, eutrophication, toxic phytoplankton 
blooms, alteration of physical habitat, and the consequences of global climate change 
(Steneck 2001). 
The need to manage the human activities that contribute to the degradation of 
vital coastal ocean ecosystems in a sustainable manner has never been more apparent. 
The pressure on coastal and ocean resources has increased relentlessly. While federal 
and related state and provincial environmental laws and regulations enacted in the 1970's 
have had an undeniable positive impact in the form of cleaner air, lakes, and rivers, 
locally and regionally rapid population growth, coastal development, and increasing user 
conflicts have degraded natural resources and led to declines in both environmental 
integrity and general productivity (Ullsten 2003). The coastal areas that provide essential 
habitats for a significant portion of commercially valuable marine species are reeling 
from the effects of habitat loss, pollution, and overfishing that have reduced populations 
of coastal fish and other species to historically low levels of abundance and diversity 
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(VanderZwaag 1995; Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000). Further, larger coastal population leads 
invariably to larger sewage treatment facilities, expanded solid waste landfills, increased 
recreational use, and other environmental pressures (Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998). As 
the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative in the United States observed: "It is clear that 
these invaluable and life-sustaining assets are vulnerable to the activities of humans. Our 
failure to properly manage the human activities that adversely affect our oceans and 
coasts is compromising the health of these systems and diminishing our ability to fully 
realize their potential" (JOCI2006,6-7). 
Certainly the overall picture is bleak. Yet stressed, degraded and overpopulated 
coastal areas still provide critical ecosystem goods and services, including fish and 
shellfish for market, coastal transportation, tourism, pollutant detoxification, oil and gas 
potential and a wealth of other benefits. In terms of traditional economics, coastal 
counties in the United States account for more than half of the nation's gross domestic 
product (GDP) (JOCI 2006). Despite the frail condition of the coastal ecosystems, and 
though sadly in need of relief, the reality is that humans continue to flock to the coasts to 
live, work and play, adding to the countless stresses already in existence, reducing 
ecosystem. Diversity and resilience are undoubtedly eroding and the deterioration of 
ecosystem functions is likely accelerating at a global scale, with potentially catastrophic 
social consequences if current trends are not significantly mitigated (Worm, Barbier et al. 
2006). 
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From the Status Quo to Ecosystem-Based Governance 
Local communities, national governments, NGOs, and international institutions 
face difficult choices concerning goals, priorities, investments, policies, and 
accountability needed to address systemic challenges driven by development and the 
environment (MilleniumEcosystemAssessment 2005a). Nearly all of the human 
activities that pose threats to the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem, including 
pollution, coastal development, and overfishing, are still managed, some more intensely 
than others, on a traditional media-specific sector-by-sector basis (JOCI2006). Current 
laws, which have largely emerged from a patchwork of specific institutional reforms, 
have resulted in "a hapless confusion of institutional purposes, authoritative controls, and 
governmental boundaries" (Skowronek 1982,287). Status quo governance regimes 
reflect the traditional tendency of government agencies and departments charged with 
responsibilities for natural resources and coastal ocean activities to be limited to some 
particular type of activity such as logging or fishing. Traditional scientific approaches 
relying upon the isolation and control of variables and replication, however, do not fare 
well in the study of ecosystem dynamics (Ludwig, Hilborn et al. 1993; Gunderson 2003). 
State and federal agency efforts are often directed to the harvest of optimum yield (e.g. 
fisheries) instead of managing toward the health and resilience of the ecosystems that 
produce the desired yields (Christie 2004). Thus management focus has historically been 
narrow or sectoral and typically concerned with increasing production of desired 
commodities (Juda 2003). It is, however,".. .understood that the collective result of these 
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individual jurisdictional efforts is not enough to ensure the long-term sustainability of the 
entire Gulf of Maine region" (Hildebrand, Pebbles et al. 2002). Clearly "... the Gulf of 
Maine is at a critical juncture, with new management approaches needed to protect its 
valuable ecosystems for generations to come" (Pesch and Wells 2004). 
With respect to the governance and management of the human activities that 
impact the integrity and resilience of ecosystems, there is a growing sense that traditional 
scientific management approaches are failing, and may in fact be making the problems 
worse. The ruling paradigm, that we need to optimize targeted ecosystem components in 
isolation of the rest of the system, is proving inadequate to deal with the dynamic realities 
of the environment (Walker and Salt 2006). Yet the institutional structures that have 
developed for decades around this paradigm are proving remarkably resistant to 
fundamental change (Skowronek 1982; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). Given the reality 
that ecosystems are complex, dynamic systems that may not be understood by reduction 
to and study of its component parts, it is becoming increasingly clear that the significant 
problems we face cannot be solved by the same level of thinking that created them 
(Einstein 1995). 
While there have been repeated calls for a broader, more holistic ecosystem 
approach to environmental management of the coastal oceans has been the pronounced 
response to the perceived failure of traditional scientific sector-based management 
(Haskell 1992; F.A.O. 1995a; Constanza 1998; EPAP 1999; Juda 1999; Sherman and 
Duda 1999; Costanza, Low et al. 2001; Macpherson 2001; Sherman and Duda 2001; Link 
2002; Policy 2002), considerable thought must be given to how such an ecosystem-based 
approach could effectively be implemented in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region. 
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Management focus in the region needs to shift from an emphasis on satisfying the needs 
of humans through output objectives to an emphasis on protecting the ecosystem 
functions that provide those goods and services. Sustainability requires ecosystems be 
viewed as non-linear complex systems with self-organizing properties, resilience, and 
inherent uncertainty (Berkes, Colding et al. 2003). Conventional natural resource models 
that assume some quantifiable equilibrium or "climax" phase of ecosystems must begin 
to recognize that nature is not necessarily equilibrium-driven but is, for the most part, 
inherently unpredictable (Regier and Baskerville 1986; Barron 2003; Berkes, Colding et 
al. 2003; Gunderson 2003). 
Transitioning traditional governmental institutions into an integrated and holistic 
regime capable of managing human activities in a sustainable manner is no easy task. 
Change, particularly in the form of innovation is, frankly, hard (Steelman 2010). While 
sustainable conditions may have occurred in some cultures in some places in the past, the 
answer to the question of how modern societies can live sustainably has been deemed 
. .the greatest challenge facing humankind..." (Mangel, Hofman et al. 1993, 573). Put 
more succinctly, while many have cited the need for sustainable governance, there exist 
few real-world examples of institutional arrangements designed for the sustainable 
regulation of natural resource protection and use. 
Thus the transition from traditional natural resource sector-by-sector management 
to the broader, more holistic, collaborative, and integrated ecosystem-based approach 
poses a daunting challenge. There is an inextricable link between prescribed policy and 
the institutional arrangements and processes that fulfill and implement the policies. 
Institutions and agencies do not merely stand down for new policies formulated by 
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legislatures or other law-making bodies, for the institution itself".. .provides an 
environment in which policies can be devised, altered, interpreted, advocated, ignored, or 
otherwise transformed" (Donahue 1988). Decades of institutional development since the 
turn of the 20th century have resulted in a labyrinth of specialized environmental and 
economic interests that generate profound ideological separation that will be difficult to 
abolish through tools currently available to leaders in society. The effect has been to 
multiply divisions among interests in society and to organize those interests to compete in 
a more complex society. Central authorities find it more difficult to satisfy public 
expectations as more agencies, institutions, and interest groups organize to be able to 
block each other (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). 
Contributing to the inability to change the behavior of people and institutions so 
that policy actions are undertaken for the public good rather than to promote special 
interests is that democracy - or negotiating interests by relying on fair play, honest 
dialogue, and mutual respect - has lost much of its meaning to the modern public. 
Democracy as perceived presently is treated as something we already have, not 
something we do (Lappe 2006). As this study points out in later chapters, there is a need 
to move beyond the "Thin Democracy" of the present toward a more engaging "Living 
Democracy" (Lappe 2006). Certainly many of the structures for democracy are in place, 
and this study examines some of them and the missions and values inherent in those 
institutions. Democracy, and the ability to implement change, however, requires more 
than structural formalities; more than multi-level governments and competing 
governmental agencies, commissions, and boards. Democracy requires public 
engagement. Public participation, a constant theme in this research, requires a public that 
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no longer prefers to leave our futures to others (Becker 1993; Wondolleck and Yaffee 
2000; Burger, Ostrom et al. 2001; Weber 2003; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Lappe 
2006; Sachs 2011): 
We need to reconceive the idea of a good society in the early twenty-first 
century and to find a creative path toward it. Most important, we need to 
be ready to pay the price of civilization through multiple acts of good 
citizenship: bearing our fair share of taxes, educating ourselves deeply 
about society's needs, acting as vigilant stewards for future generations, 
and remembering that compassion is the glue that holds society together 
(Sachs 2011, 5) 
Thus while division, fragmentation, and stalemate remain stubborn legacies of 
governance at the national, state, and provincial levels, there is opportunity for the 
mitigation of these barriers at the local and regional level, especially with an active and 
determined public (Fischer 2000; Prugh, Costanza et al. 2000; Wondolleck and Yaffee 
2000; Brunner, Colbum et al. 2002; Weber 2003; Walker and Salt 2006). In Chapter III 
we will discuss how more and more authors are calling for a greater role for local and 
regional decision-making and adaptive, flexible governance with greater public 
participation in order to keep up with the rapidly changing conditions extant in the social-
economic conditions present in the real world. 
While attitudes are beginning to change, and various iterations of ecosystem-
based decision making theories and experiments, there is little sign that stresses on the 
coastal regions are abating. In fact the problems impacting critical coastal and aquatic 
habitats appear to be worsening. Given the increasing adoption of ecosystem based 
approaches to resource management in both watersheds and coastal marine areas, why do 
many stresses and threats to ecosystem integrity of these systems still persist, or in some 
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cases, appear to be increasing? What lessons can be learned from the governance 
regimes in other regions, including the Great Lakes, where ecosystem approaches to 
resource management have been mandated by Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 
between Canada and the United States since 1978 (1987)? 
Research Focus 
It is the goal of this dissertation research to examine whether the existing 
governance regime of the Gulf of Maine has the capacity1 to implement an integrated, 
adaptable ecosystem approach to restore and sustain, over time, the integrity of the 
respective ecosystems, including the functions upon which the humans in the ecosystem 
rely. Related questions include: what, for instance, are the current goals of the 
governance system (units and subunits) in relation to the human uses and anthropogenic 
threats to the ecosystem in the Gulf of Maine and how do these differ or resemble those 
of similar ecosystem restoration projects? What are the barriers that may prevent the 
current governance regime in the Gulf of Maine and comparable ecosystem restoration 
areas from managing the living marine resources in the region in a sustainable manner? 
What measures have been adopted in more veteran regions with more experience 
implementing ecosystem-based governance models to modify and improve the 
governance and management regime so that the critical functions of the ecosystem can be 
preserved or enhanced while at the same time competing interests can be harmonized in a 
1 The term capacity is used herein in a relational perspective and focuses on the ability of individuals, 
institutions, communities and governments to establish and achieve their own goals and agendas. Factors 
associated with capacity include those that block or promote these ends and may encompass technical, 
financial, human resource, and institutional components. Karkkainen, B. C. (2001). "Collaborative 
Ecosystem Governance: Scale. Complexity, and Dynamism." Virginia Environmental Law Journal 21: 189 
- 243.. 
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fair and equitable manner? How can these innovations be incorporated in the Gulf of 
Maine, if at all? How can the policies, priorities, and actions of local, state, provincial 
and federal entities be integrated to assure a sustainable approach to the management, use 
and development of coastal ocean resources across political boundaries? 
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II. RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS 
The purpose of this research is to examine whether the existing governance 
regime of the Gulf of Maine has the capacity to implement an integrated, adaptable 
ecosystem approach to restore and sustain, over time, the integrity of the respective 
ecosystems, including the functions upon which the humans in the ecosystem rely. This 
inquiry, together with the related questions set forth at the end of Chapter 1, necessarily 
involves an exploration of the complex, non-linear and dynamic interplay of social, 
economic, and ecological forces (Holling 1995; Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998; Clark 2002; 
Gunderson and Holling 2002; Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002; Berkes, Colding et al. 
2003; Gunderson 2003). 
In order to attempt to assess the multiple factors impacting the policy process in 
the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region this comparative case study uses qualitative 
research guided by the analytical framework provided by the policy sciences. The policy 
sciences approach was developed by Harold Lasswell as a problem-solving process to 
examine complex, interrelated problems (Lasswell 1971; Clark 2002). The approach 
recognizes that policy making is a result of the interactions of many actors, each with 
different interests, information, and perspectives (Clark 2002). The framework itself, 
described more fully below, permits researchers to examine a given policy process as a 
system, moving beyond conventional reductionist views to step back and examine the 
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bigger picture in an attempt to engage difficult problems more fully (Lasswell 1971; 
Brewer and deLeon 1983; Clark 2002). The framework often permits researchers to 
explain the failure of a system to achieve sustainable resource management without 
resorting to "the same old causes such as lack of money, outside interference, or too little 
research" (Clark 2002,12). The framework also permits researchers to shift attention to 
facets of the policy process that have been largely overlooked by a trend that traditionally 
dwells on congressional or governmental policy making (Keller 2009). 
The Policy Sciences Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework provided by the policy sciences recognizes that we need to 
ask a significant array of questions of participants and actors in a governance regime. The 
policy sciences analytical framework divides the policy process into stages and highlights 
distinctive features of each stage. The framework contributes to an understanding of the 
dynamic processes in which actors, resources, and participation change from one setting 
to the next. The approach has evolved to reject, however, any assumption that policy 
making proceeds from stage to stage and acknowledges that activities in each stage occur 
in parallel with a confluence of multiple streams of activity that connect ideas, solutions, 
and political will (Keller 2009). 
The framework approach permits the development of context that helps to explain 
environmental trends and the conditions that drive result from the complex interaction of 
humans with their environment. Context is critical where, as in most environmental 
issues, there exist human problems that have been created at many times and in many 
places, under a variety of political, social, and economic systems (Ludwig, Hilbon et al. 
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1993). From a policy sciences perspective, "the ongoing interaction of people in their 
efforts to achieve what they value is the foundation of all policy, including that of natural 
resources" (Ludwig, Hilborn et al. 1993,36). From a public policy perspective, 
therefore, public policy-making is a "never ending process whereby people attempt to 
clarify and secure their common interests. Management is the actual manipulation of 
people and resources through programs" (Clark and Willard 2000, 8). 
Policy sciences analysis therefore recognizes that public policy involves more 
than state and federal legislative initiatives but recognizes the importance of values and 
the ever-changing nature of remarkably intricate social, political and environmental 
problems: 
Humanity's highest ambition can thus be defined as defined as a desire to 
analyze problems to improve the human situation. Because no one can 
fully appreciate a problem in terms of all who are affected by it, analysts 
must be careful to include relevant human perspectives, desires, and 
values as much as possible (Brewer and deLeon 1983, 5). 
Thus the policy sciences looks beyond government, defined herein as the exercise of 
power by political and public agencies and officials, and expands inquiry into 
governance, or beyond state actors and institutions to include systems of rule at all levels 
of human activity - from the family to international organizations, by which people and 
institutions strive to secure their values, goals and interests (Kjasr 2004). 
Given the complex interplay that defines governance, the importance of context, 
human perspectives, and values to policy science inquiry cannot be overestimated. From 
the values perspective, this study proposes that the overriding goal is the quest for human 
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dignity2, encompassing freedom, the sharing of power among the many instead of the 
few, and the widespread participation in all other value processes (wealth, power, 
rectitude, etc.). With human dignity as the goal, democracy may remain humane even as 
circumstances change (Brewer and deLeon 1983). 
Human dignity is fundamental. The policy-making that leads to the achievement 
of such a desired state requires the review and understanding of the competing interests 
and values of those involved. Human dignity requires an approach that identifies the 
common interests that rest within a given conflict or complex issue. Thus the purpose of 
the policy sciences approach is to clarify and secure the common interests (Lasswell 
1971; Clark 1997; Clark 2002). 
Common interests are those that are widely shared within a community and 
demanded on behalf of the whole community. This should be contrasted with special 
interests that benefit only part of a community as the expense of the rest of the 
community (Brunner, Colbum et al. 2002; Clark 2002; Steelman 2010). 
Generally a policy process serves common interests if it: 
• Is inclusive and open to broad participation 
• It meets the valid expectations of participants 
• As implemented, or tested, it is responsive and adaptable in achieving the goals as the 
context changes i.e. it is adaptive (Lasswell 1971; Brewer and deLeon 1983; Clark 
2002). 
2 Human dignity is used to mean the equal opportunity to shape and share in democracy and the values of 
society, including wealth, power, respect, health, well-being, enlightenment, skill, affection, respect, and 
rectitude. Lasswell, H. D. (1971). A Pre-View of Policy Sciences. New York, American Elsevier 
Publishing Company, Inc.; UN (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. U. N. G. Assembly, UN. 
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In order to provide an analytical basis for policy making that aspires to human 
dignity and seeks to clarify and secure the common interest, some method of data 
organization and inquiry direction must be employed. The policy sciences framework is 
a useful and flexible tool that allows a researcher to gather a complex array of data from a 
variety of sources and still understand the context of the present situation and ultimately 
invent possible alternatives. 
The framework operates in three principal dimensions: social process mapping, 
decision process mapping and problem orientation. These dimensions provide a flexible 
but stable frame of reference that allows analysts to look beyond technical particulars to 
see the functional relationships that are present. Thus, rather than ask agency and 
department heads directly whether they are employing an ecosystem-based management 
approach to the issues presented within their jurisdictions, the policy sciences analytical 
framework as used in this study attempts to review the literature and primary documents 
to establish the foundation to ask questions designed to explore the social process, 
decision process and problem orientation practices utilized by government and other 
institutions as well as stakeholders, interested parties and the public. In this manner it 
may be possible to determine the extent to which the components of an overall 
ecosystem-based governance regime are in place (Lasswell 1971; Brewer and deLeon 
1983; Clark 2002). 
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Figure 1 The Policy Sciences Approach (Used with Permission of Susan G. Clark) 
It is important, however, to discuss for a moment the observational standpoint 
held by the author: me. "Standpoint consists of an individual's value orientations and 
biases resulting from personality, disciplinary training, experiences (parochial/universal:, 
epistemological assumptions, and organizational allegiances...All observers and 
participants, especially professionals and analysts, should seek to be clear and realistic 
about their own standpoint and those of others, using both selective and comprehensive 
'lenses'" (Clark, Willard et al. 2000,21). (See Figure 1) 
My research and writing comes from my perspective as a graduate student within 
the Natural Resources and Environmental Studies Ph.D. program (NRES) at UNH. The 
program permits students to take classes for two years in various departments in order to 
develop a broader perspective on the problems and issues of interest to the student. 
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Perhaps more relevant is the background, education and prior disciplinary training and 
experiences that brought me to the NRESS program at the age of 46. I was raised in a 
military/working class family. I attended law school and went on to practice law for 
more than 20 years prior to my admission to UNH. My law practice encompassed 
representation of a broad spectrum of clients. I have represented labor unions as well as 
management in employment and labor conflicts. I have represented injured individuals 
seeking redress against those companies whose negligence or product design caused them 
harm. Most of the last ten years of my practice, however, involved the litigation of 
complex multi-jurisdiction toxic tort and superfund cases. My clients were Fortune 500 
companies that I defended in civil cases involving injuries alleged to be caused by them 
either to individuals or to the environment. 
As a result of my tenure as a trial attorney involved in complex environmental 
litigation, I became frustrated that millions of dollars were spent with the express goal of 
assigning blame. Seldom was there a resolution that actually served to remediate a 
superfund site. Fairness and justice were generally an afterthought - there was only 
evidence. It was this frustration that led me to talk to Dr. Becker about the possibility of 
other means of resolving disputes and making meaningful changes. My biases clearly 
steer me toward a desire to see justice, human dignity, and equal access to governance for 
all; for actions and policies that foster the public good over often more-powerful private 
interests. 
I should also note that in addition to my career as a trial attorney, I am also a 
Registered Investment Advisor with a series 65 license from the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority - or FINRA. I have been involved first-hand with investment and 
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portfolio management decisions and strategies over the last 20+ years and have also been 
a member of a hedge fund advisory board that helped hedge fund managers and others 
develop strategies and research opportunities for the investment portfolios of clients. In 
this role I have observed the growing power of corporations, financial leaders, and 
corporate officers in the political and governance process and have watched what, from 
my standpoint, a continuing shift away from governance for the public good and toward 
private interests. 
With that brief explanation of my observational standpoint, a description of the 
three principal dimensions of the policy sciences analytical framework is probably in 
order at this point (Table 1). Social process review tends to examine the particular social 
contexts in which problems are embedded. A set of conceptual categories are used to 
describe or map any social process or problematic situation. The categories will include 
participants, their particular perspectives, and their values or assets to the extent they are 
known. Participants use whatever values they have ("assets" or "base values") and use 
various strategies to achieve desired outcomes that have effects. Values, both what 
people strive for and the assets that are used to acquire more of them, are created and 
exchanged (shaped or shared) through social interactions to gain more values. There are 
eight values that, where relevant, are dealt with: power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, 
well-being, affection, respect, and rectitude. Social and decision processes have 
outcomes and effects that may be characterized as indulgent or deprivational in terms of 
whether values are gained or lost for participants. Critical to the analysis of governance 
process are the values of the participants that drive the political and institutional 
framework. Understanding these values helps to identify the social participation gaps 
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that need to be filled in order to make governance more broadly representative of human 
dignity and common interests. 
Table 1 Social and Decision Processes 





Outcomes Appraisal and Termination 
Another principal dimension of the framework is the decision process. The 
decision process as practiced in a given ecosystem governance regime requires an 
analysis of the seven interlinked functions of intelligence, analysis is the fundamental 
view that in all human interactions, people tend to act in ways they perceive will leave 
them better off than if they had acted otherwise (Lasswell 1971). With respect to 
ecosystem-based governance, social process mapping plays an important role in 
determining the degree of involvement of the public in all stages of the promotion, 
prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal (See Table 1). This 
systematic analysis can turn up flaws in the decision process that cause restoration and 
management plans to fail. By knowing how a decision process works, or doesn't work, 
participants can maintain good practices or correct a poorly functioning one. A decision 
process can be a way of reconciling or at least productively managing competing interests 
and policies through politics. Politics will always be with us because people seek 
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different policies that reflect their particular, or "special", interests. As discussed above, 
however, in natural resources management, people must reconcile interest differences to 
clarify and secure their common interest. Investigation should reveal who establishes 
what the common interests are or should be. In terms of ecosystem-based governance, 
trends can be determined that might indicate whether intelligence data is reliable and 
linked to the appropriate scales within an ecosystem, whether such intelligence is being 
communicated to policy makers in a meaningful manner and, ultimately, whether a 
structure exists that allows for decision makers to react to intelligence in an adaptive 
fashion. Note that ecosystem-based governance requires a decision process that is open 
and transparent, not slanted toward special interests, wealth, and power (Lasswell 1971; 
Clark 1997; Clark 2002). 






Inventing, evaluating, and selecting alternatives 
Finally, problem orientation is a strategy to address problems and invent 
solutions. It requires goal clarification. So in terms of ecosystem conservation or 
restoration, the question is what should a sustainable, viable, functioning, resilient 
ecosystem look like? These questions need to be answered by the community only after 
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considering the problem's context or social and decision process. If these questions have 
been answered and policy determined, who were the participants? What was the process? 
Were common interests defined or did special interests influence the process? 
Social process inquiry sneaks in here so that process, participants, their values and 
interests, and other factors can be evaluated to determine whether the approach used to 
define the problems or propose the goals was in some way flawed. Further, trends must 
be described with ample input from the natural sciences. Are conditions trending toward 
the goals established by the community? If not, there is a problem and action needs to be 
taken. Conditions need to be analyzed to determine the reason(s) for the environmental 
breakdowns and developments need to be projected, including the likely outcome if no 
action is taken (Clark 2002). 
Methods 
Few studies have systematically examined the effectiveness of ecosystem-based 
governance. Conventional science, while good at solving certain kinds of problems, 
especially those with tightly controlled variables carefully selected by the scientist, has 
proven less than successful at attacking complex issues that demand policy responses 
(Brewer and deLeon 1983). Where it is not possible to isolate and control 
independent/dependent variables, develop theory through hypothesis testing, or carefully 
select the narrow problems against which hypotheses can be tested, conventional science 
has little to offer in terms of help for practical policy dilemmas (Brewer and deLeon 
1983; Clark 2002). 
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In order to attempt to assess the governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
Maine region to determine whether it has the capacity to implement a broader, more 
holistic, ecosystem approach to the management of human activities that impact the 
environment, this study, guided by the policy sciences analytical framework, relies upon 
a comparative case study methodology. Qualitative research is multi-method in focus 
and permits the study of subjects and issues in their natural settings in an attempt to make 
sense or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Cresswell 
1998). Case studies provide a methodology capable of illuminating decisions, or sets of 
decisions: why they were taken and with what result. A case study approach is also 
suited to research that examines contemporary events where, as here, there is no reason 
(or even ability) to control historic behavior or variables (Yin 1994). Finally, where 
research is dependent upon context, case studies seem to be the most appropriate to 
method to use to answer questions about "how" and "why" a selected ecosystem 
approach decision-making initiative was more or less successful in the achievement of a 
region's designated goals. 
In order to examine the current governance regime of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
Maine to determine whether the management human activities that impact the Gulf 
ecosystem could become more sustainable with the implementation of a more integrated 
and ecosystem-based approach to management of the region's resources this research was 
conducted in three phases. 
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Phase 1: Literature Review and Identification of Comparative Case Study 
Phase 1 of this study involved a review of scientific literature, primary 
documents, government reports and texts to gain an understanding of ecosystem 
dynamics and the human behaviors that impact the function and resilience of those 
ecosystems. Insight was also gained into the institutions and prescriptions that govern 
those human behaviors in both Canada and the U.S. and the provinces and states that 
border the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. In furtherance of the research questions, 
research was also devoted to literature that helped cull out the characteristics of 
ecosystem-based approaches to the management of those human activities that impact 
ecosystems. Review of literature and reports that advocate various ecosystem-based 
management initiatives helped derive a set of characteristics or traits that would be 
representative of the "ideal" management scheme. Literature discussing the policy 
sciences analytical framework was used to help nest the traits of ecosystem-based 
governance and management within the principal dimensions of the framework as set 
forth in Chapter III. 
Phase 1 also included a review of the literature relevant to a variety of potential 
comparative case studies. After this preliminary review of treaties, laws, jurisdictional 
issues and ecological challenges the governance regime in place in the Great Lakes Basin 
under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement ("GLWQA") and the Great Lakes 
Fisheries Commission ("GLFC") during the time period of the 1970s and 1980s was 
selected. This choice was made because the challenges to meaningful policy 
development in the Great Lakes offer meaningful parallels to those present in the Bay of 
Fundy/Gulf of Maine. 
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The primary threats to the health of the ecosystem in the Gulf of Maine appear to 
be posed by overharvesting, pollution, shoreland development, habitat destruction, and 
global climate change (Steneck 2001; Clark 2002; Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 2004). These 
threats are not dissimilar to those present in the Great Lakes Basin during the relevant 
time period (Dempsey 2004; Botts and Muldoon 2005). Further, governance in both 
systems has been challenged by the fragmented and often confusing array of local, state, 
provincial, and federal regulatory bodies that frequently form bureaucratic barriers to 
integrated and holistic management of the activities that threaten the health of their 
respective ecosystem (Pesch and Wells 2004; Botts and Muldoon 2005). The governance 
regime in the Great Lakes Basin also provides interesting insights into ecosystem-based 
initiatives because a basin-wide ecosystem approach to management has been mandated 
under the GLWQA and the GLFC since the 1970s. 
The choice of the governance regime in place in the Great Lakes watershed was 
also influenced by the fact that a review of the literature reveals that many of the 
characteristics typically attributed to ecosystem-based management, discussed further in 
Chapter 3, were in place in the Great Lakes regime during the 1970s and 1980s. During 
the 18 th and 19th centuries the Great Lakes Basin, like the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
watershed was widely exploited for its natural resources, including forest products and 
fisheries. In the Great Lakes Basin, however, The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 
between Canada and the US created the International Joint Commission (IJC) mostly to 
mediate border disputes between the signatories. Under the treaty, however, the IJC was 
also given a role to investigate pollution issues between the two countries (1909). With 
the continued degradation of water quality and the ultimate collapse of the commercial 
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fishing industry (1909; Dworsky 1988; Dempsey 2004), the IJC, galvanized by a 
determined public, determined government officials, and unique NGO collaborations, 
instructed both the United States and Canada to take action on the water pollution issues 
in the Great Lakes. 
After the two countries negotiated a basic water pollution agreement for the 
waters of the Great Lakes in 1972, continued degradation and increasing public activism 
resulted in another amendment in 1978 (Donahue 1988; Becker 1993; Dempsey 2004; 
Botts and Muldoon 2005). The amended agreement was far more comprehensive and 
included the declared purpose to ".. .restore and maintain the chemical, physical and 
biological integrity .. .of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem." The ecosystem 
was defined as "the interacting components of air, land, water and living organisms, 
including humans." Further evidence of the fact that the 1978 agreements had morphed 
into the restoration of ecological integrity as the major goal, not just improved water 
chemistry through pollution control, can be found in the definition of the Great Lakes 
system as all of".. .the streams, rivers, lakes and other bodies of water that are within the 
drainage basin" (Becker 1993; GLWQA 1987). Thus the Great Lakes experience may 
provide valuable lessons to future governance changes in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
Maine region. A more comprehensive explanation of the importance of these and related 
developments in the basin-wide efforts of agencies, NGOs, and the public in the Great 
Lakes during the relevant time period is set forth in Chapter IV. 
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Phase 2: Data Collection 
Validity and trustworthiness of the data and analysis in any study is, obviously, 
critical. Validity is considered a goal rather than a product and it provides an avenue for 
the reader or researcher to assess both the processes and outcomes of a study (Maxwell 
2005; Greear 2011). Validity is defined by Maxwell (1996) as the "correctness or 
credibility of a description, conclusion, explanation, interpretation, or other sort of 
account" (Maxwell 2005, 87). 
In addition to the validity and trustworthiness of data as it is collected, equal care 
has been taken in the logic of the analysis used for the research. As has been discussed 
above and is more thoroughly explained below, this study has been guided by the policy 
sciences analytical framework. Thus information and data have been organized into the 
principal dimensions, tasks, or processes delineated under that framework. Thus data has 
been accumulated and organized under three major categories - problem orientation, 
social process, and decision process. Within each of the categories, data is further 
organized and analyzed as tasks. The social process, for instance, consists of some six 
tasks: participants, perspectives, strategies, values, outcomes, and effects (See Table 3). 
Trustworthiness of the analysis extends beyond the collection and initial 
organization of the data. One of the strengths of qualitative research is that it allows the 
researcher to explain the processes that led to the outcomes (Maxwell 2005). The 
explanations in a qualitative study, however, are necessarily dependent on a sound and 
thorough method for the inquiry into the data (Siccama and Penna 2008). This study 
used qualitative data analysis software, NVIVO 9.0, to analyze interview transcripts and 
observational data. NVIVO was used to organize participants and data into case files 
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called case nodes. In hierarchical fashion, sub-nodes were created to hold data relevant 
to the nodes. Finally, attributes were created for the interview participants. Attributes 
are demographic or other categorical information about participants and enabled the 
researcher to compare and contrast the contents of cases based on the attribute values 
assigned to them (Siccama and Penna 2008)(Table 3). 
In this study, the collection, organization, and analysis of the data proceeded in 
parallel fashion guided by the policy sciences analytical framework. Thus not only were 
data collected and organized in the principal dimensions of problem orientation, social 
process, or decision process matters, but the coding strategy in NVIVO 9.0 was defined 
Table 3 Interview Participant Attributes 
Canadian NGO 1 
State Employee 1 3 
US Federal Employee 2 3 
in the same manner by the framework as well. The questions asked of interviewers, for 
instance, were outlined to be consistent with the framework (See Appendix C). When the 
transcripts were coded, the coding strategy paralleled the framework so that the 
researcher simply coded responses into categories that mirrored and expanded upon the 
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framework categories. In addition to nodes and sub-nodes that paralleled the framework, 
additional coding categories were added within the sub-nodes that permitted the 
researcher to code responses to categories that more specifically referenced indicators of 
ecosystem-based governance as gleaned from the literature and explained in the narrative. 
For example, interview responses that elaborated on jurisdictional limitations of a 
particular agency, could be coded under the principal node of "decision process," then 
further coded under the sub-node of "prescription," and finally under a category of 
"jurisdiction." This enables the researcher to easily structure inquiries to reveal all 
comments related to jurisdictional limitations. 
In addition to the above, attributes were incorporated into the coding strategy 
establishing the position of the participant (e.g. Canada Federal Government employee, 
U.S State government employee, etc.) and the case the participant was involved with (i.e. 
Great Lakes Basin or Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine) permitting interrogation that allowed 
for analysis of response patterns that might be explained by an attribute. Thus an inquiry 
that seeks information about the extent of significant public participation, for example, 
can easily be broken down to determine whether significant public participation was 
mentioned more by Canadian participants as opposed to their counterparts in the United 
States. 
NVIVO, as a qualitative research software tool, helps organize and enable enquiry 
of a large amount of information. Software, however, is only as reliable as the data 
underlying the inquiry. Trustworthiness of the underlying data is a critical element of 
this inquiry. Qualitative research involving comparative case studies requires the use of 
multiple sources of evidence in order to answer or at least explain the research questions. 
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Recognized sources of evidence include documentation, archival records, interviews, 
direct observation and participant observation (Yin 1994). It is important that these 
sources are trustworthy. Trustworthiness, or "internal validity," of the sources used in 
this study rests with the verifiability of the information, legal statutes, treaties, opinions 
and other documents reviewed, all of which are in the public domain. Further, audio 
tapes and transcripts of the interviews conducted for this study have been retained. 
Observations are set forth in notes that were taken contemporaneously with the events by 
the author and are available for review. These multiple methods provide a solid basis for 
triangulation of the data that form the basis of the explanations and conclusions formed in 
this dissertation. Trustworthiness may also be established through an open and 
transparent logic chain that is set forth in the narrative (Maxwell 2005). 
Documentation relevant to both cases was reviewed. Prescriptions in the form of 
statutes and treaties were reviewed along with newspaper accounts, primary 
documentation in the form of meeting minutes and other sources, and government and 
NGO reports. Further, every effort was made to stay current with reports and 
publications that became available during the time of this study. Much of this latter 
documentation has forwarded by dedicated and cooperative individuals who were aware 
of this research and who took it upon themselves to keep me informed of developments. 
A review of this documentation provided key leads to help with the identification of key 
institutions and individuals that have been or are involved in the policy process in both 
the Great Lakes Basin during the relevant time period and the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
Maine. 
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The identification of institutions and individuals led to site visits and attendance at 
a variety of meetings of groups associated with the governance regimes in both locations. 
Most visits were associated with meetings of groups or individuals responsible for some 
aspect of governance. Thus I attended numerous meetings of the New England Fishery 
Management Council ("NEFMC") and the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine 
Environment ("GoMC") between 2001 and 2010. Meetings involving the Gulf of Maine 
Council also included quarterly meetings of the GoMC Working Group. I have attended 
two meetings of the Bay of Fundy Ecosystem Partnership in St. Andrews, NB. In the 
Great Lakes Basin I have been present at two meetings of Great Lakes United (GLU), an 
alliance of NGOs, government agencies, industry, conservation groups, labor unions, and 
citizens groups from Canada and the United States whose mission since the 1970s has 
been to develop and promote effective and coordinated policy initiatives, carry out 
education programs, and promote citizen action and grassroots leadership to assure clean 
water and air across borders in the region and to work together to safeguard and protect 
the health of people and wildlife in the Great Lakes Basin (Jackson 2005). I have also 
attended two biannual meetings of the International Joint Commission (IJC) in Kingston, 
Ontario (2005) and Chicago, Illinois (2007), and three meetings of the International 
Association of Great Lakes Researchers (IAGLR) in Windsor, Ontario (2006), Ann 
Arbor, Michigan (2005), and Toledo, Ohio (2009). IAGLR is a scientific organization of 
nearly 1,000 researchers studying the Laurentian Great Lakes that meets annually to 
discuss and debate research and issues pertinent to the Great Lakes Basin. In May, 2008, 
I attended the Coastal Zone Canada conference in Vancouver, BC, devoted to a 
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discussion of managing our coasts for a sustainable and prosperous future. Finally, I 
have attended at least one meeting of the Northeast Regional Oceans Council ("NROC"). 
The direct observation at these events contributed to the richness of the data 
collected and enabled me to observe participants in their real-life roles using strategies 
such as negotiation and diplomacy to further their interests and achieve their goals and 
values. It also provided the opportunity to interact with participants on a formal and 
informal basis permitting to gain insight into their thoughts, motivations, and frustrations. 
In addition to direct observation, this research afforded a variety of opportunities 
for participant observation. Participant observation is a special mode of observation in 
which the researcher goes beyond the role of passive observer and actually participates in 
the events being studied. I was fortunate to have been afforded a number of 
opportunities to participate in this manner. In June, 2002, for instance, I worked with Dr. 
Andy Rosenberg, Dr. Mimi Becker, and staff from the National Marine Fisheries Service 
("NMFS") and the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC") for three days 
and nights to bring together fishers, government scientists, and NGOs to try and negotiate 
an agreement on Amendment 13 to the Groundfish Fisheries Management Plan. In July 
and August, 2003, at the invitation of the East Coast Pelagic Association, a group of mid-
water trawlers that together accounted for nearly 90% of the herring catch on the east 
coast of the United States, invited Dr. Mimi Becker of the University of New Hampshire 
and I, with the help of staff from the NEFMC, to mediate and facilitate an agreement on a 
herring fisheries management plan encompassing jurisdictional, catch-rate, area 
designations, and participant eligibility issues to propose to the NEFMC. 
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In addition to passive observation at meetings of the Gulf of Maine Council on the 
Marine Environment I have had the opportunity provide reports to the Council on matters 
related to this study under contract on two occasions. One report submitted on November 
1,2005, involved a survey and synthesis of significant U.S. laws influencing governance 
in the Gulf of Maine region (Coon 2005a). The second contract gave me the opportunity 
to conduct a phone survey of Council members on a series of questions provided to me 
by the GoMC Working Group concerning their views on the role and effectiveness of the 
GoMC (Coon 2005b). In addition, in March, 2006,1 was asked to help facilitate a 
meeting of the Climate Change Task Force sponsored by the Gulf of Maine Council on 
the Marine Environment in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. The purpose was to recommend 
measures to be taken in light of changes in the environment due to climate change and to 
pass those recommendations on to the GoMC for inclusion in their five-year action plan 
(See GOMCc 2007). 
Other significant participant observation opportunities have arisen more recently. 
In June, 2007,1 was part of a group in Toronto, Ontario, that helped to facilitate a 
discussion between an invited panel of government regulators, NGOs, scientists, 
academicians, and First Nation representatives to develop and recommend alternative 
governance structures for the human activities that impact the ecosystem of the Great 
Lakes Basin. Finally, in January, 2009,1 was asked by the newly-formed New 
Hampshire Coastal Protection Partnership to facilitate their first meeting attended by a 
group of representatives from business, NGOs, and community members to attempt to set 
goals and objectives for a new initiative to bring diverse interests in seacoast New 
Hampshire to speak with one voice on social, economic and ecological issues in the 
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region. 
In addition to direct and participatory observation, interviews of key informants 
provided essential information for this study. Interviews were conducted in accordance 
with the approved guidelines of the University of New Hampshire's Institutional Review 
Board ("Appendix A: "Institutional Review Board Approval;" "Appendix B: "Informed 
Consent Form"). Interview questions generally followed the form of a "Focused 
Interview Questions" form (Appendix C) but questions were largely open-ended in 
nature, although participants were encouraged to expand on their answers and provide 
their opinions and insights on issues relevant to this research. The interviews were taped 
using a microcassette recorder and transcribed either by me or at my direction. 
Transcripts of the tapes were then forwarded to each participant by email with 
instructions to contact me if there were any inaccuracies or corrections. 
Interview subjects were selected based upon their role and involvement in 
governance or policy making in either the Great Lakes Basin or the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
Maine watershed and their availability and willingness to participate in this research (See 
Table 3 for a distribution of the participants). Those who were interviewed were chosen 
because they were available and willing to participate in this study. Four of the 
participants were veterans of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement development, 
negotiation, implementation, and adaptation in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Participants from the United States include current and former employees of 
federal and state agencies with jurisdiction over some aspect of the human activities that 
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impact the greater Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem or the Great Lakes Basin. 
Similarly, Canadian participants are generally either current or former federal or 
provincial employees in positions of responsibility for environmental policy and 
implementation in their respective regions. Most of the government employees 
interviewed in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region also play some role in the Gulf of 
Maine Council, either as Council members or as members of the GoMC Working Group. 
Two NGO representatives were interviewed in the United States and one NGO 
35 
representative/community activist participated in Canada. The phone survey of all of the 
GoMC council members conducted under a GoMC contract in 2005 also provided helpful 
information. 
Phase 3: Analysis 
In the third phase, the interview transcripts were coded using NVIVO and the data 
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was analyzed using the framework of the policy sciences. Codes were assigned using the 
content set forth in the policy sciences analytical framework and categories ("nodes") and 
sub-categories ("sub-nodes") that correspond with the interview questions (Appendix C). 
In addition, relevant text could be coded into characteristic sub-nodes within the task sub-
nodes. Characteristics are essentially elements of a framework task that have been 
identified in the literature as a part or characteristic of the sub-node. The actual NVIVO 
node summary for the social process, decision process, and problem orientation coding 
a r e  s e t  f o r t h  i n  T a b l e s  4 - 6 .  
Codes were assigned in order to group the information provided by participants 
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interviews and observations in the manner depicted below enabled the data to be 
compared and analyzed, contributing to an understanding of how the social and decision 
processes in each region may have contributed the trends and conditions extant in each 
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region. Tables 4-6 depict the categories and codes used to organize and analyze 
interview data, meeting minutes, and observation notes by region and category. It is also 
important to note that NVIVO coding categories for the interview transcripts and other 
data, like the questions asked the interviewees as set forth at Appendix C, parallel the 
organization and tasks provided by the policy sciences analytical framework. By using 
the framework approach consistently through the data collection and data analysis phases, 
then continuing the approach through the drafting of this dissertation, a high level of 
consistency was maintained throughout a process that could easily have become 
unwieldy. 
It bears repeating that the purpose of this study is to assess the governance regime 
in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region to determine whether it has the capacity to 
implement a broader, more holistic, ecosystem-based approach to the management of 
human activities that impact the environment. It is critical that governance and 
management recognize that ecosystems are dynamic and that related socio-economic 
governance must manage for surprising events (Holling 1986; Holling 1995; Berkes and 
Folke 1998; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Gunderson 2003; Daly and Farley 2004; 
Halpern, Selkoe et al. 2007). The policy sciences analytical framework provides a 
vehicle that lends support to the research questions in this study by focusing on a quest 
for governance arrangements that focus on common interests (Lasswell 1971; Brunner, 
Steelman et al. 2005). 
There is no question that a totally comprehensive evaluation of the governance 
regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine is beyond the scope of this study. What this 
study proposes, however, is a qualitative methodology and contextual mapping strategy 
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that will assist researchers in the future to determine whether existing governance 
regimes have the capacity to provide a structure that is able to clarify and secure common 
social, economic, and ecosystem-sustaining interests consistent with the general concept 
of ecosystem-based governance, as that term is further explored in Chapter III. 
The results of the data and information obtained, organized, and analyzed in the 
manner described above are presented in this study in the following manner. Chapter III 
describes the literature pertaining to the dynamic nature of ecosystems and the evolution 
of our fragmented scientific management policy process. It then distills the 
characteristics of ecosystem-based governance and, using the policy sciences framework, 
attempts to describe an "ideal" structure in terms of real-life decision and social 
processes. Chapter IV applies the policy sciences framework developed in Chapter III to 
the policy processes that guided policy development in the Great Lakes Basin in the 
1970s and 1980s and compares those processes to "ideal" model. Chapter V uses the 
framework to focus on the binational governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
Maine. Finally, chapter VI compares the governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
Maine region to both the "ideal" ecosystem approach and the regime extant in the Great 
Lakes Basin in the 1970s and 1980s and suggests recommendations for change in the 
governance that could promote the common interests relevant to the collaborative and 
inclusive regulation of the human activities that impact the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
ecosystem. 
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III. THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH ANDTHE PUBLIC GOOD 
Introduction 
The need to manage the human activities that contribute to the degradation of 
vital coastal ecosystems in a sustainable manner has never been more apparent. The 
pressure on coastal and ocean resources has increased relentlessly. Federal and related 
state and provincial environmental laws and regulations enacted in the 1970's have had 
an undeniable positive impact in the form of cleaner air, lakes, and rivers, locally and 
regionally (Ullsten 2003). These laws and the authorized agencies that promulgate 
regulations to protect the air, water, and other environmental resources have largely 
transformed the private sector. The nation spends some $200 billion annually to carry 
out these laws. An elaborate patchwork of regulatory efforts mandate an exhaustive 
system of reporting, inspections, and penalties is relied upon to compel the population to 
follow the rules. Indeed, since the early 1970's it is estimated that $3-4 trillion (in 2004 
dollars) has been spent on environmental regulation mostly related to the requirements of 
federal regulation (Fiorino 2006). Given the fact that air and water pollution from large 
industrial point sources have been reduced, and many harmful chemicals have been 
banned or removed from the environment, there is ample evidence that environmental 
protection in the United States since the 1970s has been a major domestic policy success 
(Easterbrook 1995). 
40 
This study acknowledges the fact that the environmental regulatory scheme 
developed over the last 40 years served us relatively well. The problems, however, are 
changing. Ecosystems are dynamic, governance is evolving, and the problems we face as 
a society now and in the future differ materially from the low-hanging fruit of point-
source pollution and water and air quality issues tackled mainly by government 
enforcement measures through legislation that harkens back to the 1970s. In other words, 
there is a need for fundamental change. As the Brundtland Commission noted: 
The time has come to break out of past patterns. Attempts to maintain 
social and ecological stability through old approaches to development and 
environmental protection will increase instability.. .We are unanimous in 
our conviction that the security, well-being, and very survival of the planet 
depend on such changes, now (WCED 1987,22-3). 
Change is inevitable. It may be denied, ignored, or concealed behind a deceptive 
fagade of normalcy, yet change remains inevitable (Smil 1993). And, no question about 
it, change and innovation are difficult, as one person's change may be another's 
destruction (Steelman 2010). Thus the purpose of this research: to examine whether the 
existing governance regime of the Gulf of Maine has the capacity to change - to innovate 
- in order to implement an integrated, adaptable ecosystem approach to restore and 
sustain, over time, the integrity of the respective ecosystems, including the functions 
upon which the humans in the ecosystem rely. 
Commentators have spared no ink to offer their version of how governance of 
human activities that impact ecosystem integrity needs to be changed. The role of this 
chapter is to distill the literature to describe the underpinnings for change set forth in the 
case studies and analysis of chapters IV, V, and VI. The end of this chapter proposes a 
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framework for an "ideal" governance scheme against which other regimes may be 
compared so that gaps can be identified and remedied. 
Ecosystem Dynamics and Managing for Surprise 
The notion of limiting or in some way managing the human activities that impact 
our ecosystems is not new. Robin Hood and his Merry Men gained fame avoiding fish 
and game laws in medieval England, after all. Thus before we can begin to examine the 
governance and management challenges related to the human activities that impact 
ecosystems, we first need to briefly explore the ecosystem dynamics that make 
governance such a challenge. Some history may help put the regulatory perspectives into 
context. 
Much of the initial formal scientific research arose from issues surrounding fish 
populations and related harvests. Although on land there were laws that forbade 
poaching and set other limitations, bounty from the sea seems to have been taken for 
granted for much of recorded history. Into the late 1800s or early 1900s ocean fisheries 
were generally regarded as inexhaustible resources. While fisheries populations 
fluctuated and occasional fisheries collapses occurred, they were tolerated. Following the 
introduction of steam-powered trawlers in the late 19th century, however, the possibility 
that there were limits to exploitation caused some government agencies and scientists to 
believe that commercially important species were at risk unless their population 
dynamics were better understood and new scientific knowledge could better inform 
management efforts (Scheiber 1997). 
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It was largely the work of scientists in northern Europe and Great Britain that 
began to introduce a new way of looking at fisheries populations and dynamics. As 
Scheiber (1997) details, between the late 1800s and 1930, scientists in the region began to 
advance knowledge on the "big picture" - the ecological dynamics that impacted the 
fisheries. Hjort's studies in the North Sea and North Atlantic were designed to develop 
an understanding of fishery habitats and ecosystem relationships. Schmidt studied the 
Atlantic deep sea eel population to correlate migrations with the species' chemical and 
meteorological environment. Nansens's work in the Arctic in 1893 established a link 
between physical environment, atmospheric conditions plankton and fishery dynamics 
(Scheiber 1997,638). 
The importance of these and related studies cannot be underestimated. "These 
theories conceived of fisheries ecosystem management as superior to a CPUE [catch per 
unit effort] approach, with systematic evaluation of the condition of stocks to be based 
not only on harvest data but also upon the holistic collection and analysis of data on the 
entire ecosystem (chemistry, atmosphere conditions, currents and upwelling, etc.) relating 
to the fishery environment, as well as biological data relating to population groupings, 
migration patterns, inter-species competition, nutrients, and other characteristics of the 
biomass and its dynamics" (Scheiber 1998,24). Thus scientists in the early 1900s were 
beginning to look beyond total catch-related numbers and population dynamics equations 
in order to understand what was happening to fish populations and other components of 
the ecosystem. 
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The term "ecosystem" was apparently first coined by A.G. Tansley in Great 
Britain in 1935. At that time it was largely believed that ecosystems went through a 
process of gradual attainment of complete dynamic equilibrium. Equilibrium, once 
obtained, was deemed "perfect" and "its degree of perfection is measured by its 
stability" (Tansley 1935, 301). Tansley linked ecology to advances in the physical 
sciences and mathematics by inclusion of the term "system" and noted that these 
ecosystems were of various kinds and sizes. He went on to encourage ecosystem studies 
that combined ecology with other disciplines in order to study the interactions between 
biotic and abiotic components (Tansley 1935; Aber and Melillo 2001Annex 12). 
Others followed Tansley by using the term "ecosystem" and the study of 
ecosystems began to encompass the important processes and complex interactions 
between living and organic material. More research began to correlate the function of 
ecosystems with the transfer of energy from green plants (producers) to animals 
(consumers) and ultimately to microbes (decomposers) (Aber and Melillo 2001). In an 
argument apparently novel for the time, Odum (1969) took it one step further and opined 
that the principles of ecological succession bear importantly on the relationship between 
man and nature (Odum 1969). His definition of the term "ecosystem" included humans 
in the mix: 
The ecosystem, or ecological system, is considered to be a unit of 
biological organization made up of all of the organisms in a given area 
(that is "community") interacting with the physical environment so that a 
flow of energy leads to characteristic trophic structure and material cycles 
within the system (Odum 1969,262). 
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With the inclusion of humans, perhaps the most dominant species in terms of 
ecosystem impacts, ecosystems are now defined and generally described as the complex 
of organisms (including humans) that appear together in a given area and their associated 
abiotic environment that interact through the flow of energy to build biotic structure and 
materials cycles (MilleniumEcosystemAssessment 2005; Ruhl, Kraft et al. 2007). The 
types of processes utilized by ecosystems to move and transform energy and materials 
include photosynthesis, chemosynthesis, plant nutrient uptake, microbial respiration, 
nitrification and denitrification, plant transpiration, mineral weathering, vegetation 
succession, predator-prey interactions, and decomposition (Valiela 1995; Ruhl, Kraft et 
al. 2007). 
The functions and processes interacting within ecosystems permit such systems to 
play a fundamental role in supporting life on earth. Ecosystems produce renewable 
resources (e.g. timber, fish, etc.) and ecological services. Such services include 
maintenance of the composition of the atmosphere, carbon sequestration, flood control, 
waste assimilation, nutrient recycling, soil generation, crop pollination, and many others 
(Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; MilleniumEcosystemAssessment 2005; Folke, Lowell 
Pritchard et al. 2007; Ruhl, Kraft et al. 2007). These and the many other ecosystem 
services that sustain life at global, regional, and local scales do not result from ingredients 
drifting in a uniformly mixed "soup." Interactions occur. Time and space matter (Mann 
and Lazier 1996). 
The relationships between the physical and biological processes that influence 
ecosystem function are subtle and complex both in the terrestrial and marine 
environments (Holling 1986; Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995; Mann and Lazier 1996; 
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Aber and Melillo 2001; Costanza, Low et al. 2001). The study of these same processes in 
coastal regions influenced by both land-based and marine factors provides even greater 
challenges. On land, terrestrial organisms are relatively easy to observe and manipulate 
while in the ocean marine organisms are more difficult to access and monitor. Nutrients 
required by terrestrial organisms are generally provided by the decaying remains of 
nearby entities while decaying matter containing nutrients in the oceans generally sink 
and leave the sunlit euphotic layer where photosynthesis occurs and only return to the 
photic layer through upwelling, which may occur a half a world away (Mann and Lazier 
1996; Jennings, Kaiser et al. 2001; Norse and Crowder 2005). The sea is larger and more 
three-dimensional than the terrestrial environment. The low buoyancy of air strictly 
limits the number of creatures that can fly or otherwise escape a benthic terrestrial 
existence. Functional groups critical to ocean processes that are scarcer and much less 
important on land include suspension-feeders, plankton, and nekton (Jennings, Kaiser et 
al. 2001; Norse and Crowder 2005). 
While there are challenges to collaboration and to the collaborative study of the 
coastal ocean margin, there are some important similarities that could link studies at the 
land-water interface. Natural and anthropogenic biological and physical processes 
located both on land and sea interact in critical ways. In addition, ecosystem functions on 
land and sea are threatened by the same largely anthropogenic factors: overexploitation, 
physical alteration of ecosystems, pollution, alien species, and global climate change. In 
both land and sea small populations are at special risk. Top carnivores, other keystone 
species, and structure-forming species are protection priorities because of their 
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exceptionally important relationship with other species and on ecosystem processes 
(Jennings, Kaiser et al. 2001; Steneck and Carlton. 2001; Norse and Crowder 2005). 
The natural world, unlike the controlled environment of a laboratory, poses 
additional problems for the study, understanding, and management of marine ecosystems. 
In addition to the physical factors and biological processes that impact ecosystem 
function, there are other factors and conditions that impact the processes themselves. 
Water temperature can significantly affect the rates at which biological processes 
proceed. Currents, turbulence (including tidal mixing), and stratification can bring 
nutrients into the euphotic zone and influence the availability of nutrients to the bottom of 
the food chain (Mann and Lazier 1996). Also significant, from an ecosystem perspective 
and, ultimately, as a management issue, is the scale at which many of the processes 
occur. Scale may be defined as the "physical dimensions, in either space or time, of 
phenomena or observations" (Reid, Berkes et al. 2006, 7; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 
2007). 
There are geographic scales that range from the size of the ocean, the maritime 
boundaries of regions impacted by the forces of circulation, and, in the case of the Bay of 
Fundy/Gulf of Maine, the strength and location of the Gulfstream, the North Atlantic 
Oscillation, vigorous tidal mixing, upstream inputs from the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and 
inter alia, the volume of dense slope water that enters the Gulf of Maine through the 
Northeast Channel (Xue, Chai et al. 2000). At the other extreme, processes that involve 
physical events like the inertial forces of turbulent fluctuations in the water and the 
related changes in the methods and locomotion and composition of zooplankton and 
phytoplankton can represent the shortest of length and smallest of geographic scales 
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(Mann and Lazier 1996; Balch, Drapeau et al. 2007). To make things more confusing 
from a management perspective, time scales must be added as an additional factor that 
play a role in biological and physical processes. Time scales are often correlated to 
length scales. Globally, thermohaline circulations are estimated to take a 1,000 years to 
complete a circuit (Mann and Lazier 1996). Finally there are an abundance of cross-scale 
interactions . .where events or phenomena at one scale influence phenomena at another 
scale" (Reid, Berkes et al. 2006, 8). The draining of a wetland, for example, takes place 
at a local scale, but may influence regional hydrology by reducing water storage capacity 
and thereby increasing flood threats, while also affecting rates of carbon emissions that 
ultimately impact climate change on a global scale (Reid, Berkes et al. 2006). 
Thus ecosystems depend upon an abundance of processes in order to continue to 
function in a sustainable manner. The assemblage of processes, inputs, and systemically 
important ingredients necessary for the continued viability of ecosystem health are 
incredibly interlinked and dynamic. No longer can we assume that the services provided 
by ecosystems are a natural result of some "perfect" stage of environmental evolution 
infinitely capable of providing goods and services to humans. Ecosystems, in any form, 
have limits. We've come a long way since Thomas Huxley, an esteemed director of the 
UK Royal Commission on the Sea Fisheries, addressed a gathering in 1883 at the 
International Fisheries Exhibition in London and assuaged the fears of those concerned 
about reports of declines in fish catches by confidently opining that it was inconceivable 
that the great fisheries for cod, herring, and mackerel could ever be exhausted (Sims and 
Southward 2006). 
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More realistically, the view that nature exists at or near an equilibrium condition 
has been described as the "myth" of nature balanced (Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002, 
12). Under this view equilibrium, if disturbed, will return to a similar if not identical 
equilibrium through negative feedback (in systems terms). Nature is considered to be 
infinitely forgiving and thus forms the basis for maximum sustainable yield and of 
achieving fixed carrying capacity for animals and humans; the effect being the imposition 
of static, rigid goals on dynamic systems. As we will see later, it is these static 
assumptions that can create the environmental surprise and crisis that management seeks 
to avoid. Given this, however, the myth of nature balanced may not be wrong, just 
incomplete since inevitably there are forces of balance in the world; it's just that those 
forces can be overwhelmed (Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002). 
Since Huxley (1883) and Tansley (1935), the fundamental views of 
ecosystem function and processes have changed. One of the major changes has been the 
recognition that ecosystems do not progress in linear fashion to a climax or equilibrium 
state. Nature is seldom linear and predictable. Indeed structure and processes, whether it 
be in ecology, economics, social institutions, or any number of other areas are dominated 
by uncertainty and nonlinear phenomena (Gunderson and Holling 2002; Berkes, Colding 
et al. 2003; Gunderson 2003; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Natural systems, as 
well as social and economic systems, are complex. Problems related to natural resources 
and ecosystem degradation are thus complex systems problems involving the additional 
complexity of interactions between natural and social systems often operating at different 
scales (Holling 1995; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003) 
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Thus while ecosystems can be studied at the level of their individual processes or 
components, it should be stressed that in reality ecosystems are more than the sum of 
their parts (Holling 1986; Francis 1993; Mann and Lazier 1996; Costanza, Low et al. 
2001; Gunderson 2003). Synergistic feedbacks between organisms and their environment 
exist and sustain the functioning and structure of ecosystems (Folke, Lowell Pritchard et 
al. 2007). The interactions among species in an ecosystem, or food webs within an 
ecosystem, together with their relations to water flow, temperature, and quality and to 
biogeochemical cycling are complex and non-linear and riddled with lags and 
discontinuities, thresholds, and limits (Francis 1993; Gunderson, Holling et al. 2002; 
Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002). 
Since ecosystems are complex, self-organizing systems nested across temporal 
and spatial scales, any factor or process stemming from either internal changes or outside 
disturbance can push ecosystems over a threshold and result in a regime shift (Gunderson 
and Holling 2002; Gunderson 2003; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). The functions 
and services that survive regime shift may not be those that humans need or even expect. 
As self-organizing systems, with a complex array of dynamic structures and processes 
exerting influences, ecosystems are evolutionary, not mechanical, and exhibit limited 
predictability (Costanza, Low et al. 2001). Thus complex natural systems are not easily 
understood, let alone predictable. Despite the lack of predictability, humans continue to 
become more dependent on ecosystem services even as ecosystems become more 
vulnerable to unexpected events (Gunderson 2003). 
Given the vulnerability of ecosystems, the issue becomes how they are able to 
maintain their function and structure despite significant perturbation and disturbance. 
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This ability to absorb shock and maintain its functions relate to the ecosystem's 
resilience. Resilience can be used as a way to describe the return time to a steady-state 
equilibrium following a perturbation. In ecosystems that do not show signs of a steady-
state equilibrium phase, where instabilities can flip a system into another stability domain 
or regime of behavior, resilience is the measure of the magnitude of disturbance that can 
be absorbed before the system flips into a another stability domain by changing the 
variables and processes that control behavior (Gunderson 2003; Walker and Salt 2006). 
Further, stressed ecosystems, like those weakened from resource overexploitation, tend to 
change in lurches, not gradually, after passing through a threshold, creating surprises, or 
reactions that differ from predictive models both quantitatively and qualitatively (Holling 
1986; Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995; Holling 1995; Berkes and Folke 1998). 
Thus the structure and resilience of ecosystems play a huge role in determining 
how well such ecosystems perform from the perspective of human predictions and 
expectations. Given the challenges posed by the co-evolving systems of humans and 
nature, however, surprises are common and tend to be the rule, not the exception 
(Gunderson and Holling 2002; Gunderson 2003). With no lack of ecosystems that have 
been weakened by resource overexploitation, poor planning, etc., effective governance 
will have to enable adaptive management capable of learning and able ".. .to deal with the 
unpredictable interactions between people and ecosystems as they evolve together" 
(Berkes and Folke 1998,11). 
Given that ecosystems are not linear and do not function in predictable fashion, 
what are the implications for the management or governance of the human activities that 
impact ecosystems? How are resilience and management related? And how can we 
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transition from management for human needs and sustainable yields to management for 
resilience and "surprise?" The next section discusses these management and governance 
issues. 
Institutional Efficiency and the Legacy of Scientific Management 
Humans need not travel in order to witness or be immersed in nature. There is no 
need to head to the mountains or the shore. Humans are, without doubt, and without 
more, an integral part of the ecosystems upon which they depend. Systems of people and 
nature in fact co-evolve in what some have described as an 'adaptive dance' (Gunderson 
2003). Resilience and adaptive behavior play critical roles in the choreography. As 
discussed above, the interactions that occur in ecosystems between fast- and slow-
moving processes as well as between processes with vastly different spatial dimensions 
result in a nonlinear, unpredictable system. These self-organizing, nonlinear, and 
unpredictable assemblages of processes and structures are marked by alternating stable 
states and regular movements of biotic and abiotic variables between those states 
(Gunderson and Holling 2002; Gunderson 2003). 
It turns out that this variability is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact it is 
essential for ecosystem maintenance. There is now an understanding that variability and 
diversity are created by internal biotic and abiotic disturbances as well as external forces 
that help maintain and renew the resilience and resistance of ecosystems. "Reducing 
variability and diversity produces conditions that cause a system to flip into an 
irreversible (typically degraded) state controlled by unfamiliar processes" (Gunderson 
and Holling 2002,9). 
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There is a propensity for society to reduce variability in order to feed some social 
or economic need that frequently causes ecosystem function and, ultimately, services to 
decline. Holling (1986) studied twenty-three examples of managed ecosystems. In each 
case he examined both the way the ecosystems were organized and the way they were 
managed. With respect to organization his study suggests that. .the great diversity of 
life in ecosystems is traceable to the function of a small set of variables, each operating at 
a qualitatively different speed from the others" (Holling 1995, 6) More importantly his 
study suggests that any attempt to manage ecological variables (e.g. fish, timber, water) 
resulted in less resilient ecosystems, more rigid management institutions, and more 
dependent societies. So, and as will be discussed more fully infra, success ultimately 
leads to failure in the management of ecosystem activities (Holling 1995). 
The intersection of unpredictable ecosystem processes and complex human 
systems makes environmental problems doubly complex (Dryzek 1997). Yet there is an 
understanding that there is a general pattern to unexpected changes and ultimately to 
resource crisis. The pattern, as distilled by Holling's (1986) so-called 'science of 
surprise', starts with a sequence of events that begins with exploitation of a resource 
(Berkes and Folke 1998). As experience with the resource grows, and more and more 
social and economic interests begin to use and rely on its existence, the resource is 
exploited more efficiently (Berkes and Folke 1998; Gunderson and Holling 2002). 
Efficiency, of course, is a major consideration in economics. To many if not most 
economists efficiency refers to the use of resources in such a way as to maximize the 
production of goods and services (Daly and Farley 2004). Thus successful suppression of 
spruce budworm infestations using sprayed insecticides during the mid-1900s in Eastern 
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Canada not only served to preserve a waning pulp and paper industry, but encouraged 
expansion of pulp mills, leaving the forest and the economy exposed to"... more intense 
extensive tree mortality than had ever been experienced (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995, 
509). Exploitation of fresh water resources in the Everglades by a hodgepodge of 
government agencies and private interests intent on funneling fresh water to developers 
and agricultural enterprises has precipitated a steady series of environmental and human 
crises in the form of flooding, drought, and unprecedented environmental degradation 
(Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). Similarly, passage of the Magnuson-Stevens Act (1976) 
in the United States was designed to encourage and subsidize a U.S. fishing fleet with the 
goal of catching fish sufficient to achieve optimum sustainable yield, or "a yield which 
provides the greatest benefit to the United States as determined on the basis of the 
maximum sustainable yield.. .as modified by relevant ecological, economic and social 
factors." The act "loosed an unprecedented expansion of fleets, landings, and exports" 
(Weber 2002,84 - 85). The brutal efficiency enabled by Magnuson-Stevens (1976) was 
clearly a key factor in the exhaustion and collapse of the New England groundfish fishery 
by the mid-1980s (Kurlansky 1997; Dobbs 2000; Weber 2002). Economic efficiency in 
terms of resource exploitation seldom leads to sustainable and resilient ecosystem 
viability. 
Efficiency is also a key element of scientific management - the natural resource 
management approach underpinning our past and present governance regime. As Teddy 
Roosevelt proclaimed: "The Conservation of our national resources is only preliminary to 
the larger question of national efficiency" (Taylor 1911,1). 
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Scientific management strives to use the fullest extent of the latest scientific 
knowledge (often described as the "best available science") through disinterested experts. 
It should be made clear that this discussion concerning the scientific management 
paradigm is not a condemnation of science or scientists. Science has provided enormous 
value to society and it has the potential to contribute significantly to improving both the 
discourse and the actions that will be required to deal with social and ecosystem 
degradation (Pielke 2007). Scientific management, as a governance paradigm, insists 
that planning and decisions made concerning the use or preservation of natural resources 
are to be based on technology and efficiency. Further, scientific management routinely 
relies on a single, central authority for making optimal decisions on a national scale and 
implementing them through a bureaucratic chain of command (Hays 1959; Fischer 2000; 
Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). 
The paradigm of scientific management falls securely within the discourse that 
John Dryzek (2005) defined as administrative rationalism. A discourse is a shared way 
of looking at the world that allows for those who share the discourse to gather bits of 
information and make them into coherent stories or accounts. Discourses can help 
construct meanings and define relationships as well as shape interpretations of every day 
events. Although the way a particular discourse, or perspective, views the world is not 
always understood by others who do not share the discourse, seldom is there complete 
discontinuity across discourses. Discourses also generally bring with them some 
measure of political power and may exercise power in the manner that they condition the 
perceptions and values of those that adhere to them as some interests and values are 
pursued while others are suppressed (Dryzek 1997). 
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Dryzek's administrative rationalism, like scientific management, consists of a 
governance regime that governs largely through a bureaucracy with experts and managers 
as the heads of the bureaucracies. Activities are managed by experts using expert tools 
and theories like "cost benefit," "risk" analysis, environmental impact assessments, 
"expert advisory commissions" and other methods that experts can speak about but which 
shuts out the general public . As far as who's in charge: 
.. .administrative rationalism implies hierarchy based on expertise, with 
both power and knowledge centralized at the apex. Those at the apex are 
assumed to know better than subordinate levels, so as to be able to assign 
tasks and coordinate operations. But problems of any complexity defy 
such centralization: nobody can possibly know enough about the various 
dimensions of an issue such as acid rain, global climate change, ozone 
depletion, or the interacting cocktail of urban air pollutants, not to mention 
the social and economic aspects of these issues, to sit with any confidence 
at the apex. (Dryzek 1997, 93). 
Thus public or local knowledge is marginalized and relevant "expert" knowledge 
is too often so dispersed and fragmentary that the closed, hierarchical style of 
administrative rationalism simply cannot put the pieces together in a useful manner. If 
aggregation is tried with complex problems, the result is typically problem displacement 
rather than problem solving, e.g. air pollution getting turned into water pollution. As 
Dryzek (2005) notes, most anti-pollution agencies operate under single-medium statutes 
like clean air acts and clean water acts - thus increasing the likelihood of problem 
displacement across media (Dryzek 1997,95). 
Thus, whether it is called scientific management or administrative rationalism, the 
present paradigm of fragmented bureaucratic, expert-driven, regulation with efficiency-
centered decision-making hierarchy has been developing and strengthening since the 
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early 1900s. The advent of the industrial era brought on increased need for expert control 
and management because only scientific and technical experts had the requisite 
knowledge and skills (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). Citizens, who once largely 
controlled the production of their own food, transportation, and other necessities, began 
to rely upon increasingly complex corporate and institutional interests for their needs. 
Individuals found themselves unable to easily determine their own interests and 
escalating complexity left citizen participation in governance largely in its wake. Control 
was turned over to technocrats and bureaucrats and public participation was left behind. 
So just at a time in when political influence of the public was being folded into an 
increasingly technical society ".. .it was undercut by the rise of bureaucratic organization 
and technical expertise" (Fischer 2000, 6). 
The tension between participatory democracy and social and technical complexity 
continued to evolve in a special-interest laden version of "adaptive dance." Participants in 
the natural resources arena learned over time that local groups were not nearly as 
effective as national pressure groups. National pressure groups began to morph into 
national single-interest groups and often combined with administrative agencies and 
congressional committees that dealt with specialized subjects to marginalize more 
integrated approaches. "Iron Triangles," a term describing the process that involved the 
linkages formed between powerful special interest lobbying groups, government 
regulatory agencies, and congressional committees or sub-committees so as to write rules 
and regulations that harmonized their particular interests while preventing the more 
general interests of society to participate, emerged as the dominant structures in spite of 
the avowed goal of scientific management to rise above politics. The next logical step, 
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naturally, was for organized interests to hire their own experts to justify conflicting 
positions, ultimately leading to scientific analyses and economic assessments that 
fractured along traditional political fault lines and contributing to an overall erosion of 
public confidence in science (Brunner, Colburn et al. 2002,212). 
In this manner politics and policy have evolved to promote single or special 
interests over the common good. We have already seen that ecosystem surprise is often 
triggered by the targeting of a single commodity or focusing on output or yield of a 
desired ecosystem product or service. Economic regimes form around the extraction or 
use of desired commodity or product. To spell it out: 
Economic dependence on a short list of products, linked via politicians in 
powerful legislative positions who are supported by economic interests, 
can reinforce the thinking in a bureaucracy managing a natural resource 
(Trosper 2003, 328) 
Thus under the scientific management status quo, bureaucracies and special 
interests can feed off one another. In response, natural resource users and conservation 
groups have had little choice but to engage each other in issue-by-issue power-balancing 
politics. Politics, therefore, has rarely, if ever, been driven by the knowledge and input of 
impartial scientific experts. Politics evolved as the context and typically enabled a 
regulatory scheme that drafted and enforced rules dedicated to the controlled exploitation 
of natural resource sectors and components (Dryzek 1997; Brunner, Colburn et al. 2002; 
Fiorino 2006). 
There is more to the story. Ever-changing and evolving societies utilize more 
than interactions that are based purely on economic or political forces to apportion values 
and access to democracy and capital markets. Ultimately the behavior of individuals is a 
58 
response to their environment in a way that is far more complex than can be delineated or 
captured by basic rules of economics and politics (Dryzek 1997; Gunderson and Holling 
2002). 
What we have learned, therefore, is that there are common patterns behind the 
failures of management of the human activities that impact an ecosystem's function. One 
pattern that is typical of resource exploitation scenarios involves the need for or 
identification of a target variable that is then successfully controlled. Social and 
economic systems initially flourish with increased economic opportunity centering on the 
controlled target variable. The efficiencies and limited, fragmented interests of the 
scientific management/administrative rationalism paradigm are unable to effectively 
control ecosystem variables and actually enhance exploitation. Initial success sets the 
stage for ultimate failure with the stabilization of target variables effectively causing 
meaningful changes in other ecological, social and economic components - leading 
ultimately to the collapse of the entire system (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995; Dryzek 
1997; Gunderson and Holling 2002; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Armitage, Berkes et al. 
2007; Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). In sum: 
Although there is considerable variation in detail, there is remarkable 
consistency in the history of resource exploitation: resources are inevitably 
overexploited, often to the point of collapse or extinction. We suggest that 
such consistency is due to the following common features: (i) Wealth or 
the prospect of wealth generates political and social power that is used to 
promote unlimited exploitation of resources, (ii) Scientific understanding 
and consensus is hampered by the lack of controls and replicates, so that 
each new problem involves learning about a new system, (iii) The 
complexity of the underlying biological and physical systems precludes a 
reductionist approach to management. Optimum levels of exploitation 
must be determined by trial and error, (iv) Large levels of natural 
variability mask the effects of overexploitation. Initial overexploitation is 
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not detectable until it is severe and often irreversible (Ludwig, Hilborn et 
al. 1993,17). 
Clearly our current regulatory scheme is inextricably structured to permit the 
identification and efficient exploitation of targeted ecosystem components. As we will 
see below, this ability opens the door to ecosystem frailty and, ultimately, collapse. 
Resilience and Adaptive Cycles 
The previous section stressed that ecosystems are dynamic, continually changing, 
and unpredictable. It also described the process whereby regulation that focuses on the 
control of a target variable can lead ultimately to the collapse of the entire system. The 
reason that most ecosystems don't collapse is that healthy ecological systems have the 
resilience to withstand wide change and still maintain the integrity of their functions. As 
was pointed out previously, resilience, or ecosystem resilience which "emphasizes 
conditions far from any equilibrium, where instabilities can flip a system into another 
regime of behavior - i.e., to another stability domain ... resilience is measured by the 
magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system changes its structure by 
changing the variables and processes that control behavior" (Gunderson and Holling 
2002,27-28). 
It needs to be stressed, however, that ecosystem resilience involves humans. 
Humans all live within social-ecological systems. We depend on ecosystems for our 
existence. So when we talk about resilience and the capacity of a system to absorb 
disturbance and still retain its structure and function, we are not simply talking about 
"nature," but a totally linked social-ecological system of which we are all a part 
(Davidson-Hunt and Berkes 2003; Walker and Salt 2006). 
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In order to better understand change and resilience in complex systems, the 
stored-' < Reorganization Conservation 
Capita 
activt r Growth 
weak Connectedness strong 
metaphor of the adaptive cycle3 is useful (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995; Gunderson and 
Holling 2002). Its phases of exploitation, conservation, release, and reorganization 
3 The adaptive cycle provides a vehicle for the discussion of ecosystem succession. The 
traditional view of succession involved the incomplete "equilibrium" model discussed previously. 
That view assumed that equilibrium, or the attainment of a climax phase, was controlled by two 
functions: exploitation and conservation. Exploitation referred to the organizations and processes 
that enable the quick colonization of recently disturbed areas by species considered r-strategists. 
Conservation describes the slow accumulation and storage of energy and material by species 
described as K-strategists. The use of r and K to describe the strategies of species in the 
exploitation and conservation phases is directly related to the parameters of the logistics equation. 
The r types are therefore species that have extensive dispersal ability and rapid growth in 
disturbed areas or any area where the best 'scrambler' wins, while K-strategists generally have 
slower growth rates and flourish in areas where resources become divided. Holling, C. S. (1995). 
What Barriers? What Bridges? Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and 
Institutions. L. H. Gunderson, C. S. Holling and S. S. Light. New York, Columbia University 
Press: 3-34, Gunderson, L. H. and C. S. Holling, Eds. (2002). Panarchv: Understanding 
Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, D.C., Island Press. 
To continue the metaphor, the adaptive cycle responds to subsequent ecological inputs 
and expands the traditional exploitation and conservation model by adding two additional 
functions. The first addition is the function that results from the tightly bound accumulation of 
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provides a strong framework that underpins the interpretation of ecosystem change and 
governance (See Figure 4). 
The adaptive cycle metaphor attempts to demonstrate how three properties of 
ecosystems interact to focus and shape the future responses and trajectories of the 
ecosystem, agencies, and people. These three properties are: 
biomass and nutrients in the conservation of K phase. This addition, called the 'release' phase or, 
borrowing from economics, "creative destruction" Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism. 
Socialism and Democracy. New York, Harper and Row., reflects the sudden collapse or release of 
the nutrients and biomass accumulated in the K phase. Resources are released from their bound 
and controlled state, connections are broken, feedback regulatory controls weaken, and 
destabilizing positive feedbacks develop. This is designated as the omega (Q) phase (Figure 3) 
Gunderson, L. H. and C. S. Holling, Eds. (2002). Panarchv: Understanding Transformations in 
Human and Natural Systems. Washington, D.C., Island Press.. 
The second additional function is that of "reorganization" and is deemed the alpha (a) 
phase. In this phase, the remnants of the collapse of the K phase begin a slow, random process of 
reorganization. It is during the transition from CI to a that there is an explosive increase in 
uncertainty where conditions might arise for chaotic behavior. During this phase the system is 
essentially unregulated, connections are weak and there is no organization ibid.. Thus it is the 
stage "most affected by probabilistic events that allow a diversity of entrained species, as well as 
exotic invaders, to become established.. .it is the stage most vulnerable to erosion and to the loss 
of accumulated capital... [And] it is the stage from which jumps to unexpectedly different and 
more productive systems are possible" Holling, C. S. (1995). What Barriers? What Bridges? 
Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions. L. H. Gunderson, C. S. 
Holling and S. S. Light. New York, Columbia University Press: 3-34.. 
The omega (Q) and alpha (a) phases, shaded in figure 3, form the back loop of the 
adaptive cycle. The back loop phase, from Q to a, is a rapid reorganization and leads to renewal. 
This can be contrasted with the front loop phase, r to K, which is the slow, incremental, phase of 
growth and accumulation. The front loop is predictable with higher degrees of certainty. The 
back loop, on the other hand, encompasses the outcomes following collapse and reorganization 
and is highly unpredictable Gunderson, L. H. and C. S. Holling, Eds. (2002). Panarchv: 
Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, D.C., Island Press-
Thus there are two phases in the adaptive cycle where ecosystems become briefly vulnerable to 
dramatic transformation. The back loop reorganization (a) phase and the conservation, or K, 
phase of the front loop. These are phases where slower and larger levels in ecosystems become 
vulnerable to small events and fast processes. The a phase is vulnerable, as we have seen, due to 
the weak connections and lack of organization. At the other end of the spectrum, the K phase is 
vulnerable because a mature ecosystem can become overconnected in a variety of ways as well as 
brittle. Although the system may be at some version of equilibrium, there is a loss of resilience, 
particularly if target variables are attempted to be controlled, manipulated, or exploited, and the 
system becomes an accident waiting to happen Holling, C. S. (1995). What Barriers? What 
Bridges? Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions. L. H. Gunderson, 
C. S. Holling and S. S. Light. New York, Columbia University Press: 3-34.. 
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• The potential [Capital] available for change, since that determines the range of 
options possible; 
• The degree of connectedness between internal controlling variables and processes, 
a measure that reflects the degree of flexibility or rigidity of such controls - i.e., 
their sensitivity or not to external variation; 
• The resilience of the systems, a measure of their vulnerability to unexpected or 
unpredictable shocks (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995; Gunderson and Holling 
2002, 32-33) 
The adaptive cycle provides a helpful metaphor to demonstrate the dynamic, 
complex and difficult if not impossible to predict nature of ecosystems. It also helps 
depict the importance of resilience as a quality of ecosystem dynamics and function. 
Ecosystems that are resilient are better able to absorb disturbance without changing in 
structure and flipping to a new, and perhaps less desirable, equilibrium. One of the ways 
to impair resilience, as we have seen, is for governance or regulation to try to control or 
exploit targeted variables within the system. 
Current governance, for the most part, is based on the legacy and processes of 
efficiency and scientific management which strives to efficiently control variables and to 
maximize value from natural resources using command and control bureaucracy and 
expert-driven technology. The adaptive cycle metaphor demonstrates that ecosystems are 
most vulnerable when the system is at seeming (and mythical) equilibrium but brittle 
with entanglements between numerous variables within the system, including human and 
institutional inputs. As ecosystems grow and mature, and variables are controlled or 
limited for the benefit of society or for economic gain, the system becomes more brittle 
and less resilient - the accident waiting to happen. The next section looks at whether 
there may be a better way to develop governance that permits more effective 
management of the human activities that impact the environment. 
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Changing Course: An Ecosvstem-Based Approach to Adaptive Governance 
The study of the impact of governance on the human activities that impact the 
environment has been the poor step-child for researchers in the academic and scientific 
communities. Far more work, money, and effort has gone into the study of the natural 
components and processes underlying ecosystems, but research on socioeconomic and 
governance aspects of ecosystem dynamics has been limited despite the fact that progress 
in these areas is essential to achieving effective ecosystem-based approaches to 
management (Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000). There is a need to develop connections between 
the spatial and temporal scales of nested ecosystems and networked institutions capable 
of monitoring, assessing, and regulating at appropriate levels of regional, national, local, 
citizen and NGO involvement. It is axiomatic that the manner of organization of 
governance arrangements is critical to resource use and, by extension, ecosystem health 
(Costanza, Norton et al. 1992). 
Current laws in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere reflect the traditional 
tendency of government agencies and departments charged with responsibilities for 
natural resources and coastal activities to be limited to some particular type of activity. 
Thus management focus has traditionally centered on legislatively-mandated 
jurisdictional sectors and is typically concerned with limiting some narrow activity or 
increasing production of desired commodities (VanderZwaag 1995; Juda 2003; Fiorino 
2006; Brunner 2010a). 
With respect to the governance and management of the human activities that 
impact the integrity and resilience of ecosystems, the notion that traditional scientific 
management approaches are failing, and may in fact be making the problems worse, has 
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been discussed. The institutional structure that has developed for decades around the 
low-hanging fruit of egregious smokestacks and end-of-pipe discharges are proving 
remarkably resistant to fundamental change and innovation (Skowronek 1982; Brunner, 
Steelman et al. 2005). Thus old regulation, evolving from a late 19th century obsession 
with efficiency, largely designed to respond to a 1970s view of environmental problems, 
and revolving around selective intervention by government based on a strategy of 
bureaucratic control, is no longer an effective response. It may even be largely irrelevant. 
We must move beyond simply controlling pollution to preventing it, reducing risk, 
promoting eco-efficiency, advancing stewardship, and achieving a sustainable economy 
and society over the long term (Fiorino 2006; Pielke 2007; NRC 2009). 
As discussed in the Introduction to this paper, there have been repeated calls for a 
broader, more holistic ecosystem approach to environmental management of the coastal 
oceans has been the pronounced response to the perceived failure of traditional scientific 
sector-based management (Haskell 1992; F.A.O. 1995a; Constanza 1998; EPAP 1999; 
Juda 1999; Sherman and Duda 1999; Costanza, Low et al. 2001; Macpherson 2001; 
Sherman and Duda 2001; Link 2002; Policy 2002; Steelman 2010; Brunner 2010a; 
Brunner and Lynch 2010b). The implementation of a more ecosystem-based approach to 
regulations for the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region will require considerable thought, 
courageous experimentation, and the ability to monitor trends in order to learn from our 
mistakes. Management must shift its focus from the current emphasis on satisfying the 
needs of humans through output objectives to an emphasis on protecting the ecosystem 
functions that provide those goods and services. It bears repeating that sustainability 
requires ecosystems be viewed as non-linear complex systems with self-organizing 
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properties, resilience, and inherent uncertainty (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995; 
Gunderson and Holling 2002; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003). Conventional natural 
resource models that assume some quantifiable equilibrium or "climax" phase of 
ecosystems must begin to recognize that nature is not equilibrium-driven and is 
inherently unpredictable (Regier and Baskerville 1986; Barron 2003; Berkes, Colding et 
al. 2003; Gunderson 2003). 
It will certainly not be easy to overturn more than a century of developed 
government, NGO, and economic interests that seemingly perpetuate profound 
ideological separation. As laws and regulations became more complex society and 
special interests evolved to divide and fragment environmental issues. Potential 
regulatory change is frequently watered-down or blocked by galvanized and often 
piecemeal efforts by interest groups organized to block each other. (Brunner, Steelman et 
al. 2005). At a time when common or public interests should be front-and-center with 
respect to the decisions and policies considered by policy makers that have the effect of 
distributing values as well as resources, special interests, those interests that detract from 
the public good, are often in control of the decision and policy making. With respect to 
science having a role as a neutral, objective force: 
Science in the service of common interests is threatened as scientists and 
policy-makers have come to see science mainly as a servant of interest 
group politics. That is to say, increasingly, science has come to be viewed 
as simply a resource for enhancing the ability of groups in society to 
bargain, negotiate, and compromise in pursuit of their special interests 
(Pielke 2007,10) 
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Certainly, at a national level, and often at a state or provincial level, many believe 
that political institutions have broken down, so that the broad public no longer believes 
them credible: 
The American economy increasingly serves only a narrow part of society, 
and America's national politics has failed to put the country back on track 
through honest, open, and transparent problem solving. Too many of 
America's elites - among the super-rich, the CEOs, and many of my 
colleagues in academia - have abandoned a commitment to social 
responsibility. They chase wealth and power, the rest of society be 
damned (Sachs 2011, 5). 
Given the precarious position of the federal political regime, and the distractions 
provided by mindless power struggles, the division, fragmentation, and stalemate that 
remain stubborn legacies of the nation's governance structure at the national, provincial, 
and state levels may signal opportunities for the mitigation of these barriers at more local 
and regional levels (Prugh, Costanza et al. 2000; Brunner, Colburn et al. 2002; Cortese 
2011). Indeed a goal of implementing an ecosystem-based approach to the management 
of the human activities that impact the environment may be a way of ushering in a more 
diverse and effective local and regional approach to governance. The move toward a 
more regional and local governance regime will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Ultimately, however, there is no magic or mystery to the notion of an ecosystem-
based approach to the management of human activities that impact ecosystems. The 
ecosystem approach integrates ecological protection and restoration with human needs to 
strengthen the essential connection between economic prosperity and environmental 
well-being. The process requires meaningful collaboration between federal, 
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state/provincial, local, and tribal and first nation governments, and an active and 
informed public, to achieve the ultimate goal of a resilient and sustainable environment. 
Expanding upon the definition proffered by the Helsinki Commission (2003), an 
ecosystem-based approach to governance may be defined as: 
A governance process that develops an integrated ecosystem approach to 
coastal management bounded by ecological, not political, boundaries, and 
uses collaborative, cooperative, and community actions as often as 
possible to implement a goal-driven community-supported process for the 
comprehensive integrated management of human activities. Policy 
development is based on the best available local and expert knowledge 
about the ecosystem and its dynamics in order to identify and 
collaboratively take action at all appropriate levels on influences which are 
critical to the health and resilience of coastal ecosystem, thereby achieving 
sustainable use of ecosystem goods and services and maintenance of 
ecosystem integrity 
Thus the approach is applied within a geographic framework determined primarily by 
ecological, not political, boundaries. The process must overcome the fragmentation 
inherent in both the sectoral management approach and the splits in jurisdiction among 
levels of government at the land-water interface. Included at every level is the need for 
significant stakeholder and resource user involvement, recognition of human dignity 
social justice, democracy, and intergenerational equity. Finally, scientific uncertainty 
must be countered with the use of precautionary decision making. 
The important characteristics of an ecosystem approach to governance may be 
summarized as follows: 
• Management for resilience. Governance must take the perspective that its task is 
to find common ground on policies that advance the common interest (Brunner 
2002). The common interest of maintaining and supporting ecosystem integrity 
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should outweigh parochial interests in preserving bureaucratic turf or command 
and control hierarchy. The critical component of ecosystem-based governance is 
that management focuses on the relationship between people and the natural 
processes necessary to sustain ecosystem structure and function, the life support 
systems, while recognizing the need for human and institutional involvement at 
every level of the ecosystem (Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000), 
• Significant, meaningful public participation. Any ecosystem management regime 
must provide the opportunity for meaningful participation and input of a broad 
representative segment of the population in decision making processes (Costanza, 
Norton et al. 1992; Pauly and Maclean 2003). Significant, meaningful public 
participation is required (Becker 1993; Cortner and Moote 1999; Jackson 2005). 
Participation must be open to almost any person or group with a significant 
interest in the issue (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). Citizen involvement and 
partnership must be sufficient to build "civic science" instead of the traditional 
public information programs designed to inform passively (Gunderson, Holling et 
al. 1995). Together we must "pay the price of civilization through multiple acts 
of good citizenship..." (Sachs 2011, 5) 
• Integrated, collaborative government involvement. Regulatory agencies must 
participate in coordinated and integrated fashion and allow softer local and 
regional input into governance. The approach is applied within a geographic 
framework determined primarily by ecological, not political, boundaries. Thus 
the process must overcome the fragmentation inherent in both the sectoral 
management approach and the splits in jurisdiction among levels of government 
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(Regier and Baskerville 1986; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Folke, Lowell 
Pritchard et al. 2007). In an ideal system, government acts less on other actors 
and more with other actors in a collaborative and communicative way. There is, 
therefore, more frequent, collaborative contact (i.e. not just during crisis). Thus 
government would require less of the local, state, or federal governments exerting 
control over others in society and more of a partnership-like interaction among 
them (Fiorino 2006). 
• Governance is adaptive. There must be a realization that stewardship cannot wait 
on science to achieve a full understanding of ecosystem structure and function. 
Thus an ecosystem based approach in any region must be prepared to cope with 
the uncertainty inherent in complex natural and institutional systems (Sutinen, 
Clay et al. 2000; Sherman, Kane et al. 2002). Adaptive governance is a mode of 
learning that allows for decision makers with a poor understanding of the 
connection between their actions and the consequences to learn by doing 
(Ludwig, Hilborn et al. 1993; Holling 1995; NRC 2009). Ecosystem surprises 
stemming from delay in feedback, and/or rapid feedback, are both normal 
ecosystem dynamics and require adaptable governance. It should be understood 
that it is not humanly possible to design a flawless governance process capable of 
coping with multiple, complex systems. All that can be done is to attempt to 
design a system that operates under rules that allow sufficient information to be 
generated over time to enable participants to learn from their mistakes and 
continually adapt and improve the institutional system to operate within natural 
limits (Costanza, Low et al. 2001). Under an adaptive governance regime, policy 
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choices and interventions are treated as experiments (NRC 2009), relying 
explicitly on monitoring, evaluating, and terminating failed policies instead of 
expert-driven planning that relies primarily on science-based technology rather 
than trial and error (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). 
• Mobilizing local knowledge. Social and cultural memory and contemporary local 
knowledge must be mobilized by developing links between key persons and 
providing a direction for adaptive governance. This is a way of building social 
capacity for resilience in social-ecological systems (Holling 1995; Berkes, 
Colding et al. 2003; Steelman 2010). 
• Overarching lead or joint institution. Governance must have a lead or joint 
institution able to adapt to new information and understanding (Christensen, 
Bartuska et al. 1996). They must, therefore, have the authority (formal or 
informal) and means to carry out systematic scientific research to understand 
system response and status, to track compliance with policy goals and objectives 
as well as to make changes when necessary. The obvious need is for transparency 
and fairness as perceived by the public and regulated community. More pertinent, 
however, may be the existence of informal or voluntary venues for dispute 
resolution that gives the public and stakeholders an opportunity to work together 
toward resolution of local or regional problems. This may be especially important 
where, as in this study area, the problems we are having with environmental 
degradation are the result of the cumulative impact of activities that are entirely(or 
mostly) legal under our existing laws and regulations (Brunner 2002; Fiorino 
2006). 
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• A precautionary approach to uncertainty. A precautionary decision-making 
approach must be used in order to account for the great degree of uncertainty 
inherent in complex natural resource issues (Sherman 1994; Sutinen, Clay et al. 
2000; Costanza, Low et al. 2001). Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration makes it 
clear that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation (Sitarz 1994). There must be a 
realization that stewardship cannot wait on science to achieve a full understanding 
of ecosystem structure and function. Thus ecosystem management in the region 
must be prepared to cope with the uncertainty inherent in complex natural and 
institutional systems ((Sherman, Kane et al. 2002; Whiteside 2006), Clay et al. 
2000; Sherman, Kane et al. 2002). Rapid feedback and appropriate decision-
selection mechanisms must be in place to compensate for lack of knowledge by 
decision makers (Costanza, Low et al. 2001). 
While the above attempts to cull some of the more obvious characteristics of 
ecosystem-based governance from the literature, the more important message is that 
governance as usual is not an option. As the National Research Council (2009) recently 
pointed out in no uncertain terms, government agencies, private organizations, and 
individuals are "...unprepared, both conceptually and practically..." to meet the 
environmental challenges, including climate change, that will affect our futures (2009,1). 
Thus the time is right for concerned institutions, groups, and individuals in the region to 
seriously contemplate a transition from "business as usual" to a more holistic, 
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collaborative, and participatory governance regime for the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
region. 
Significant change, especially the kind of change and innovation required to 
achieve at least some of the characteristics set forth above, is exceedingly difficult. There 
have indeed been many examples of bold innovation on the part of government agencies 
and institutions aimed at fostering new approaches to remedy environmental harm and 
achieve sustainable resource use. In the last decade, no fewer than twenty federal 
agencies have adopted innovative ways to improve their efforts at achieving their 
environmental tasks and mission, including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA), the 
National Park Service (USNPS), the US Forest Service (USFS), and the US Fish and 
Wildlife Service (USFWS) (Steelman 2010). Desired outcomes, however, remain 
bewilderingly elusive. From an outside observer's standpoint, nothing seems to have 
changed. 
One significant reason that new initiatives fail is that innovative change must 
occur within larger institutional processes that impact the effectiveness of innovations. 
There is inherent tension between innovation and institutions. Innovations are often 
adaptive and transitory. Institutions are not (Steelman 2010). Further, any attempt to 
implement change and innovation in the regulation of the use and exploitation of natural 
resources in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed must recognize that the 
institutions and entities that comprise the governance regime of the region are embedded 
in existing and enduring social and decision processes. There are economic, cultural, and 
social systems in place now that determine how values are distributed (Lasswell 1971; 
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Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). Industry, governments, and NGOs often have strong 
vested interest in maintaining the status quo as change in governance can mean a 
redistribution of values like wealth and power. 
The next section attempts to distill the existing literature, including case studies 
and academic treatises, to construct an "ideal" compilation of characteristics that I 
suggest would be reflective of an ecosystem-based approach to governance within the 
framework of the policy sciences. In chapters 4 and 5 the governance regimes of the 
Great Lakes Watershed Basin during the 1970s and 1980s and the regime extant in the 
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed will be compared to the criteria and 
characteristics set forth in the "ideal" framework. In this manner, using the framework, it 
is hoped that gaps between the governance that "is" and the governance that "should be" 
will be revealed and can lay the groundwork for the recommendations and conclusions 
set forth in chapter 6. 
The Ecosvstem-based Approach and the Policy Sciences Analytical Framework 
The decision to use the policy sciences analytical framework approach to the 
analysis of the ecosystem-based approach to governance is an attempt to organize the 
various indicators or characteristics of ecosystem-based governance and put them into 
context. The characteristics of ecosystem-based governance are not distilled from thin air. 
Context is critical for the analysis of complex problems like those underpinning many if 
not most environmental issues and assessments. The principle of context, that all things 
are interconnected and that the meaning of anything depends upon those connections, is 
at work in this investigation. Moreover, the related notion that the properties of the parts 
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cannot be understood except in the context of the whole is consistent with our discussion 
of the dynamic nature of environmental and social systems (Clark 1997). Holling (1995) 
notes the importance of a "systems view" necessary for addressing complex ecosystem 
issues. In the language of the policy sciences, a "systems view" is synonymous with a 
"policy-oriented" perspective (Clark 2002, 30). The sobering reality, however, is that: 
.. .the system we deal with is always incomplete. Surprise is inevitable. 
Not only is the science incomplete, but the system itself is a moving 
target, evolving because of the impact of management and the progressive 
expansion of the scale of human influences on the planet (Gunderson, 
Holling etal. 1995,13). 
Thus reality and our less-than-satisfactory experience with fragmented, expert-
driven, piecemeal restoration plans are forcing researchers, scientists, and policy-makers 
to veer off the linear path into the decidedly non-linear woods where complexity, 
contextuality, and uncertainty abound. 
As has been discussed, an analysis of the policy process as fostered by the 
framework provided by Lasswell and the policy sciences permits an examination of the 
policy process through multiple stages. Lasswell's approach demands a greater 
attention to context and to some degree enables scholarly attention to shift focus to 
institutional and other aspects of the policy process that has long been dominated by a 
fascination with congressional policy making (Keller 2009). Importantly, the research 
approach suggested by the policy sciences framework acknowledges that the stages of the 
policy process do not operate in linear fashion but instead may occur in parallel or 
iterative cycles (Lasswell 1971; Clark 2002; Keller 2009). 
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Problem Orientation 
The problem orientation phase of the policy sciences analytical framework acts 
rather like flexible bookends to guide and assess the entire framework. It helps frame the 
mapping and context of the social and decision process in an effort to strike at the heart at 
the primary concern of all analytical methods: how to bring appropriate knowledge to 
bear in policy decisions (Clark 2002,128). Problem orientation is geared toward forcing 
investigators to switch from being "solution minded" and to approach policy from a 
"problem minded" perspective. In essence, problem orientation serves as a guide to the 
learning process fostered by the decision and social process inquiries. As such the five 
tasks within problem orientation serve as an overall "strategy to address problems and 
invent solutions (Lasswell 1971; Clark and Willard 2000, 9). Thus: 
In problem orientation, the problems at hand must first be specified in 
relation to the goals that people seek, thus permitting a clearer definition 
of the problems than is otherwise possible. Historic trends must then be 
described to see if events and decision making are moving toward or away 
from the specified goals. Next, factors or conditions that have influenced 
or caused these trends must be determined. When past trends and 
conditions are adequately known, projections of future trends are possible. 
Finally, after these four tasks have been completed and the necessary 
information assembled, alternative courses of action for achieving the 
stated goals can be invented; evaluated according to their effectiveness, 
efficiency, and equitability in solving the problem (Clark 2008, 57). 
Certainly problem orientation is ongoing and iterative. To begin the examination 
using the framework approach we will look at the characteristics of goal clarification 
under our "ideal" ecosystem-based approach to governance. 
Goal Clarification. Clark tells us that clarifying the goals of the participants is our 
first task. "People involved in a resource management issue must specify what they hope 
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to achieve (a content matter) and also how they expect to achieve it (a procedural matter 
(2002, 87). "The goal-clarifying task is indicated by the blunt question: 'What ought I to 
prefer?'" (Lasswell 1971,40). 
Goals are preferred outcomes within a specific context and are typically expressed 
in terms of the distribution of values and practices. Clarifying goals means finding the 
answers to the question: What value outcomes should we seek in an ecosystem-based 
approach to governance? Under the traditional governance model, goals are often 
established by a government with the supposed cognitive capacity to determine society's 
environmental goals and, in some detail, how those goals should be achieved (Fiorino 
2006). Goals are single targets to be realized efficiently; they are fixed, given, or 
assumed to separate science from non-science, and progress is measurable (Brunner, 
Steelman et al. 2005). Goals of government agencies are fragmented, however, and 
paradoxes abound. Different agencies operate independently striving to achieve separate 
and often-unrelated or competing objectives. Furthermore, some agencies are charged by 
statutory prescription with the responsibility to limit the taking of a commodity while 
simultaneously promoting the same commodity for harvest (Cortner and Moote 1999). In 
1976, for instance, the National Forest Management Act charged the Forest Service with 
the responsibility to both protect forested lands and to proscribe rules for the harvest of 
timber lands (Trosper 2003). Similarly, the Sustainable Fisheries Act (1996) requires the 
National Marine Fisheries Service to rebuild overfished stocks of fish on a species-by-
species basis within certain time requirements, and at the same time determine optimum 
yield catch limits while being pressured by some members of Congress and other special 
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interests to extend deadlines and allow increased harvests (Safina, Rosenberg et al. 2005; 
MSFCMA 1996). 
Goal choices should, initially, be fairly broad and widely accepted. Clark cites 
Lasswell and MacDougal (1992, 737-58) for the idea that the overriding goals should be 
human dignity, ecosystem health, and democracy. Indeed, the emphasis on the protection 
and advancement of human dignity has historically been a fundamental quest of the 
policy sciences approach (deLeon 1988). When we consider that we are examining the 
effects of human decisions on human lives, which require a healthy, resilient environment 
capable of sustaining human life, commencing any investigation with a goal of human 
dignity begins to make sense. As to the goal of democracy, it is "well-rooted in many 
cultural traditions throughout history.. .for all people to have full opportunity to shape 
and share power, wealth, enlightenment, well-being, skill, affection, rectitude, and 
respect" (Lasswell and MacDougal 1992; Clark 2002, 89). Further it should be clarified 
that the policy sciences strives to achieve an overriding goal of the realization of human 
dignity for the many, not the dignity of the few at a cost of indignity for the many. Since 
the goal is democracy and dignity for the many, decision outcomes must aim at achieving 
equal opportunity for participation in power, wealth, well-being, and the other important 
values (Lasswell 1971). 
While there can be little serious question as to the virtues of having the goals of 
human dignity and democracy at the heart of any policy process, there needs to be more 
detail for the goal process and content in an assessment of ecosystem conflicts and issues. 
Some detail may be found in the terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 
the universal agreement all nations agreed to recognize that the inherent dignity and the 
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equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world (UN 1948). This sentiment ultimately expanded 
into a carefully worded statement of world community intent that declared that "human 
beings are at the center of the of concerns for sustainable development" and are entitled 
to good health and economic well-being (UNCED 1992, Principles 1,3, 5,6,7,8,10, 
13,14,15, 17, 18, 19,23,23,24,, 25,26). 
The symptoms that governance and society in the United States are not living up 
to the ideals of human dignity and democracy are numerous: 
• In the last seventy years, barely half of eligible voters in the United States actually 
voted in a presidential election (Norris 2002). Voter turnout in the U.S. is roughly 
63% of that in Western Europe. Further, U.S. elections fail to meet 
internationally recognized fairness standards (Lappe 2006). 
• America is dividing. During the 1980s and 90s the United States underwent the 
largest wealth transfer in its history as the net worth of the top 1 percent rose by 
63% while the net worth of those in the bottom 40% dropped by 44%. At the start 
of the 1970s, the corporate Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) earned an average 
pay that was approximately 40 times the pay of an average worker. By the year 
2000 it had reach 1,000 times the average worker's pay. Shockingly, the U.S. 
census bureau records reveal that the median earnings of male full-time workers 
actually peaked in 1973. Further, while earnings have declined, Conference 
Board data indicate that job satisfaction has been on the wane for the last 25 years 
(Sachs 2011). 
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• In 1964 three-quarters of the American public trusted government. By the late 
1990s that number had shrunk to one quarter - while the number of Americans 
who believe that "the government is run by a few big interests looking out only 
for themselves" more than doubled between the mid-1960s and the mid-90s, 
reaching 76% (Orren 1997, 80-81). The number of lobbyists in Washington has 
tripled since 1996, outnumbering members of Congress by fifth-six to one (Lappe 
2006). 
• Poverty is real and expanding. Thirty-five million Americans - a number equal to 
the entire population of Canada - live in households that are so poor that they are 
not sure from where their next meal is coming. Further, the Institute of Medicine 
estimates that eighteen thousand Americans die unnecessarily each year because 
they lack health care (Lappe 2006). In addition, the United States ranks forty-
second in infant survival (CIA 2005). 
This list is, of course, not exhaustive. The point is simply that current governance 
in America does not appear to be overly concerned with human dignity, fairness, or 
democracy. "Moreover, we're made to believe that we like it this way - that we prefer to 
leave our futures to others. Only a few oddballs care about contributing to something 
bigger than themselves. You know, those activists " (Lappe 2006,6). 
With the goal of human dignity and democracy in mind, there must be some focus 
on how we best begin to change the trends and make headway toward a society that 
advances these goals. It is noteworthy that a popular assessment of the cause of the 
deteriorating social and economic equalities in this country is the notion that government 
is the cause of society's ills. As I write these words, we are about a week from the 2012 
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New Hampshire presidential primary election. There is a theme to the political rhetoric, a 
mantra if you will that the ills of modern society are the fault of government regulation. 
Certainly a discussion of the history of government and its relationship to human 
dignity is beyond the scope of this research. To some degree, however, the notion that 
governance should somehow back off and leave regulation, including rules relating to 
human impacts on ecosystem health and resilience, entirely to supply and demand and 
free market capitalism deserves brief comment. 
There is little dispute that for some three decades, from the new Deal of the mid-
19308 through the civil rights legislative battles of the 1960s the federal government 
steered the national economy and drove equitable policy as a trusted instrument of 
democratic power. National highways were built, a national power grid was created, and 
government teamed with private enterprise to launch satellites and create the Internet. 
School systems became integrated and social programs, including Medicare, social 
security, food stamps, and other programs supportive of the less-fortunate and elderly 
came to fruition. As Franklin Roosevelt put it as he ushered in a new era of government 
intervention in the economy: 
[Government [is] the instrument of our united purpose to solve for the 
individual the ever-rising problems of a complex civilization. Repeated 
attempts at their solution without the aid of government had left us baffled 
and bewildered.4 
Yet those sentiments are hardly recognizable today. After Viet Nam, Richard 
Nixon, and the oil crisis and higher interest rates of the 1970s, Ronald Reagan 
proclaimed: 
4 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address, January 20, 1937 
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In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; 
government is the problem.. ..It is my intention to curb the size and 
influence of the Federal establishment5 
The rhetoric, through the popular and business media, is insisting that free market 
capitalism remains the only way to a prosperous economy. The conservative right often 
expands upon the "invisible hand" metaphor first used first by Adam Smith (2003)6 for 
the proposition that the U.S. economy requires that entrepreneurs must have a free hand, 
unfettered by government regulation, to create wealth and jobs for those that have thus 
far been harmed by our status quo economic and regulatory scheme. So the challenge is 
relatively clear. Can governance be restored to the point that citizens believe that it can 
actually foster the public good? Is there any way that people can be convinced to pay the 
price and participate with their interest, time, and commitment in a participatory 
democracy that reflects the will of the populace? 
As we know, governance is active at several levels. Public dignity and 
democracy operate at local, state/provincial, and federal levels. Clearly the status quo is 
a disappointment. The federal level of governance, however, may be losing credibility 
while involvement and participation at local and regional levels could be fostered. Surely 
every situation is different and context changes from community to community. Thus it 
may be more productive to approach goal clarification as an inquiry into what the 
5 Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address, January 20, 1981 
6 Interestingly, a review of Adam Smith's work shows that the term "invisible hand" was used but once in 
his 1200+ page The Wealth of Nations and it was used with numerous caveats and conditions that involved 
an overall notion of fairness and justice. It would likely come as a surprise to the current crop of 
Republican candidates canvassing our state that Smith also concluded that workers were often oppressed 
and that legislation pertaining to workers typically was harmful to workers (p. 195). Smith also wrote that 
workers should be ".. .well fed, clothed, and lodged" (p. 110-111). Finally, modern day political rhetoric 
seems to ignore the fact that Adam Smith believed that taxing the wealthy was appropriate, opining that 
subjects . .ought to contribute toward the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion 
to their respective abilities" (p. 1043). Smith, A. (2003). The Wealth of Nations. New York, Bantam Dell. 
82 
community wants. What values does the community prize over others? Again it is better 
to start with broader goals. In theory all communities should want fishable, swimmable 
water and the ability to harvest food from land and water from lakes and rivers that is 
safe to consume. 
In our ideal ecosystem-based approach to governance, goals would be determined 
with a great deal of input from community. Strong public outreach and education efforts 
should provide incentive for community members to establish goals consistent with the 
overriding goals of human dignity and democracy (e.g. the "common good"). Resources 
should be available to assist communities in clarifying their common interests and, if 
necessary, stepping back from their individual demands, claims, and special interests to 
find common ground in more general and widely shared values (Clark 2002). New and 
measurable goals can be part of facilitated efforts by agencies with roles that evolve from 
rigid enforcement toward collaborative efforts integrated across all media and 
encouraging local and regional civic environmentalism (Fiorino 2006). Multiple goals are 
to be integrated if possible or traded off if necessary; they depend on judgments in the 
particular context and are subject to change (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). Goals 
should place the integrity and resilience of the ecosystem functions over human use 
because human demands for ecosystem goods and services cannot otherwise be 
sustainably met. Common interests should prevail over special interests. There should 
be methods for individuals and groups to find common interests. 
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Table 7 Goal Clarification 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
Goals established by government 
agencies with assumed expertise to 
determine society's environmental 
goals and how they should be 
achieved. Agency goals trump 
community acceptance. 
Meaningful public and/or community 
participation and input in the goal 
clarification process. National goals 
may provide guidance but community 
has broad input into how to achieve 
goals. Goal choices have broad 
community acceptance 
Public participation generally limited 
to after-the-fact public comments on 
plans developed by government 
agencies and experts. 
Strong public outreach and education 
provide ability to establish community 
goals inclusive of human dignity and 
democracy and provide basis for 
clarifying common interests. Human 
dignity includes economic fairness and 
sustainability. 
Goals are traditionally single targets to 
be realized efficiently; they are fixed, 
given, or assumed to separate science 
from non-science, and progress is 
measurable 
Multiple goals may be integrated that 
embrace human dignity, economic 
fairness for the many, and equal access 
to governance with a focus on 
maintenance and preservation of the 
integrity and resilience of ecosystem 
functions. 
In sum, the key goal clarification characteristics of an ecosystem-based approach 
to governance are: 
1) Meaningful community participation in the goal clarification process; 
2) Strong public outreach and education efforts devoted to governance options and 
ecosystem issues, and 
3) Multiple goals that are long-term and enduring and overall embrace human dignity, 
economic fairness, and equal access to governance with a premium placed on 
maintenance of the integrity and resilience of ecosystem functions (Table 7). 
Describing Trends. The second task in problem orientation is the description of 
past trends. Trend description serves in important function in ecosystem-based 
examination and decision-making because reliable, objective trend analysis tells us what 
progress, if any, we are making toward short, medium, and long-term goals. When 
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examining ecosystem issues, our ideal ecosystem-based governance regime requires that 
the status of environmental as well as social and economic variables be assessed, i.e. are 
the eight values set forth in the social process becoming more abundant and available in 
the community and are institutional practices beginning to reflect the goals of human 
dignity, democracy, and ecosystem resilience rather than those of tyranny and deprivation 
(Clark 2002; Brunner and Lynch 2010b). 
Thus in our ideal ecosystem-based governance the trends should be toward a 
greater sharing of wealth, knowledge, education, power, health, respect, skill and 
rectitude throughout the community. Ecosystem function should be trending toward 
greater resilience and community demands on ecosystem services should be moving 
toward a closer alignment with its capacity. Given that the pressures of global population 
trends, and the increasing demands being placed on the resources at the coastal margins 
of our continents, the earth's role as a provider of renewable and nonrenewable resources 
is becoming strained (Table 8). This means that fewer resources must be spread further. 
Trends, therefore, will reflect the value demands that will be rubbed raw in the years and 
decades to come. As society takes steps to determine how the attainment of human 
dignity will play out, the demands for wealth, knowledge, education, well-being, power, 
rectitude, skill, and health will only grow. The sustainable management natural resources 
will not be possible without the achievement of basic human rights for all (Clark 2002). 
Trends in our ideal system should be determined and characterized factually, 
based on reliable and verifiable knowledge. Knowledge plays a critical role in trend 
analysis but needs to take a broader form than under traditional scientific management. 
Traditional science is an important subset of knowledge and must play a critical role in 
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determining trends and clarifying and attempting to expand the choices available to 
policy makers (Pielke 2007; Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). Other kinds of knowledge 
are important to making good policy, however. Local knowledge can materially assist 
policy makers by providing context and place-based experience (Berkes, Colding et al. 
2003; Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). 
Table 8 Describing Trends 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
"Best available science" mandates the 
development of indicators by scientists 
and academics to determine whether 
ecological variables are reaching targets 
established by government. Public input 
into the development or relevance of 
indicators limited. Data gathered by 
scientists or academics. 
The use of reliable methods to measure 
whether a suite of socioecological 
variables are moving closer to, not away 
from, goals established with significant 
input from community. Use of local 
residents, NGOs, and community, 
municipal, and regional participants to 
gather trend data in collaboration with 
scientists and academics. 
Trend analysis performed by 
scientists/academics and published mainly 
through peer-reviewed literature and 
professional/scientific conferences. 
Open and transparent communication of 
the progress and trend data to policy 
makers and to an informed public through 
frequent meetings, accessible media, and 
other techniques. 
Trend data and analysis performed by 
scientific and/or academic community 
with very little public input. Data may be 
presented at public meetings or in 
newsletters, sometimes using "science 
translators," but public not meaningfully 
involved in report development or 
educated to understand importance of data. 
Significant opportunities for community 
members and the public to be involved 
with scientists in die assessment of trend 
data using local knowledge and local 
preferences. Public participation in the 
development of reports and presentations. 
Public outreach used to educate public on 
the importance and significance of data in 
advance of regular meetings in a variety of 
forums. 
Another form of knowledge has been called public preferences and involves 
knowledge that is revealed through political behavior. It entails insights into the support 
or opposition of individuals and groups in the community and the strength or intensity of 
the public preferences (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). Using local preferences can greatly 
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assist policy makers who need to know how well past decisions and actions have 
achieved the goals of the community, how well they have served the common interest, 
what the perceived consequences (outcomes and effects) have been, and what groups, 
institutions or segments of the community have benefitted as well as who has been 
relegated to the background (Clark 2002). 
Analyzing Conditions. Condition analysis is a task that encompasses the analysis 
of the conditions that impacted or affected past events and decisions. For each trend 
identified in a particular policy or natural resources problem and his socioeconomic 
context, there are conditions both historical and current that influence those trends. It is 
also an opportunity to determine how participants have performed against goals (Clark, 
Willard et al. 2000). Once again knowledge, especially a collaborative scientific 
approach encompassing a variety of disciplines, is necessary. Local knowledge also must 
play an important role in the analysis of conditions (Becker 1993; Berkes and Folke 
1998; Brunner, Colburn et al. 2002). 
Buried within conditions analysis is the presumption by stakeholders and the 
relevant community that there is an underlying ecological and socioeconomic equilibrium 
that buttresses a status quo view of the current situation. Any analysis of conditions, 
therefore, must pay particular attention to a search for factors that move a system toward 
or away from that equilibrium. This includes social, institutional, and economic factors, 
as well as problems in the natural ecosystem. The treatment of class may need to receive 
careful attention as the upper classes in society have long enjoyed the most in terms of 
values while lower classes the least. A broad understanding of the social, economic and 
environmental factors should help explain individual and collective behavior - an 
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explanation that lies within the social process, defined as humans pursuing values 
through institutions using resources (Clark 2002). Indeed, thorough conditions analysis 
needs to take into account the tension between democracy and capitalism in the 
community and region. The root of this tension lies in the fact that democracy is based 
on the ideal of political equality where every citizen has the same potential to influence 
what government does - whether or not each citizen chooses to use the opportunity or 
chooses to use their powers poorly. As "all are created equal," therefore, money should 
not matter in this governance regime. Contrast this with capitalism and the marketplace, 
where money matters a great deal. Markets often respond to preferences backed by 
powerful financial interests. Thus the rich and poor, though equal politically, are seldom 
equal in an economic sense. Conditions analysis can reveal where the contrasting features 
of democracy and the free market come into play. All too routinely, economic markets 
fail to produce "public goods" that are shared in common, like clean water, unpolluted 
air, safe streets, and a system of justice. Similarly, corporate balance sheets seldom 
account for negative externalities - the benefits, costs, or consequences that accrue to 
those outside a market transaction (e.g. toxic waste disposal). Finally, other values can 
get trampled by economic markets, including the fair treatment of workers, neighbors, 
and even the fair distribution of wealth or economic rewards (Visser 2004). 
In an ideal system, condition analysis should be part of an iterative effort by 
scientists and community members to determine the causes or other factors influencing 
trends. Resources should be available to permit scientists and others to sort out the 
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Table 9 Conditions Analysis 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
Conditions analysis is a function 
of scientific and academic 
communities with results 
published in technical peer 
reviewed publications and 
infrequently shared with or 
accessible by public. 
Conditions analysis is iterative 
with collaborative efforts by 
scientists and community to gain 
and share knowledge necessary 
to determine the conditions that 
are factors in any negative 
trends. 
Current iterations of democracy 
and free markets can marginalize 
the public well-being and 
common interests by enabling 
powerful financial interests to 
the detriment of a fair 
distribution of wealth, health, 
education, and well-being. 
Conditions analysis explores 
more than ecosystem factors and 
examines social and economic 
factors in order to understand 
whether economic or other 
special interests are overriding 
common interests and the public 
good 
various environmental signals and determine what conditions are factors in any negative 
ecosystem trends. The inquiry, however, should not be limited to ecosystem factors. 
Trends can be affected by the individual and institutional effects of economic activity. 
Democracy, if waning, will be effectively unable to counter economic market pressures 
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and compel government and regulatory authorities to step in and correct environmental 
abuses. Environmental and ecosystem measurements should be transparent and involve 
the community in a significant manner. Education and outreach should be an integral 
part of the ideal governance in order to keep citizens informed and aware of the 
importance and context of conditions (Table 9). 
Projecting Developments. This task is all about determining how likely it is that 
the community will realize its goals. Policy decisions must look to the future, so past 
trends and conditions must be projected forward. Problem solving here relies on the 
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ability to estimate whether the important features of social context, conditions, and 
problems will persist unchanged or in what manner they may change in the future given a 
range of choices. If the future is unacceptable, action must be taken (Clark, Willard et al. 
2000; Clark 2002). 
Projecting developments depends upon reliable knowledge about trends and 
conditions. Another factor creeps in here. History tells us that often policy makers are 
knowledgeable about trends and conditions, yet are either unwilling to buck political 
hazards or are blocked by special interest opposition (Clark 2002). 
In our ideal system (Table 10), reliable knowledge will underpin the projection of 
developments. If trends and conditions are such that projected developments appear to 
take a community away from its goals, away from progress toward human dignity, and 
toward a weakened, less resilient ecosystem, there needs to be a system that will reward 
those who bring these issues to the attention of policy makers. 
Table 10 Projecting Developments 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
The task of projecting 
developments and problem 
solving is responsibility of 
government and academic 
institutions and policy makers 
using best available science. 
Through regular public 
education and outreach, an 
involved public collaborates 
with academic institutions, 
scientists, and policy makers to 
understand reliable data and 
project developments. 
Policy makers and regulatory 
authorities depend on reliable 
knowledge about trends and 
conditions, but may be unable to 
project unpopular potential 
developments because they are 
either unwilling to buck political 
hazards or are blocked by 
special interest opposition. 
With the input of 
knowledgeable public, scientists 
and policy makers can 
acknowledge mistakes or policy 
failures, learn from them, and 
make adaptive changes, to 
reverse negative trends without 
fear of retribution from the 
governance system. 
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There also must be a way for policy makers to make adaptive changes in an 
attempt to reverse negative trends without fear of retribution from a system more 
concerned with wealth than long-term environmental viability. 
Inventing. Evaluating, and Selecting Alternatives. In our ideal system, an integral 
part of governance is that there is a learning approach that focuses on improving policy 
and practice in the face of uncertainty. Governance and management strategies are 
considered experiments. Learning in our ideal world is promoted through both structural 
experimentation and management flexibility (Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007). Governance, 
and the ability to invent, evaluate, and select alternatives, must be adaptive (Regier and 
Baskerville 1986; Francis and Regier 1995; Straussfogel and Becker 1996; Costanza, 
Low et al. 2001; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007; Brunner 
2010a; Brunner and Lynch 2010b). Under an adaptive governance regime, policy choices 
and interventions are treated as experiments (NRC 2009), relying explicitly on 
monitoring, evaluating, and terminating failed policies instead of expert-driven planning 
that relies primarily on science-based technology rather than trial and error (Brunner, 
Steelman et al. 2005). 
Thus alternative experimentation in our ideal system will employ social and 
decision making processes that make use of inter alia of broad participation, rapid 
feedback, reliable intelligence, transparent promotion, and appropriate value trade-offs to 
create a process capable of coping with multiple, complex systems (Table 11). No 
particular set of practices or governance tools can regulate human impacts so as to 
guarantee a resilient and productive ecosystem. All that we can do is attempt to design a 
system that operates under rules that allow sufficient information to be generated over 
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time to enable participants to learn from their mistakes and continually adapt and 
improve the institutional system to operate within natural limits (Francis 1993; Costanza, 
Low et al. 2001; Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007; 
Steelman 2010; Brunner 2010a). These characteristics are many and varied, and are 
largely discussed in the next two sections involving the social and decision-making 
portions of our ideal system. 
Table 11 Inventing, Selecting and Evaluating Alternatives 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
Existing governance is centered 
on legislatively-mandated 
jurisdictional sectors typically 
concerned with one aspect of 
the environment spectrum and 
collaborative projection and 
problem solving are typically 
beyond the scope of fragmented 
jurisdictional limits. 
Government, policy makers, and an 
informed public work together to 
create, invent, evaluate, and select 
alternatives in order to solve problems. 
Agency jurisdictional lines do not 
impede collaboration and focus is on 
problem-solving. Policy choices are 
treated as experiments and failures 
provide a chance to leam and adapt. 
Industry, governance, and 
NGOs develop increasing 
entanglements and strong vested 
interests in maintaining the 
status quo thus change is made 
more difficult when there can be 
a redistribution of wealth and 
power away from existing 
institutions. 
Broad participation, rapid feedback, 
reliable intelligence, transparent 
promotion, and appropriate value 
negotiation contribute to a process 
capable of adaptation to cope with 
multiple complex systems. 
Social Process 
Few would argue with the fact that humans are involved in ecosystem health and 
resilience. Individual behavior expressed singly or through groups and institutions 
defines how natural resources are used, misused, exploited, controlled, conserved or 
restored. Social process gives us a way to map, often roughly, the interaction of people 
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and institutions as they influence the actions, plans, or policies of others, even if there is 
no awareness of the existence of one another: 
The interaction of every individual and organized interest in society - in 
other words, the social process - constitutes the context of every resource 
problem, and neither the problems nor the decision-making processes 
necessary to solve them can be understood unless their context is known 
(Clark 2002, 32) 
Thus this study attempts to map the basics of the social process participants and 
factors at work in each of the case studies. In addition we need to be cognizant that every 
participant in the use of resource services and every player with a potential say in the 
governance of the human activities that impact the ecosystem employs strategies in order 
to pursue particular values and/or outcomes. Typically, as people seek to improve their 
well-being by acting in ways that they perceive will leave them better off than if they had 
acted otherwise, they are engaged in an interplay of human value trade-offs. Generally 
no amount of "cold, hard facts" collected by "neutral objective" scientists, no amount of 
"education," or "transparency" can completely neutralize basic inherent value differences 
or perceptions among people. Certainly, however, this realization should not take away 
from the fact that there are common interests and the need to attempt to clarify and secure 
them (Lasswell 1971; Clark, Willard et al. 2000; Clark 2002). 
In order to examine the social process components in our ideal system, we will 
use the elements set forth by the policy sciences framework described in Chapter II as a 
guide. We will, therefore, examine the social process of our ideal system by asking the 
questions: Who should be participating? With what perspectives? In which situations? 
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Using what strategies? With what outcomes? And with what effects (Clark, Willard et al. 
2000; Clark 2002)? 
Participants. In the traditional governance scenario, a key aspiration for 
proponents of efficiency and scientific management is to use the latest scientific 
knowledge and expert, disinterested personnel. As we have seen, the key participants in 
traditional resource management are experts and scientists, with government relying upon 
their divination and implementation of the best available science (Berkes, Colding et al. 
2003; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Fiorino 2006) Further, pressure groups concerned 
with single interests, i.e. navigation, fishing, irrigation, join with administrative agencies 
in charge of individual programs as well as congressional committees to defeat any 
attempt at an integrated approach. Conservation and environmental groups also join in 
the policy process often belatedly and usually in a single-interest context (Brunner, 
Steelman et al. 2005) Courts are participants in traditional natural resource management 
to resolve conflicts (Fiorino 2006). Thus top-down, command-oriented, fragmented 
natural resource and environmental policy management are the rule in traditional 
governance (Weber 2003). 
In any ideal ecosystem management regime (Table 10) there must be an 
expectation or at least the opportunity for meaningful participation and input of a broad 
segment of the regulated population in decision making processes (Costanza, Norton et 
al. 1992; Pauly and Maclean 2003). Significant, meaningful public participation is 
required (Becker 1993; Cortner and Moote 1999; Jackson 2005). Participation must be 
open to almost any person or group with a significant interest in the issue (Brunner, 
Steelman et al. 2005). Regulatory agencies must participate in coordinated and integrated 
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fashion and allow softer local and regional input into governance (Regier and Baskerville 
1986; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Citizen 
involvement and partnership designed to build "civic science" is needed, not public 
information programs to inform passively (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). Better 
governance and enhanced accountability can come through grass roots ecosystem 
management i.e. the ongoing, collaborative governance arrangement in which inclusive 
coalitions of the unalike (citizens, government regulators, small businesses, 
environmentalists, commodity interests, and others) come together to resolve policy 
problems affecting the environment, economy, and communities of a particular place 
(Weber 2003) (See Table 12). 
Table 12 Participants 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
Governance relies chiefly on "impartial" 
scientists and experts to determine the best 
available science to address (or develop 
plans) concerning natural resource use. 
Pressure groups participate typically on 
single issues of importance to their specific 
values and strive to defeat integrated 
approaches. Public informed, if at all, 
through passive public information 
programs. 
Significant, meaningful public participation 
is required. The expectation is for 
significant meaningful participation and 
input of a broad segment of the affected 
population in decision making processes. 
Participation must be open to almost any 
person or group with a significant interest 
in the issue. Active outreach to develop 
citizen involvement and partnerships and 
build "civic science" base 
Top-down bureaucracies are the chief 
means of enforcement of uniform rules and 
regulations 
Regulatory agencies must participate in 
coordinated and integrated fashion and 
allow softer local and regional input into 
governance. 
Perspectives. Since each participant in a policy process will have a different way 
of viewing any policy issue it is important to try to understand the perspectives of 
participants in order to help understand the differences and similarities in the quest to 
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clarify and secure common interests. Perspectives are manifested through identity, 
expectations and demands (Clark, Willard et al. 2000; Clark 2002). 
Identity, frequently shaped by myth, is at the center of a participant's perspective. 
"Conservationist" or "libertarian" are expressions of identity and overall can represent a 
rather stubborn pattern of behavior which can be studied and anticipated when common 
interests are sought. Parochialism, or a narrow, close-to-home outlook on the world, has 
diminished a bit over time and now is basically seen as a barrier to the development of 
cooperative solutions to problems. Parochialism may be contrasted with universalism, 
which encompasses a broader, more encompassing view that takes into account the 
experiences of all humanity (Clark 2002). 
John Dryzek (2005) helped to shine some light on perspective in the context of 
complex environmental issues when he developed and defined a series of discourses 
which attempt to characterize the perspectives that people and organizations view the 
environment. A discourse is essentially a shared way of looking at the world. It enables 
those who prescribe to a particular discourse to convert information into a form 
understandable to them. Each discourse has its own philosophy, and proponents share 
assumptions, judgments and positions, creating their own version of reality after filtering 
information through the filter of their discourse. A discourse may further be classified 
with respect to its positions on economic growth and development (or industrialism), the 
nature and manner of environmental problem solving, the motivation and identity of the 
chief decision makers in the discourse, and the metaphors the discourse uses to convince 
others of the correctness of their positions (Dryzek 1997). Dryzek labels the various 
discourses. For example, the Promethean discourse views natural resources as 
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inexhaustible. Those that adhere to this discourse believe that humans have the ability to 
develop technology to solve any problem presented to them, including environmental 
problems. In fisheries management issues, for instance, I would expect a Promethean to 
believe that the ocean would supply an inexhaustible supply of fish for the world. Should 
facts indicate otherwise, Prometheans might then offer that aquaculture could raise the 
necessary fish while oceans systems recover to be fished another day (Dryzek 1997). 
Another one of Dryzek's discourses pertinent to this study is Administrative 
Rationalism, or as it has been called, the "Leave it to the Experts" discourse (Dryzek 
1997, 75). This description is apt. Administrative rationalists believe that environmental 
problems, and other societal ills and issues, should be left to experts: scientists, 
experienced policy managers and others of a similar stature to manage. The repertoire of 
administrative rationalism includes the professional resource-management bureaucracy 
that makes decisions and implements "natural resource management" responsible for the 
oversight, use and coordination of natural resources (Dryzek 1997,76). Natural resource 
management does not take place in a vacuum in an administrative rationalism discourse, 
and politics can worm its way into scientific or technical management, "especially the 
influence of extractive industry," but administrative rationalism provides a public 
justification for its positions regardless of the accuracy of the avowed justification 
(Dryzek 1997, 77). Pollution control bureaucracies (generally media specific) are an 
indicator of administrative rationalism. 
In Dryzek's (2005) view, when classifying an entity as administrative rationalism 
it is likely that there will be a government more concerned with rational management in 
the service of a clearly defined public interest using the best available expertise than it is 
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with democracy. Scientists and other experts will solve the problems. Thus technical 
experts and managers have a greater say in government decisions than anyone else. The 
motivation of the experts is generally assumed to be one of public interest. 
As was discussed in chapter 2, administrative rationalism folds the scientific 
management paradigm into a discourse or shared way of looking at the world: Scientists 
and experts from many different fields working to solve a problem for the benefit of the 
ecosystem and those who rely upon its products and services. Dryzak (1997) notes that 
the only thing that spoils ecosystem management by experts is politics. Politicians, to an 
administrative rationalist, are not to be trusted with issues on an ecosystem scale, for 
politicians have a short term horizon (the next election), lack the patience to learn, and do 
not have the willingness to tolerate failure for the sake of learning (what we would call 
adaptive management) (Dryzek 1997). 
While administrative rationalism parallels the model of scientific administration 
by marginalizing public input and delegating decisions concerning ecosystem issues and 
conflicts to experts, bureaucracy, and scientists, Dryzek (1997) suggests another 
discourse that more closely resembles our general understanding of a more holistic, 
ecosystem-based perspective to governance. 
Democratic pragmatism, or "Leave it to the People," is a discourse that is 
. .characterized in terms of interactive problem solving within the basic institutional 
structure of liberal capitalist democracy" (Dryzek 1997,99). The term "democratic" is 
used in the title of the discourse to refer to a way of approaching problems in a broad-
based problem-solving manner. "Pragmatism" has two intended connotations. The first 
signifies a practical view of the world. The second refers to the pragmatist philosophies 
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of William James, John Dewey and others who believed that solving complex problems 
in an uncertain world required a rational approach; more specifically, problem solving in 
life as in science - through experimentation. 
Thus democratic pragmatism, like our ideal ecosystem-based approach to 
governance, relies upon expanded use of local knowledge since knowledge that is 
centralized in the hands of any individual or centralized administrative structure is 
typically incapable of solving environmental problems with significant complexity. 
Problem solving therefore becomes a flexible process involving a broad array of 
participants and cooperation across a variety of perspectives, creating an . .essential 
congruence between the demands of rationality in social problem solving and democratic 
values" (Dryzek 1997,100). 
The discourses described by Dryzek (2005) represent more than an intellectual 
exercise. They represent positions, beliefs, and actions that help define and delineate the 
views that people hold that are pertinent to the manner in which policy decisions 
impacting human activities that affect the environment are made. The discourses also 
provide a list of possible indicators that help us to understand whether an existing 
governance system is moving toward democratic pragmatism, or an ecosystem-based 
approach to governance, or whether indicators are telling us that we are stuck in the 
traditional scientific management paradigm represented by the administrative rationalism 
discourse. 
In sum, the traditional paradigm, that we can somehow continue to optimize 
components of a system in isolation of the rest of the system, is proving inadequate to 
deal with the real world's dynamic complexity. The more those elements of an 
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ecosystem are optimized for some specific goal, the more that resilience is diminished. 
Thus the drive for efficiency, or business as usual, effectively makes the total system 
more vulnerable to shocks and disturbances (Gunderson and Holling 2002; Walker and 
Salt 2006). Reliance on the remnants of scientific management results in reliance upon 
science, or even the "best available science." The traditional quest for scientific 
justification is emblematic of perspectives that are driven by opposing views that proffer 
tailored "science" that support their policy views (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Fiorino 
2006). The role of science is viewed as the provider of data needed for litigation 
(Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). 
Perspectives under an ideal ecosystem-based approach to governance requires a 
governance structure that looks to find common ground on policies that advance common 
interests (Brunner 2002). One common interest in ecosystem-based governance is to 
enable management to focus on the natural processes necessary to sustain ecosystem 
structure and function while recognizing the need for human and institutional 
involvement at every level of the ecosystem (Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000). The common 
interest of maintaining and supporting ecosystem integrity should outweigh parochial 
interests in preserving bureaucratic turf or command and control hierarchy. In addition, 
the perspective necessary for ecosystem-based governance should be more universal and 
open to new ideas and experimental approaches rather than parochial and institutionally 
resistant to innovation. Problem solving should be viewed as a flexible process with 
broad participation and a variety of perspectives and should be cognizant that 
environmental, social, and economic systems are related with problems that overlap and 
need to be approached with a concern for human dignity and a respect for democratic 
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values (Dryzek 1997). Finally, perspective involves more than governance but extends to 
the expectations and demands of people (See Table 13). In an ideal world, citizens would 
have the knowledge necessary to adopt collective, community-oriented values instead of 
the selfish materialism of consumer values (Dryzek 1997; Clark 2002). 
Table 13 Perspectives 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
Traditional perspective loses sight of the 
common interest as politics and policy 
have evolved to favor the special or single 
interests over the common good. 
Perspective requires a governance structure 
that looks to find common ground on 
policies that advance common interests. In 
addition, the perspective necessary for 
ecosystem-based governance should be 
more universal and open to new ideas and 
experimental approaches rather than 
parochial and institutionally resistant to 
innovation. 
Scientists and other experts will solve the 
problems. Technical experts and 
managers have a greater say in 
government decisions than anyone else. 
Problem solving should be viewed as a 
flexible process with broad participation 
and a variety of perspectives and should be 
cognizant that environmental, social, and 
economic systems are related with 
problems that overlap and need to be 
approached with a concern for human 
dignity and a respect for democratic 
access. 
Legislative and regulatory perspective 
promotes policies and enforces rules 
dedicated to the controlled exploitation of 
natural resource sectors and components 
for human consumption or use even at the 
risk of permanent harm to the natural 
processes of the ecosystem that produce 
the desired resources. 
Common interest in ecosystem-based 
governance is to enable management to 
focus on the natural processes necessary to 
sustain ecosystem structure and function 
while recognizing the need for human and 
institutional involvement at every level of 
the ecosystem. The common interest of 
maintaining and supporting ecosystem 
integrity should outweigh parochial 
interests in preserving bureaucratic turf or 
command and control hierarchy. 
Situations. Inquiry into this task helps to tell us about the situations in which 
participants - armed with their perspectives - make value demands on each other which 
affect ecosystem functions and services. Participants in an ecosystem governance 
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process may interact in formal or informal settings, on a number of levels, and regularly 
or only during crises. Thus the examination of the situations in which participants 
interact may temper elements depending upon how often the participants interact. It may 
also have spatial issues determined by the geographic boundaries represented by the 
participants. There may be institutional issues that depend upon the degree that power is 
centralized or decentralized in the region and whether regimentation is increasing or 
decreasing. Finally the issue is whether it takes a crisis for participants to mobilize 
participants to alter their perspectives and discourse-related practices in order to resolve 
the crises (Clark 2002). 
In terms of actions between government and stakeholders or participants, 
traditionally participants interact in situations where there is an adversary relationship -
government acting to stop or limit economic or social activity because of environmental 
issues (Fiorino 2006). As we have seen, crisis in the form of collapse or surprise is 
generally the driving force behind interaction. Traditionally, success controlling an 
ecological variable that normally fluctuates leads to reduced resilience. Surprise is the 
result. Crisis, conflict and gridlock emerge when: 
• There is a single target and piecemeal policy 
• A single scale of focus, typically short term and local 
• No realization that all policies are experimental 
• Rigid management with no priority to design interventions as ways 
to test cause and effect assumptions 
• Pathology increases when reaction to conflict is to demand more 
data or more precision in data along with more certainty and more 
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control of information and individuals (Gunderson, Holling et al. 
1995). 
In an ideal system, on the other hand, government acts less on other actors and 
more with other actors in a collaborative and communicative way to understand and 
address problems. There is more frequent, collaborative contact. Thus government 
would require less of the state exerting control over others in society and more of an 
interaction among them (Fiorino 2006). Decision-making and other collaborative 
processes are iterative and ongoing, not simply single-play problem-solving efforts 
(Weber 2003). 
The pathology of the status quo is broken when the issue is seen as a strategic one 
of adaptive policy management, of science at appropriate scales, and of understanding 
human behavior, not a procedural one of institutional control. It requires: 
• Integrated policies, not piecemeal 
• Flexible, adaptive policies, not rigid, locked in ones 
• Planning and management for learning, not simply for economic or 
social product 
• Monitoring designed as a part of active interventions to achieve 
understanding and to identify remedial response, not monitoring 
for the sake of monitoring or purely for enforcement purposes 
• Investments in "eclectic" science, or science on a broad-range of 
topics, not just focused, controlled science 
• Citizen involvement and partnership, not public information 
programs to inform passively (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). 
In our ideal system, the situations in which participants would interact would in 
order to avoid collapse, surprise, or gridlock, might have the following characteristics in 
common: 
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• Frequent collaborative interaction between government and more 
local resource users and the general public. 
• Interactions between government and participants at local and 
regional levels. 
• Situations should be informal and formal, with agencies willing to 
be used as resources for local involvement (Table 14). 
Table 14 Situations 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
Interactions typically occur in 
adversarial situations when government 
acts to stop or limit economic or social 
activity because of environmental 
issues. Inspections, citations, 
enforcement and litigation typify the 
contentious situations. 
Collaboration, communication and 
cooperation between government, 
stakeholders, and the public allow for 
governance that works more with 
participants than on them. This means 
more frequent collaborative interaction 
between government and participants at 
all levels. Further, agencies need to be 
less geared toward enforcement and 
more willing to be used as resources for 
local involvement and for solving 
problems where they arise. 
Other interactions limited to situations 
called for by legislation or regulation 
that requires public hearings in order to 
passively inform the public and/or 
solicit public comments on plans that 
have largely been drafted by or left to 
the discretion of government scientists 
and experts. 
Decision-making and other 
collaborative processes are iterative and 
ongoing, not simply single-play 
problem-solving efforts. The need for 
passive formal public and adversarial 
public hearings can be reduced through 
citizen involvement and partnership, not 
just public information programs to 
inform passively. 
Base Values. The concept of values is key to an understanding of how people 
interact. Values are the medium of exchange which people strive to gain while they use 
values or expend assets to gain them. Thus interactions between people, institutions, 
agencies, and others involve the gain and loss of values. It is this interpersonal and/or 
transactional tug-of-war of values that anyone interested in solving policy problems need 
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to take into account (Brewer and deLeon 1983; deLeon 1988; Clark 2008). Indeed 
environmental policy disputes are almost always "contests over values" despite the fact 
that they are often masked in economic or environmental jargon or appear to revolve 
around technical issues (Layzer 2006). 
What assets or resources do participants use in their efforts to achieve their goals? 
What do they bring to the table? All values, including authority, can be used as bases of 
power. What assets or resources should participants use to achieve their goals? The 
Policy Sciences Framework suggests these include: 
Power is to make and carry out decisions 
Enlightenment is to have knowledge 
Wealth is to have money or its equivalent 
Well-being is to have health, physical and psychological 
Skill is to have special abilities. 
Affection is to have family, friends, and warm community relationships 
Respect is to show and receive deference 
Rectitude is to have ethical standards 
Choices on ecosystem uses and stresses will turn on values. Whose values? The 
answer is probably very different depending upon whether one is looking at the current 
governance regime vs. our ideal system. 
Traditional regulation was frequently based on a zero sum mentality - i.e. that the 
interests of private economic interests in the business community inevitably conflict with 
the broader economic interests of society. Business firms are often viewed as "amoral 
calculators" with a commitment to economic gain above all over values. Thus the old 
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approach was that regulation had to use a blunt hand consisting of legalistic and 
deterrence-based regulation in order to effectively change industry behavior (Fiorino 
2006). 
The behavior of US federal and state agencies is often strongly influenced by 
industrial interests and a desire to minimize or avoid loss of values such as power, wealth 
(i.e. funding), and respect. In decisions involving potential adverse effects on important 
industries (e.g. fishing in New England), agency value losses include decreased budget 
allocations from unsympathetic legislatures so the costs of making decisions that 
adversely affect various industries are often perceived as too great to risk. Agencies rely 
on the support of elected officials and support is often tied to the satisfaction of those 
officials with the agency's contributions to or lack of interference with local or regional 
gains. Backlash against strong conservation methods that may impact economic 
productivity can be severe even at a local level (Wallace 2003). As Wallace (2003) 
found when he reviewed the efficacy of efforts to preserve marine mammals under the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act in the United States (MMPA 1972), values have a strong 
impact on interrelated social factors impeding the cultures of participating organizations 
from adopting measures that would protect marine mammals in a meaningful fashion: 
The role of values in the behavior and interactions of program participants, 
the quality of agency leadership, and communication skills and strategies 
influence decision-making in every stage of the policy process. Even 
where biophysical data strongly influence decision-making, the case 
studies indicate that leadership, communication strategies, and values had 
a profound effect on decision-making (Wallace 2003,112). 
In contrast to the traditional model of resource management which reduces 
agency and institutional (public institutions and private business interests) behavior into a 
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constant quest for power and wealth as capital for the purchase of other values, the policy 
sciences approach has consistently been focused on the intelligence relevant to an 
integration of values derived from interpersonal relations which prizes not the glory of a 
depersonalized state or the efficiency of a social mechanism, but human dignity and the 
realization of human capacities" (deLeon 1988,37 - 38) Thus in an ideal society: 
.. .citizens enjoy a full range of values, a state that has also been called 'a 
commonwealth of human dignity.' A healthy society is possible only 
when citizens enjoy a level of all eight values satisfactory to their needs 
(Clark 2008,45). 
In order to begin to achieve the kind of society described above, governance must 
move away from its administrative rationalist underpinnings. Speaking broadly, the 
values of power and wealth should be utilized to press demands for common interests of 
human dignity, ecosystem integrity and resilience (Holling 1995; Holling and Gunderson 
2002a; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003). Knowledge (enlightenment) should be a goal that, 
as we have seen, is ideally gained from a variety of sources through a process of trial and 
error as much as through traditional experimental science (Brunner and Steelman 2005). 
The bottom line is that we need to move beyond the traditional approach that values 
power and wealth as interrelated ends in themselves: 
Rosa Parks' refusal to move to the back of the Birmingham bus released 
the flood gates of the civil rights movement, not because she was 
powerful, but because her act symbolized and tapped the deprivation of 
respect felt by millions of others like her. Many other sympathetic values 
were certainly involved, and later decisions sought to allocate them more 
equitably than before. Power and wealth were not sought as ends nearly 
so much as they were used as means to acquire access to other values: 
respect (non-discrimination in jobs and housing), skill (job training and 
educational opportunities), well-being (nutrition and health programs), and 
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rectitude (realization of long-denied constitutional guarantees and simple 
recognition as fellow human beings) (Brewer and deLeon 1983,16). 
While transitioning to a broader and more collaborative governance process is 
different from the genesis of the civil rights movement, there are similarities given how 
society must adjust the priorities of our personal and institutional values. The 
characteristics of an ideal ecosystem approach to governance demand a heavy reliance on 
significant public participation, collaboration, resilience, and learning through trial and 
error. The values necessary for the implementation of an ecosystem-based approach 
must move away from the traditional goals of power and wealth as ends in themselves. 
In order for implementation of an ecosystem-based approach to governance to have a 
chance there needs to be much more emphasis on utilizing power and wealth to obtain 
stronger inputs from the values of knowledge, rectitude, well-being, and respect. A trial-
and-error approach to management solutions, for example, requires a strong commitment 
to the gathering and sharing of knowledge together with an ability to acknowledge 
failures without the fear that funding will be lost. In addition, collaboration and 
significant public participation will require a focus on the values of respect, affection, 
rectitude and well-being. There is simply no way to gain the trust, credibility, and respect 
necessary for problem-solving and planning collaboration and public and broad-based 
community support without a shift more in the direction of these important values. 
Thus our ideal system (Table 15) must be characterized by resource sharing and 
collaborative efforts designed to bring a broad base of the public and regulated interests 
together with regulators to share ideas, develop knowledge, and gain mutual respect to 
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identify goals, threats to those goals, and possible actions to take in order to preserve and 
restore ecosystem resilience. 
Table 15 Base Values 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
Traditional approach values power 
and wealth as interrelated ends in 
themselves. 
The values of power and wealth 
should be utilized to press demands 
for common interests prioritizing 
human dignity, ecosystem integrity 
and resilience. Knowledge 
(enlightenment) should be a goal that 
is ideally gained from a variety of 
sources through a process of trial and 
error as much as through traditional 
experimental science. 
Agency and institutional (public 
institutions and private business 
interests) behavior is essentially a 
constant quest for power and wealth 
as capital for the purchase of other 
values or die preservation of existing 
power and wealth, e.g. Agency turf 
or budget, private corporate profits, 
non-profit organizations donations 
and prestige. Other values are too 
often secondary. 
In order for implementation of an 
ecosystem-based approach to 
governance to have a chance there 
needs to be much more emphasis on 
utilizing power and wealth to obtain 
stronger inputs from die values of 
knowledge, rectitude, well-being, and 
respect 
Strategies. There are various strategies that people and institutions may employ 
in order to pursue their values. The four basic strategies that will be included in this 
study are: 
• Diplomatic strategies which use communication among and between the 
leaders of any group or agency to foster collaborative opportunities to 
problem solving which engage the multiple interests concerned; 
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• Ideological strategies that involve communications to a public that is 
wider than just leaders or heads of agencies and include public talks, 
newspaper and other mass media appeals and, in the extreme, propaganda; 
• Economic strategies that consist of practices that rely on the production 
and distribution of goods and services. Boycotts and labor actions are 
included in economic strategies (Clark 2002), and 
• Litigation which in this study is defined as disputes that are submitted for 
binding resolution by a third party7 (e.g. lawsuits and other legal action; 
mediated or negotiated proceedings, etc.). 
In the traditional governance scheme, strategies typically are built upon a 
regulatory format and therefore rely upon regulation using economic or social 
intervention to force compliance with uniform rules. Where this intervention fails, 
litigation provides the remedy (Fiorino 2006). Thus status quo strategies use litigation as 
a principle weapon in the management arsenal (Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 2004; Walker 
and Salt 2006). Indeed it has been noted that the United States more often relies on 
lawyers, legal threats, and legal maneuvering in implementing public policies and 
attempting to hold governmental officials accountable, not to mention other civil and 
criminal proceedings (Buhi and Feng 2009). 
7 Most of the Policy Sciences literature sets forth four strategies, to wit: diplomatic, idealogical, economic, 
and military deLeon, P. (1988). Advice and Consent: The Development of the Policy Sciences. New York, 
Russel Sage Foundation, Clark, T. W., A. R. Willard, et al., Eds. (2000). Foundations of Natural Resources 
Policy and Management. New Haven, Yale University Press, Clark, T. W. (2002). The Policy Process: A 
Practical Guide for Natural Resource Professionals. New Haven, Yale University Press.. As the military 
option is not typically a realistic strategy in the negotiation and resolution of environmental issues, I have 
eliminated military as a strategy option and added litigation which, in my experience, is a strategy of last 
resort employed relatively often in environmental disputes. 
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From the time of the nation's formation commentators like Alexis de Toqueville 
(2005) couldn't help but note that the American governance scheme . .entrusted huge 
political power to their courts..(Gross and Dodge 2005,120). A strong, death-grip­
like reliance upon lawyers, judges, and the rule of law most likely stems from two 
different and powerful elements: "first, a political culture (or set of political attitudes) 
that expects and demands comprehensive governmental protections from serious harm, 
injustice, and environmental dangers - and hence a powerful, activist government - and, 
second, a set of governmental structures that reflect mistrust of concentrated power and 
hence that limit and fragment political and governmental authority" [emphasis original] 
(Buhi and Feng 2009,15). 
America's obsession with litigation as a first-line strategy, however, does not 
stem from any unique genetic or social/culture predisposition to "litigiousness:" 
Rather, American adversarial legalism arises from political traditions and 
legal arrangements that provide incentives to resort to adversarial legal 
weapons. Such weapons are used far less frequently in parliamentary 
democracies with different institutional mechanisms for addressing social 
problems. Put another way, American adversarial legalism arises from the 
relative absence of institutions that effectively channel contending parties 
and groups into less expensive and more efficient ways of resolving 
disputes, ensuring accountability, regulating business, and compensating 
victims of injury or economic misfortune [emphasis original] (Buhi and 
Feng 2009, 34). 
It would appear, therefore, that the general proclivity for Americans to use 
adversarial confrontation or litigation as a strategy for redressing perceived wrongs and 
for stopping or stalling regulatory efforts to implement, or not, environmental limitations 
or regulations (Rosenbaum 2008), does not have to be the primary strategy. Different 
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approaches and some institutional change, including greater use of mediation, facilitation 
and other alternative dispute mechanisms can be developed and mandated. 
An ecosystem-based approach, therefore, would requires movement away from 
regulatory enforcement efforts geared toward targeted interventions at point sources and 
problem areas in the form of commands to different classes of firms mandating change in 
existing technologies or behavior (Table 14). Instead there should be a movement toward 
cooperation and collaboration in decisions about processes and raw materials, 
sustainability planning integrating environmental goals with other social and economic 
goals using diplomatic and ideological strategies. Certainly there will always be a need 
for basic rules backed by the coercive power of the state in order to keep firms in line and 
not give unfair competitive advantage to environmentally noncompliant firms (Harrison 
1995). The point is that ecosystem-based approach governance would seek to work with 
the regulated public to a greater degree. This might mean that technical violations that 
cause no harm and are no threat can be overlooked. It might also mean that plants or 
industries with excellent environmental histories receive less attention than those with a 
history of problems. These decisions, of course, would need to be made by field 
inspectors and front line regulators that are well-trained and capable of exercising the 
discretion necessary to implement a more flexible regulatory approach. 
The presence of a bridging organization that connects and navigates the interests 
of different stakeholders as well as across organizational levels should also be integral 
part of adaptive governance of social-ecological systems. Bridging organizations have 
become increasingly necessary as realization grows that conventional science is no longer 
adequate to deal with the nonlinearity and complexities inherent in the management of 
112 
activities that impact the environment (Ludwig, Hilborn et al. 1993; Reid, Berkes et al. 
2006). The Quincy Library Group, Henry's Fork, and the Applegate Partnerships, 
discussed elsewhere, are examples of the creation of multiple interest bridging 
organizations created to fill contentious management gaps existing in traditional 
management laws and practices (Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Reid, Berkes et al. 2006; 
Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007; Armitage and Plummer 2010; Brunner 2010a). 
Farther to the north, a diverse group of interested parties came together to form the Arctic 
Borderlands Ecological Knowledge Co-op in order to buttress traditional science with 
local knowledge and to monitor and assess ecosystem changes in the traditional range of 
the Porcupine Caribou herd - a range that transcends the political border between the 
Canadian Yukon Territories and the U.S. state of Alaska (Artic_Borderlands 2012). The 
bottom line is that it is increasingly evident that knowledge is contextual and that there 
has been space created for considering other systems of knowledge in scientific 
assessments, including political inputs, values, worldviews, and other options that need to 
be recognized, negotiated and resolved (Reid, Berkes et al. 2006). 
Such organizations provide social incentives by rewarding and creating space for 
collaboration, value formation, and innovation. The collaboration that bridging 
organizations initiate is strategic,; conditional on the goals to enhance the values from the 
ecosystems (Hahn, Schultz et al. 2008). 
In the final analysis (Table 16), strategies in an ecosystem-based approach should 
be more goal-oriented and should have institutions and processes that enable and 
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incentivize more diplomatic and ideological strategies and discourage the use of more 
adversarial and/or litigious strategies. 
Table 16 Strategies 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
Strategies typically are built upon a regulatory 
format and therefore rely upon bureaucratic 
regulation and enforcement using economic or 
social/punitive intervention to force 
compliance with uniform rules. 
Strategies are more directed toward 
ideological and diplomatic practices. An 
ecosystem-based approach would rely more 
on ideological and diplomatic strategies, 
moving away from regulatory enforcement 
efforts geared toward targeted interventions at 
point sources and problem areas which take 
the form of commands to different classes of 
firms mandating change in existing 
technologies or behavior. Instead there would 
be cooperation and collaboration in decisions 
about processes and raw materials, 
sustainability planning integrating 
environmental goals with other social and 
economic goals. 
Thus status quo strategies use litigation or the 
threat of litigation as die principle weapon in 
the management arsenal 
Litigation will play a role as there is a need for 
basic rules to be backed by the coercive power 
of the state in order to keep firms in line and 
not give unfair competitive advantage to 
environmentally noncompliant firms. 
Litigation would, however, rely more upon 
alternative dispute mechanisms, including 
facilitation and mediation. 
Citations and enforcement are fragmented 
under an array of bureaucracies at various 
levels (local, state, provincial, and federal). 
Compliance can be confusing and costly and 
may not be consistent with overall goals. 
The existence of a bridging organization that 
connects and navigates the interests of 
different stakeholders across organizational 
levels should be integral part of adaptive 
governance of social-ecological systems. 
Such organizations provide social incentives 
by rewarding and creating space for 
collaboration, value formation, and 
innovation. The collaboration that bridging 
organizations initiate is strategic; conditional 
on the goals to enhance the values from the 
ecosystems 
Outcomes. Outcomes, generally short-term but may be medium or long-term as 
well, are the culminating events measured in terms of values that may be seen as 
indicative of progress, or not, depending on the perspective of the participants. Outcomes 
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may take the form of changes in process, or institutions, which, at least in terms of a 
transition to ecosystem-based governance, indicate movement toward the creation and 
implementation of the perspectives and institutional structures that are conducive to 
innovation and/or sustained attention to the situation of concern. 
In terms of our ideal system, progress would be indicated by efforts to share 
power with and distribute more values to a greater portion of the public. If analysis of the 
values set forth in our social process reveals that more power and wealth is being 
accumulated by fewer entities, which would reflect a negative trend to those who seek to 
move in the direction of a more ecosystem-based approach to governance. If, on the 
other hand, there are tangible efforts toward creating governance processes and structures 
that encourage public participation, collaboration, the mobilization of local knowledge, 
and more adaptable, accountable, and flexible management, then outcomes are headed in 
a direction consistent with ecosystem-based governance. 
Thus in our ideal system (Table 17) we would simply be looking for progress on 
the goals of the participants. Indicators of progress might include continuous or routine 
conversation and sharing of intelligence through a process that can determine progress on 
goals. In addition, there should be a movement toward structures and processes that 
provide more accountability to the public and stakeholders. Another positive indicator 
would be signs that regulatory activities reveal that institutions are more collaborative, 
cooperative, and integrated as opposed to adversarial and litigious. Institutions and 
governance should show signs of being able to innovate and learn from their experiences 
with successes being scaled up to other regions and contexts. 
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Table 17 Outcomes 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
If analysis reveals that more power 
and wealth is being accumulated by 
fewer entities it would reflect a 
negative trend to those who seek to 
move in the direction of a more 
ecosystem-based approach to 
governance. 
Indicators of progress include 
continuous or routine conversation 
and sharing of intelligence through a 
process that can determine progress 
on goals. Progress also indicated by 
a movement toward structures and 
processes that provide more 
accountability to the public and 
stakeholders. Another positive 
indicator would be signs that 
regulatory activities are more 
collaborative, cooperative, and 
integrated as opposed to adversarial 
and litigious. 
Stubborn adherence to uniform top-
down bureaucratic regulation with 
continued adversarial strategies 
would be indicative of a lack of 
progress of transition toward 
ecosystem-based governance. 
Institutions and governance should 
show signs of being able to innovate 
and learn from their experiences 
with successes being scaled up to 
other regions and contexts. 
Effects. Effects represent true change. They are the long-term outcomes in terms 
of values, processes, and institutional innovation (Clark 2002). The characteristics of 
ecosystem-based approaches to governance are set forth earlier in this chapter and 
provide us with a shopping list of goals at which to aim. Outcomes would be changes in 
governance that help to develop and implement those characteristics. 
In essence, effects developed for our ideal system would include innovative 
measures that would transforming current governance entities and create new or modified 
value institutions that get beyond scientific management and strict command and control 
hierarchy of bureaucracy using local input and collaborative processes (Brunner and 
Steelman 2005; Coe-Juell 2005; Fiorino 2006; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). It 
would allow for softer and more voluntary local or regional regulation of activities that 
impact the ecosystem consistent with community goals and national standards. Indicators 
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of effects that would evidence a change for the better in terms of a broader, more 
accountable and adaptable ecosystem-based approach we expect to effects that would 
foster greater respect and cooperation between regulators and regulated public and 
increased knowledge among public to understand that their actions impact the 
environment. There should also be evidence of a greater acceptance by regulators of 
public and community input and decision-making (Table 18). 
Table 18 Effects 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
Continuation of status quo 
governance with no or 
insignificant change. Existing 
institutions preserve values of 
power and wealth and there is 
continuation of failed policies and 
processes of the past - although 
sometimes under new names. 
Transition toward a more adaptive 
ecosystem-based approach to 
governance. Innovative measures 
are tried that transform current 
governance entities and create 
new or modified value institutions 
that get beyond scientific 
management and strict command 
and control hierarchy of 
bureaucracy using local input and 
collaborative processes 
The social process, and more specifically the outcomes and effects analyzed 
within the social function, are necessarily dependent upon the problem orientation and 
decision process functions. An examination of the effects element of the framework 
assures that we do not neglect to look at the overall changes and cumulative impacts of 
many changes implemented on a number of scales. With that acknowledgement of the 
need to assess the larger picture, we can now turn to an examination of the decision 
process and the characteristics that might be grounded therein in order to effectively 
create much-needed change and innovation designed to improve existing governance. 
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Decision Process 
It bears repeating at this juncture that the purpose of this dissertation research is to 
examine the governance processes in place in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region to 
determine whether existing governance has the capacity adopt a more ecosystem-based 
approach to the management of the human activities that impact the ecosystem. This 
chapter has reviewed the literature that provides a compelling basis for the conclusion 
that our current scientific management approaches are unable to effectively contain many 
of the forces that are leading to an overall degradation of the ecosystem. The comparison 
of the social process and problem orientation functions under traditional vs. ecosystem-
based governance in the above analysis shows us that newer governance trends require 
the significant involvement of an educated public in governance structures that rely less 
on the institutional top-down enforcement of regulatory laws and more on softer and 
more local community efforts involving the collaboration of a broad spectrum of affected 
parties and other participants. 
The problem orientation and social processes of the current management 
processes have been reviewed using the framework provided by the policy sciences See 
Chapter II). In addition the framework has been used to present governance process and 
content alternatives in terms of the problem orientation and the social processes that 
society should be moving toward. In this manner a new governance regime is being 
proposed component-by-component. We now turn our attention to the Decision Process. 
No meaningful progress can be made toward environmental sustainability may 
occur without an active and fully engaged public able to utilize a responsive, attentive 
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governance system. "... [Wjhether society can move toward ecological sustainability will 
depend on the health of our governance process" (Cortner and Moote 1999, xi) Thus 
notions of human dignity and a fair distribution of values are integral to the ability and 
willingness of a community to pitch in and become an active part of the effort to clarify 
and secure common interests that can lead to the restoration of our ecosystems to healthy, 
functional, and resilient systems that are able to sustainably supply the ecosystem 
services upon which humans depend for their continued survival. 
Natural resource policy and management are mostly often thought of as a process 
of decision making. An examination of the decision process practiced in a given 
ecosystem governance regime requires mapping the six interlinked functions of 
intelligence, promotion, prescription, implementation8, termination, and appraisal. This 
systematic analysis can turn up flaws in the decision process that cause restoration plans 
to fail. Knowing how a decision process works, or doesn't work, participants can 
maintain good practices or correct a poorly functioning one. A decision process can be a 
way of reconciling or at least productively managing competing interests and policies 
through politics. Politics will always be with us because people seek different policies 
that reflect their particular, or "special", interests. In many cases, however, as in 
sustainability management, people must reconcile interest differences to clarify and 
secure their common interests. Investigation should reveal who establishes what the 
common interests are or should be. In terms of ecosystem-based governance, trends can 
8 The policy sciences analytical framework generally includes an examination of seven interlinked 
functions. For purposes of this study, I have combined the functions of invocation and application into one 
function: implementation. In this manner enforcement and adjudicatory functions may be analyzed 
together in a more meaningful and less redundant manner. This has been done in the examination of other 
environmental conflicts using the analytical framework. See, e.g. Clark, S. G. (2008). Ensuring Greater 
Yellowstone's Future. New Haven, Yale University Press. 
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be determined that might indicate whether intelligence (see below) data is reliable and 
linked to the appropriate scales within an ecosystem, whether such intelligence is being 
communicated to policy makers in a meaningful manner and, ultimately, whether a 
structure exists that allows for decision makers to react to intelligence in an adaptive 
fashion. Note that ecosystem-based governance requires a decision process that is open 
and transparent, not slanted toward special interests and power (Clark 2002). In terms of 
ecosystem-based governance, trends can be determined that might indicate whether 
intelligence data is reliable and linked to the appropriate scales within an ecosystem, 
whether such intelligence is being communicated to policy makers in a meaningful 
manner and, ultimately, whether a structure exists that allows for decision makers to react 
to intelligence in an adaptive fashion, and whether there is impartial third-party appraisal 
of existing policies that will permit participants to adapt or even terminate programs. 
Note that ecosystem-based governance requires a decision process that is open and 
transparent, not slanted toward special interests and power (Clark 2002). 
Intelligence. Intelligence is the process of obtaining and processing information 
and making it available to decision makers, stakeholders, members of the public, and 
others (Clark 2002). It involves the generation of knowledge, the transmission of 
knowledge, the use of knowledge, and the effects of knowledge on the policy process. 
Knowledge relevant to environmental decision making may be generated by scientists as 
well as local knowledge. It may also come in the form of public preferences, i.e. beliefs 
and priorities that give clues to the support of or opposition to given choices or outcomes 
and the intensity of those positions. In other words, what groups are for or against a 
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proposed policy and how much power do they have to influence the outcome (Ascher, 
Steelman et al. 2010). 
Earlier in this chapter there was discussion centered on the idea that our current 
status quo of limiting the process of gathering of intelligence largely to scientists and 
other experts who then confine transmission of research and data to members of their 
own discipline needs some improvement. Knowledge disseminated through peer-review 
processes may help to ensure some measure of reliability and assurance of rigor, but there 
are also distributional consequences that have the effect of screening out knowledge that 
policymakers should take into account (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). 
As opposed to the traditional way of dealing with the gathering, transmission, and 
processing of intelligence, new more participatory and transparent approaches may be 
more effective in making a difference and improving our environmental practices. 
Intelligence, for instance, should be comprehensive and gathered at appropriate scales in 
order to detect trends and changes in ecosystem resilience and function (Lasswell 1971; 
Gunderson and Holling 2002; Gunderson 2003; Reid, Berkes et al. 2006). Intelligence 
and information must then be made available to researchers, scientists and the public. In 
order for the public to be interested and be able to understand the data and other 
intelligence, significant public outreach and capacity building is required (Becker 1993) 
Social capacity is also characterized in terms of capital, especially social capital (trust, 
skills in collaboration, and conflict resolution), human capital (advancement in different 
knowledge systems), and cultural capital (beliefs about how people, nature, and society 
are related) (Fiorino 2006). Bridging organizations help bring these out, as well as help 
to foster collaboration between social capacity and institutional capacity (Hahn, Schultz 
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et al. 2008). Local groups able to inventory and sample the natural resources with results 
communicated to a variety of actors, including the general public, using a wide range of 
methods, are preferable to the kind of closed process we have now that collects and 
transfers knowledge only amongst a select group of peer review journal aficionados. 
Information, collected by a range of volunteers under the guidance of a blend of scientific 
and local knowledge and transferred freely provides the basis for feedback loops required 
for the holistic and sustainable management of complex systems (Walker and Salt 2006). 
Monitoring systems designed to detect the responses of both natural and social systems to 
intervention are critical elements of such an intelligence system. 
Broader public and community involvement in the gathering and transmission of 
data is no longer a novel idea. There are numerous examples of collaborative groups of 
scientists, government agency representatives, stakeholders and the public joining forces 
to develop indicators, monitor conditions, and assess trends. In the McKenzie River 
watershed straddling northern Alaska and the Yukon, the Arctic Borderlands Ecological 
Knowledge Co-op, comprised of government scientists, local resource users (hunters and 
fishers), state and territorial government representatives, and open to participation to 
anyone who wishes to maintain and improve the program, has been operating since 1996. 
It began when a rift developed between government scientists and community 
representatives concerning the accuracy and value of different types of information. In 
the past, the same situation would be handled at meetings run by government 
representatives respectfully acknowledging the differences and then proceeding to 
strengthen the science-based approach. At a meeting in the mid-1990's the community 
decided to tackle the issue and developed a monitoring plan that sought to improve the 
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collective understanding of conditions and trends by using local observations, traditional 
ecological knowledge, science-based research and monitoring, as well as government 
records. The 1996 meeting morphed into an annual gathering with members reporting on 
a list of some seventy indicators. Led, but not owned, by Environment Canada, residents 
and scientists meet to trade information and discuss trends and conditions and make 
decisions by consensus on the Co-op's plans (Reid, Berkes et al. 2006). 
Similarly, residents of the Applegate Valley watershed in southern Oregon lived 
in crisis mode for most of the 1980s due to the polarization and conflict between loggers 
and conservationists as a result of the spotted owl controversy. In the early 1990s, 
however, two unlikely collaborators in the form of a life-long logger and a staunch 
environmentalist began talking to one another. Their discussions planted the seed for 
what ultimately became known as the Applegate Partnership. This community-based 
partnership was comprised of representatives from industry, conservation groups, natural 
resource agencies, and residents whose goal was to move away from the frustrating "my 
opinion against yours; my expert against yours; my laws against your guidelines" 
dynamic that had marked historic interactions. The partnership was able to rid 
themselves of the "us" versus "them" mentality. Goals and a mission statement 
developed with the assistance and input of the public drive the partnership. Local 
knowledge is critically important. The partnership elected a board of directors whose 
nominations were based not on affiliations but on their desire to work toward solutions 
and put ecosystem health in front of private agendas. Their decisions and deliberations 
involve significant public participation, formal and informal transparency, and 
successfully focus on creating trust and working together to solve to solve problems and 
123 
ease conflict (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000,140 - 141). Admittedly the ultimate 
decisions on timber sales and fire suppression methods remain within the mandate of 
national and state laws and agencies, but the information and input from the Applegate 
Partnership has provided creative new ideas and methods of implementation that have 
provided traditional management with effective "outside the box.. .prescriptions" and 
have produced better information that "increases the legitimacy of agency decision 
making" (Weber 2003,115). 
Many more examples exist of community partnerships that have resulted in 
effective and accountable governance and management with shared research and fact­
finding as a pivotal element in their success. In central Michigan public monitoring is 
critical to efforts to save the Kirtland Warbler populations. The Eel River Delta 
Sustainable Agriculture Committee in Humboldt County, California, receives funding 
from state and federal agencies to test water quality throughout the delta in order to 
determine the impacts of land use to the water quality in the region. The bottom line is 
that by using the public and stakeholders to assist with the gathering and sharing of 
information, uncertainty is reduced and personal relationships among participants are 
strengthened while trust is created (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). 
In sum, in an ideal system that uses an ecosystem-based approach to governance, 
there are common elements that we would expect to find in terms of the use of 
knowledge and the gathering of data and information relevant to ecosystem and 
socioeconomic conditions (Table 19). In the first place we would expect to find that 
intelligence relevant to the goals of the community is being collected for all relevant 
components of the ecosystem and from all affected people regardless of political borders. 
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Intelligence must come from a broad array of participants that includes information from 
scientists, academics, the regulated public, and the public at large. Intelligence must then 
be communicated to appropriate institutions for analysis and coordinated action. There is 
reliable monitoring and intelligence matched in scale to the multiple scales of the 
ecosystem. Intelligence is communicated to an accountable entity, i.e. a person, 
partnership, or other entity that has an obligation or responsibility to an authority, group, 
standard, mandate or behavior norm external to that person or entity (Weber 2003). 
Finally there should be overlapping governance structures that enhance the resilience of 
social shocks and adds to the resilience of adaptive governance (Berkes, Colding et al. 
2003; Gunderson 2003; Walker, Gunderson et al. 2006) 
Table 19 Intelligence 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
Intelligence function, including selection 
of data to be collected, data collection, 
monitoring, and analysis is the 
responsibility of experts and scientists 
within various government agencies with 
fragmented jurisdictions. 
System is facilitated by identification of 
intelligence needs and enabled by 
cooperative agreements among relevant 
entities to assure reliability, compatibility, 
timely analysis and accessibility. 
Intelligence must come from a broad array 
of participants that includes scientists, 
academics, the regulated public, and the 
public at large. 
Information is kept within agency or 
department that collected and analyzed the 
data or information and access may be 
provided through data base or publication. 
No bridging organization exists to view the 
"big picture" and detect adverse trends or 
make policy changes as a result of trend 
data. 
Intelligence must be communicated to an 
accountable entity for analysis and 
coordinated action, i.e. a person, 
partnership, or other entity that has an 
obligation or responsibility to an authority, 
group, standard, mandate or behavior norm 
external to that person or entity. 
Intelligence and information must be made 
readily available to researchers, scientists 
and the public. 
Information and analysis largely 
communicated through publication in peer-
review publications. Public and 
community have limited access to 
information and data. Public generally 
uninformed unless or until there is a crisis 
or "surprise." 
In order for the public to be interested and 
be able to understand the data and other 
intelligence, significant public outreach and 
capacity building is required. 
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Promotion. The gathering of intelligence utilizing a broad spectrum of 
participating entities collaborating at a variety of scales within an ecosystem is vitally 
important. But what should happen to that information? How should it be used and by 
whom in order to decide upon the policy options that will best be able to achieve the 
goals of the community? 
Promotion, sometimes called estimation, involves the function of recommending 
and mobilizing support for policy alternatives and serves to define and even limit the 
possible solutions to a problem. Thus promotion involves the development and analysis 
of alternatives as well as the subsequent efforts to win support and enthusiasm for 
collective action necessary in most cases to achieve needed change. Promotion 
necessarily includes political parties, lobbyists, pressure groups, people, and powerful 
organizations of all types (including business and environmental groups) working to 
shape and share values (Clark 2002; Clark 2008). While confusing and often frustrating, 
democratic promotional outcomes that add "agitational intensity to the dissemination of a 
value demand", are nonetheless preferable to the totalitarian alternative of placing 
promotion exclusively in the hands of a single party that monopolizes and controls debate 
(Lasswell and MacDougal 1992,29). 
It is difficult to get around the reality that promotion, or the generation, 
transmission, and use of knowledge, not only comprise a technical process that creates 
and compiles scientific and local knowledge, but also a political process. Politics is part 
of the deal and can be a process that establishes goals to be implemented by policy. 
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Certainly there is a significant concern that special interest or selfish politics 
intrudes on the policy process with disappointing regularity. Healthy politics, however, 
that includes "policy relevant science, pertinent local information, constructive public 
involvement, and conflict resolution - can serve to clarify and secure the common 
interest in knowledge generation for environmental decision processes" (Ascher, 
Steelman et al. 2010, 8). There should be open, honest debate about what to do. Further, 
the decision process provides" a means of reconciling (or at least managing) conflict 
through politics in order to find a working specification of a community's common 
interests" (Clark 2002, 57). 
Promotion under an ecosystem-based approach to governance differs markedly 
from the traditional expert-driven planning model that relies almost exclusively on 
science- and expert-based technology. Under the traditional view, only experts are 
qualified to make and implement sound management plans. Promotion is done by 
bureaucracies - bureaucracies that are also responsible for enforcement of uniform rules 
and regulations (Fiorino 2006). 
The alternative under an ecosystem-based approach would require the 
development of processes of promotion designed to get to the common interests over 
special interests. This will include strong public education and outreach followed by 
open debate about policy choices. Community-based initiatives can compensate for the 
limitations of bureaucracies.9 This is very different from the notion that agency experts 
99 One example of a community-based initiative currently in use is the Exeter River Dam Removal Study 
Process. This is a local initiative consisting of a working group with direct oversight of the study of the 
removal of the Exeter River Dam. It is a joint effort among local, state, citizens, federal agencies and other 
bureaucracies to determine whether the dam Exeter dam should be removed and the natural, social, and 
economic impacts of removal vs. non-removal. 
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formulate plans in order to solve problems. Further, social and cultural memory must be 
mobilized by developing links between key persons and providing a direction for 
adaptive governance. This can effectively build social capacity and therefore build 
resilience in social-ecological systems (Berkes, Colding et al. 2003). Further, the 
development of social networks can play a key role in giving practitioners the chance to 
develop support, trust, and sharing of lessons learned which can facilitate processes of 
change at multiple levels (Hahn, Schultz et al. 2008). 
Social memory or the captured experience with change and successful adaptations 
embedded in a deeper level of values is actualized through community debate and 
decision-making process into appropriate strategies for dealing with ongoing change. 
Importantly, it links past experiences with present and future project and provides a 
foundation for modification of rules, typically referring to decadal time scales as opposed 
to months or a year (Hahn, Schultz et al. 2008). Social learning processes are present that 
link the ability of management to respond to environmental feedback and direct the 
coupled social-ecological system into sustainable trajectories. Social learning and 
memory provide context to social responses to ecosystem change, increases the 
likelihood of flexible and adaptive responses, and seems exceptionally important during 
periods of crisis, renewal, and reorganization (Berkes, Colding et al. 2003). 
It is by using these ideas and methods that ranchers, state agencies, 
environmentalists, anglers, miners, and others were able to establish the Upper Clark 
Fork Steering Committee, a watershed initiative established in the early 1990s to solve a 
resource conflict that was headed for litigation by looking beyond traditional water 
management tools and fashioning a compromise agreeable to all parties (Brunner, 
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Colburn et al. 2002). Similarly, in 1992 environmentalists, loggers, residents, and others 
in Quincy, California simply lost patience with the rancor and division between 
environmentalists and logging interests in the community in the wake of the spotted owl 
decision. After numerous incidents of tree spiking, fist-fights, and finally gun shots 
through a local environmental lawyer's windows, a group of traditional opponents began 
to meet at the only location in town that was available, the public library, and ultimately 
agreed on a Community Stability Proposal for the management of the national forests in 
the surrounding area. When the plan met with disdain from the U.S. Forest Service as 
well as with national environmental organizations, the Quincy Library Group took their 
proposal to Congress and ultimately got their plan passed into law despite opposition 
from the Forest Service, Audubon and others (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000; USEPA, 
NOAA et al. 2001). So what was the Quincy Library Group and who were the people 
that formed the group, negotiated an acceptable resolution, and promoted it all the way 
through Congress and, ultimately, to the President? Colburn (2001) described the 
group's composition: 
The Quincy Library Group stabilized at about thirty participants after the 
town meeting in July 1993. They are employees of Sierra Pacific 
Industries and Collins Pine, county supervisors, an environmental lawyer, 
a biologist, a retired airline pilot, a forestry professor, moms, dads, 
husbands, grandparents, business owners, and more. Most are residents of 
Quincy, though a few live in neighboring towns. Participation is 
voluntary - members are not appointed by the QLG, though some 
members have actively encouraged others to participate. One 
member.. .took the initiative to assume the role of unofficial liaison and 
representative for ranchers, because the demands of raising cattle made it 
difficult for them to attend the meetings.. .(USEPA, NOAA et al. 2001, 
186) 
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Thus a community-based initiative can work to clarify the common interest of 
communities embroiled in ecosystem-based conflicts or priorities through the 
development of a policy proposal. With persistence, community-based initiatives can 
build social networks that can survive to bring resilience to governance issues. 
Table 20 Promotion 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
Only experts are qualified to make and 
implement sound management plans 
intended to manage resources for the public 
good - often interpreted as for public use and 
consumption. Promotion is done by 
bureaucracies - bureaucracies that are also 
responsible for enforcement of uniform rules 
and regulations. 
Promotion and politics involve honest debate 
using policy relevant science, pertinent local 
information, constructive public involvement, 
and conflict resolution - which can serve to 
clarify and secure the common interest in 
knowledge generation for environmental 
decision processes. 
Special interest or selfish politics intrudes on 
the policy process with disappointing 
regularity to direct policy initiatives away 
from common interests toward powerful 
single or special interests. 
Development of processes of promotion 
designed to get to the common interests over 
special interests. This will include strong 
public education and outreach followed by 
open debate about policy choices. 
Community-based initiatives can compensate 
for the limitations of bureaucracies. Further, 
social and cultural memory must be 
mobilized by developing links between key 
persons and providing a direction for adaptive 
governance. Social learning and memory 
provide context to social responses to 
ecosystem change, increases the likelihood of 
flexible and adaptive responses, and seems 
exceptionally important during periods of 
crisis, renewal, and reorganization. 
There is another valuable lesson that can be learned from the many community-
based initiatives that have been underway now for decades. Regardless of whether we 
are debating intelligence, promotion, prescription, enforcement, or any other of the 
decision process tasks, the public decision making processes should be perceived as 
legitimate, fair, and wise. Asking the following questions may go far in determining 
whether there is a perception of fairness that could enable successful initiatives: 
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1. Is it Legitimate? Is the process tied to existing law and regulation through the 
direct involvement of responsible officials? Does it provide for significant public 
review and comment opportunities for those who care about the issues but are 
either unable or uninterested in participating directly? If not, is it clear about how 
it is addressing and the topic or problem and open to the concerns of 
stakeholders? 
2. Is it Fair? Does it involve credible representatives of those who will be affected 
by its decisions and recommendations" Is it open, accessible, and transparent so 
that no individual is excluded except by his or her own choice, and no decision is 
imposed without agreement? Finally, are decisions made so that they encourage 
consensus as opposed to capitulation (or at least provide acknowledgement of 
minority perspectives)? 
3. Is it wise? Does the process encourage participants to focus on the problems to be 
solved? Does it promote creativity and flexibility? Is local knowledge used in the 
process? Does the process ensure that decision process ensure that decision 
making is consistent with scientific knowledge or highlight where it is not 
(Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000)? 
The more of these questions that can be answered in the affirmative, the more 
likely it is that traditional governance can give way to more collaborative efforts that 
include community initiatives to solve the "wicked" problems that plague the health of 
our ecosystems (Table 20). 
Prescription. In the prescription, or selection, phase, decisions concerning an 
appropriate law, policy, or management option are chosen. Thus the data, information, 
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and interests that were identified, debated and discussed in the first two phases are 
converted into regulatory and policy choices. The decisions in this phase result in the 
establishment of new rules or guidelines selected to solve a problem or deal with an 
environmental conflict or issue (Clark 2002; Clark 2008). 
It is beyond the scope of this study to propose a flurry of legislative and 
regulatory changes that need to be made in order to secure a sustainable future for the 
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region. I will attempt, however, to describe in broad terms 
the kinds of changes that need to be made if the governance that affects the region is to 
move in a more holistic ecosystem-based manner. 
The traditional or "old" regulatory forms of prescription were designed with a 
1970s view of environmental problems; more specifically, obvious pollution from large 
industrial sources. Regulatory strategies that held polluters accountable through selective 
intervention by government based on a strategy of bureaucratic control were generally 
reasonable and effective tactics (Cortner and Moote 1999; Young 2002; Weber 2003). It 
is time, however, to move on and to recognize that environmental problems have changed 
to a significant degree: 
We have moved from a concern with just controlling pollution to also 
preventing it, reducing risk, promoting eco-efficiency, advancing 
stewardship, and achieving a sustainable economy and society over the 
long term. The environmental "problem" has continually evolved and 
been redefined. This means that in addition to worrying about pollution, 
we now want to use energy, materials, and water efficiently; design 
environmentally friendly products; think about the impacts of products 
over their life cycle; preserve habitat and species; protect the global 
commons; and worry generally about the effects of today's actions on 
future generations (Fiorino 2006, 81). 
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Thus environmental concerns today are far more encompassing than simply 
controlling pollution, rendering the traditional approach to regulation increasingly 
irrelevant to ecosystem preservation and resilience. Traditional regulation does little, for 
instance to address a variety of aspects of industrial performance that impact our 
ecosystems, including the use of energy, materials, and water. There is also little 
regulation over the effects of product use and disposal. This is not to say that 
government must intervene in these activities, but creative ways need to be found to 
balance the regulation using more cooperative and collaborative efforts (i.e. government 
must be at the table). 
The political debate over the last 40 years has been polarized along two disparate 
lines of thought, both of which revolve around a "free market" vs. environmental 
regulation mentality. In short, those who champion a free market and fear the potential 
economic consequences that may accompany increased environmental regulation use a 
variety of strategies to prevent such regulation. On the other side of the debate are often 
those that believe that more stringent government regulation in the fashion of the 
traditional government approaches are necessary to prevent increased harm to the 
ecosystem at all scales. Our ideal system, however, promotes a different approach, 
another way, in which new relationships, structures, and roles are fashioned by careful 
planning with broad-based involvement and implemented on a trial and error basis in 
order to facilitate learning (Fischer 2000; Fiorino 2006). 
Further, while there is little question that some form of regulation and other 
limitations will be necessary; society may simply not be able to afford the cost of the 
traditional methods of environmental regulation and enforcement. Dryzek (1997) argues 
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that the goals of cleaner air and water, fewer toxins and persistent organic pollutants 
circulating in the human environment, a future that includes environmental security, 
improving standards for urban, rural, suburban, and wilderness, collectively place 
incredible demands on traditional government. He calls it the "implementation deficit - a 
substantial gap between what legislation and high-level executive decisions clear will be 
achieved and what is actually achieved at street level" (Dryzek 1997, 82). In short, 
regulators working under traditional prescriptions simply cannot do everything that they 
are required to do under their own laws, rules, and regulations. 
Despite the problems inherent in traditional government regulation, it must be 
made perfectly clear that the design and implementation of new prescriptions does not 
mean doing away with the old one. Government will always play a crucial role in 
regulatory matters. "The new governance arrangements are more of a supplement or 
complement to existing institutions than a complete replacement for them" (Weber 2003, 
245). Many elements of the traditional regulatory scheme will provide a core for new 
initiatives. Government, for instance, will need to maintain core standards that place 
pressure on industry and others to continually improve performance. Further, 
government must have the legal authority and enforcement capability to hold participants 
accountable for meeting the core standards (Fiorino 2006; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007; 
Steelman 2010). 
New regulatory approaches, however, must transition away from the premise of 
the traditional regime that the regulated public will act for the common good only under 
threat of legal sanctions. Further, new regulation should reject the assumption that 
adversarial relationships are superior to collaborative ones. Although pressure on 
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participants must come from government and the community whenever appropriate, 
society must move beyond the habit of finding fault and assigning blame toward a search 
for solutions (Fiorino 2006). 
Much of the discussion of the need for collaboration and cooperation discussed in 
the previous two sections are just as important for the adjustment and development of 
prescriptions in the future. Thus the goals of the prescription as established with 
significant public input should be clear. Prescriptions should then be consistent with 
those goals (Brewer and deLeon 1983; Clark 2002). It is far more likely that 
prescriptions will be consistent with community goals and norms if they are developed 
with procedures that integrate local knowledge and significant local participation 
(MilleniumEcosystemAssessment 2005a; Reid, Berkes et al. 2006; Seixas 2006). 
Further, institutions created, consolidated or limited by prescription should be 
amenable formally or informally to integration horizontally and vertically and their 
jurisdictional impact should transcend political lines with mechanisms that authorize the 
exercise of jurisdiction throughout regional and local ecosystem boundaries (Gunderson 
and Holling 2002). Prescriptions should be flexible enough to allow for adaptive 
measures - enabling learning by trial and error. This ultimately means prescriptions 
should give those who enforce, apply, and review the regulations the ability to make 
appropriate adjustments as experience and learning develop. 
Finally, standards set forth within any new prescription should allow for, or at 
least not preclude, the application of a precautionary approach when presented with 
uncertainty. The 1992 Rio Declaration specifically laid out the foundation for the 
precautionary approach in Principle 15: 
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In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States, according to their abilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation" (UNCED 1992). 
The Precautionary Approach developed out of the Precautionary Principle to deal 
with systems that may be slowly reversible, but are difficult to control, not well 
understood, and are subject to fluctuations in the environment and human values 
(Restrepo, Mace et al. 1999). While the United States has lagged in the implementation 
of the precautionary approach (Whiteside 2006), overall the United Nations has had a 
huge influence on the international acceptance of this concept. Not only was it given 
prominence in the Rio Declaration but it provided the driving force behind international 
agreements and, to some degree, domestic natural resources regulatory statutes 
(Rosenberg 2002). 
The precautionary approach recognizes that the absence of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason to postpone decisions where there is a risk of serious or 
irreversible harm. However, guidance and assurance are required as to the conditions 
governing the actions that will be taken. Guidance and assurance are particularly needed 
when a decision must be made regarding a risk of serious or irreversible harm about 
which there is significant scientific uncertainty. 
The plain language of Principle 15 highlights the need for national/international 
guidance. For the precautionary approach to be triggered, for instance, there must first be 
a situation where there is a threat of serious or irreversible damage. When that is present 
there must next be a perceived lack of certainty about the impact of the threat. Finally, 
affirmative action banning the release or preventing the harm may only occur if the 
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measure is "cost effective." Who makes these decisions? How does an agency 
determine whether a threat has the potential for "serious or irreversible" damage? What 
should the guidelines be for the determination of whether a proposed measure is "cost 
effective?" Finally, who should bear the burden of proof for any of these issues? These 
are issues which must be considered by communities when they modify or adopt 
prescriptions. 
What may make the precautionary approach unique (i.e. different from traditional 
risk analysis) is the notion that the burden of proof be on the proponents of any actions 
that might prove harmful to human health or the environment to show that the impacts 
will be benign, or at least that the harm caused will be outweighed by a 'greater good' 
(i.e. "reverse onus"). It still begs the question of when the actors have to submit such 
actions to an administrative body and what standards should apply to the decision process 
thereafter. One key will be the level of protection that society chooses. The threats can 
then be compared to society's expressed level of protection (e.g. ranging from zero 
tolerance for persistent organic pollutants to some form of threshold limit values 
combined with monitoring and control rules with prearranged management actions in 
response to unanticipated monitoring results - for instance if a regulatory "total allowable 
catch" ("TAC") is hit, by prior agreement the fishery shuts down). 
Involvement of the public in the determination of the desired level of protection, 
through outreach and education, could be expanded so that transparency and full public 
input could give credibility to regulatory efforts. The bottom line is the need for 
overarching law or policy that permits the application of the precautionary approach to all 
relevant aspects of regulation. Guidelines and regulations developed in an agency-by-
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agency fashion would have to meet certain requirements as defined by the legislation. 
The approach can be flexible. It could provide a "balancing of interests" approach so 
frequently found in law, that is, the magnitude of the threat of harm or irreversible 
damage would be weighed against the value to society of the actor's planned act. The 
greater the uncertainty, the more conservative would be the criteria before actions are 
permitted. For example, the burden of proof may be difficult for industry to demonstrate 
that the risk of irreversible harm of the release of dioxins by the pulp and paper mills into 
the waters of Canada and the U.S. outweighs the social value of toilet paper that is whiter 
in appearance than toilet paper manufactured without the need to discharge dioxins. By 
the same token, the risk of genetically-modified foods might pale in comparison to the 
possible starvation of millions in drought-stricken and war-torn nations of Africa and 
Asia. Again, public input into these essentially value-based considerations is critically 
important. 
The United States is not unfamiliar with the precautionaiy approach. In fisheries, 
the precautionary approach and its implementation have rather conveniently fallen into 
the hands of regulators in a manner that facilitates conservation measures and contains 
uniform implementation considerations. The precautionary approach has certainly been a 
key component in a series of binding and non-binding international agreements since Rio. 
These include the FAO International Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing (F.A.O. 
1995a) and the UN Agreement for Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Species 
(United_Nations 1996). The United States is signatory to both these agreements (EPAP 
1999). 
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The Code of Conduct integrates the precautionary approach into all aspects of 
fisheries management and explicitly admonishes parties that "States should apply the 
precautionary approach widely to conservation, management, and exploitation of living 
aquatic resources in order to protect them and preserve the aquatic environment." It 
further emphasizes that "The absence of adequate scientific information should not be 
used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management 
measures" (F.A.O. 1995a; Restrepo, Mace et al. 1999). 
In sum, the prescriptions developed and/or modified in our ideal ecosystem-based 
approach to governance would have a variety of characteristics (Table 20). Overall new 
regulations would adopt principles of social-political governance and facilitate shared 
responsibility and institutional arrangements that promote communication, transparency, 
and dialogue. The traditional".. .strategies of control, commands, and deterrence, should 
give way to a strategy based more on incentives, learning, and accountability" (Fiorino 
2006,194). In addition strong, direct national governmental control of resources, 
especially living marine resources, creates a form of top-down management that makes 
enforcement of regulations and collection of reliable data difficult because of the 
resentment and resistance in the regulated community (Pauly and Maclean 2003). It's 
probably time to develop prescriptions that are consistent with a broader, more informed, 
constituent base. 
There are more specific elements that can be indicative of a movement toward a 
more flexible, ecosystem-based approach to governance. A few can be listed here (Table 
21), but there are as many combinations and strategies as a creative society can invent. In 
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the first place, prescriptions should lend themselves to agency collaboration across policy 
sectors and jurisdictions with a focus on integrated problem-solving. 
Table 20 Prescription 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
Regulatory strategies that hold polluters 
and other environmental violators 
accountable through selective intervention 
by government based on a strategy of 
bureaucratic control using adversarial tools 
and techniques (inspections, fines, 
penalties, etc.) 
A transition away from adversarial 
methods designed to punish violations 
toward greater emphasis on cooperation 
and collaboration between private and 
public entities to prevent pollution, reduce 
risk, and promote sustainability. New 
relationships, structures, and roles are 
fashioned by careful planning with broad-
based involvement and implemented on a 
trial and error basis in order to facilitate 
learning 
The regulated public will act for the 
common good only under threat of legal 
sanctions and adversarial strategies are the 
only way to affect behavior and produce 
positive outcomes. 
Adversarial strategies and deterrence are 
not the only way to influence behavior. 
Collaboration and cooperation with 
partnerships designed to achieve economic 
goals, can promote eco-efficiency, 
innovation, and sustainability. 
Centralized top-down command and 
control strategy of bureaucratic control is 
the best way to achieve uniform 
compliance. 
Community and regional involvement in 
the development and enforcement of 
environmental regulations can increase 
learning, inform the public, and lead to 
greater progress towards goals. 
Second, accountability should be built into any prescription. Thus agencies and 
other institutions should at a minimum be required to report to the public and to each 
other on status and progress on identified problems on a regular basis (Weber 2003). 
New prescriptions should also be designed to promote learning as a route to innovation 
and better performance. In order to accomplish this each new prescription will have to be 
flexible though to enable government and industry to change their behavior based on 
what they learn. This can be done by explicitly creating reliable monitoring, reporting, 
and feedback mechanisms; using neutral third parties and forums to document and help 
institutionalize lessons learned, including legal protections for good-faith efforts to 
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innovate, and building trust that promotes the sharing of information and open 
communication (Fiorino 2006). Finally, prescriptions should promote significant public 
involvement. This can be done by the mandated utilization of public and local 
knowledge, by strong public outreach designed to inform the public on the issues, and 
involving the public in ongoing program evaluations and appraisals (Becker 1993; Weber 
2003; Whiteside 2006; Steelman 2010) 
Implementation. This task is a combination of the traditional policy analysis 
framework categories of invocation and application (See, e.g. Clark 2008). Invocation 
encompasses the initial actions that communities, governments and/or institutions take to 
invoke, enforce, or otherwise implement a prescription. Application, on the other hand, 
is the process that a community chooses to ultimately characterize the cited behavior and 
determine whether the behavior is a violation of the prescription. Application also 
generally provides the process that determines what, if any, sanction or consequence will 
be applied for the violation. In the case of an inspector or field agent inspecting an 
industrial facility, the initial decision to issue a citation to the regulated entity for a 
perceived violation is an example of invocation, while the ultimate determination of 
whether the regulated entity is indeed guilty of a violation and, if so, the nature and 
amount of the penalty is an example of the application phase of the implementation 
process (Clark, Willard et al. 2000; Clark 2002). Ideally implementation should be 
perceived as "dependable, even-handed, realistic, and timely, and conflicts over the 
implementation of policies must be resolved in ways that are deemed fair by consensus of 
the participants" (Clark 2008, 53). 
141 
Implementation under the U.S. constitutional framework is, by design, 
fragmented. The framers of the constitution were concerned that too much power would 
be concentrated in one branch of government or institution, so separation of powers 
became the foundation of our nation's constitutional scheme (Plater, Abrams et al. 2004). 
Unlike a parliamentary process, where legislative and executive powers are fused, 
making consensus on environmental goals and priorities more likely, the "balance of 
powers" in the U.S. results in separate elections for president and Congress, often 
resulting in the executive branch and legislative branch coming under control of different 
parties. As a result, the constitutionally-independent judicial branch is often a major 
factor in the resolution of controversies and stalemates between battling government 
branches. The existence of multiple layers of governance, with policy implementation 
divided between federal, state, and local bodies, makes for an even greater challenge to 
the creation of policy and the development of implementation schemes (Kjaer 2004; 
Plater, Abrams et al. 2004; Brunner and Lynch 2010b). 
More specifically, the impact of our fragmented and divided governmental 
implementation scheme is profound. One example is the tremendous reliance in the U.S. 
on what has been described as bureaucratic rationality or, as discussed above, 
administrative rationalism (Dryzek 1997). This describes the U.S. implementation 
scheme's penchant for the use of bureaucracy for the implementation of environmental 
prescriptions. Thus the U.S. system is marked by a system based on a division of labor, 
subject matter specialization, technical expertise, uniform predictable rules, defined 
procedures, and a defined hierarchy with upper management controlling the behavior and 
activities of lower levels and field personnel (Hays 1959; Fiorino 2006). In essence: 
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Congress passes laws and oversees their implementation by agencies, 
which in turn prescribe rules and oversee the behavior of regulated firms. 
Agencies are highly specialized, with engineers, biologists, chemists, 
toxicologists, lawyers, economists, and statisticians, among others, in their 
ranks. Elaborate rules, applied as uniformly as possible, define the 
technology, monitoring, and other requirements that regulated entities 
must meet (Fiorino 2006, 39). 
Thus the rules and regulations relevant to enforcement in the U.S. are created and 
implemented mainly through bureaucracies (Weber 2003; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; 
GLFA 1956). As a result, the implementation of laws passed by Congress and by state 
legislatures through the promulgation of regulations by agencies, are generally narrower 
in scope than in other parts of the world, emphasizing control over the manufacturing 
process and specific categories of pollution (Fiorino 2006). Furthermore, in the U.S. 
there is an enhanced focused on legal compliance and, unlike many other countries, less 
emphasis on overall environmental performance. In Sweden, Norway, Great Britain, and 
The Netherlands, for instance, governments set goals and design policies to achieve them 
through negotiated agreements, partnerships, and other means (Buhi and Feng 2009; 
GLFA 1956). In the United States, technology standards are routinely set forth in the 
applicable statutes and the rules and regulations promulgated by the bureaucratic 
agencies (Fiorino 2006). Thus U.S. businesses are constantly making decisions based 
upon the ever-present threat of litigation. A great deal of time and resources are spent by 
both agencies and regulated entities on "defensive science" striving to make decisions 
that will withstand judicial scrutiny (Quinton 2011). 
The United States, on the other hand, emphasizes policy implementation through 
compliance and threat of sanction. Compared with Japan and several European countries 
the U.S. regulatory system is significantly more legalistic, adversarial, and punitive, with 
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a net effect of diverting the efforts of all sides to "pointless and dispiriting legal routines 
and conflicts" (Fischer 2000,229). Indeed the United States regulatory and legalistic 
implementation style, described by Kagan (2011) as adversarial legalism, "uses more 
complex legal rules, more adversarial procedures, more punitive legal sanctions, and 
more judicial interventions into administrative decisions" (Fiorino 2006,37). These 
practices have implications: 
.. .American forms of regulatory law, processes for making regulatory 
policy, and methods of enforcing regulatory rules are more legalistic and 
more adversarial. Adversarial legalism does not necessarily make 
American regulation less effective than regulation in other economically 
advanced democracies - although it sometimes does. But adversarial 
legalism clearly makes American regulation more costly, more inefficient, 
and more inflexible. That inefficiency and inflexibility, moreover, tend to 
undermine the kind of government-business cooperation that is essential 
for fully answering the public's regulatory prayers (Quinton 2011,182) 
Much of the cost, complexity, inefficiency, and seeming inflexibility of 
adversarial legalism results of the fact that, as discussed above, ecosystems and the 
interplay between humans and their environment are complex, adaptive, and dynamic. 
The human activities that impact the environment directly or indirectly are many and 
varied. Those activities that are perceived to harm the health, safety, and security of 
humans are limited or restrained by the rule of law. Laws require certain procedures, and 
demand that regulations and laws be applied fairly, consistently, and uniformly, i.e. to 
every violator. When uniform, consistent laws are applied across the board to the variety 
of human activities that may or may not harm the environment, there is tension. It is 
simply not possible to satisfactorily connect universal mandates of law and regulation 
indiscriminately to the immense variety of possible interactions without repeated 
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episodes of unreasonableness (Fiorino 2006; Buhi and Feng 2009). Often called "site-
level unreasonableness" these particular encounters between regulated entities and 
regulators encompass the individual and cumulative experience of being subjected to 
inefficient, or unreasonable, regulatory action. "Site-level unreasonableness explains 
much of the present political and social discontent with protective regulation"(Bardach 
and Kagan 2010, 7). "Yet government must govern, and if it cannot do so by forging 
perfect connections to the society it governs, then it will make do with imperfect 
connections" (Bardach and Kagan 2010,3). 
Thus traditional government regulatory implementation and enforcement relies 
upon uniform rules and regulations applied across the board to the regulated population 
resulting in inefficiencies and numerous cumulative incidences of unfair or unreasonable 
application (Fiorino 2006; Buhi and Feng 2009; Bardach and Kagan 2010). Given that 
regulators and the regulated public are often subject to uniform rulemaking and 
enforcement, for example, a great deal of time is necessarily spent to inspect and evaluate 
regulated entities. To regulated entities, it is a costly but necessary part of business to 
spend a great deal of time and resources to avoid violations. There is no incentive to go 
beyond the statutory minimums so while resources get squandered in order to develop 
defensive science, creativity and innovation are stunted. Trust evaporates (Fiorino 2006). 
In sum, commentators are consistently calling for a regulatory evolution away 
from the old regulatory ways. As we have seen, the prescriptions and implementation 
inherent in the old regulation strategy impedes innovation; it is legalistic, fragmented, and 
inflexible; it is expensive; it has become largely irrelevant; and we are more and more 
confronting a burgeoning implementation deficit (Wilson 2000; Fiorino 2006; Walker 
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and Salt 2006; Whiteside 2006; Bardach and Kagan 2010; Steelman 2010; Quinton 
2011). 
It is unlikely that society can count on an overhaul of existing environmental 
laws. Change away from old regulation and transitioning toward a more holistic, 
ecosystem-based approach to governance will most likely have to come by way of 
changes in implementation. There are simply too many entrenched forces, including 
existing agencies, regulated entities, and NGO's all have a vested interest in maintaining 
the status quo. Most every existing entity is more geared for litigation than for exploring 
collaborative solutions. Change will have to "muddle through" with a large number of 
small steps that move the pendulum slowly over time (Fiorino 2006). 
For the implementation task, therefore, the trick will be moving both invocation 
and application toward more community-driven, more voluntary, cooperative systems. 
Government could assist with the identification and clarification of community goals as 
well as develop measureable standards. It would be up to regional or community efforts 
to develop solutions to bring environmental indicators into compliance with those 
standards (Weber 2003; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007). 
Dryzek's (1997) discourse of ecological modernization borrows from many of 
the practices used by governments in Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and 
other nations viewed as having successful environmental policy performance to offer 
some traits that might advance a government toward an ecosystem-based approach. 
Included in the discourse, for instance, is a description of a National Environmental 
Policy Plan, published every four years in the Netherlands, which identifies and 
integrates environmental criteria for all departments of government. The plan, which 
146 
relies on collaboration, not rules and penalties, focuses on a set of environmental quality 
targets and establishes a timetable for achieving them based on a model of how pollutants 
are generated in and travel through human social systems. The plan also looks beyond 
"end of pipe" discharges to "identify and change activities that cause pollution in the first 
place. The changes are identified in consultation with the relevant industry, citizen 
groups, and responsible government officials, especially those departments dealing with 
industry, agriculture, and transport" (Dryzek 1997,163). It would not be a total stretch to 
envision a similar approach in the U.S. and Canada. 
I am not suggesting that transition will be easy. There are plenty of bad apples in 
operation that have a history of environmental violations and will have to be dealt with 
using the conventional top-down deterrence model offered by old regulation. Traditional 
command and control uniformity enforced with threats of sanctions could slowly be 
replaced, however, by regional collaborative efforts utilizing partnerships, performance 
agreements, and cooperative assistance. Novel cooperative arrangements, including site 
specific environmental management contracts, could begin to be implemented with those 
in the regulated public with the best track records on environmental performance (Dryzek 
1997; Dietz, Ostrom et al. 2003; Fiorino 2006). 
Finally, in order for there to be realistic transition to a more collaborative and 
capacity-building system of implementation there needs to be an acknowledgement that 
the change and uncertainty that would accompany a movement toward ecosystem-based 
governance is significant. While innovation may be a process of "muddling through" 
(Dryzek 1997) it is still a foray into relatively new and uncertain territory. Increased 
discretion for field personnel, the use of partnerships and environmental performance 
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agreements, the tension between the need for a governance system that is based on 
learning and the need for some secrecy of trade secrets and other matters for commercial 
enterprises, are some examples of areas that will require guidance and conflict resolution. 
Thus there needs to be planning for increased use of alternative dispute resolution 
techniques, including facilitation, mediation, and, perhaps, arbitration (Fiorino 2006; 
Bardach and Kagan 2010). Further, for those issues that are not resolvable through 
negotiation or alternative dispute resolution, there should be a specialized court created 
with the exclusive jurisdiction to decide environmental issues. The United States 
expressly rejected the creation of an environmental court system in the 1970's with the 
start of the modern environmental era. New Zealand, on the other hand, made the 
creation of a specialized environment court a critical component of its environmental 
governance regime, with exclusive jurisdiction over all matters related to the environment 
and sustainable development. While the disadvantages and advantages of the court can be 
debated, it has had the effect of establishing a tribunal with environmentally-
knowledgeable judges and staff as well as the creation of an exclusive bar of attorneys 
and staff experienced in environmental advocacy. Issues are therefore more capably and 
efficiently handled with less cost to the participants (Sproule-Jones 2002). These tools 
should be readily available, credible, and inexpensive relative to the costs of traditional 
litigation conducted in courts of general jurisdiction in state, provincial, and federal 
courts in the U.S. and Canada. 
In summary, therefore, the task of implementation for a governance regime 
striving to move toward an ecosystem-based approach should first strive to reject the 
notion that industry will act only if threatened with legal sanctions. Traditional sanctions 
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Table 21 Implementation 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
The U.S. system is marked by a system based 
on a division of labor, subject matter 
specialization, technical expertise, uniform 
predictable rules, defined procedures, and a 
defined hierarchy with upper management 
controlling the behavior and activities of lower 
levels and field personnel. 
Transition is needed to move implementation 
toward more community-driven, more 
voluntary, cooperative systems. Government 
could assist with the identification and 
clarification of community goals as well as 
develop measureable standards. It would be up 
to regional or community efforts to develop 
solutions to bring environmental indicators into 
compliance with those standards 
Narrow, elaborate rules, applied as uniformly as 
possible, define the technology, monitoring, 
and other requirements that regulated entities 
must meet, emphasizing control over the 
manufacturing process and specific categories 
of pollution. Regulations relevant to 
enforcement in the U.S. are created and 
implemented mainly through bureaucracies. 
Regulatory reliance upon uniform rules and 
regulations applied across the board to the 
regulated population resulting in inefficiencies 
and numerous cumulative incidences of unfair 
or unreasonable application. Adversarial 
sentiment creates tension and is costly as 
industry engages in costly "defensive science" 
and incurs costs to avoid violations rather than 
to reduce environmental impact. 
Adversarial relationships should give way to 
cooperative and collaborative ones with the 
emphasis on interactions designed to solve 
problems with strategies that are developed and 
shared with the input of scientists, regulators, the 
regulated community, and other interested 
parties. In consultation with industry, citizen 
groups, and government officials, plans created 
through collaboration can look beyond "end of 
pipe" discharges to "identify and change 
activities that cause pollution in the first place. 
Command and control could gradually be 
replaced with incentives and learning through 
trial and error. 
Conflicts are resolved through costly traditional 
litigation and judicial intervention. 
More reliance upon facilitation, mediation, and 
other forms of alternative dispute resolution. If 
court necessary there should be specialized 
courts with knowledge of environmental factors. 
would still be available but typically used for serious performance breaches or 
historically bad actors. In addition, when possible adversarial relationships should give 
way to cooperative and collaborative ones with the emphasis on interactions designed to 
solve problems with strategies that are developed and shared with the input of scientists, 
regulators, the regulated community, and other interested parties. In this way, command 
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and control could gradually give way to incentives and learning through trial and error. 
Further, improvement should be measured not in the number of administrative or 
regulatory actions taken, but instead by environmental performance as measured against 
measurable goals. Finally, conflict resolution should move away from traditional 
litigation in courts of general jurisdiction toward the use of alternative dispute resolution 
techniques. If those measures fail, then resolution should be through a dedicated court 
with specialized jurisdiction designed to adjudicate environmental disputes (Table 21). 
Appraisal. The appraisal function involves the assessment of a decision process 
as a whole and of the success of particular prescriptions in achieving their goals. Thus 
the basic criterion is the policy objectives that were originally sought. Appraisals are 
therefore an important method of assessing whether a prescriptions and their 
implementation have effectively met the goals set by the community and who is 
responsible and accountable (Lasswell 1971; Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). Appraisal 
provides a major opportunity for learning and course correction, for using the lessons of 
experience to adapt failing practices into future changes (Clark 2002). The main criteria 
for appraisals are dependability, comprehensiveness, continuity and independence 
(Lasswell 1971; Clark, Willard et al. 2000; Brunner and Lynch 2010b). Put more 
succinctly, the appraisal function requires that: 
Even when decisions are made on the basis of the best information and 
with a high degree of consensus, they may not adequately address the 
problem in the ways anticipated. Initial conditions may also change, 
requiring shifts in policies. As time goes on, leaders and participants 
should evaluate how well the selected alternative has solved the original 
problem and, in larger terms, how well the overall decision process has 
served in achieving common interest outcomes (Clark 2008,54). 
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In order to accomplish thorough and unbiased appraisals, trend data from relevant 
scales must be available and transparent. Local knowledge and scientific efforts need to 
be combined. One example is a periodic public assessment of the state of the ecosystem. 
This provides opportunity for meaningful public education and involvement. Further, it 
is critical that appraisals be carried out by third parties, i.e. NOT the agencies that are 
charged with programmatic responsibility (Lasswell 1971; Clark, Willard et al. 2000; 
Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). 
It is also important to view the appraisal function as the philosophical and 
practical home of adaptive management, which is frequently proposed as a tool to frame 
the management of the human activities that impact ecosystems (Holling 1986; Lee 1993; 
Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). While appraisal is about the assessment of the success 
of prescriptions and implementation schemes, adaptive governance goes one step further 
to recommend that we have governance systems that are able to learn from the appraisal 
process and change course if anticipated results fail to materialize. Included in appraisal, 
therefore, is the need for trend data obtained through monitoring and other methods 
designed to inform governance of the status and change in key indicators over time as a 
Result of management actions (Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007; 
Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010; Steelman 2010). "As a given policy is implemented, 
information gained is quickly fed back so that it can produce midcourse corrections in the 
specific policy being studied, and the experience gained can add to the general stock of 
environmental knowledge" (Steelman 2010,202). In short, if society is to insist on a 
shift from regulatory strategies based on bureaucratic control to strategies based on 
learning and trial and error, appraisal functions that involve a broad base of agency, 
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stakeholder, and public monitoring and assessment will be critical to the quest to achieve 
common, as opposed to special, interests (Brunner, Colburn et al. 2002; Weber 2003; 
Fiorino 2006; Brunner and Lynch 2010b). 
Table 22 Appraisal 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
There is a community of 
interests and agency protocols 
built around any position. This 
makes it difficult for appraisals 
to be dependable and 
independent when so many rely 
on the continuation of a 
program. 
Appraisal provides a major 
opportunity for learning and course 
correction, for using the lessons of 
experience to adapt failing practices 
into future changes. The main 
criteria for appraisals are 
dependability, comprehensiveness, 
continuity and independence 
Trend data is usually gathered 
at the direction of experts. 
Periodic assessments, if any, 
are generally performed by 
experts with a possible 
comment period after the 
assessment is completed. 
Trend data from relevant scales 
must be available and transparent. 
Local knowledge and scientific 
efforts need to be combined and 
included in a periodic public 
assessment of the state of the 
ecosystem. 
Often assessments are 
performed by agencies/entities 
that are responsible for the 
implementation of a policy. 
It is critical that appraisals be 
carried out by third parties, i.e. not 
the agencies that are charged with 
programmatic responsibilities. 
Fragmentation is largely still 
the rule. Decisions are made by 
separate agencies with 
jurisdiction over a narrow 
component of an overall 
ecosystem. 
Existence of a collaborative entity 
or single overarching body that can, 
formally or informally, accumulate 
the knowledge accumulated through 
appraisals and implement change to 
reverse adverse trends. 
Therefore the key characteristics of the appraisal process in an ideal ecosystem-
based governance regime, therefore, include periodic appraisals by entities unrelated to 
the agencies and institutions responsible for the regulation of the targets of the appraisals. 
Appraisals should provide unbiased trend data and utilize both local knowledge and 
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expert knowledge to deliver a thorough, dependable, and comprehensive product. 
Further, appraisals should be shared periodically with the public. Finally, appraisals 
should provide knowledge that can be utilized to learn from our regulatory efforts. A 
system should exist through either a collaborative entity or a single overarching 
governing body that can, formally or informally, accumulate the knowledge accumulated 
through appraisals and implement change to reverse adverse trends (Table 22). 
Termination. This is the final activity of the decision process and occurs when a 
problem is solved by a previously selected prescription or course of conduct (Clark 1997; 
Clark 2008). Termination, like appraisal, relies upon the dependable conveyance of 
knowledge from intelligence generation through transmission, including thorough 
monitoring to assess whether the knowledge has proved that the original problem has 
been resolved (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). 
Curiously, it seems that it is far from easy to terminate a policy action or 
prescription. "Often, if a decision process is successful, the institutions that were formed 
to address the problem remain, actively carrying out the duties assigned to them during 
the process" (Clark 2008, 93). In fact, the accumulation of knowledge about the success 
of a policy or even new discoveries do not in most cases cause the termination of old 
policies and the adoption of new ones. There are a variety of reasons for this 
phenomenon. In the first place, once a policy selection is made, it develops its own 
momentum. Any "buildup of expertise among scientists makes them resist radical new 
theories" (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010,94). In addition to the barrier of knowledge 
coalitions, attempts at termination must deal with those that have an economic stake in 
the continued existence of the policy and are therefore resistant to change or unlikely to 
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admit error. Further, advocacy coalitions like environmental NGOs and others tend to 
reject knowledge that runs counter to their interests causing policy debates to be 
prolonged and acting as barriers to termination (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). 
Table 23 Termination 
Traditional Ecosystem-based Approach 
Numerous factors combine to make it 
difficult to terminate a policy or 
prescription. 
Ecosystem-based governance requires the 
periodic public assessment of the 
progress, status, and continued need for 
any environmental policy prescription or 
implementation scheme. The decision to 
terminate should be made by a bridging 
entity with knowledge of trend data. 
It is clear that many of the concerns that apply to the need for dependable and 
comprehensive appraisal. Thus ideal ecosystem-based governance would require the 
periodic public assessment of the progress, status, and continued need for any 
environmental policy prescription or implementation scheme. The decision to terminate 
should be made by a bridging organization or entity with knowledge of trend data. This 
organization should be comprised of diverse representation from scientific, regulatory, 
private enterprise, environmental and public sectors (Table 23). There is no reason that 
such a body or process necessarily be vested with a legal mandate to enforce its 
decisions. It may be enough that parties follow recommendations of this overriding 
entity out of respect for its processes and opinions. 
Conclusion 
Chapter III lays the groundwork and traces the literature that calls for a change in 
the manner in which society governs the human activities that impact the environment. 
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Every effort has been made to detail the problems with the current "mostly" centralized 
command-and-control bureaucracy and to explain the potential transition to a more 
holistic form of governance that moves into a more voluntary, collaborative, and adaptive 
force. 
Using the information developed in the first part of this chapter, the policy 
sciences analytical framework was used to demonstrate how each task within the 
framework might change if our governance regime moved away from old regulation 
toward a more ecosystem-based approach. The framework also sets forth the 
characteristics that should exist under each task within the problem orientation, social 
process, and decision process in an ecosystem-based governance regime. 
In chapters 4 and 5 the policy sciences analytical framework "ideal ecosystem 
based approach" will be used to examine the governance regimes extant in the Great 
Lakes Basin from approximately 1970 - 1992 (Chapter 4) and the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
Maine Watershed (Chapter 5). We will attempt to determine how the governance 
regimes examined in both cites compare with the ideal ecosystem-based approach 
developed in this chapter. In this manner we will be better able to determine what 
characteristics are present that might indicate whether the governance regimes are/were 
capable of adopting or using an ecosystem-based approach to the management of those 
human activities that impact the environment. Utilizing the methods described in 




IV. THE GREATLAKES BASIN 
Introduction and Background 
The Great Lakes Basin watershed is one of the world's largest freshwater 
systems. The lakes themselves occupy more than half a billion square kilometers with a 
shoreline of 17,000 kilometers (10,000 miles). More than 35 million people reside within 
its basin and 23 million rely upon the lakes for fresh water. The basin includes area 
within 7 U.S. states and 2 Canadian provinces (Figure 6) - and encompasses more land 
than England, Scotland, and Wales combined. The fresh water system of the Great Lakes 
basin comprise roughly one-fifth of the world's fresh surface-water supply (Sproule-
Jones 2002; Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
The Great Lakes are essentially a closed but interconnected system. In essence, it 
is one long river, (Evans and Regier 1990), and it is a 2,000 mile voyage from Duluth at 
the western end of Lake Superior to reach the Atlantic Ocean (Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
The lake system was formed by glacial processes, and those that affected the lakes the 
most took place during the Pleistocene era. Melting glaciers filled the basins until they 
reached their current configuration approximately 4,000 years ago (Grady 2007). 
Formed by glacial melt, only one percent of water in the Great Lakes is renewed 
each year by rain and snow. Roughly the same amount flows into the sea. Thus 
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Figure 3 Great Lakes Basin Watershed (Used with permission Great Lakes Information 
Network) 
pollution that winds up in the lakes mainly stays in the lakes (Dempsey 2004; Botts and 
Muldoon 2005) 
The up and down history of resource exploitation in the Great Lakes region is 
well documented and a brief background and history of the evolution of the Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement is necessary at this point for context. Suffice to say, during the 
18th and 19th centuries, the Great Lakes Basin was widely exploited for its natural 
resources, including forest products and fisheries. Major cities were built, and even 
rebuilt, on the back of Michigan and Wisconsin forests. By the late 19th centuries fish 
populations had crashed due to overfishing and loss of habitat. Cholera and typhoid, 
along with other water-related diseases, were major causes of death in lakeside 
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communities10 (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). Laws and regulations relating to the 
t 
control of human activities that impacted the Great Lakes ecosystem were fragmented 
between the U.S. and Canada and their respective states, provinces and local 
governments. As a predictable result, overfishing and pollution continued unabated into 
the 1960s, culminating in the public eye with the famous burning of the Cuyahoga River 
in Cleveland, the declaration of Lake Erie as "dead," Love Canal, and other similar 
crises (Dworsky 1988; Dempsey 2004). 
It was during this period that an angry and determined public, acting through a 
rapidly expanding list of citizens' organizations that had emerged to combat pollution 
began to drive reform measures. The International Joint Commission (IJC), acting on a 
reference, instructed both countries to take action on water pollution issues in the Great 
Lakes. The initial 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) between the 
United States and Canada was negotiated. It was essentially a water pollution agreement 
but effectively introduced controls on phosphorous discharges and "an extensive set of 
broad studies under the Pollution from Land Use Activities Research Group (PLUARG) 
was initiated" (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990, xxv). 
With increasing environmental degradation and active citizen involvement, the 
agreement was ultimately amended in 1978 with the declared purpose to . .to restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity .. .of the waters of the Great 
Lakes Basin Ecosystem." The ecosystem was defined as "the interacting components of 
air, land, water and living organisms, including humans." Further evidence of the fact 
10 For instance, in 1854 a typhoid epidemic in Chicago causes the deaths of some 5,000 people, and in 
1891, the rate of death due to typhoid fever ad reached 124 per 100,000 people. Fuller, K., H. Shear, et al., 
Eds. (1995). The Great Lakes: An Environmental Atlas and Resource Book. Toronto, Government of 
Canada and US Environmental Protection Agency, ibid. 
159 
that the 1978 agreements had morphed into the restoration of ecological integrity as the 
major goal, not just improved water chemistry through pollution control, can be found in 
the definition of the Great Lakes system as all of".. .the streams, rivers, lakes and other 
bodies of water that are within the drainage basin" (Becker 1993; GLWQA 1987). 
The years of the 1970s through the mid-1980s, marked by open and transparent 
decision making with significant public input at all levels, integrated governance task 
forces and overlapping advisory boards, had an impact. The 1978 Amendments to the 
GLWQA recognized the link between land-based activities and water quality (GLWQA 
1987), explicitly acknowledging the role of non-point source pollution. It formally 
adopted the ecosystem approach basin-wide (GLWQA 1987). The governance regime 
under the GLWQA in the early years is widely thought to have been a success (Donahue 
1988; Becker 1993; Young 1998; Jackson 2005). 
While the GLWQA speaks mainly to water quality and the impacts of land based 
activities, there is another critical component to the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem: the 
biological system, including the fish. Fisheries in the Great Lakes, including a once-
significant commercial fishery, had seen a complete collapse caused by overfishing, the 
invasion of lamprey eels and pollution. In the 1950s, lake trout populations had been 
reduced to 99% of their 1930s levels. This drove the ultimate formation of the Great 
Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC) through the ratification of a Convention between 
Canada and the U.S. in 195511. Its charter recognized the value of 'joint and coordinated 
efforts' to address fisheries conservation (Convention 1955; Dempsey 2004). The 
11 Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries between the United States and Canada signed September 10,1954; 
entered into force October 11,1955. 6 UST 2836; TIAS 3326; 238 UNTS 97. 
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convention was implemented through passage of the Great Lakes Fisheries Act of 1956 
(GLFA 1956). While the job of the GLFC was initially to formulate a plan to combat the 
invasive lampreys, by the 1980s the Commissioners from both sides of the border, and 
their staffs, had cultivated and begun to practice a protective ecosystem policy by 
working closely with the UC and it's the Science Advisory Board (SAB). Collaboration 
and coordination was also buttressed by the fact that members of the GLFC Board sat as 
voting members on the SAB under the GLWQA (Prelli and Becker 2001). The 
Convention further set the stage for an ecosystem approach to fisheries management in 
the Great Lakes with an institutional design that incorporated a decision-making process 
that promoted problem solving and a research based approach to the management of the 
Great Lakes basin ecosystem fisheries (Prelli and Becker 2001). They often reviewed 
land use and pollution impacts on fish, but stopped short of challenging the use and 
release of contaminating chemicals on the fisheries or the people who consumed them 
(Dempsey 2004). 
The governance system under the IJC and the GLFC from 1978 until the early 
1990s allowed for a social process that included a wide variety of actors, including 
government agencies, NGOs, citizens, and related institutions. In 1979 the UC 
established a standing committee to assist in providing the public information service 
called for in the 1978 agreement (GLWQA 1987) The basic concept was that citizens 
have rights to participate in IJC activities and should be encouraged to do so.12 The 
policy stressed that information should be provided while studies and activities were 
12 Public participation in the governance of the Great Lakes had been mandated since 1909 by Treaty 
(1909). Treaty Relating to the Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the Boundary Between the 
United States and Canada. U.S.-Gr.Brit. 36 Stat. 2448.. 
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being carried out, not just after decisions were already made. The aim was to increase the 
UC's credibility by taking public opinion into account (Becker 1993). 
The UC was aware of the importance of public participation to the success of an 
ecosystem-based approach to governance. It was also cognizant that the public would be 
unable to participate meaningfully without education and increased understanding of the 
ecosystem threats. In its 1980 report "Pollution of the Great Lakes Basin by Land Use" 
the IJC advised that: 
The PLUARG Public Hearings and the Public Consultation Panels which 
preceded them demonstrated that most people are unaware of the extent to 
which urban and rural land use activities affect the water quality of the 
Great Lakes and of the fact that they themselves may be directly involved 
and responsible for deteriorating ecosystem quality. The lack of awareness 
of the effect of the various land use activities on water quality was 
attributed mainly to the fact that there has been little or no public 
education with respect to these diffuse sources of pollution. It was also 
recognized that the acceptance and successful implementation of 
PLUARG's recommendations would be possible only if there were an 
informed public. A stronger educational program was recommended by 
many witnesses at the public hearings as being the best way to create this 
informed public. An informed and active public would also assist 
Governments in reaching acceptable solutions to nonpoint pollution 
problems and should be encouraged for this reason also. (IJC 1980,69) 
While the details of ups and downs of the Great Lakes resource exploitation, 
economic upheavals, and gyrations from ruin to recovery and back are oft-published 
legacies of the region, the story is more personal to me. My family moved to St. Joseph, 
Michigan, on the Southeast shore of Lake Michigan and at the mouth of the St. Joseph 
River in the summer of 1960. My father was a career member of the U.S. Navy, so being 
uprooted and moving somewhere every two years was no big deal, and I saw no reason to 
be especially excited about this new place. 
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Things changed. My first memories of our new home are all about the lake. 
Swimming in fresh water for the first time was a jolt. I remember how clean it felt and 
when you got out there was no residual stickiness that I associated with swimming in the 
ocean. I could ride my bike from our home with a cane pole and catch perch that made 
for incredibly tasty feasts. Ships could be seen transiting far offshore delivering iron ore 
from the Lake Superior mines to the steel plants in Gary and East Chicago. 
St. Joseph was a small, working class town. Most of my friends' parents worked 
at a factory for Whirlpool, Auto Specialties, or one of many others in the area. There was 
a thriving fishing industry. Many restaurants had weekly "all you can eat" perch specials 
- a treat that was occasionally affordable for a family living on an enlisted man's wages. 
As I grew up I watched the changes. Trips to the beach began to mean swimming 
through brown foam floating where water met the land. The perch disappeared. 
Mollhagen's fishery closed down and the odd fully enclosed lake fishing boats were no 
longer visible heading out to the lake between the piers. Alewives (we called them 
"shad") were everywhere in the lake, and swimming was now accompanied by seemingly 
millions of dead alewives floating ashore to pile up on the beach. The only fishing I 
could do was to submerge the end of my cane pole into the water and wave it around, 
hook trailing, to snag shad and bring them home to bury under my mother's rose bushes. 
The manufacturing plants began to close, moving their facilities to locations where, it 
was said, labor was cheaper and costs were low. This meant "the south" at first; later 
more plants closed as manufacturing moved off shore. 
The town changed as well. Block after block of housing was torn down to make 
way for a new courthouse here and a shopping mall there. The factory workers, to me, 
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just faded away. The bowling alleys emptied. The annual picnic put on by Whirlpool for 
its workers, the highlight of every summer, got smaller and smaller, then just stopped. 
Too expensive, I suppose, and most of the workers were gone. 
But in the early seventies, my high school years, the lake changed again. My 
father would get me up at 5 am on many school days in the fall and spring and we'd be 
off to put a small boat in the water and head out on the lake to troll for salmon and lake 
trout before he went to work and me to school. My parents and neighbors complained 
about having to buy phosphorous-free detergent, but the feasts returned and our freezer 
was full, literally, of fish - fish that, years later, we heard we shouldn't eat because of 
PCBs, mercury, and other persistent organic substances in their tissue. This advice we, 
like many, simply ignored. Pointy headed scientists weren't going to tell us that our 
fishing efforts were for naught. We had a freezer full of fish - always - and a dozen 
ways to filet, steak, boil, and barbeque them. Besides, why would the government bother 
to introduce salmon into the lake if you couldn't eat them when you caught them? 
It was all there - on a very small scale. Right in front of my eyes I had 
experienced the degradation of a fresh water ecosystem, the demise of our manufacturing 
base and the humbling of an entire labor force. Yet news of these developments never 
seemed to strike home. I remember hearing of Lake Erie's "death" and thinking that it 
was a Lake Erie problem. The very real indicators of ruin and recovery through which I 
swam and fished seemed somehow disconnected from those "other" problems that I 
heard about on the news. 
The fact is, however, that the Great Lakes were at a tipping point, precariously 
close to thresholds that would have been devastating to cross. The story of their 
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restoration, the governance changes, and the efforts of some very courageous and 
dedicated groups and individuals that helped steer recovery, may provide lessons for the 
present and the future. This is chiefly why the governance regime in the Great Lakes 
Basin during the time period leading up to the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, its 
amendments, and protocols, roughly 1970 through 1992, was chosen as a comparative 
case study for this project. It has personal meaning to me, and it also has many elements 
in common with the current situation in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. 
Both are somewhat isolated bodies of water with many influences from land-based 
activity. Further, many of the threats to the Great Lakes ecosystem are the same as those 
thought to be threats to the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine: Overextraction of marine 
organisms, chemical pollution and eutrophication, together with toxic algae blooms, 
alteration of physical habitat, invasive species, and global climate change (Steneck 2001). 
Given this brief background, I will now examine the problem orientation, social 
process, and decision process characteristics that evolved in the Great Lakes leading up to 
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972 and its subsequent adjustments through 
1987 and some of the impacts thereafter. These characteristics can be compared to the 
"ideal" characteristics developed through the use of the policy sciences analytical 
framework as set forth in Chapter III. In Chapter VI will follow the same process for the 
governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine Watershed. 
Ecosvstem-based Governance and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 
The ability to reconstruct the context of events and actions taken 30 to 40 years 
ago in order to fit them within the analytical framework of the policy sciences is not 
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without challenge. For instance, in hindsight, the problems in the Great Lakes in the 
1960s and 1970s and their causes appear clear. It needs to be understood the actions 
taken and policies developed were done in the moment. Thus while it may be clear to us 
today that phosphorous and phosphates were an important factor contributing to 
eutrophication in the Great Lakes, at the time no one could be sure that limiting 
phosphorous inputs from water treatment plants and banning the use of phosphate 
detergents would ultimately prove a turning point in the restoration of the lakes. 
It is the intent of this project to make every attempt to approach and reconstruct 
the goals, trends, conditions, actions and policy process from a perspective that may 
prove helpful to the problems that exist today. Thus the fact that phosphates were banned 
in the region through piecemeal state-by-state legislation after 1972 may well be less 
important than the fact that there was a process that could be relied upon to explore the 
possibility that phosphate releases should be banned and subsequent trends monitored 
after the ban to learn whether it was a policy action that should be continued or adjusted 
based on the objective data. 
Problem Orientation 
From the earlier discussion in chapters 2 and 3, it may be helpful to briefly 
reiterate the role of problem orientation in the analysis of the Great Lakes Basin 
watershed. Recall that the five tasks within problem orientation serve as an overall 
"strategy to address problems and invent solutions (Lasswell 1971; Clark and Willard 
2000, 9). Thus: 
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In problem orientation, the problems at hand must first be specified in 
relation to the goals that people seek, thus permitting a clearer definition 
of the problems than is otherwise possible. Historic trends must then be 
described to see if events and decision making are moving toward or away 
from the specified goals. Next, factors or conditions that have influenced 
or caused these trends must be determined. When past trends and 
conditions are adequately known, projections of future trends are possible. 
Finally, after these four tasks have been completed and the necessary 
information assembled, alternative courses of action for achieving the 
stated goals can be invented; evaluated according to their effectiveness, 
efficiency, and equitability in solving the problem (Clark 2008, 57). 
Goal Clarification. Goal clarification involves the process by which goals are 
determined for a given community. The emphasis on the protection and advancement of 
human dignity has historically been a fundamental quest of the policy sciences approach 
(deLeon 1988). When we consider that we are examining the effects of human decisions 
on human lives, which require a healthy, resilient environment capable of sustaining 
human life, commencing any investigation with a goal of human dignity begins to make 
sense. As to the goal of democracy, it is "well-rooted in many cultural traditions 
throughout history.. .for all people to have full opportunity to shape and share power, 
wealth, enlightenment, well-being, skill, affection, rectitude, and respect" (Lasswell and 
MacDougal 1992; Clark 2002, 89). Further it should be clarified that the policy sciences 
strives to achieve an overriding goal of the realization of human dignity for the many, not 
the dignity of the few at a cost of indignity for the many. Since the goal is dignity for the 
many, decision outcomes must aim at achieving equal opportunity for participation in 
power, wealth, well-being, and the other important values (Lasswell 1971). 
As discussed in chapter III the key goal clarification characteristics of an 
ecosystem-based approach to governance are: 
1) Meaningful community participation in the goal clarification process; 
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2) Strong public outreach and education efforts devoted to raising awareness and 
understanding of ecosystem issues and governance options, and 
3) Multiple goals that overall embrace human dignity and equal access to 
governance with a premium placed on maintenance of the integrity and resilience of 
ecosystem functions. 
How does the governance regime during the early years under the Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement stack up against our notion of an ideal ecosystem-based 
approach to governance? 
First we must look to the extent of public and/or community participation and 
input into the goal process. As we know, the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem was a 
polluted and degraded mess by the mid-1960s. The initial goals for the Great Lakes 
Basin initially came from two powerful government sources. In the wake of the publicity 
that followed the burning of Ohio's Cuyahoga River and a massive oil spill off the 
California coast, the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution and Control Act 
(the Clean Water Act) were passed into law over the veto of President Nixon (Gross and 
Dodge 2005). Under the 1972 Amendments, the objective was to "restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters." 33 U.S. C. § 
1251(a). 
The 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act prohibited the discharge of 
pollutants without a permit and set the stage for the clean-up of publicly owned treatment 
works ("POTWs"). The Act, however, was applicable only to the United States and its 
territories. On the Canadian side, Parliament enacted the Canada Water Act (1970). 
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In the Great Lakes region, the International Joint Commission ("IJC"), a bilateral 
body of six commissioners, three from each country that had evolved from the Boundary 
Waters Treaty of 1909 between Canada and the U.S. (1909) had been investigating 
pollution problems in the region pursuant to references13 received from both Canada and 
the United States (IJC 1970; IJCIRG 1978; IJC 1980). The IJC was responding not only 
to the growth of public concern about pollution, and references made to IJC, but also to 
citizen movements that. .exploded with demonstrations and campaigns throughout the 
late 1960s and early 1970s.. .public demands for actions increased as huge windrows of 
decaying algae piled up on Lake Ontario beaches, and a massive alewife die-off in Lake 
Michigan in 1967 not only interfered with swimming but threatened public water supplies 
and caused a secondary die-off due to botulism of shorebirds who fed on the dead fish" 
(Botts and Muldoon 2005,14). 
The Great Lakes therefore had general goals and objectives initially from two 
powerful sources - one stemming from treaty and the other from the Clean Water Act. 
One word, integrity, however, was never defined in the Agreement and its meaning 
continues to be debated (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). There is no question, however, 
that the word took on a broad and significant meaning to many of those responsible for 
13 One of the powers granted to the IJC by treaty to assist in its function to resolve disputes and avoid 
conflicts involving the Canada/US boundary waters is the power to investigate specific situations and make 
recommendations to governments based on a "reference" received from either or both of the parties. The 
IJC began receiving references concerning pollution in 1946 and the GLWQA arose out of a 1964 joint 
reference concerning pollution in the lower lakes (Erie and Ontario) Botts, L. and P. Muldoon (2005). 
Evolution of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. East Lansing, MI, Michigan State University 
Press. 
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the development of the GLWQA.14 To some who participated in the GLWQA 
investigation and development, including influential members of the Science Advisory 
Board during these crucial debates, the notion of integrity15 was synonymous with 
integration: 
Integrity became a key word in thel972 Federal Water Pollution Act 
[Amendments]. A senior ecologist George Woodwell... at Woods Hole... 
who had been working on the effects of radioactive radiation on a pine 
forest in on Long Island, NY... recommended to Senator Muskie to bring 
in the word "integrity" as a good thing to which to strive in the federal 
water pollution control. I suspect.. .1 never found out why he proposed 
it.. .but, integration was a very good word in the '60s amongst activists. 
Gender integration, racial integration, and to some extent there was an 
emphasis on poverty. So, if you think integration, disintegration.. .that 
was a concept that sort of perfused the whole politics of those days it was 
a key consideration. It's actually related to justice. Integrity was related 
to justice. And our Great Lakes to me, and Lee Botts, and George and 
many more.. .we have got that. (Canadian Academic 2) 
Policy and progress in the Great Lakes between the U.S. and Canada did not end 
with the 1972 GLWQA. While the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act and GLWQA of 1972 announced laudable broad goals (and in the case of the 
Annexes to the GLWQA, some specific goals concerning particular contaminants), the 
GLWQA also directed programs and other measures for the achievement of the water 
quality objectives, including the development of measures for the abatement and control 
of pollution from land use activities. Article VI of the initial GLWQA agreement 
14 
"Integrity" was added to the GLWQA by the 1978 Amendments (1987). Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement of 1978, U.S.-Can., 30 U.S.T.1384; Protocol to Amend the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement of 1978, Nov. 18,1987, Can.-U.S„ 1987 Can. T.S. No. 32. 30U.S.T. 1384. ibid. 
15 Interestingly, Henry Regier once noted that: . .Proponents of the term "integrity" for the U.S. Federal 
laws [and citing, inter alia, to Woodwell] apparently understood that a political process in which 
benefit/cost ratios played a dominant role must threaten integrity..." Regier, H. A. (1993). The Notion of 
Natural and Cultural Integrity. Ecological Integrity and the Management of Ecosystems. S. Woodley, J. 
K a y  a n d  G .  F r a n c i s .  O t t a w a ,  S t .  L u c i e  P r e s s :  3 - 1 8 .  
170 
authorized an investigation of pollution from land use activities, and mandated that the 
Commission would set up boards16 and commissions and issue reports annually 
concerning the progress of the parties toward the achievement of water quality goals and 
the effectiveness of the programs (1972; Becker 1993; Botts and Muldoon 2005; 
GLWQA 1987). 
Annual reports concerning the progress being made toward water quality 
objectives under the GLWQA were issued by the Boards and advisory groups to the IJC 
from 1972 through 1978. 
Direct citizen participation in the work of the UC under the provisions of 
the 1972 Agreement was relatively limited between 1972 and 1975. 
However, public interest in Great Lakes pollution problems continued to 
be very high, and citizens increasingly demanded access to information 
and a voice in Agreement work. Pressure for direct access to the 
Commission's work was exerted by citizen action groups, such as the Lake 
Michigan Federation, the United Auto Workers, and the League of 
Women Voters on the United States side of the Basin. Canadian citizen 
groups exhibiting an early interest in direct involvement included the 
Conservation Council of Ontario, the Canadian Environmental Law 
Research Foundation, and various local organizations, such as cottagers' 
associations (Becker 1993, 244). 
As citizen pressure mounted, the IJC and its Boards began to recognize the need 
for public support in order to implement the terms of the GLWQA and build 
infrastructure, it took affirmative steps to galvanize citizen involvement (Becker 1993). 
The meetings between the boards and the IJC began to be made public in 1975 and . .in 
time presentation of the board reports to the UC in public meetings became a mechanism 
16 There were two advisory boards originally set up under the GLWQA in 1972. The Water Quality Board 
and the Research Advisory Board (later the Science Advisory Board) (1987). Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement of 1978, U.S.-Can., 30 U.S.T.1384; Protocol to Amend the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement of 1978, Nov. 18,1987, Can.-U.S., 1987 Can. T.S. No. 32. 30U.S.T. 1384. 
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for increased public understanding of Great Lakes problems, as well as for citizen 
activism" (Botts and Muldoon 2005,23). In addition, the UC hired a professional public 
relations staff to augment its Great Lakes Regional Office. 
The UC reports and publication of documents and other measures increased 
credibility and boosted public involvement in agreement-related activities, often in the 
early stage of implementation (CUSIS 1991; Botts and Muldoon 2005). In addition, the 
1972 GLWQA enabled the UC to create the International Reference Group on Pollution 
from Land Use Activities (PLUARG) (Colbum, Davidson et al. 1990). The PLUARG 
panels, like the panels created for the Upper Lakes Reference Group (ULRG) were 
illustrative of the representation of a broad range of the public and interested parties in 
the process used by the UC. Great Lakes Tomorrow was contracted by the UC for 
outreach and pre-hearing educational workshops on issues relevant to the work of the UC 
and its panels. The work of Great Lakes Tomorrow in these cases was: 
.. .to prepare the public for the UC hearings on technically complex 
reports. These UC boards required the contractor to: develop community 
profile to systematically identify the groups and individuals whose 
interests would likely be affected, prepare lengthy mailing lists of 
individuals representing the target publics; and design and implement a 
media campaign to reach others who might have an interest. Besides 
recruiting participation from the public at large, those targeted publics 
were recruited explicitly to elicit their participation in the workshops and 
hearings (Becker 1993,242). 
PLUARG ultimately established 17 public advisory panels throughout the 
watershed. Representation on the panels went far beyond experts to include municipal 
leaders, elected officials, farmers, academics, environmental activists, labor unions and 
other interested individuals (Becker 1993; Botts and Muldoon 2005). "PLUARG really 
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did want to know what the panels thought. Panels met formally (at least) four times to 
discuss and make recommendations on the social, environmental, and economic aspects 
of the PLUARG study. Most panels also articulated their goals for the future of the Great 
Lakes to provide a context for their deliberations" (Becker 1993,247). One significant 
result of the panel process was that PLUARG's final report influenced the agenda of the 
IJC (Becker 1993; Botts and Muldoon 2005) and, as explained by a PLUARG 
participant, helped usher in the adoption of the "ecosystem-based approach" language 
incorporated into the 1978 protocol: 
In 1978, when the PLUARG Report was going to come in, they asked us 
to facilitate the public process, but the committee had decided that, "oh my 
gosh, we're going to have to have a public process because the treaty says 
we have to do this." They didn't do it at the beginning of PLUARG, they 
did it during the last year... We reported directly to both the Commission 
and PLUARG.. .the collective recommendations of what came up from all 
of those panels, on both about the process of engaging the public and 
about substantive issues. The general consensus was that the process that 
PLUARG had run, which Great Lakes Tomorrow facilitated, we 
facilitated all the hearings that went on around the lakes on both sides. 
We also reported as an organization on what we saw. The public 
composition didn't matter because the panel was really diverse in terms of 
the representation. They included industry.. .by then everybody's at the 
table.. .the result was that they really liked that model of participation and 
recommended that the Commission empower its reference toward another 
initiative to use similar process. To my knowledge it hasn't happened 
since... Because the outcome of the process was a significant change in 
the Panel's report in terms of what ought to be done with respect to what 
the references reported out. It was a very radical report in terms of what 
needed to happen. That was the thread that Great Lakes Tomorrow kind 
of ran through and realized, and when that report hit the fan, that we were 
going to a) change the Agreement—in 78 the agreement was renegotiated 
and the ecosystem approach was adopted, and so then that raised a whole 
other flag about what we needed to do in terms of getting our heads 
wrapped around it—what does this mean, how are you going to implement 
it, and what does this mean for the people who have to make decisions 
here, there and everywhere? That's where the "Decisions for the Great 
Lakes Program" came from. It was to lay the groundwork for engaging 
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the relevant stakeholders in restoring the health of the Great Lakes. (US 
NGO/Academic) 
It was not just PLUARG panel doing outreach in the Great Lakes. Another group, 
the Lake Michigan Federation, was doing outreach in connection with the Great Lakes 
Basin Commission (GLBC).17 When the Basin Commission requested public comment 
related to a draft Framework plan designed to assess public sentiment on what was most 
important in the region. In other words, what did the public prefer on the issue of 
"environmental quality" versus "economic development?" The Lake Michigan 
Federation held a series of meetings around the region in 1975. As its president at the 
time recounts: 
The mission of the Lake Michigan Federation was ... "citizen action to 
save the Great Lake." So things continued and by 1975, '74/'75, the 
GLBC had a draft framework plan getting ready to be presented for the 
formal review that was part of the process laid out for it. One of the big 
issues was that under the.. .1 can't remember if they were called standards, 
rules, regulations or whatever, but the operating governance rules for the 
Basin Commission was, that part of what the plan was supposed to do was 
to say what was most important in the region. Was it economic 
development or environmental protection? There might have been a third. 
But, the real issue was between economic development and environmental 
protection. So, there was.. .the Basin Commission set up a series of public 
meetings to be held to pose that question, and because they were getting 
the most noise from Lake Michigan.. .1 think they only had like four or six 
or seven such things altogether.. .but, four of them occurred around Lake 
Michigan... and this was a standard way we operated a lot in those 
days.. .issues would come up and we would carry out, in effect, an 
information or an education campaign to inform the local communities or 
organizations about the issues from the perspective as a regional issue that 
needed local input. (US NGO 2) 
17 The Great Lakes Basin Commission was one of six regional "river basin commissions" that were created 
by the 1965 Federal Water Resources Planning Act. Its mission was to coordinate water resource activities 
between the 8 state and various federal agencies in the Great Lakes region. 
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As a result of these meetings, public officials were "astounded by the strong 
support expressed for "environmental quality: as a regional goal over economic 
development" (Botts and Muldoon 2005,42). 
From the above it is clear that goal clarification process utilized by the IJC was 
intentionally designed to gather broad public input as part its efforts to restore the Great 
Lakes under the GLWQA. Illustrative are the efforts of the PLUARG process, which 
ultimately altered the goals and agenda for the 1978 amendments to the GLWQA and 
ushered in the practice of using a basin-wide ecosystem-approach to the IJC's efforts in 
the region. Also of note is the process used by the GLBC to gather input on priorities of 
the public by holding public meetings to determine whether the public preferred 
economic development or environmental protection as a focus of its new Framework 
plan. The result of its public outreach, perhaps much to its chagrin, demonstrated that the 
public was more interested in environmental quality than economic development. 
Unfortunately the strength of the citizen involvement process fostered by 
PLUARG began to fade after the final recommendations and the passage of the 1978 
amendments to the GLWQA. The cohesive group of citizen experts and participants was 
not used to monitor the actions of the Parties after the final Commission 
recommendations (Becker 1993) The public involvement that drove PLUARG can fairly 
take credit for the inclusion of the ecosystem-based approach in the 1978 amendments 
(Botts and Muldoon 2005), but there has not been sufficient public pressure or political 
will to follow through or implement other goals set out in either the 1978 amendments or 
the 1987 protocol (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990; Becker 1993). The 1978 amendments, 
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for instance, adopt a "zero discharge" philosophy for achieving the standards for the 
persistent toxic substances.18 Other than banning DDT, PCBs and dieldrin, no initiatives 
have been successful in banning other persistent organic pollutants (Colburn, Davidson et 
al. 1990). 
The criteria for goal clarification under an ideal ecosystem-based governance 
regime were as follows: 
1) Meaningful community participation in the goal clarification process; 
2) Strong public outreach and education efforts devoted to governance options 
and ecosystem issues, and 
3) Multiple goals that overall embrace human dignity and equal access to 
governance with a premium placed on maintenance of the integrity and resilience of 
ecosystem functions. 
The experience in the Great Lakes under the GLWQA seems to demonstrate that 
the UC reacted to immense public pressure by seeking community participation in the 
goal clarification process through its insistence on transparency, public meetings, and 
public debate which, as demonstrated by PLUARG, resulted in meaningful expression of 
community and public goals and interests (Table 24). The public outreach component of 
goal clarification was present during the same period with Great Lakes Tomorrow, the 
Lake Michigan Federation, and others traveling to venues around the watershed to 
educate people on the issues confronting the IJC and, then, reporting back their 
impressions and findings. Finally it would appear that the public participation in a 
variety of significant topics was broad, well-informed, and placed a premium on 
18 Persistent toxic substances are defined at Annex 12 (l)(a) as 
. .any toxic substance with a half-life in water of greater than eight weeks.. .(1987). Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreement of 1978, U.S.-Can., 30 U.S.T.1384; Protocol to Amend the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement of 1978, Nov. 18,1987, Can.-U.S., 1987 Can. T.S. No. 32. 30U.S.T. 1384. 
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environmental quality. As the work of the Lake Michigan Federation demonstrated, the 
public preferred this attribute over economic development. In the case of PLUARG, the 
results are clear that the public believed that the GLWQA should be expanded to include 
the entire basin so that governance could be extended beyond the lakes into the watershed 
where land uses were impacting water quality. 
Table 24 Goal Clarification 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Governance 
Meaningful public and/or 
community participation and input 
in the goal clarification process. 
National goals may provide 
guidance but community has broad 
input into how to achieve goals. 
Goal choices have broad community 
acceptance 
Public interest high in region in 1970s. Many 
citizen action groups demanding direct involvement 
and access. IJC recognizes need for public support. 
PLUARG and UGLR panels and investigations 
hold hearings and draft reports to IJC. Major force 
behind 1978 addition of ecosystem-based approach 
to GLWQA. IJC annual and biennial reports and 
publications increase credibility and understanding 
of public. Annual IJC meetings made public and 
become mechanism for public understanding and 
civic activism. Regional office opened and public 
relations staff hired by IJC. Citizen participation 
on IJC Boards and panels. 
Strong public outreach and 
education provide ability to establish 
community goals inclusive of human 
dignity and democracy and provide 
basis for clarifying common 
interests. Human dignity includes 
economic fairness and sustainability. 
Wingpread conferences begin early-on with broad 
participation. GLT contracted by IJC for outreach 
and pre-hearing educational workshops throughout 
basin. GLT also works with RAP facilitation. 
Lake Michigan holds public hearings at request of 
GLBC. Decisions for Great Lakes to educate and 
train leaders in the ecosystem approach and its 
implementation. 
Multiple goals may be integrated 
that embrace human dignity, 
economic fairness for the many, and 
equal access to governance with a 
focus on maintenance and 
preservation of the integrity and 
resilience of ecosystem functions. 
GLWQA articulates general goals and numerous 
specific goals. Democracy fostered by increased 
public participation, access and input to 
government decision making. 
Participants in GLWQA governance considered 
ecosystem "integrity" to include justice and 
equality. 
It is sad, however, that the PLUARG group of knowledgeable citizens was 
allowed to lapse. This was despite the fact that the UC urged the parties to continue and 
expand the public participation component and to increase overall education and outreach 
(IJC 1980). The goals of the region are still in place - qualitatively to restore and 
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maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters. While 
the original individuals involved in the development of the GLWQA Agreements may 
have intended for "integrity" to have a broader meaning that included basic human 
dignity and democracy (CUSIS 1991), the interpretations since that time have been far 
narrower. 
So the involvement of the public in goal clarification has waxed and waned under 
the GLWQA agreements and protocols. It is important, however, to remember how 
public involvement made change possible for a significant period of time, and how 
difficult implementation has become without a galvanized citizenry. It is also important 
to realize the extent of public outreach and education and how instrumental such efforts 
were in creating a knowledgeable public capable of offering valuable local knowledge 
and input to regulators and UC officials. 
The final characteristic of the goal clarification task is whether there are multiple 
goals that overall embrace human dignity and equal access to governance with a premium 
placed on maintenance of the integrity and resilience of ecosystem functions. The key, 
again, may be the notion of integrity. 
The GLWQA has numerous goals different from but related to water quality. The 
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement establishes the overall environmental goal: 
"restoring the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes 
Basin Ecosystem" to achieve healthy populations of plant, fish, and wildlife populations 
and to protect human health. The Agreement mandates the protection and restoration of 
habitats vital for the support of healthy and diverse communities of plants, fish, and 
wildlife, with an emphasis on interjurisdictional fish and wildlife habitats, wetland 
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habitats, and those habitats needed by threatened and endangered species. Further, the 
GLWQA recognizes that in order to restore the biological integrity of the Great Lakes 
Basin Ecosystem self-sustaining populations of fish and other aquatic organisms must be 
protected (USEPA 1992; GLWQA 1987). Finally, the institutional mandate and structure 
of the GLFC enables it to collaborate and generate deliberations that identify interrelated 
components of the "fish system" and thereby determine catch limitations based on the 
needs for restoration and the health of the ecosystem. The focus, therefore, in 
collaboration with the UC and the federal, provincial, and state agencies with 
responsibility for fisheries is on the common goal. .to sustain the functional integrity of 
ecosystems while producing desired resources and environmental services; any practices 
contrary to that goal are viewed as illegitimate" (Prelli and Becker 2001,481) 
Thus the goals and objectives extant under the GLWQA governance regime 
appear to have had multiple goals and objectives that embraced human dignity (via 
human health and greater access to decision-making) and that placed a premium on the 
integrity and resilience of ecosystem functions. Again, the goals and objectives may be 
satisfactory and sufficient, if achieved, to foster a sustainable governance system. The 
achievement of these goals, however, relies upon the Parties to the GLWQA. An 
examination of the trends of public participation, public outreach efforts, and toward the 
restoration and protection goals of the GLWQA will help determine whether progress is 
trending toward those goals. 
Describing Trends. In order to assess the trends for the governance regime under 
the GLWQA, it is necessary to view the situation from the perspective of a time traveler 
transported to the late 1960s. Trends need to be examined in the context of what became 
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known to participants in the governance system under the GLWQA, its amendments, and 
the 1987 protocol, through the early 1990s. 
The trends task in an ideal ecosystem-based approach to governance has been 
discussed and may be characterized by: 
1) Collaboration and the use of reliable methods and data in order to measure 
whether socioecological variables are moving closer to, not away from, goals, 
2) The open and transparent communication of the progress and trends data to 
policy makers and to an informed public with significant opportunities for 
community members to be involved with scientists in the assessment of trends 
using local knowledge and local preferences (Table 25). 
Table 25 Descibing Trends 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Governance 
The use of reliable methods to measure 
whether a suite of socioecological variables are 
moving closer to, not away from, goals 
established with significant input from 
community. 
1972 GLWQA successful at stemming 
eutrophication due to phosphorus overloading. 
PLUARG key in expanding later agreements to 
include land-based activities. Emphasis in later 
GLWQA amendments and protocol shifted to 
toxic contamination. Collaborative efforts 
between IJC, WQB, SAB, GLU, GLBC, and 
the Lake Michigan Federation work to identify 
problems and sources and put pressure on 
toxics issues. Great Lakes Fisheries 
Commission collaborates with SAB and IJC on 
water quality, habitat, and fisheries issues. 
Introduction of Pacific Salmon as experiment 
rebuilds fish populations in the lakes. Trends 
show increasing threats from toxic 
contaminants. 
Open and transparent communication of the 
progress and trend data to policy makers and to 
an informed public through frequent meetings, 
accessible information, and other techniques. 
GLWQA emphasis on cooperation and 
collaboration with interlocking directors, 
citizen participation on boards and panels, 
biennial public meetings, active NGOs, IJC 
biennial reports and other publications. 
Biennial "state of the lake" reports published 
with assistance from citizens and NGOs. GLIN 
on-line resource established in 1998 creating 
public access to data, assessments, 
publications, and reports relevant to the GLB. 
Use of GLT and other NGOs for public 
education and outreach to create a 
knowledgeable base of "citizen scientists." 
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In other words, trends are examined in terms of the movement of governance 
toward a more participatory and holistic ecosystem-approach; and whether the 
socioecological trends are moving toward more sustainable and resilient ecosystem 
functions. 
As the previous chapter discussed, during the PLUARG process under the 
GLWQA, there was open and transparent communication by the UC and its Boards to a 
public made more knowledgeable by extensive and effective outreach efforts. There was 
also laudable opportunity for community members to be involved with scientists and 
regulators in the assessment of trends through panel meetings, regular annual (then 
biennial) meetings of the IJC, and participation of knowledgeable citizens on IJC Boards 
and panels (UCIRG 1978). The question that remains is whether there was evidence that 
trends moved closer to, not away from, the goals the period examined by this research. 
The trend toward public action and participation under the PLUARG and UGLR 
processes, a trend that made the 1972 GLWQA and, to some extent, the 1978 
amendments possible, began to fade after the 1978 amendments: 
Unfortunately the IJC and the Parties 'dropped the ball' and never took 
advantage of the PLUARG's potential. The Commission failed to make 
use of the pool of expert and committed citizens to monitor the Parties' 
actions in response to the IJC's recommendations. The Parties failed to 
respond directly to the Commission's PLUARG recommendations in any 
formal way, although amending the Agreement in 1978 to formally adopt 
an ecosystem approach could be interpreted, in part, as a response. The 
Parties also failed to allocate resources to the IJC for follow-up on the 
public consultation process in PLUARG. Further, the knowledgeable 
citizen veterans of the PLUARG initiative didn't see any direct and 
substantive results in the GLWQA compliance activities of their own 
governments in response to the Reference Group's report. As a result, the 
citizens lost a certain amount of faith in the ability of both the IJC and the 
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Parties to work collaboratively with their constituencies. This 'critical 
mass' of advocates for early and decentralized implementation of the 
ecosystem management aspects of the 1978 Agreement was not cultivated 
further and the momentum was lost (Becker 1993,248 - 249) 
The 1978 Amendments to the GLWQA did not end public involvement in the 
Great Lakes Basin governance scheme, however. Great Lakes Tomorrow, the non-profit 
group headquartered in Hiram, Ohio, that had taken such an active role in public outreach 
and education throughout the basin, was kept busy and, among other projects, was asked 
to conduct a workshop in 1983 supported by the IJC, the Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission (GLFC), and others. The purpose of the workshop was to facilitate the 
movement toward the ecosystem approach mandated by the 1978 Amendments. 
Attendees included Commissioners and staff of the UC, major corporations, foundations, 
local and regional elected officials and others. After identifying potential obstacles to its 
attainment, including rationalist thinking and lack of holistic perspective, the participants 
drafted a set of 33 strategies for implementation (Becker 1993). 
Public participation thereafter began to coalesce more within established 
environmental organizations. The Lake Michigan Federation became an umbrella for 
most of the groups around Lake Michigan, while advocating for Great Lakes Basin-wide 
issues on behalf of its members. Another group, Great Lakes United (GLU), was formed 
in May, 1982, in a now mildly famous emergency gathering on Mackinac Island funded 
by the Joyce Foundation and arranged by agreement between "Save the River," from the 
Thousand Island region of New York and the Michigan United Conservation Clubs 
(MUCC). The purpose of the meeting was to consider MUCC's proposal to form a 
"Great Lakes Federation" and was attended by representatives from the UAW as well as 
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staff and members of local and national environmental organizations. GLU was formed 
and played a huge role in the negotiations for the 1987 protocol amending the GLWQA 
(Francis 1990). Convening some 19 citizens' hearings around the basin in 1986, the GLU 
ultimately published "Unfilled Promises," a report that called for faster and stronger 
measures to stem toxic contamination and laid out the argument for greater involvement 
of the public and more accountability for governments under the agreement. GLU also 
played key roles in organizing its binational membership to play roles in IJC's biennial 
meetings, and in fact meets once a year to develop consensus for positions to be advanced 
to the IJC (Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
The extent and influence of public involvement in the governance of the Great 
Lakes Basin under the GLWQA has waned from the intense days after the original 1972 
agreement and before the 1978 Amendments. While citizen involvement remained a 
potent force in many ways, the momentum built by the PLUARG and ULRG efforts was 
diminished somewhat following 1978. The trend after the 1987 protocol was for the 
greater participation of NGOs, mostly those national environmental organizations that 
had begun to join the movement in the 1980s. They were joined at biennial meetings of 
the IJC, starting in 1989, by numerous (and sometimes raucous) grassroots organizations 
concerned about toxic contamination. Their presence transformed IJC biennial meetings 
from dry exchanges of information into major demonstrations of public opinion. "The 
increased activism enhanced political support for the Great Lakes programs and led to 
new, strong U.S. legislation in support of the agreement in the United States, and to 
major policy developments in both countries" (Botts and Muldoon 2005,136). 
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There was, however, still a governance regime, with two powerful governments 
linked by the GLWQA and a fragmented, multi-jurisdictional domestic legal scheme 
presiding over the binational Great Lakes Basin and its watershed. How well did 
governance perform? Were socioecological measures moving in the direction of goals? 
The general goal agreed to by the Parties to the GLWQA for the Great Lakes 
through the 1987 Protocol is to "restore, and maintain the chemical, physical and 
biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem (1987, Article II)" 
The ecosystem is defined as "the interacting components of air, land, water and living 
organisms, including humans, within the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence River" 
(1987, Article I (g)). As we have seen additional goals called for the protection and 
maintenance of self-sustaining fish populations and aquatic organisms and for protection 
and restoration of habitats vital for the support of healthy and diverse communities of 
plants, fish, and wildlife. The water quality trends will be examined first. 
More specific goals and implementation strategies set forth in the GLWQA 
evolved through the 1972 Agreement, the 1978 Amendments, and the 1987 Protocol. 
The 1972 Agreement was concerned mainly with the elimination of phosphorous inputs 
via water treatment facility upgrades and a phosphate detergent ban. It also provided that 
the discharge of toxic substances in toxic amounts was prohibited, and the list of toxic 
substances has grown to over 400 in the 1987 Protocol (1987, Article II, Annex 10, 
Appendix 1-2), was prohibited. The 1978 Amendments included revised and more 
stringent water quality target loadings for phosphorous (1987, Annex 3). Since the 
PLUARG studies demonstrated the connection between water quality and land-based 
nonpoint sources the IJC, after a preliminary meeting with the GLFC, endorsed the 
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ecosystem-based approach for inclusion in the 1978 amendments. Finally, the 1978 
Amendments introduced 'virtual elimination' as either a goal or philosophy.19 
The demonstrated trends pertinent to this litany of goals and objectives have been 
mixed. Recall that the primary culprit for eutrophication and algae growth in the lakes, 
especially Lake Erie, was phosphorous. The primary purpose of the initial 1972 GLWQA 
was to reduce phosphorous and improve waste water treatment. This was largely based 
on a 1970 report in which the IJC highlighted the serious pollution problems in the waters 
of Lakes Ontario and Erie and the St. Lawrence River which was causing injury to health 
and property. The report also noted that 70% of the phosphorous in U.S. sewage and 
50% of the phosphorous in Canadian sewage originated from detergents and 
recommended improved sewage treatment by municipalities and industry and a reduction 
in the phosphorous content of detergents "to the maximum practicable extent at the 
earliest possible time" (IJC 1970) As one member of the of the Research Advisory Board 
at the time described the situation in Lake Erie: 
There was just severe gross pollution. There was nothing subtle about it. 
And then the lower lakes had all of the eutrophication as one form of 
nutrient enrichment, so they had all that to deal with, and that was pretty 
gross when you look back at it now. (Canadian Academic 1) 
In fact, untreated sewage pouring into the lakes had been a problem for decades, 
as the following recollection from a former SAB member illustrates: 
19 There is disagreement. Article 11(a) of the GLWQA states: "The discharge of... any or all persistent 
toxic substances be virtually eliminated..." while, at Annex 12(2)(a)(i) the GLWQA sets forth: "The intent 
of programs specified in this Annex is to virtually eliminate the input of persistent toxic substances in order 
to protect human health and to ensure the continued health and productivity of living aquatic resources and 
human use thereof... 
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In 1943, as a thirteen year old swimming in Lake Ontario Just west of the 
mouth of the Niagara River, Four Mile Creek. Four Mile Creek was a 
famous well-known, very productive seining site. In 1943 we were 
swimming in Lake Ontario, my family had moved there, and at that time, 
soon after that they started urging people not to go into the lake because of 
polio, and it was the raw untreated sewage coming down from St. 
Catharines. I knew people who got polio. So Lake Ontario was a 
dangerous place. (Canadian Academic 2) 
Over strong opposition from the Soap and Detergent Association, led by Proctor 
and Gamble, the UC adopted strong phosphorous abatement recommendations in the 
1972 GLWQA. Citizens and environmental advocates then pressed their state and 
provincial lawmakers to implement strict limitations through legislation. One by one 
Ontario and the states passed laws requiring the removal of phosphates from detergents. 
The USEPA reversed its previous stand and in 1977 joined with the UC and its Water 
Quality Board to recommend that all states in the Great Lakes Basin adopt a detergent 
phosphate ban (USEPA 1977). The movement toward improved water quality received a 
boost from the provisions of the Clean Water Act that paid for 75% of costs for 
municipalities to improve their waste water treatment (1972). Spending on treatment 
plant projects in the Great Lakes alone exceeded $8 billion from the late 1970 to the 1990 
(USEPA 1991). As a result of these measures, by 1991 the USEPA was able to report to 
the U.S. Congress that nutrient levels in the Great Lakes Watershed had significantly 
diminished, and that "[t]he two nations have achieved a world-class success in abating 
nutrient-related algae problems in Lake Erie. Levels of many targeted contaminants have 
declined drastically in fish and wildlife, resulting in clear improvements in the health of 
many species" (USEPA 1991, i) 
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One key member of an NGO in the Great Lakes at the time described the impact 
of the GLWQA on water quality: 
Q: Why do you think.. .when you say it was successful of the 
GLWQA process, what happened that made you think it was successful? 
What changed? Did the Great Lakes get cleaner? Did the water quality 
improve? 
A: Yes. The water quality improved. For one thing, when we started, 
you could smell it, see it, and taste it. 
Q: There's a correlation.. .there's a cause and effect between the 
agreement and the cleanup? 
A: Oh yes. Absolutely. Because, the agreement at that time was so 
essential in driving action and the allocation of resources to build strategic 
plans, we had planning going on all over the basin for dealing with the 
point source stuff, you had all kinds of action on the part of both citizens 
and politicians on getting the phosphorous detergent bans. (US 
NGO/Academic) 
While the waters of the Great Lakes visibly improved in a relatively short period 
of time, and basking in the glory of these improvements, additional monies poured in for 
Great Lakes research and monitoring. From 1975, the annual full RAB report was 
supplemented by increasing numbers of separate reports describing a proposal to 
combine the study of the structure and activity of persistent bioaccumulative toxic 
contaminants. As early as 1975 a monitoring and surveillance plan was in place to 
monitor the lakes, their tributaries, and other areas for pollutants, including persistent 
toxic substances (IJCWQB 1975). Reports thereafter began to express a growing concern 
about the number and extent of discoveries of toxic contaminants (UCIRG 1978; USEPA 
1980a). These discoveries were being made at about the same time that newspapers were 
trumpeting stories of Michigan dealing with the contamination of water supplies by 
polybrominated biphenyls (PBBs). Further groundwater contaminated with toxic 
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substances were being found in Great Lakes states, raising additional concern about 
preservation of the water quality in the lakes as a future source clean drinking water 
(Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). When high levels of PCBs were found in fish tissue 
from a small lake on Isle Royale in northern Lake Superior it became obvious that 
chemicals were being transported long distances through the atmosphere as there were no 
other possible sources in this location. The RAB report also set forth the number of 
chemicals found in the Great Lakes that were persistent organic compounds and pointed 
out their ability to bioaccumulate. By the late 1970s nearly a thousand chemicals had 
been found, "though the list for priority action would be refined to 11 criteria substances" 
(Botts and Muldoon 2005,47). Thus water quality trends in the Great Lakes were a 
mixed bag. Pollution due to nutrient overloads had vastly improved in a short time while, 
during the same time, monitoring efforts were revealing the existence of persistent 
organic compounds, including PCBs and PBBs in sediments and fish tissue, was 
escalating. As one individual involved in the RAB investigation at the time put it: 
.. .they [had] made good grounds in cutting the phosphorus out of the 
water, and cutting back on eutrophication, and of course we've started 
finding more toxic contaminants of various kinds, and at least they tried to 
deal with them as they came across them as best they could, but then the 
more they got into.. .or agencies got into looking into the water and the 
sediment and the fish, the more they found, and of course as the detection 
levels became more sophisticated in the more you can find. So that threw 
it into the whole mode of trying to deal with toxic contaminants, and 
particularly in trying to identify the key ones, the ones that are known to 
be widespread within the lakes, and also have biomagnification properties 
and therefore potential for health effects. It revealed first in fish and 
wildlife, but then there's some sense that there may be some human 
concerns. So that evolved through the '80's and '90's... (Canadian 
Academic 1) 
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Thus the growing toxic contamination became the focus of the efforts of the IJC 
through the 1978 amendments and the 1987 protocol, including the call for "an 
ecosystem approach to management" based on "virtual elimination" of toxic 
contaminants (GLWQA 1987). 
The trends in water quality in the Great Lakes have, like the trends in public 
participation, waxed and waned. The binational approach to governance so essential to 
achieving the goals of the GLWQA has deteriorated over the last 20 years (Jackson and 
Sloan 2008). The critical engagement of the public in Great Lakes issues and the 
accompanying sense of community has also largely fallen away over the same period 
(Krantzberg, Manno et al. 2007). But what about healthy fish populations - another 
important indicator in a region devoted to clean water and healthy ecosystems? 
Stories of the bounty of Great Lakes fisheries in the 18th and 19th centuries 
abound. Boat loads of sturgeon were not uncommon near the Wisconsin shore where 
they were treated as nuisance fish and cast aside to die after being pulled from nets. 
When their value for caviar was discovered, the few remaining sturgeon were decimated. 
In the early 19th century boatloads of trout were not uncommon around Sault St. Marie. 
By the mid-1880s that commercial fishery had all but disappeared. In 1830 the Maumee 
River in Ohio was famous for its abundance of fish - some thirty odd varieties, including 
"[mjaskinonge, pike, white and black bass, and catfish were caught, salted and sold fresh 
each year for food, amounting to some thousands of barrels yearly" (Dempsey 2004, 38) 
Landlocked Atlantic salmon, once prolific in Lake Ontario, were extirpated by 1903. 
Finally, whitefish, the delectable staple of Great Lakes commercial fishing, began to 
decline precipitously, with whitefish harvests falling from 24.3 million pounds in 1879 to 
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9 million pounds in 1899 (Dempsey 2004; Gaden, Krueger et al. 2008). The story of the 
demise of the whitefish fishery bears resemblance to many other similar stories around 
the globe: 
The stunning advancement of nets and fishing gear, as well as the 
increasing number of commercial anglers, fueled ever-growing fears about 
the fate of the fishery. In the early 1800s most fishing was conducted 
close to shore and fish caught were sold to local markets. But the second 
half of the nineteenth century revolutionized fishing techniques, enabling 
harvesters to target more species, capture fish in deeper waters, and fish 
during a greater portion of the year (Dempsey 2004,42) 
Not surprisingly, the decline in whitefish caused attention to turn to lake trout and 
hearing. More elusive and greater populations kept this fishery robust well into the 
twentieth century before collapsing (Dempsey 2004). But, as a former Commissioner of 
the GLFC notes in this exchange, fishers in the Great Lakes can be persistent: 
A: There's always been active commercial fishery on the Canadian 
side. On the U.S. side, [three] things caused the commercial fishery to go 
downhill fast. One of them was unionization of the fishermen. And 
secondly it was the sportfishermen. And the third one was the 
environment. A small commercial fishery still persists on the U.S. side. 
Q: The commercial fishery in Canada was it for walleye? 
A: Well, the blues but they disappeared, and then the walleye. And 
smelt was pretty important. Not necessarily on the US side, but the 
Canadian side in particular. The trawling that was done then and with 
strong federal subsidies, the smelt fishery was really quite effective for a 
long time. It wasn't as lucrative as, comparatively speaking, as the white 
fish industry. The walleye was never as important on the Canadian side as 
it was in the U.S. But they were important. And yellow perch came along. 
Yellow perch and walleye, particularly, were preadapted to succeed 
reasonably well in a highly eutrophic environment. They are preadapted 
to the way Lake Erie became. (Canadian Academic 2) 
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Unfortunately, the few lake trout and whitefish that survived until the 1930s 
became targets of lamprey eels, an invasive species that made it through the Welland 
Canal from the Atlantic and lived by feeding on fish - attaching themselves to the body 
of a larger fish and slowly draining them of life (Ashworth 1987). By the time that 
Canada and the U.S. ratified a Convention that created the Great Lakes Fisheries 
Commission in 1955 it was estimated that lake trout production was 99% lower than the 
average annual commercial catch in the 1930s. Commercial fishing was history. Sport 
fishermen abandoned the lakes (Dempsey 2004). 
To add misery to the Great Lakes situation, a small silver fish, the alewife, began 
to sweep into the Great Lakes. Although it was forage for larger fish when there were 
larger fish, after predator populations crashed with the lamprey eel invasion, the 
population soon exploded in size. One of their most memorable traits was the mass die-
off that occurred every spring, starting in the 1960s, when water temperatures began to 
rise. It was in response to the alewife issues that Michigan sought and received 
permission from other Great Lakes states and Ontario to try a field experiment. Thus in 
1966 they released some 650,000 Coho salmon smolts into rivers around Lake Michigan 
and crossed their fingers. The same fall, young salmon returned to their streams of 
origin, filling the heads of recreational fishermen with dreams of a salmon fishery. The 
autumn of 1967 was better than anyone had could have dreamed (Dempsey 2004). 
Salmon fought ferociously when hooked and, from personal experience, earned 
those who landed one bragging rights on the pier or back at the dock. Needless to say a 
powerful recreational fishing industry developed around the Coho and Chinook salmon 
introductions. Lake trout are now not an uncommon catch in the lakes as well. 
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Some disagree with the methods used, considering the introduction of salmon as 
simply unleashing another invasive species. Many, especially on the Canadian side of the 
lakes, thought that more effort should have been put forward to restore self-sustaining 
stocks of native fish. It was their belief that the introduction salmon was just another 
invasive species that crowded out lake trout and whitefish (Dempsey 2004). A former 
member of the Science Advisory Board as well as an advisor to the Great Lakes Fisheries 
Commission explained the different salmon introduction perspectives to me this way: 
Q: What about the introduction of salmon.. .coho and chinook, good 
idea? 
A: Well it represents just a different notion of what fisheries is or 
even what the lakes are, you could argue, and at one time there was a little 
bit of a difference of views I'm told that was told between the people 
coming from one side of the lake or the other. It's a good idea if you just 
use the lakes as essentially a holding tank, and you have plenty of put and 
take fishery, which creates economic benefits for the marina owners and 
all the other people that live in these little towns that are all upstate in 
terms of the geography of the jurisdiction. So you have these little upstate 
towns, you've got a little tourism going on, and everybody's happy and it 
seems to work. For a long time the people in Ontario Ministry of Natural 
Resources really much preferred to have self-sustaining stocks of native 
species. And they only wanted to put that as what we should be aiming 
for and that's where the lake trout come in was going to be the icon fish. 
And you can see that difference a little bit in some of the wordings in the 
visions for the Great Lakes that come out of the fisheries commissions, 
something like yes, they want self-sustaining stocks and so on with these 
fish, but one word in there, something like "judicious planting" that 
someone who is a lawyer might enjoy it, these visions statements that 
come out of these fisheries commissions. Which I think is a sense of 
saying okay, we agree to disagree. And then I suppose if you catch a fish 
where you put them in that would seem all right, but they don't always 
stay there. I used to spend a lot of time around Long Point on the north 
shore of Lake Erie. There's a tremendous sense of place there. Some of 
those Pacific Salmon used to spend the summer in the deep water right off 
the end of that point. So, locals would come out with their charter boats or 
their own boats, just around the villages around there at Long Point, and 
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they would catch these fish. The Americans put them in, we pick them up, 
and it seems like a sense of justice. (Canadian Academic 1) 
Thus the demise of the Great Lakes fishery that included lake trout and whitefish 
from the 1800s through the 1960s was countered with a somewhat daring experiment by 
planting Pacific salmon. They took. Healthy populations of Pacific salmon flourished, 
foraging on alewife and other available food sources. 
The recreational fishing industry in communities around the Great Lakes boomed. 
The emerging surprise, however, was the discovery that salmon and other fish had 
accumulated persistent toxic compounds in their tissue. 
The first sport fish advisory was issued in the Great Lakes in 1971 for people 
consuming fish caught from the lakes (Fuller, Shear et al. 1995). Thus while there were 
populations of sport fish making themselves a new home in the Great Lakes, it would be 
a stretch to label them 'healthy' populations. Again we see that trends wax and wane. 
Increasing the biomass of recreationally popular sport fish only to discover that the 
flourishing populations had become indicators of the toxic contaminants in the Great 
Lakes was perhaps a mixed blessing. Time will tell. 
Conditions. In an ideal system, condition analysis should be part of an iterative 
effort by scientists and community members to determine the causes or factors 
influencing trends. Resources should be available to permit scientists and others to sort 
out the various environmental signals and determine what conditions are factors in any 
negative ecosystem trends. The inquiry, however, should not be limited to ecosystem 
factors. Trends can be affected by the individual and institutional effects of economic 
activity. Thus special interest activity that detracts from the common interests of resilient 
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ecosystems may give rise to conditions that need to be investigated and, if necessary, 
abated. 
The most harmful threat to the health and resilience of the ecosystem of the Great 
Lakes Basin under the GLWQA scheme is a possible trend away from the goal of 
restoring and maintaining the "chemical, physical and biological integrity of the waters of 
the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem" and the fading interest in the 'virtual elimination' of 
the discharge of persistent toxic chemicals (Fuller, Shear et al. 1995; GLWQA 1987). 
In order to understand the causes for the trends of increased discovery of toxic 
contamination in the Great Lakes Basin, as well as other positive and negative trends, any 
conditions analysis must incorporate not only the processes that permit collaboration and 
open discussion of causes and possible solutions, but the existing physical and biological 
characteristics of the region. As a starting point it was pointed out early in this chapter 
that the Great Lakes Basin was formed and shaped during the Pleistocene Epoch as 
glaciers sometimes 2,000 meters (6,000 feet) thick scoured the surface of the earth, 
retreating only to return several times. As the climate warmed, the glaciers melted, the 
land began to rise, and the water drained into the basins now known as the Great Lakes 
(Fuller, Shear et al. 1995; Grady 2007). Formed by glacial melt, only one percent of 
water in the Great Lakes is renewed each year by rain and snow. Roughly the same 
amount flows into the sea. With a flushing time from Lake Superior to the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence of some 600 years, pollution that winds up in the lakes mainly stays in the 
lakes (Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
While there is no question that passage and flow through the lakes is slow, with 
time periods of decades to up to 600 years for a particle to pass from the innermost lakes 
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to the Atlantic (Dempsey 2004), the Great Lakes are not large vessels of still, uniformly 
mixed waters. There is movement. The lakes are large enough for the gravitational pull 
of the moon to cause tides in Milwaukee and Chicago of 4 - 5 centimeters (1.5-1.8 
inches) (Grady 2007). Winds can push surface waters from one side of the lakes to the 
other, lowering the water on the leeward shore while raising it to windward, sometimes in 
waves, called seiches, that can inundate a shore with sudden surges up 6 to 8 feet high 
(Fuller, Shear et al. 1995; Dempsey 2004). 
In addition to the mainly horizontal effects of surface water movement, the lakes 
are subject to vertical mixing in nature of stratification and turnover. Essentially heat 
from the sun and changing seasons cause water in the lakes to become stratified, or 
layered. The density of water increases as temperature decreases, causing the lakes to 
form distinct layers in the summer months when increased sunlight warms up surface and 
coastal waters while deeper waters stay cool and more dense. As summer progresses, 
temperature differences increase and a middle layer, the thermocline, develops between 
the deep cooler waters and the warm surface waters (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 Stratification and Turnover 
The warm surface and coastal layer is where most photosynthesis and algal 
production occurs. This productivity is magnified by the increased oxygen in the surface 
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layer due to mixing with the atmosphere. In the fall, surface waters cool and become 
denser, sinking to displace deep waters and causing a mixing or turnover of the entire 
lake. This sinking of oxygen rich surface waters to the deeper portions of the lake helps 
to prevent oxygen depletion, anoxia, in the lower levels (Grady 2007). Stratification in 
the summer months also tends to limit dilution of pollutants from land runoff and other 
inputs, concentrating pollution in the surface layer (Fuller, Shear et al. 1995). Another 
unique feature of these huge freshwater lakes is a the appearance of a sharp temperature 
gradient, a vertical thermal bar, that prevents mixing of nearshore waters with open 
waters until early summer. This thermal bar concentrates pollutants close to shore until 
increasing sunlight allows for mixing (Fuller, Shear et al. 1995; Grady 2007). 
The physical processes of the Great Lakes set the stage for the living resources 
that fill out the ecosystem of the region, or the "the interacting components of air, land, 
water and living organisms, including humans" (GLWQA 1987). 
The living resources of any ecosystem begin with sunlight. Light energy from the 
sun is essential for photosynthesis of green plants. When sunlight and essential nutrients 
like phosphorus and nitrogen combine with oxygen, water, and inorganic carbon, water 
plants can survive. Plant material is consumed in water by zooplankton. Energy is 
transferred to the next step by organisms that feed on other animals (carnivores) or those 
that feed on both plants and animals (omnivores) (Fuller, Shear et al. 1995). 
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Figure 5 Simplified Great Lakes Food Web (U.S. EPA Great Lakes National Program 
Office) 
In the Great Lakes, primary producers are largely comprised of Rhodophyta (red 
algae) and Phaeophyceae (brown algae). The most dominant variety of zooplankton, or 
primary consumer, is diporeia hoyi, although the invasive zebra mussel is making inroads 
as a primary consumer. Bottom animals such as mayfly nymphs also fulfill the role of 
primary consumer where the water is clean enough to support populations. Sculpin, 
197 
chub, alewife, and smelt are secondary consumers in the ecosystem, while cormorants 
and gulls along with the sport fish are tertiary consumers. At the top of the food chain 
are eagles and humans (Fuller, Shear et al. 1995) (Figure 5). 
As the food web shown graphically in Figure 6 depicts, organisms at the higher 
trophic levels depend on the stability of the lower trophic levels in the web. If something 
goes wrong at lower levels, the effect at higher levels can be catastrophic. Phosphorus 
overloading in the Great Lakes, for example, caused massive algae growth at the bottom 
of the web, causing the biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) created by decomposing 
algae to threaten the survival of the entire web (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). 
The food chain also demonstrates that some substances introduced into the food 
Herring Gull Eggs 
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Figure 6 Bioaccumulation (EPA Regional Office) 
chain can get consumed or absorbed and are retained in their tissue. The organism that 
consumes the substance is then consumed by predator in next higher food chain, and so 
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on. As this process continues up the food web, persistent organic substances become 
increasingly concentrated, or biomagnified. The GLWQA (GLWQA 1987) requires the 
Parties to maintain a list of substances known to have toxic effects and to continually 
revise the list as new substances become known. The Agreement also requires the Parties 
to monitor the lakes for the presence of persistent toxic substances (GLWQA 1987) 
While a certain amount of dynamic change may be expected of any ecosystem 
(Gunderson and Holling 2002; Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002), humans have forced a 
great many unnatural changes on ecosystem dynamics in the Great Lakes. Overfishing, 
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Figure 7 Sources and Pathways of Pollution (EPA Regional Program Office) 
habitat destruction, and invasive species nearly destroyed most native fish species. 
Pollution, in the form of nutrient loading and toxic contaminants add stress to fish 
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(Gunderson and Holling 2002; Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002), humans have forced a 
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Figure 7 Sources and Pathways of Pollution (EPA Regional Program Office) 
habitat destruction, and invasive species nearly destroyed most native fish species. 
Pollution, in the form of nutrient loading and toxic contaminants add stress to fish 
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populations and may pose threats to human health (Fuller, Shear et al. 1995; Carson 
2002). The Great Lakes, being very nearly a closed system, manages to accumulate 
pollutants from a variety of sources that ultimately inter the lakes in any number of ways 
(Figure 7). The conditions are almost ideal for the continued escalation of pollution, 
especially persistent toxic chemicals, in the Great Lakes Basin. As a former president of 
the American Fishery Society stated: 
.. .if you think of it as a great river, and the lake's a great whirlpool, then 
it's kind of a watershed phenomenon, and what can threaten a watershed? 
Change in that watershed is a big thing. Things that can be concentrated 
downstream as a result of water: contaminants, nutrients, stuff like that. 
Land use practices generally, lots of different aspects of land use practices 
impact downstream. So, the whole.. .it's.. .when you take a watershed 
approach and seeing it as a river, that kind of focuses for me a regional 
thing, and then what kind of things are the rivery behavior actually 
predisposed. (Canadian Academic 2) 
An examination of conditions must not be limited to the natural ecosystems, and 
their potential for degradation, however. While the sections above have outlined some of 
the most significant natural processes, their susceptibility to further degradation, and 
detailed some of the more relevant legislation that have attempted to control and alter the 
behavior of humans toward their environment, the analysis of overall conditions requires 
us to look at the more general socioeconomic situation extant in the Great Lakes Basin. 
Over the last century or more citizens in the Great Lakes Basin have seen several 
sides of a dynamic Great Lakes Basin ecosystem. Clear, clean water with a variety of 
healthy flora and fauna have changed when fish stocks have collapsed and beaches have 
become clogged with dead fish, oil, grease, debris, and ugly foam. Shoreland has been 
transformed in many cases from forest and wetland to golf courses, marinas, factories, 
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and homes. Legislation and regulation have helped to stem some of the abuse, but new 
threats continue to find a home in the Great Lakes Basin. The changes and trends over 
the last century have, however, been related to decisions made by officials in Washington 
D.C., Ottawa, and the capitals of one province and eight states. Well known Great Lakes 
historian Dave Dempsey (2004) captured the essence of these trends when he wrote: 
While the multiplying problems of the last decade can be traced in great 
measure to a growing gulf between citizens and their governments, there is 
nothing unique in kind about this period. A close look at the history of the 
Great Lakes since the mid1800s reveals that the same governments have 
always done only what the public permitted, or pressured, them to do. 
When exploiting the lakes for immediate riches seemed the wisest course, 
when the struggle for survival distracted the public, or when the faith of 
the electorate flagged in the ability of governments to solve the problems 
of individuals as well as the collective, the lakes frequently deteriorated. 
But when the full-throated voice of the citizen rang true, both individually 
and in great numbers, the lakes recovered (Dempsey 2004, 3) 
In terms of this research, it is abundantly clear that common interests only prevail 
over special interests when the voice of the people collectively demand that the 'powers 
that be' rise in the face of pressure from single or special interests to act for the public 
good. 
In truth, the pressure brought to bear on behalf of economic special interests since 
the early 1970s has been compelling. Once known as the manufacturing heart of 
America, the Great Lakes region is now better known as America's 'rust belt'. It has 
historically been the manufacturing center of the North America. Consider for a moment 
that in 1955 4 out of every 5 cars in the world were made in the US - mostly in the region 
in and around Detroit and northern Ohio. The combination of globalization and the oil 
crisis of the early 1970s, however, made smaller cars the rage. Innovation was left in the 
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dust as US manufacturers refused to consider changing costly and comfortable assembly 
lines. The economy of the manufacturing heartland went into a tail spin as the many 
industries that relied on automobile manufacturing, including parts manufacturers and 
steel mills felt the pinch. Flint, Michigan, for instance once had 100,000 workers 
employed by General Motors. In 2007 that number was down to 6,000 (SchifFeres 2007). 
The water quality of the Great Lakes was not a priority to policymakers. Indeed, one 
individual involved in the evolution of the GLWQA believes that much of the initial 
success of Agreement was due to the economic meltdown in the region: 
In the absence of deindustrialization the [the] water quality agreement 
would have never got off the ground. If Cleveland and Lackawanna, 
there's a big steel complex there, if these hadn't decided to deindustrialize, 
like Gary Indiana, also, back in Lake Erie, in the '50's and '60's there 
would have been trouble. (Canadian academic 2) 
The economy in the rust belt did not improve from the 1970s through the 1990s. 
Neither, as we've seen, after the initial success of the phosphorus removal and water 
treatment plant upgrades of the 1970s, has the environment in the region (Dempsey 
2004). When employment plummets and residents struggle to survive, it is difficult for 
governments to feel that water quality is a priority. 
Thus when the ecosystem health in the Great Lakes is an issue, it must be 
remembered that the GLWQA documents are simply agreements between Canada and 
the U.S., known in diplomatic parlance in the documents as the "Parties." The Parties are 
in fact two sovereign federal governments who, by agreement, established the IJC as an 
entity with limited jurisdiction designed to supervise the observance of obligations 
assumed by treaty under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty (1909; Caldwell 1988). Both 
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Parties are, however, comprised of many different government agencies, each being 
pressured by often powerful, and sometimes desperate, special interests, which can 
override environmental prudence. To put it another way: The US and Canada together 
with "[t]he eight states and Ontario are answerable primarily to their own constituencies. 
So who speaks for the lakes? Hardly the governments" (Caldwell 1993,20). 
The debilitating economic story in the Great Lakes region had operated to put a 
damper on measures that might be protective of the ecosystem. As a general rule, the 
conditions relating to the willingness of federal and state agencies to lead with innovative 
or environmentally enlightened efforts also waned after more conservative governments 
took the reins in both Canada and the U.S. in the 1980s. In the United States, President 
Reagan abruptly dismissed all three of the IJC Commissioners from the U.S. within two 
months after taking office. Abandoning the previous practice of appointing qualified 
candidates who were not replaced with every change in the presidency, Reagan appointed 
two individuals who had been state campaign chairmen in the election, and a third who 
was a former Republican congressman from New York. His administration also 
disbanded the Great Lakes Basin Commission, whose role had been to coordinate federal 
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and state government agencies on matters related to the Great Lakes, and reduced funding 
for university and agency research and for regulatory programs. On the Canadian side, 
Brian Mulroney took office and promptly named political allies to the Canadian posts. 
None of the new commissioners from either side had any prior experience with Great 
Lakes issues or knowledge or understanding of the traditions that were critical to the 
IJC's status as an independent advisory body committed to binationalism (Botts and 
Muldoon 2005). Or, as one commentator noted: "Observers inclined to cynicism see the 
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IJC today as a front for politically conservative governments that have no real 
commitment to the water quality agreements" (Caldwell 1993,20). 
An influential government regulator in the Great Lakes region put it another way: 
You also have the phenomenon I believe that started in the 80's with the 
Reagan administration where government was declared to be, for reasons 
of political expediency, the enemy. That message was, I think, conveyed, 
and trumpeted by more and more people who found it politically 
expedient to just say, very cavalierly, that government is an obstacle, 
government is interference with your rights, government doesn't serve 
you, it harms you. I think we've had a generation or so of that kind of 
attitude that really has sort of affected public perception, public beliefs, 
and ultimate public values. (U.S. State Employee 3) 
Apparently, the weakening and marginalization of the powers of the IJC was not 
cause for grief with the U.S. agencies with jurisdiction over components of the Great 
Lakes ecosystem: 
The preference for partially decentralized implementation through duly 
constituted conventional units of government has been perceived by some 
observers as a bias of relatively conservative administrations in Ottawa 
and Washington against centralized regional governance and institutional 
innovation. This bias, to the extent that it exists, is congenial to the line 
agencies, especially in the United States. The United States Army Corps 
of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Coast Guard, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Departments of 
Agriculture and Interior, and the Department of State would hardly act in 
character if they welcomed the growth of a coordinative authority for the 
Great Lakes to which their own planning and decision-making might be 
subordinated (Caldwell 1993,18) 
In the final analysis, the documents, committees, boards, and transparency of the 
IJC allowed for the existence of collaborative research, monitoring, and progress on 
environmental issues. In our ideal system, materials indicative of ecosystem trends are 
present and available. There are positive indications that a process for collaboration and 
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basin-wide cooperation existed even after neoconservative attempts to thwart the 
GLWQA esprit de corps. 
There are still research laboratories in the region dedicated to the study of the 
natural processes at work in the Great Lakes Basin. NOAA maintains the Great Lakes 
Environmental Research Laboratory (GLERL) in Ann Arbor. The USGS has 
responsibility for the USGS Great Lakes Science Center, with a mission of "Advancing 
scientific knowledge and providing scientific information for restoring, enhancing, 
managing, and protecting the living resources and their habits in the Great Lakes basin 
ecosystem" (USGS 2011). The Great Lakes National Research Laboratory is run by the 
EPA. In Canada, the Canada Centre for Inland Waters, maintained by Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada (DFO), staffs the Great Lakes Laboratory for Fisheries and Aquatic 
Sciences. There are numerous universities in the basin and beyond who work on Great 
Lakes issues. They are all linked through the Great Lakes Information Network (GLIN), 
an internet web site that permits participants and the public to access data and articles that 
have been published relevant to the Great Lakes. In addition, the International 
Association of Great Lakes Researchers (IAGLR) is an active binational organization of 
Great Lakes Researchers, scientists, regulators, NGOs, citizen and watershed groups, 
First Nations, and others, which publishes a monthly journal and holds annual meetings 
open to participation and presentations from all researchers, NGOs, watershed groups, 
and interested parties. Thus the scientific community has maintained a spirit of 
cooperation, certainly stronger during the early years, but still in existence and still 
apparently a galvanizing force for researchers in the region. 
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There is, however, an underlying trend in the economics and political 
developments since the 1970s. The divisive forces that undermined the UC traditions in 
the 1980s have played a role in attempting to return the Great Lakes region to governance 
by traditional fragmented scientific and governmental units. Budgets for research and 
collaboration have been slashed. As one regulator familiar with the evolution of the 
environmental regulatory scheme in Michigan described it: 
Q: No, you misunderstood. I meant, the political pressure, the 
backlash, has to be a practical... is it a practical impediment to doing.... 
A: To doing our jobs? To carrying out our missions? Yes, 
absolutely, it's more than that, because it's.. .in Michigan, here's what 
happened. In order to respond to the articulated dissatisfaction with the 
time it takes to issue a permit within the state, two years ago the 
legislature modified our environmental code to require that, if we didn't 
issue a permit declaring application administratively completed within 30 
days and issue it within a timeline, which can vary under program, then 
we had to refund a portion of the application fee, which had the following 
consequence: When we have fewer people to issue more permits and 
more authorizations, which is our current status quo, we have this self-
fulfilling prophecy of being unable to meet our mission. Fewer people, 
fewer resources, requirements by law to make decisions quicker, in fact, 
the consequence of doing that has led us to probably deny more permits as 
the intended decision deadline came, based. ..where prior to having this 
deadline imposed upon us.. .we had more opportunity to work with the 
applicants on trying to design a ... project permitting some of the 
programs from being a dialogue and interaction between the applicant and 
the regulator. So, that's one consequence. The more pernicious 
consequence is now we find ourselves administering an entirely new 
program, obviously without any new resources, and that's the permit 
application fee return program. (U.S. State Employee 3) 
It is clear that there have been special interest efforts that have come together to 
dampen the efforts of a lot of dedicated people who have been trying to focus again on 
water quality and ecosystem health issues. The prescriptions are present in the Great 
Lakes governance regime to collaborate, cooperate, and, with input from the interested 
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public, begin to experiment with solutions to the problems that exist (Table 26). In the 
years since the rise of public outrage in the 1970s, however, the pressure seems to have 
been removed from governments, and the door has swung open for special interests to 
dominate over those who would advocate for the public good. These developments are 
examined more closely in the next section. 
Table 26 Conditions 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
Conditions analysis is iterative 
with collaborative efforts by 
scientists and community to gain 
and share knowledge necessary to 
determine the conditions that are 
factors in any negative trends. 
Conditions analysis explores more 
than ecosystem factors and 
examines social and economic 
factors in order to understand 
whether economic or other special 
interests are overriding common 
interests and the public good. 
Collaboration between scientists, 
regulators, and citizen participants 
jointly work to identify causes and 
conditions responsible for negative 
trends. 
Spirit of collaboration and cooperation 
between scientists, regulators, NGOs, 
regional commissions (GLFC, 
GLBC/GLC). Biennial meetings of the 
IJC provide opportunity for 
social/natural scientists, economists, 
regulators, NGOs, and public to 
exchange information. GLU has biennial 
meetings to develop an agenda of 
concerns amongst its many NGO 
members to take to the IJC biennial 
meetings. Annual meetings of IAGLR 
provide opportunity for presentation and 
discussion of social, natural sciences, 
economics and related issues. GLIN on­
line service provides access to basin-
wide information and data. 
Projecting Developments. This task is about the use of accurate and reliable data 
about trends and conditions in order to project developments in the future, even if those 
projections are resisted by powerful special interests. History tells us that often policy 
makers are knowledgeable about trends and conditions, yet are either unwilling to buck 
political hazards or are blocked by special interest opposition (Clark 2002). 
In our ideal system, reliable knowledge must underpin the projection of 
developments. If trends and conditions are such that projected developments appear to 
take a community away from its goals, away from progress toward human dignity, and 
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toward a weakened, less resilient ecosystem, there needs to be a system that will reward 
those who bring these issues to the attention of policy makers. There also must be a way 
for policy makers to make adaptive changes in an attempt to reverse negative trends 
without fear of retribution from a system more concerned with power and wealth than 
long-term environmental viability. Strong public participation is a requirement for 
reliable assessment and projection of developments (Table 27). 
Table 27 Projecting Developments 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
Through regular public 
education and outreach, an 
involved public collaborates 
with academic institutions, 
scientists, and policy makers to 
understand reliable data and 
project developments. 
Public education and outreach 
favored and recommended by 
IJC. IJC philosophy: people 
must be made aware of the 
existing local problems and their 
impact on the Great Lakes 
ecosystem, and be encouraged 
to participate in solving these 
problems. Also education of 
government officials and other 
decision-makers advocated and 
implemented via educational 
programs such as GLT's 
Decisions for the Great Lakes 
With the input of 
knowledgeable public, scientists 
and policy makers can 
acknowledge mistakes or policy 
failures, learn from them, and 
make adaptive changes, to 
reverse negative trends without 
fear of retribution from the 
governance system. 
Problem-solving was the focus 
of IJC and SAB efforts. All 
ideas accepted. Public input 
critical. Scientists and agency 
board members worked on 
problems in their personal and 
professional capacity - no 
retribution for unpopular ideas. 
Binationalism - focus was on 
the good of the GLB, not 
necessarily the interest of 
respective federal or state 
governments or agencies. 
From the discussions above, it should be apparent that there has been strong 
public involvement in the governance regime in the Great Lakes Basin under the 
GLWQA, especially during the early years. It perhaps bears expanding on the fact that 
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the UC used outreach and education groups like Great Lakes Tomorrow to educate the 
public about the serious issues facing the water quality in the Great Lakes. After the 
PLUARG panel reports were completed, we have seen that the IJC and its boards 
gradually left the knowledgeable public galvanized by significant involvement with 
PLUARG and IJC out of the process after the 1978 amendments. Thereafter, when the 
Parties submitted a reference to the IJC to reevaluate the issue of regulating lake levels, 
the IJC commissioned a study group with participation by scientists, academics, and 
members of the public, to examine the issue. Four of the eleven board members were 
from the general public and the Study Board was advised by an 18 member Citizen 
Advisory Committee (CAC) appointed by the UC (Becker 1993). The public, whose 
participation is mandated by the 1909 treaty, was also intended to play a large role in the 
remediation and restoration of the 42 localized "areas of concern" identified in the 1987 
GLWQA Protocol (Becker 1993). 
In addition to forceful public participation, another strength of the GLWQA 
process in the early years was the focus on collaboration among scientists, agencies, and 
the public. While this topic will receive more detailed attention in the discussion on the 
decision process, it is important to note the IJC tradition of binationalism. In 1911, at its 
very first meeting after adoption of the Boundary Waters Treaty, the U.S. co-chair 
proclaimed that the commission members were neither Canadians nor Americans, but 
representatives of all the people on both sides of the border. In 1972 Charlie Ross, a 
commission member under five presidents, affirmed that the Commission acted as a 
single body, without interference from the governments of the United States and Canada 
(Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
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Collaboration was also critical to the ecosystem approach built under the IJC 
GLWQA approach. Interlocking directors, acting on behalf of the good of the Great 
Lakes and not necessarily on behalf of a participant's agency, played a critical role in the 
ability of the LFC and its principle boards, together with the GLFC, to solve problems. 
One of the early participants explained it to me this way: 
A: Let's step back a bit. In the '60's and '70's, the three main 
commissions, which were then the UC, the Great Lakes Basin 
Commission and the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, all collaborated. 
The IJC, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, and the Great Lakes Basin 
Commission which preceded the Great Lakes Commission which was 
interstate and expanded to international to pick up what was left hanging 
when Reagan closed down the Great Lakes Basin Commission. While I 
was a Commissioner for the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, I served as 
an advisor to IJC on the Science Advisory Board, and I worked with Mike 
Donahue on the Great Lakes Commission.. .all at the same time. 
Q: So there were interlocking commissioners, members, advisors. 
A: Yes. I was a commissioner on one, a scientific advisor on another, and 
Donahue and I co-sponsored some of CUSIS - George Francis mentioned 
Canada US Interuniversity Seminars yesterday. Donahue and I were 
leading a CUSIS initiative which was being managed out of the Great 
Lakes Commission. So, precisely at the same time, I was working in three 
different capacities. And not only I, I didn't do it by design; it's just the 
way it happened. So, the progress in the 80's came partly because each of 
the other commissions had connections with the IJC... It was the closest 
thing to a free market, you know, what people think of as a free market, in 
concepts and ideas. But, now this free market was constrained by 
concepts like justice, equity, things like that. Aesthetics. George is very 
sharp with aesthetics. And secondary to justice. I'm justice I think 
primarily... There were far more people who were involved locally, and 
then there were all sorts of ad hoc arrangements, intergovernmental 
arrangements between states. Something came together in the 70's and it 
worked. It was not formal and not informal, it was extra-constitutional 
that played a bigger role than the Constitution. (Canadian Academic 2). 
Another key participant in the early GLWQA governance scheme explained the 
collaboration under the regime in a similar vein: 
210 
Well, the strengths I think were [the GLWQA scheme] provided the 
occasion, if you will, to let the water quality board, the science advisory 
board, [and] the IJC have people come together, whether they're 
representing jurisdictions or just representing people interested in aspects 
of the lakes. An awful lot just came about getting to know who they are 
and chatting and so on, and just following up the way you and I are doing 
right now. So there is a sharing of knowledge. So that sort of knitting 
together a little larger sense of the lake and what we might be able to work 
together to do is a strength. (Canadian Academic 1) 
So collaboration took the form of commission members who could put the good 
of the Great Lakes in front of allegiance to government, agency, or special interests. It 
also came in the form of working with the public and listening to all ideas - the free 
market of concepts and ideas. Biennial UC meetings provided valuable engagement 
between the SAB* the WQB, and the press with the public present in a very public 
discourse in open sessions. These efforts were buttressed by an interdisciplinary Great 
Lakes science community. In the late 1960s concern about fishery and lamprey eel 
problems and the reference on phosphorus spawned the establishment of the International 
Association for Great Lakes Research (IAGLR) in 1967. Its journal and well-attended 
annual meetings became venues for a greater flow of information within the binational 
Great Lakes community. Although begun by physical and biological scientists, by 1971 
academic political scientists and others interested in natural resource management issues 
began to participate in earnest (Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
From the above it appears that collaboration between the public and scientists to 
understand and even act on data was not a problem in the early years of the GLWQA. 
The concept of binationalism, the esprit d' corps within the scientific and regulatory 
community, the outreach efforts and related participation of the public in a variety of 
significant ways, and the willingness to share and discuss information all paved the way 
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for water quality improvement in the early years. There can be no question that these 
same factors also contributed to the ability to stand up to special interests and arrive at 
proposed solutions and policies that centered on the public good. The state-by-state 
effort to adopt a detergent phosphate ban over strong objection of industry is one 
example. As one participant said while explaining what integrity meant to many of those 
who were active in the early years of the GLWQA: 
So, if you think integration, disintegration.. .that was a concept that sort of 
perfused the whole politics of those days.. .it was a key consideration. It's 
actually related to justice. Integrity was related to justice. And our Great 
Lakes to me, and Lee Botts, and George and many more.. .we have got 
that. (Canadian Academic 2) 
Integrity, fairness and justice were obviously important to those who were 
involved in governance and policy decisions under the GLWQA regime. Similarly, 
writing in 1991 as part of the CUSIS gathering, Dr. Mimi Becker wrote about the 
importance of community as opposed to individual rights as they related to governance of 
resources shared by the United States and Canada: 
We talked a lot about using different words, but underneath is the issue of 
community as a fundamental value versus the issue of individual rights. 
That difference tends to cover a lot of the discussion about how we 
approach regulation, negotiation, and what kinds of institutional 
arrangements need to be redesigned and how. This also is reflected in 
different attitudinal perspectives about the role of constitutional rights or 
prerogatives versus community obligations and litigation versus 
negotiation (CUSIS 1991,39). 
Dr. J.R. "Jack" Vallentyne, Senior Scientist for Canada's Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans (DFO) as well as a member of the Great Lakes Research Advisory Board, 
which evaluated the Agreement when it came up for review in 1977 and 1978, was 
quoted by historian Dave Dempsey as citing a more specific reason why the early 
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GLQWA regime could stand up for the common good and include notions of fairness, 
integrity, and community despite the opposition of special interests: 
The International Joint Commission's tradition that persons serving on its 
advisory boards represent not the organizations that employ them, but 
their own capacities as citizens and experts, helped draw the best, least 
selfish, least compromised advice from its advisors... (Dempsey 2004, 
192-93). 
Thus, in the early years of the GLWQA, a host of knowledgeable citizens, 
scientists, and regulators, buttressed by a galvanized public and working in their personal 
and professional capacity, were able to set aside personal agendas and make some bold 
moves to reverse the negative trends that were surely killing the Great Lakes Basin. It 
would appear that the ideal characteristics for the projecting developments task of an 
ideal ecosystem approach as set forth in Table 28 appear to have been met in the early 
years of the GLWQA. 
Inventing. Evaluating, and Selecting Alternatives. As pointed out above, an 
ecosystem approach requires that participants be emboldened to experiment and not face 
punishment if failure results from a well-conceived attempt. An integral part of 
governance is that there is a learning approach that focuses on improving policy and 
practice in the face of uncertainty. Governance and management strategies are 
considered experiments. Learning in our ideal world is promoted through both structural 
experimentation and management flexibility (Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007). Governance, 
and the ability to invent, evaluate, and select alternatives, must be adaptive (Regier and 
Baskerville 1986; Francis and Regier 1995; Straussfogel and Becker 1996; Costanza, 
Low et al. 2001; Kjaer 2004; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Fiorino 2006; Whiteside 
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2006; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007; Steelman 2010; Brunner 2010a; Brunner and Lynch 
2010b). 
Under an adaptive governance regime, policy choices and interventions are 
treated as experiments (NRC 2009), relying explicitly on monitoring, evaluating, 
expanding successful interventions and terminating failed policies instead of expert-
driven planning that relies primarily on science-based technology rather than trial and 
error (Francis 1993; Costanza, Low et al. 2001; Gunderson 2003; Brunner, Steelman et 
al. 2005; Fiorino 2006; Steelman 2010). 
Thus alternative experimentation in our ideal system must employ social and 
decision making processes that make use, inter alia, of broad participation, rapid 
feedback, reliable intelligence, transparent promotion, and appropriate value trade-offs to 
create a process capable of coping with multiple, complex systems. No particular set of 
practices or governance tools can regulate human impacts so as to guarantee a resilient 
and productive ecosystem. In chapter III it was noted that really all we can do is attempt 
to design a system that operates under rules that allow sufficient information to be 
generated over time to enable participants to learn from their mistakes and continually 
adapt and improve the institutional system to operate within natural limits (Francis 1993; 
Costanza, Low et al. 2001; Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 
2007; Steelman 2010; Brunner 2010a). These characteristics are many and varied, and 
for the governance regime under the GLWQA, the collaborative, citizen participation 
fueled, bold measures taken in the early years are illustrative of this task as part of an 
ecosystem approach. What hasn't been discussed above will be explained in the next two 
214 
sections involving the social and decision-making portions of our ideal system. So I will 
move on to discuss the social process in the Great Lakes GLWQA governance regime. 
Social Process 
In this section the social process under the GLWQA governance regime will be 
examined. It should be understood that this analysis is a product of one person and that a 
detailed study of the social and institutional scheme in the subject study areas was not 
possible. Obviously countless individuals and institutions are involved in some level in 
decisions and impacts on the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem. This project attempts to gain 
a rough, mile-high view of some of those key actors. In addition, much information and 
research concerning the social process was presented in the preceding section on problem 
orientation in order to give the reader a better context of the challenges present in the 
Great Lakes during the pertinent time period. Every effort will be made to avoid 
duplication in this section. 
It might help to be reminded that in the social process we must be cognizant that 
every participant in the use of resource services and every player with a potential say in 
the governance of the human activities that impact the ecosystem employs strategies in 
order to pursue particular values and/or outcomes. People tend to improve their well-
being by acting in ways that they perceive will leave them better off than if they had 
acted otherwise and therefore engage in an interplay of human value trade-offs. 
Generally no amount of "cold, hard facts" collected by "neutral objective" scientists, no 
amount of "education," or "transparency" can completely neutralize basic inherent value 
differences or perceptions among people. Certainly, however, this realization should not 
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take away from the fact that there are common interests and the need to attempt to clarify 
and secure them (Lasswell 1971; Clark, Willard et al. 2000; Clark 2002). To the degree 
possible we will now turn to an examination of the participants in the GLWQA 
governance regime. 
Participants. As a reminder of the participant characteristics in ideal ecosystem 
management regime, discussed in Chapter III, there is an expectation or at least the 
opportunity for meaningful participation and input of a broad segment of the regulated 
population in decision making processes (Costanza, Norton et al. 1992; Pauly and 
Maclean 2003). Significant, meaningful public participation is required (Becker 1993; 
Francis 1993; Francis and Regier 1995; Cortner and Moote 1999; Clark 2002; Jackson 
2005; Fiorino 2006; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Participation must be open to 
almost any person or group with a significant interest in the issue (Becker 1993; Kjaer 
2004; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Jackson 2005; Brunner and Lynch 2010b). 
Regulatory agencies must participate in coordinated and integrated fashion and allow 
softer local and regional input into governance (Regier and Baskerville 1986; Berkes, 
Colding et al. 2003; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Citizen involvement and 
partnership designed to build "civic science" is needed, not public information programs 
to inform passively (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). Better governance and enhanced 
accountability can come through grass roots ecosystem management i.e. the ongoing, 
collaborative governance arrangement in which inclusive coalitions of the unalike 
(citizens, government regulators, small businesses, environmentalists, commodity 
interests, and others) come together to resolve policy problems affecting the environment, 
216 
economy, and communities of a particular place (Brunner, Colburn et al. 2002; Weber 
2003; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Walker and Salt 2006; Clark 2008; Steelman 2010). 
We have already examined the somewhat remarkable history of public outreach, 
education, and significant participation from the early years of governance under the 
GLWQA (1987). But was the process open to any person or group with a significant 
interest in the issues? And did regulatory agencies participate in a coordinated and 
integrated fashion? 
Ironically, citizen influence and the power of NGOs, beginning with the 
involvement of the Great Lakes Basin Commission (GLBC), the Lake Michigan 
Federation and the League of Women Voters (LWV), began even before the 1972 
GLWQA was adopted: 
And so, at any rate, in 1971,1 believe it was late spring.. .1 know it wasn't 
cold weather.. .1 get a phone call from a staff member of the GLBC, and 
he tells me about a meeting that's going to place on Mackinac Island, at 
the Grand Hotel.... and that I need to go to this meeting... And the reason 
I should was because.. .he explained.. .that there was.. .the purpose of this 
meeting on Mackinac, was that it was a meeting of the governors and 
premiers in effect to ratify the GLWQA that had been negotiated and was 
going to be signed. This must have been early spring because the 
agreement was signed in April, and it was going to be signed.. .and so this 
was the ratification meeting, and there was a move afoot to omit coverage 
or inclusion of Lake Michigan. 
I go up to the meeting and I find that there was a.. .and I can't remember 
all the names... but,.. .and there were a couple of local LWV members, 
because.. .by local I mean Michigan LWV.. .because in those days, 
because water management and water resources was an ongoing concern 
of the League, as a practice, they tried to send two League members to any 
kind of public meeting that occurred related to water resources or water 
management, so.. .and me.. .and we were the citizens that were present at 
that meeting. So, I arrive on one day and right away I pick up that there 
had been an executive meeting the day before, before governors for Lake 
Michigan where they had agreed, or at least there had been a majority 
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vote.. .at that point I didn't know whether there was agreement among all 
four governors or not, but.. .to lobby that Lake Michigan should not be 
covered under the agreement for the obvious reasons.. .being entirely 
within the U.S. and so forth. So, anyway, there were sessions and 
presentations, and.. .the formal meeting was convened and Governor 
Milliken presided, and so the afternoon of the first full day of the formal 
meetings.. .and I don't remember what exactly caused me to stand up at 
that period of time, but I use this as an example when I'm telling young 
people, don't be afraid to do things because there are a lot of things I've 
done in my life that I know better now I shouldn't have done, but I'm glad 
I did, and this was one of them. So, I stood up, in the middle of the 
meeting, I said, Governor Milliken, excuse me, but you're forgetting Lake 
Michigan.. .Then I made a little speech, it's one system that's all 
connected, blah, blah, blah. He soon after adjourns the meeting for the 
day. There was a big formal meeting that evening, a fancy dinner, and so 
on and so forth, and as the meeting adjourned and broke up, then-
Governor Pat Lucey of Wisconsin came to me and said, I agree with you, 
now let's figure out how not to let this happen. And so, we worked out a 
game plan, and the next day we instituted the game plan, and I think it's 
described in the book, and it was successful. And so, Lake Michigan, and 
if you want more details about it, I'll tell you what the game plan was and 
how we carried it out, was an enormous a lot of fun and I learned a lot 
from it. At any rate, so Lake Michigan got included under the GLWQA. 
(US NGO 2) 
Thus one NGO and a couple of interested citizens managed to save the day for 
Lake Michigan and keep it included in the GLWQA. The IJC, shortly after the adoption 
of the 1972 Agreement, began to rely heavily on citizen involvement and scientific 
coordination. The initial Wingspread conferences at the Johnson Wax Convention Center 
in Racine, Wisconsin, are illustrative: 
A: We made recommendations for some legislative change that came 
out of that. Then in 1976-77 there were a series of Wingspread 
conferences at the Johnson Wax Conference Center in Racine, Wisconsin 
- one of which was to assess the extent to which there was a need for a 
binational citizen organization that would focus on the Great Lakes. 
Q: Who set up the Wing Spread conference? 
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A: That one was instigated by the Lake Michigan Federation, and it 
was funded by the Joyce Foundation of Chicago. Lake Michigan 
Federation was a group that the Lake Erie Basin Committee of the League 
had been working with over a period of time, because it was a 
collaboration of different organizations on Lake Michigan. 
And, initially, the Lake Michigan Federation, because they had taken the 
lead to enable this, was kind of the lead organization for pulling people 
together and, if I recall correctly, that enabling group included some of the 
subsequent directors of Great Lakes Tomorrow.. ..Frances, Regier, Dick 
Robbins, who was the then Executive Director of the Lake Michigan 
Federation; Arthur Timms, who was the Exec Director of the 
Conservation Foundation in Ontario, and Grant Merritt, who was head of 
pollution control in Minnesota... .A state agency. So there was a mix of 
people there. There were some other Canadians.. ..Oh, and John Yolton, 
who was the VP of the UAW, and he had a counterpart from Canada.. .the 
name escapes me. 
There was no industry involved.. .They weren't invited. It was an attempt, 
because of the politics of the times, to form a coalition between labor and 
the environment so that industry could not succeed in getting the jobs 
versus the environment conflict going, which at the time, under the 
politics of the era, was their strategy. At the time that this thing occurred, 
this might have been '75/'76 maybe, the only way that we were dealing 
with industry was in court. It was very adversarial because of the 
accumulated muck. 
There were... [also] First Nations present at that..., Henry Likkers from 
the Mohawk tribe up on St. Regis reservation.. ..Canadian.. .was there. 
So, that was the first Wing Spread conference. The result from that 
meeting was the formation of the binational citizen group Great Lakes 
Tomorrow. Its mission was to educate and engage the citizens of the basin 
in decisions about its recovery and future direction.. .The first thing we 
took on was a contract with the IJC to hold a series of public meetings to 
brief the public on the results of the upper lakes reference groups studies, 
and train them in how to participate in the IJC hearings. So, it was 
basically an education facilitation function. We published a newspaper.. .1 
think it was called The Great Lakes Tomorrow.. .as background 
information, and that was widely distributed. We also used that particular 
initiative as a way of beginning to develop the mode that we used with 
designating a local coordinator, local planning committee, and working 
with them to enable development of local capacity, so that we weren't 
controlling it, it was more facilitation and a way of engaging citizens 
locally in learning about their lakes and in having a say about how to 
move forward with solutions. 
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Q: Was this participation important in the Great Lakes, in the 
development? 
A: It would never have happened without it. (US NGO/Academic) 
It seems, then, from the above, that no efforts were spared to bring on board all 
those who had an interest. The only exception was industry, which was challenging the 
phosphate restrictions set forth in the 1972 Agreement at that time. With Decisions for 
the Great Lakes industry was invited in, as they were for the Hiram Conference. 
There were a number of institutional players. The IJC has been discussed in the 
previous sections and an explanation of their role and importance is unnecessary here. 
There were two boards advising the UC: The Research Advisory Board (later the 
Science Advisory Board) and the Water Quality Board (Figure 11). The Great Lakes 
Fisheries Commission also played a huge role in coordination with the IJC and its boards. 
There were regional coordinating bodies as well, chiefly the Great Lakes Basin 
Commission (GLBC) and the Great Lakes Commission (GLC). 
The composition and duties of the IJC have been discussed in the previous 
section. The IJC is comprised of three commissioners from the United States and 
appointed by the President and three from Canada appointed by the Prime Minister. 
Historically, commissioners were appointed because of their unique knowledge or 
expertise or else as rewards for public service. Since 1980, however, appointments have 
generally gone to political allies of the President or Prime Minister. Further, 
appointments are not for a specified period of time and before 1980 there had never been 
a wholesale turnover in the panel of commissioners at the same time. Since 1980, 
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however, every president has dismissed the entire panel and replaced them with his own 
appointees (Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
Figure 8 The IJC Administrative Structure 1972 - 1979 
From its inception the IJC lacked the jurisdiction on issues of water quality to 
compel the U.S and Canada, the Parties to the GLWQA, to do anything.20 Their role was 
to investigate and make recommendations. The annual and then biennial reports of the 
UC were made available to the public and recommendations set forth in the reports were 
often acted upon by the Parties out of credibility and respect for the UC and its Boards 
.(Dempsey 2004; Botts and Muldoon 2005) 
The Water Quality Board (WQB) was created by the GLWQA to be the principal 
advisor to the commission. Its official membership included the heads of provincial and 
state environmental agencies. By tradition, the WQB is co-chaired by the director of the 
Ontario Regional Office of Environment Canada and the Director of EPA Region 5 
20 It has always had authority to make decisions pertaining to water diversion and consumptive use issues. 
(1909). Treaty Relating to the Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the Boundary Between the 
United States and Canada. U.S.-Gr.Brit. 36 Stat. 2448. 
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(Botts and Muldoon 2005). One participant during the early days explained the WQB's 
function: 
The Water Quality Board came as a representative of the agencies 
involved with water management or pollution control, and in a way it was 
argued that made a lot of sense, because they're the ones who ultimately 
have to do something, so they got involved in the discussions and 
consultations about what it is that you should do in setting general 
priorities there's more likely to be a follow-through on it. So, in that 
sense, they were using it as a forum to try and get things together, which 
would otherwise help maybe do what they're doing back home. So, that 
in a sense would be the positive side. It did look like it was a little bit of a 
closed shop sometime, and it even gave them the kind of special privilege 
role as chief advisory to the UC and the science advisory group was more 
a matter of people coming from various agencies and organizations, I 
think, largely in their individual capacity, or because of the expertise they 
brought into it. So, they had a role as well. I don't know how the LJC 
balanced all of them in terms of what they were hearing from one against 
the other... (Canadian Academic 1). 
The Science Advisory Board (SAB) is the body chiefly responsible for advising 
the Board on science-related matters under the GLWQA. The name was changed from 
the Research Advisory Board in 1978. The SAB included managers of Great Lakes 
research programs, scientists, social scientists, representatives of industry, environmental 
activists and others (Botts and Muldoon 2005). As the quote immediately above 
suggests, the Science Advisory Board was comprised of a wider array of participants with 
a broader perspective.21 
21 Illustrative is the Terms of Reference for the Establishment of a Research Advisory Board, part of the 
original 1972 GLWQA, which provided: 
4. The International Joint Commission shall determine the size and composition of the 
Research Advisory Board. The Commission should appoint members to the Advisory 
Board from appropriate Federal, State and Provincial Government agencies and from 
other agencies, organizations and institutions involved in Great Lakes research activities. 
In making these appointments the Commission should consider individuals from the 
academic, scientific and industrial communities and the general public. Membership 
should be based primarily upon an individual's qualifications and potential contribution 
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The Council of Great Lakes Research Managers, sometimes called the IJC's 
"Third Board" was never designated in the GLWQA, but it was formed by the IJC in 
1984 and ultimately granted full board status in 1994, taking over the functions of the 
SAB (Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
Another important participant under the GLWQA scheme in the early years was 
the Great Lakes Regional Office. Set up under Article VII of the 1972 GLWQA, the 
GLRO was to "provide a public information service for the program." The office was 
furnished with a binational staff and also functioned to provide clerical tasks for the UC 
in its Great Lakes functions, and to its advisory boards. It was located in Windsor, 
Ontario in order to give it a convenient centralized location. It was also the function of 
the GLRO to coordinate activities with the GLFC, IAGLR, and others (Botts and 
Muldoon 2005). 
The material immediately above discusses the participants that were in essence 
created by the GLWQA. But the GLWQA is basically an executive agreement or 
protocol. The Parties, as has been discussed, are actually the governments of Canada and 
the United States. Without the participation of federal and state government entities the 
GLWQA would be meaningless. The lead federal government agencies are the USEPA 
on the U.S. side and Environment Canada for the Canadian side. Thus a discussion of 
those participants who fall within the federal, state, and provincial jurisdictions is 
merited. 
to the work of the Advisory Board. [Emphasis added] (1972). Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement, with Annexes and Texts and Terms of Reference, Between the United States 
of America and Canada: 79. 
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The US EPA is the lead federal agency on the U.S. side. It was established by 
executive order of President Richard Nixon in 1970. It directs the U.S. federal activities 
implementation of the GLWQA mostly by virtue of its jurisdiction to enforce and 
implement the Clean Water Act (1972). The Great Lakes obligations were handed by the 
EPA to its Region 5 district headquartered in Chicago. Thereafter, in 1976, 
Congressional support was received and the Great Lakes National Program Office 
(GLNPO) was opened (Sproule-Jones 2002; Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
On the Canadian side, Environment Canada, established in 1971, took the federal 
lead on GLWQA agenda items in Canada. In some ways, EC had it a little easier than the 
EPA as phosphates had already been banned in Canada in 1970 by the Canada Water Act 
(1970). It has been suggested that Canada may have used their own reductions in 
phosphates to their advantage in persuading the U.S. to adopt a ban in the 1972 GLWQA 
(Botts and Muldoon 2005). EC, through the negotiation of the Canada-Ontario 
Agreement (COA) handed off many of the Canadian federal responsibilities to the 
Province of Ontario. Under the COA Ontario became responsible for implementation of 
the GLWQA provisions, with the federal government paying for the capital 
improvements needed to update sewage-treatment facilities in the province while the 
Ontario EPA is used to impose effluent standards on all point sources discharging into the 
basin (Sproule-Jones 2002; Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
The states bordering the Great Lakes have played a role to a great degree, 
sometimes for more of a role than they bargained. Under the U.S. Constitution, states 
can't negotiate treaties with foreign governments. Thus while the U.S. federal 
government negotiated the GLWQA with Canadian authorities, it was the states that 
224 
ultimately carried much of the burden to follow through with obligations made by the 
federal government. The role of the states was not all bad, however. There was pride 
taken in the massive improvement of municipal sewage-treatment plants as part of the 
Clean Water Act and GLWQA mandates, although when water treatment grants began to 
dry up after the 1977 Clean Water Act, and as more and more persistent organic 
chemicals were being revealed, some states began to balk at their clean water burdens. 
Some, especially Michigan, were unhappy at not being permitted to participate in 
negotiations for the 1977 Amendments and 1987 Protocol of the GLWQA (Botts and 
Muldoon 2005). 
To their credit, however, states, provinces, and First Nations found ample 
opportunity to cooperate. Some notable achievements include the 1985 Great Lakes 
Charter and the Great Lakes Toxic Substances Control Agreement of 1986 (GLTSCA). 
Both are voluntary agreements, initiated by the Council of Great Lakes Governors, 
designed to facilitate the sharing of information and to take a unified stance to protect 
Great Lakes resources. The Charter was motivated chiefly by threats of massive water 
transfers out of the Great Lakes Basin and prevents any diversions that would have a 
significant, adverse impact on lake levels, in-basin uses, or the Great Lakes ecosystem 
(Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). It "commits the parties to develop a common data base 
on water resource use and a cooperative management program that includes an inventory 
of surface water and groundwater resources" (Botts and Muldoon 2005,213) By the late 
1980s eight states and the provinces of Ontario and Quebec had signed the Charter. The 
data base was established by the Great Lakes Commission by 1988. (Colburn, Davidson 
et al. 1990; Sproule-Jones 2002; Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
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With so many players in the GLWQA governance scheme, there has been a need 
for regional coordination in order to facilitate the cooperative arrangements found 
frequently in the basin and to help overcome institutional fragmentation (Colburn, 
Davidson et al. 1990). In this light, attention will briefly be turned to the GLBC, the 
GLC, and the GLFC. 
The Great Lakes Basin Commission was created on the U.S. side in 1967 to 
provide a coordinating mechanism for federal and state agencies as well as public 
participation in matter involving the great lakes. The commission was one of six river 
basin commissions established under the Federal Water Resources Planning Act in 1965 
(1965). The Federal Water Resources Planning Act was established to coordinate state 
and federal policies and plans for the development of water resources.22 It did this by 
permitting the President to form River Basin Commissions. When the GLBC was 
established water quality was by far the chief issue. It immediately began work on the 
development of a regional framework plan for water resources in the great lakes 
watershed (Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
The Basin Commission consisted of 8 state members and 12 federal members. 
The Department of State was involved to make sure that Canadian Interests were taken 
into account. The Ontario Ministry of the Environment sent a representative to attend 
Commission meetings. In addition staff members of the ministry and other federal 
22 More specifically, the Preamble to the Federal Water Basin Commission Act of 1965 provides: 
AN ACT To provide for the optimum development of the Nation's natural resources 
through the coordinated planning of water and related land the establishment of a water 
resources council and river basin commissions, and by providing financial assistance to 
the States in order to increase State participation in such planning. 42 U.S.C. §1962 
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Canadian Agencies regularly participated in workshops and conferences that involved the 
Commission. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement was signed in 1972 and the 
Commission provided planning and analysis that were funded partly by grants and 
agreements with the US EPA. The Commission was shut down by the Reagan 
administration in 1981. When it was still in effect the Basin Commission provided a 
collaborative policy forum as well as technical analysis for GLWQA-related issues (Botts 
and Muldoon 2005; Krantzberg, Manno et al. 2007) 
An example of one of its projects was helping to develop modeling techniques 
used in creating target loadings for phosphorous in the great lakes. Yearly meetings were 
held and attended by state heads of the Soil Conservation Service in the US Department 
of Agriculture. These meetings served as a forum where skeptics about the value of 
conservation tillage are said to have become advocates. US Coastal Zone Management 
and Canadian Shoreline Management (Binational Coordination) did not directly relate to 
this agreement but influentially expanded the Great Lakes Community. The Binational 
Coordination was made known through publication funded by a combination of the Basin 
Commission, U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife, and 
Environment Canada. These publications called for new strategies including the use of 
vegetation to stabilize shorelines instead of the use of engineered structural erosion 
control measures (Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
The Basin Commission requested public participation and comment on a draft 
framework plan in 1975 through a series of public meetings. The very strong support for 
"environmental quality" over economic development was altogether astounding as was 
the general public turnout. All in all the GLBC played an important role in coordinating 
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state and federal agencies. The GLBC . .was disbanded by the Reagan administration 
in 1981." (Botts and Muldoon 2005,42). 
The Great Lakes Commission (GLC) is another regional body and was created by 
a U.S. compact in 1955 (Dempsey 2004). Its original purpose was to represent state 
navigation and shipping interests with the completion of the St. Lawrence Seaway. 
Although it was originally a member of the Great Lakes Basin Commission and focused 
on Great Lakes navigation issues, it negotiated a compromise with the states and agencies 
formerly coordinated by the GLBC to expand its role into a broader agenda that included 
environmental issues and the coordination of state and federal agencies. As a source 
familiar with the transition explained: 
The authorizing legislation provided that, if a River Basin Commission 
was dissolved, the states could decide where the resources would go, and 
because the Basin Commission wasn't immediately dissolved.. .1 
participated in over about 6 months' time in a number of meetings, and the 
division within the GL states about whether or not to give the funding to 
the GLC. There had been controversy.. .not all the states had supported 
the GLC. One of the things I had to do as Chair was.. .there were certain 
state legislatures.. .and I had to go to every year and convince them they 
should get funds to the GLBC and the GLC, but there were certain states 
that did not want to give the resources to the GLC. So, the compromise 
that emerged.. .you know in our system everything is a compromise.. .the 
compromise that emerged was, yes, they got the resources.. .1 was mad as 
hell.. .1 had gotten a million dollars through OMB to work on energy 
conservation issues.. .and it all went to the GLC, but the compromise was 
that it was going to move beyond shipping and navigation issues. (US 
NGO 2). 
So the GLC mandate expanded to include coordination of environmental issues 
for the state and federal agencies that the GLBC had formerly provided. As a source 
within the GLC and very familiar with the role of the GLC after the elimination of the 
GLBC explains: 
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We have a really broad mandate. We're fortunate in that the Compact that 
created us gives us broad authority to advise the governments that created 
us which are the states as well as the federal government on matters of 
Great Lakes use, development, and protection. It's very broad. We were 
created in the 1950s at the time that the St. Lawrence Seaway was being 
created and developed so I'm sure that a prime motivation was to manage 
water resources in the interests of commercial navigation, including water 
levels, water quantity, dredging - promoting maritime commerce and the 
shipping industry. The mandate in the Great Lakes Basin Compact is 
much broader than that. It includes water quality, conservation, tourism, 
recreation. Of course over time with the dawning of environmental 
awareness our portfolio has shifted much more towards environmental 
protection and restoration. We still have this history and emphasis on 
maritime commerce but it's shifted from commerce, water levels, 
dredging which is now maybe 20% of our portfolio and the balance over 
time has shifted toward environmental protection. (US Federal Employee 
2) 
So with the termination of the GLBC, which had been a remarkable vehicle to 
promote state, federal, and to some extent, international cooperation and collaboration, 
the GLC began to step forward to fill the gap. 
The final Great Lakes Basin regional body that will be examined is the Great 
Lakes Fisheries Commission (GLFC). In order to understand the role of the GLFC it 
must be understood that while an international border runs through the middle of all of 
the Great Lakes except Lake Michigan, no international waters exist in the Great Lakes 
(Piper 1967). This is because the states and tribes in the region have the established 
authority to manage fish within their boundaries (Piper 1967; Nielsen 1999). Unlike 
oceanic coastal borders where state jurisdiction normally extends to a three miles from 
the shore, the fact that state borders in the Great Lakes extend to the international border 
makes it possible for states to assert their authority over federal jurisdiction and control 
the lake beds, waters, and fish of the waters of the Great Lakes (Piper 1967; Gaden, 
Krueger et al. 2008). Thus the GLFC is the binational entity that attempts to integrate 
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and coalesce the separate but complementary sectors of the non-federal governments 
(states, provinces, and two U.S. intertribal agencies) and the federal governments, and the 
GLWQA entities to integrate and take a coherent approach to what would otherwise be a 
hopelessly fragmented Great Lakes fishery (Prelli and Becker 2001; Gaden, Krueger et 
al. 2008). They are able to manage this by facilitating Joint Strategic Plans between all 
involved entities that include cooperation, consensus, accountability, information sharing, 
and ecosystem management (Gaden, Krueger et al. 2008). 
Finally, no assessment of the Great Lakes institutional and governance regime 
would be complete without mentioning the powerful role played by the public both as an 
entity to themselves and through the work of environmental organizations. The role of a 
public unhappy about environmental trends in the late 1960s through the early 1990s has 
already been discussed in the Problem Orientation section above. There has also been 
some discussion of the role of environmental organizations like the League of Women 
Voters, the Lake Michigan Federation, and Great Lakes Tomorrow, and Decisions for the 
Great Lakes, a basin-wide leadership training program run by Great Lakes Tomorrow and 
funded by EPA, Environment Canada, the Joyce Foundation and others.23 What remains 
is to note the importance of organizations that were able to bring together many separate 
environmental groups and form politically powerful political forces. 
23 The "Decisions for the Great Lakes" program trained volunteers around the basin with a 40 hour course 
designed, inter alia, to create an informed binational constituency for the Great Lakes, to build public 
understanding of existing management structure and process and encourage better decision making through 
citizen access and participation; to organize a continuing network of citizens, scientists, educational 
institutions and agencies to share and use information and data to better manage the Lakes.. .GLT (1985). 
Decisions for the Great Lakes: A :Program to Improve Decisions for the Protection and Wise Use of Our 
Binational Resource Through Informed Citizen Participation. Great Lakes Tomorrow. G. L. Tomorrow. 
Hiram, OH. 
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The Michigan United Conservation Clubs (MUCC), for instance, brought together 
many diverse constituencies and led the lobbying effort that resulted in a phosphate 
detergent ban in that state (Botts and Muldoon 2005). But more was needed, and citizens 
needed a basin-wide organization. It was the joint effort of MUCC and the New York 
NGO Save the River, a combination that had led the fight against an Army Corps of 
Engineers proposal to allow winter navigation on the Great Lakes, that finally got 
together to form a basin-wide organization. MUCC's Tom Washington and Save the 
River's Abbie Hoffman, were backers of such an organization, but frankly didn't see eye-
to-eye. After a series of meetings on Mackinac Island, a new basin-wide group, Great 
Lakes United (GLU), emerged. GLU became a united voice for hundreds of 
organizations throughout the Great Lakes dedicated to preserving and restoring the Great 
Lakes and St. Lawrence River ecosystem, representing a diverse group of organizations 
that include labor unions, environmental groups, hunters, fishers, community groups, and 
citizens of the United States, Canada, First Nations, and tribes (Jackson and Sloan 2008). 
GLU holds annual meetings that seek the advice of these groups to develop by consensus 
an agenda to pressure Congress, the IJC, and other policy makers to collaborate and put 
the common good of a healthy Great Lakes Basin (Dempsey 2004; Jackson 2005). 
Another key NGO, the National Wildlife Federation, coordinated all litigation 
through its Ann Arbor offices: 
Q: The NWF, were and are they the principle litigation strategy 
component in the Great Lakes? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Is that still the case? 
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A: Yes. 
Q: So if GLU or Lake Michigan Alliance or one of those groups has 
an issue that they want to litigate, do they typically go to NWF for help? 
A: Not exclusively but there's always coordination. 
Q: But there is a coordination mechanism they provide? 
A: Yes. Absolutely. And that just developed. It's not necessarily 
formal and NWF isn't always the plaintiff for all the environmental issues 
that come up. 
Q: But somehow they play a coordinating role even there? 
Q: Informally, yeah. I mean, they're not always in the lead, though.... 
If you were somebody on water quality issues you would talk with NWF 
first, and if NWF didn't take the case, then GLU might go to another law 
firm. (U.S. Federal Employee 2) 
Another source familiar with the litigation strategy verified that the NWF 
coordinated litigation efforts during critical periods in GLWQA governance regime: 
Q: One last question. Remember the National Wildlife Federation -
when they established the GL Resource Center, through the NWF, they 
basically did all of the legal activity that was required. Is that your 
understanding...? 
A: Most of it. I would say.. .yeah, after it was established, they did do 
that, and actually, Cam Davis.. .well, yes.. .that's true... 
Q: How did the NWF get in the position of coordinating all of the 
litigation? 
A: Because they specifically.. .they had the resources.. .they were by 
far had the largest paid membership of any environmental 
organization.. .and they specifically.. .oh, God, to get into that, you had to 
go back to the history of legal litigation in the environmental movement as 
a whole.. .The way it was structured.. .they had.. .what they called 
chapters, affiliated organizations and so forth, but, they.. .those centers 
were created for the purpose of providing legal resources. That was their 
purpose. (US NGO 2) 
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Table 28 Participants 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
Significant, meaningful public 
participation is required. The expectation 
is for significant meaningful participation 
and input of a broad segment of the 
affected population in decision making 
processes. Participation must be open to 
almost any person or group with a 
significant interest in the issue. Active 
outreach to develop citizen involvement 
and partnerships and build "civic science" 
base 
IJC actively encourages recognizes the 
need for an informed and active public. 
Encourages broad education plans 
because a knowledgeable public. IJC 
stresses that public involvement in t h e 
solution of local problems should be 
developed within the perspective of the 
overall Great Lakes ecosystem. GLT and 
other NGOs outreach and education. The 
Decisions for the Great Lakes program 
trains citizen leaders throughout the basin. 
GLIN, biennial reports, annual/biennial 
IJC meetings, citizen participation on IJC 
boards and panels, all serve to educate and 
engage the public. All participants 
welcome. Unions, NGOs, academics, 
environmental groups, agencies, hunters, 
fishers, and First Nations involved from 
the beginning. 
Regulatory agencies must participate in 
coordinated and integrated fashion and 
allow softer local and regional input into 
governance. 
Coordination and Collaboration of 
agencies by SAB and IJC. Binationalism, 
dedication to GLB, and participation in 
"personal and professional capacity" 
important. GLWQA, as amended, 
provided targets and goals, parties, and 
with 1987 AOC development, 
communities played large role in 
restoration efforts. 
The participants in the Great Lakes governance regime were many and varied. 
The fact that there was a critical mass of institutional and public support was important to 
the restoration of the Great Lakes during the early years of the GLWQA regime. It took 
more than the mere existence of an array of participants, however (See Table 28). The 
perspectives of those who participated were also important. 
Perspectives. All participants have perspectives. Such perspectives can include 
conflicting ideas, feelings, and beliefs about a problem and often rest on basic beliefs. 
Social groups may coalesce around a perspective, but participants are individuals with 
their own beliefs, interests, loyalties, and faith. The way they see themselves, or their 
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identifications as members of some group, are important to explain their actions (Clark 
2008). The actors that coalesced around the governance regime of the GLWQA in the 
1970s and 1980s shared a deep and enduring concern for the overall health and integrity 
of the Great Lakes. There were moving quotes presented in prior sections of this paper 
from people who were involved in the GLWQA process during its early years. For 
awhile, anyway, people who put the good of the GLB ecosystem before other more 
parochial interests shared a belief in collaboration, cooperation, and citizen 
empowerment, became the "we/us" (as opposed to "they/them") in the political and 
social system. 
Perspectives under an ecosystem-based approach to governance requires a 
governance structure that looks to find common ground on policies that advance common 
interests (Lasswell 1971; Brunner 2002; Clark 2002; Steelman 2010). One common 
interest in ecosystem-based governance is to enable management to focus on the natural 
processes necessary to sustain ecosystem structure and function while recognizing the 
need for human and institutional involvement at every level of the ecosystem 
(Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995; Costanza, Andrade et al. 1998; Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000; 
Gunderson and Holling 2002; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Walker and Salt 2006). The 
common interest of maintaining and supporting ecosystem integrity should outweigh 
parochial interests in preserving bureaucratic turf or command and control hierarchy. In 
addition, the perspective necessary for ecosystem-based governance should be more 
universal and open to new ideas and experimental approaches rather than parochial and 
institutionally resistant to innovation. 
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Table 29 Perspectives 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
Perspective requires a governance structure 
that looks to find common ground on 
policies that advance common interests. In 
addition, the perspective necessary for 
ecosystem-based governance should be 
more universal and open to new ideas and 
experimental approaches rather than 
parochial and institutionally resistant to 
innovation. 
During the first decade of the GLWQA 
there was strong support by the IJC and its 
Boards and panels to pursue common 
interests and interests of the health of the 
GLB ecosystem were paramount. Problem-
solving approach to SAB and related IJC 
panels was to solicit and listen to all ideas -
a universal approach - in order to make sure 
no potential innovation was overlooked. 
Problem solving should be viewed as a 
flexible process with broad participation and 
a variety of perspectives and should be 
cognizant that environmental, social, and 
economic systems are related with problems 
that overlap and need to be approached with 
a concern for human dignity and a respect 
for democratic access. 
IJC, SAB and other GLWQA participants 
shared an implicit commitment to the basin 
and to the equity and justice. Equity, 
fairness, and human health reached the 
operational levels under the GLWQA and 
were factors in the early years. Also, 
information and input was gathered from 
broad base of participants, overlapping 
board members, and knowledgeable citizens 
Common interest in ecosystem-based 
governance is to enable management to 
focus on the natural processes necessary to 
sustain ecosystem structure and function 
while recognizing the need for human and 
institutional involvement at every level of 
the ecosystem. The common interest of 
maintaining and supporting ecosystem 
integrity should outweigh parochial interests 
in preserving bureaucratic turf or command 
and control hierarchy. 
Language of the GLWQA and the Preamble 
to the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries 
requires parties to focus on the entire 
ecosystem as a basis for sustaining the 
fisheries. The goal of the GLFC is to 
sustain the functional integrity of 
ecosystems while producing desired 
resources and environmental services. 
Dedication, commitment, and service in 
their personal and professional capacity 
enabled early participants to make difficult 
decisions that favored the common interests 
of the health of the GLB over other more 
narrow interests. 
Problem solving should be viewed as a flexible process with broad participation 
and a variety of perspectives and should be cognizant that environmental, social, and 
economic systems are related with problems that overlap and need to be approached with 
a concern for human dignity and a respect for democratic values (Dryzek 1997). Finally, 
perspective involves more than governance but extends to the expectations and demands 
of people. In an ideal world, citizens would have the knowledge necessary to adopt 
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collective, community-oriented values instead of the selfish materialism of consumer 
values (Becker 1993; Dryzek 1997; Clark 2002) (Table 29). 
The governance regime under the GLWQA between the late 1960s and early 
1990s thrived on a perspective that included a dedication to collaboration, cooperation, 
inclusion, and a desire to do good for the Great Lakes Basin that was stronger than the 
desire to profit or otherwise drain it of resources or resilience. Several factors accounted 
for this overall perspective. The first operating principle of the IJC requires that meeting 
locations are alternated on each side of the border and that the costs of joint activities are 
shared equally. In this manner since its inception the Commissioners have demonstrated 
that the symmetry demanded of the UC offset the asymmetry in sheer size between 
Canada and the U.S. (Botts and Muldoon 2005) 
The IJC's historic insistence on the binationalism of its Commissioners, described 
in the problem orientation section of this chapter, was certainly relevant to the 
perspective of activities by the DC and its Boards and panels. This tradition of 
independence from consideration or interference from national interests is found nowhere 
in the treaty, yet it was essential to achieving the goals of the GLWQA (Jackson and 
Sloan 2008). Charles Ross, a Commissioner under five presidents, explained that the UC 
acted "as members of a single body," with independence from the United States or 
Canadian government interference, even though appointed by the heads of each country 
(Botts and Muldoon 2005,11). Thus independence and collaboration marked the process 
followed by the UC and its boards. 
Another operating principle that reflects the perspective of the UC and its boards 
and panels was the principle that required each commissioner to operate "in his (or her) 
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own professional capacity and expertise" rather than as a representative of an agency, 
NGO, or any other special interest (UC 1975; Botts and Muldoon 2005,12). Independent 
of the constraints that might be placed on individuals who might have to act within their 
roles as agency employees, this operating principle helped assure that attention and 
expertise was focused on the challenges of the Great Lakes Basin without worrying about 
their agency interests and limitations. Thus officials of various agencies crossed over and 
served on different Boards and panels within the UC scheme. The affiliation of the 
participant was not important - the focus was on using knowledge and expertise to solve 
problems. As one member of the Science Advisory Board explained: 
A: And at the staff level, a number of GL Fishery Commissioners 
were on IJC boards. And Great Lakes Commission had similar 
arrangements. Mike Donahue for years was co-chair of UC's Science 
Advisory Board. And so at staff level, there were some senior IJC staff 
that just consider themselves a cut above, they were quasi-diplomats and 
so on. But, generally at the staff level, it was like in CUSIS, people 
participated and the way we ran those meetings, when people participated, 
you couldn't tell from where they came. 
Q: People were there under their personal and professional capacity, 
not necessarily as representative of their agencies? 
A: And to this implicit commitment to the basin and to the equity and 
justice. And they all shared that, and so you didn't know where they came 
from, and of course they didn't keep verbatim records. (Canadian 
Academic 1) 
The process was independent early on under the GLWQA process. No one on the 
Water Quality Board or especially the Science Advisory Board really cared where their 
fellow board members were from or what agencies employed them. Their implicit 
commitment was to the basin and notions of equity and justice were important. 
As the Commissioners explained in the 2nd Annual Report of the UC (1975): 
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The Commissioners act, not as separate national delegations under 
instruction from their respective Governments, but as a single body 
seeking common solutions in the joint interest and, most important, in 
accordance with the agreed rules or principles set out in the Treaty. 
Significantly, all Commissioners make a solemn declaration in writing that 
they will faithfully and impartially perform the duties imposed under the 
Treaty. The effect of this declaration is to give the Commissioners a sense 
of the primary loyalty they have to the treaty system while they are 
serving (IJC 1975,1). 
Another characteristic of perspective in an ideal system is the willingness and 
ability to examine many different viewpoints - a universal approach to problem solving 
rather than a linear, parochial approach. One participant in the GLWQA process in the 
early years explained how this perspective helped to introduce him to the ecosystem 
approach: 
We had a working group.. .we met regularly over two years, and put 
together our understanding. We started by saying that we were going to 
take every explanation.. .anybody who had any claim to expertise we'll 
take their hypothesis .. .we'll listen to accusations.. .before we bring in any 
of our own personal hypothesis. And we checked out every one of them. 
And to our surprise we found people who were using the same evidence to 
support different kinds of causal claims. We even had Barry Commoner 
arguing that Lake Erie's problems were due to atmospheric testing of 
nuclear weapons. We didn't take that one very seriously. But we took all 
the rest seriously. I was also very much struck by the fact that there was 
evidence out there that wasn't diagnostic of any particular problem. There 
was ambiguous evidence. So we started asking, what kind of evidence is 
diagnostic for a particular causal approach and which evidence was non­
diagnostic. And that is how I got into the ecosystem approach. Even my 
expert colleagues were doing the same thing. People who had expertise in 
eutrophication were blaming all sorts of things on nutrient overload. 
People who knew about fishing like I did were blaming all sorts of things 
on overfishing. The people like Huxley, who knew about erosion were 
blaming erosion for lots of things. And we said well if we take an 
ecosystem approach you're obligated to sort these things out and try to 
attribute the cause where you have evidence, diagnostic evidence. That is 
one way of how I got interested in the ecosystem approach. (Canadian 
Academic 2) 
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Finally, an ideal ecosystem-based governance regime perspective requires a 
governance structure that looks to find common ground on policies that advance common 
interests. 
Under the GLWQA scheme the IJC has no jurisdiction to force a Party to act in 
any particular way. It is chartered with the purpose of resolving disputes and avoiding 
conflicts. The IJC, and its related Boards and panels, have the ability to investigate only 
"such subjects related to the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem as the Parties may from time 
to time refer to it" (GLWQA 1987, Article VII(l)(g)). Even upon reference, the IJC only 
has the power to hold hearings, make recommendations and draft reports and comments. 
While the IJC has the power upon request to arbitrate a dispute between the parties, in the 
more than 100 years of its existence this provision has never been invoked (IJC 1975; 
Botts and Muldoon 2005). Thus it appears that the perspective of the IJC has been to 
look for common ground that works for the good of the GLB in order to resolve disputes. 
They simply lack the power or authority to do anything but attempt through common 
fact-finding, collaboration and diplomatic efforts, to convince the Parties to act in the best 
interest of the Great Lakes Basin. 
The participants in the Great Lakes overall governance scheme, as we learned in 
the section immediately above, go well beyond the UC and its Boards. They include 
regional commissions and the federal governments of Canada and the U.S., as well as the 
state and provincial interests. 
The Great Lakes Basin Commission and their role and perspectives were 
examined in the Participants section above. The Great Lakes Commission, as was 
discussed above, broadened its mandate to begin to take in the state and federal 
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coordination function previously fulfilled by the GLBC before it was shut down in 1983. 
Since its days as a mainly navigational compact in the 1950s the GLC has been not only 
broadening its mandate but it has also been honing its collaborative skills and building a 
process for US and Canadian interests to cooperate on a number of levels: 
A: The compact that created us gave the Commission the authority to 
advise and consult with Canada and the provinces. That was what the 
states wrote into the compact. Congress said: "Thank you very much but 
we'll take care of the relationship with Canada."... they said that they 
didn't want a regional organization like us negotiating or consulting or 
anything involving direct consultation with the Canadian government... So 
Congress said no you can only be a US organization created by the 
involved States - you know the way compacts work - they have to go to 
Congress under the Constitution. We, however, recognize that there's 
another side to the border so we created by resolution a category of 
membership for the provinces called "associate commissioners" and 
basically treat them just like U.S. Commissioners. Technically they don't 
have a vote but we generally operate by consensus. So they sit at the table 
with our Board of Directors. They participate in all deliberations. We just 
had our annual meeting up in Quebec city. Quebec and Ontario are very 
active but technically they're not part of the Compact and technically they 
don't actually have a vote. 
Q: But in all other respects? 
A: It was a way for us to get around what Congress did when they 
took it up. (US Federal Employee 2). 
So the GLC has made inroads into forging a solid relationship between US and 
Canadian federal, state, and provincial entities and now provides another forum where the 
participants can discuss issues and priorities. In this manner, the GLC has developed an 
innovative and flexible process with the broad participation of governments and entities 
on both sides of the international border. They are able to cope with a variety of 
perspectives and by their efforts and mandate must be cognizant of environmental, social, 
and economic influences. One example is the way that the GLC facilitates the various 
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entities around the Great Lakes to press the US Congress for funds for Great Lakes 
i 
restoration efforts: 
A: See we play very nice in the same sandbox. And the other thing 
about the Great Lakes is that we have a number of regional organizations 
and I am quite proud of the fact that since I came here one of my motives 
was to bring the regional organizations together so that when we do things 
like go to Washington we speak with one voice. In fact one of the things 
that I've heard from people in Washington with my work is that you guys 
come down here every year and you've got your list, you're ready for 
what some call the annual "begathon." And all those lists look a little bit 
different. 
A: And you're all together on it? 
No, we weren't. But now we are. Now we've actually done a one pager 
and that's kind of just a vehicle for getting all the organizations on one 
sheet of paper in terms of our annual legislative and appropriations 
priorities to Congress. And that was, I mean, I made that happen. 
Q: How did you do that? 
A: Just got everybody around the table and everybody had their 
longer, more comprehensive lists and we still have our four page summary 
of what we're asking for, and we just got together and looked at where the 
ven diagrams overlapped and found what we all agreed with, and we argue 
over every single word and then talk about what color paper it should be 
on and what pictures should be used and we actually divide up which 
organization is going to take the lead on each of the four or five elements. 
We bring the tribes in and we run it by our board of directors and we make 
sure all the states and all of our constituents can live with it. 
Q: Is everyone at the table that needs to be there in order to... 
A: I think we've done a pretty darn good job. I mean we have the 
Commission and our representation of the states. We have the Council of 
Great Lakes Governors and their more direct access to the governors. We 
have the cities through the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative. 
We have the fishery commission. We have the NGOs through NWF and 
Healing Our Waters. We now have the Council of Great Lakes Industries 
at the table on our web page and the annual legislative agenda. And we 
have the tribes. (U.S. Federal Employee 2) 
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The above fairly characterizes the perspectives of the GLWQA entities and the 
GLC. The perspectives of the GLFC, federal agencies, and state agencies were discussed 
above in the problem orientation section of this chapter and will not be repeated here. 
Situations. Participants to an ecosystem governance process may interact in 
formal or informal settings, on a number of levels, and regularly or only during crises. 
Thus the examination of the situations in which participants interact may have temporal 
elements depending upon how often the participants interact. It may also have spatial 
issues determined by the geographic boundaries represented by the participants. There 
may be institutional issues that depend upon the degree that power is centralized or 
decentralized in the region and whether regimentation is increasing or decreasing. 
Finally the issue is whether it takes a crisis for participants to mobilize participants to 
alter their perspectives and discourse-related practices in order to resolve the crises (Clark 
2002). 
In an ecosystem-based approach we would expect that there would be ample 
opportunity, or situations, for participants to communicate and collaborate (See Table 
30). There has been a great deal written about the opportunities for communication, 
collaboration, and citizen involvement presented in the sections above, specifically the 
Problem Orientation and Participants sub-section. We have seen that there was a great 
deal of public outreach sponsored by the UC and others during the 1970s and 1980s that 
resulted in a public prepared to question policy and participate in panels and decision 
making processes. We have also seen that the IJC held meaningful annual and, later, 
biennial meetings and, during the pertinent time period, gave the public chance for 
significant input. 
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The collaborative efforts of the GLWQA entities do not tell us much, however, 
about the conduct of the parties in the enforcement of domestic legislation like the U.S. 
Clean Water Act after the early years. All indications are that after the collaboration and 
cooperation shown during the first 10 years under the GLWQA, cooperative activity 
began to wane as conservative governments on both sides of the border began to isolate 
the IJC and its participatory decision-making model. 
There has been little indication of movement towards a governance system that is 
heading toward partnerships with innovative techniques for working with industry other 
than the traditional confrontational methods. This is discussed further in the Effects 
portion of this section. 
Table 30 Situations 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
Collaboration, communication and cooperation 
between government, stakeholders, and the 
public allow for governance that works more 
with participants than on them. This means 
more frequent collaborative interaction 
between government and participants at all 
levels. Further, agencies need to be less geared 
toward enforcement and more willing to be 
used as resources for local involvement and for 
solving problems where they arise. 
GLWQA provides targets for Parties to reach, 
including toxic contaminant reduction and 
standards for monitoring and reporting. IJC 
advocates and encourages collaboration as well 
as education and outreach for public and for 
local government officials so they can better 
understand the nature of non-point source 
impacts and cumulative effects. IJC and 
GLWC work together, with continuous 
deliberations to evaluate conditions and trends 
in the entire ecosystem. 
Decision-making and other collaborative 
processes are iterative and ongoing, not simply 
single-play problem-solving efforts. The need 
for passive formal public and adversarial public 
hearings can be reduced through citizen 
involvement and partnership, not just public 
information programs to inform passively. 
IJC publishes regular reports, including state of 
the lake and basin-wide reports to the Parties. 
These are public documents and widely 
distributed. Governments respond to 
challenges raised in IJC reports. Biennial 
meetings set stage for presentation of Board 
reports to the IJC with public attendance and 
participation (especially in early years). Strong 
emphasis on education and outreach to 
empower a knowledgeable public. All 
information transparent and readily available. 
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Base Values. In Chapter III it was pointed out that environmental policy disputes 
are almost always "contests over values" despite the fact that they are often masked in 
economic or environmental jargon or appear to revolve around technical issues (Layzer 
2006). 
The values that we will discuss in terms of the GLWQA governance regime 
include the typical assets or resources that participants use in their efforts to achieve their 
goals. All values, including authority, can be used as bases of power. Brewer and 
deLeon (1983) have listed the values pertinent to this inquiry: 
Power is to make and carry out decisions 
Enlightenment is to have knowledge 
Wealth is to have money or its equivalent 
Well-being is to have health, physical and psychological 
Skill is to have special abilities. 
Affection is to have family, friends, and warm community relationships 
Respect is to show and receive deference 
Rectitude is to have ethical standards 
The characteristics of an ideal ecosystem approach to governance include a heavy 
reliance on significant public participation, vertical and horizontal collaboration, 
resilience, and learning through trial and error. The values necessary for the 
implementation of an ecosystem-based approach must move away from the traditional 
goals of power and wealth as ends in themselves. In order for implementation of an 
ecosystem-based approach to governance to have a chance there needs to be much more 
emphasis on utilizing power and wealth to obtain stronger inputs from the values of 
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knowledge, rectitude, well-being, and respect. A trial-and-error approach to management 
solutions, for example, requires a strong commitment to the gathering and sharing of 
knowledge together with an ability to acknowledge failures without the fear of 
punishment or the loss of funding. 
Table 31 Base Values 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
Values sought should be consistent 
with goals of promotion of broad 
collaboration with emphasis on 
ecosystem resilience. The values of 
power and wealth should be utilized 
to press demands for common 
interests prioritizing human dignity, 
ecosystem integrity and resilience. 
Knowledge (enlightenment) should 
be a goal that is ideally gained from 
a variety of sources through a 
process of trial and error as much as 
through traditional experimental 
science. 
Goals under GLWQA defined 
broadly with emphasis on ecosystem 
approach and resilience of ecosystem 
function. CWA goals consistent. 
Goals include reduction of pollution 
and virtual elimination of toxic 
contaminants. Broad coalition of 
scientists, agencies, IJC, SAB, and a 
knowledgeable public collaborate to 
solve problems using principles of 
binationalism and a free flow of 
ideas to experiment with policies and 
monitor results, with transparent 
communication fostering trust and 
accountability. Participants aware of 
and dedicated to human dignity, 
health, fairness and democratic 
traditions. 
In order for implementation of an 
ecosystem-based approach to 
governance to have a chance there 
needs to be much more emphasis on 
utilizing power and wealth to obtain 
stronger inputs from the values of 
knowledge, rectitude, well-being, 
and respect 
Values of knowledge, rectitude, 
well-being and respect gained 
through strong ethic fostered by 
binationalism, freedom and open 
exchange of ideas, and the 
participation of experts and citizens 
in their personal and professional 
capacities. Pressure applied by 
public, labor unions, NGOs and 
coordinated by umbrella groups like 
GLU help apply pressure to policy 
makers to utilize power public, not 
private, interests. 
In addition, collaboration and significant public participation will require a focus on the 
values of respect, affection, rectitude and well-being. There is simply no way to gain the 
trust, credibility, and respect necessary for problem-solving and planning collaboration 
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and public and broad-based community support without a shift more in the direction of 
these important values. 
Thus our ideal system must first be characterized by resource sharing and 
collaborative efforts designed to bring a broad base of the public and regulated interests 
together with regulators to share ideas, develop knowledge, and gain mutual respect to 
identify goals, threats to those goals, and possible actions to take in order to preserve and 
restore ecosystem resilience. In an ecosystem-based approach to governance, base values 
come into play in both the goals for the governance of the ecosystem and in the 
implementation processes that seek to implement the goals (Table 31). 
As set forth above in the discussions about goal clarification and trends in the 
GLB, the goals for the Great Lakes Basin, have largely been articulated by GLWQA and 
the Clean Water Act. The general goal agreed to by the Parties to the GLWQA for the 
Great Lakes through the 1987 Protocol is to "restore, and maintain the chemical, physical 
and biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem" (1987, Article 
II). The ecosystem is defined as "the interacting components of air, land, water and 
living organisms, including humans, within the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence River" 
(1987, Article I (g)). As we have seen additional goals called for the protection and 
maintenance of self-sustaining fish populations and aquatic organisms and for protection 
and restoration of habitats vital for the support of healthy and diverse communities of 
plants, fish, and wildlife. Other, more particular goals and objectives have been 
discussed earlier in this chapter (toxic chemicals, virtual elimination, etc.). 
These goals rely heavily on the base values of knowledge (enlightenment), well-
being, respect, and rectitude for their achievement. In the discussions above there has 
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been ample evidence of the various ways that knowledge has been sought and acquired 
under the GLWQA scheme. In the early years we have seen how the public was involved 
in key aspects of learning, especially through PLUARG and UGLR studies. We have 
also seen how participants in the process fostered a 'free market of ideas' and all were 
welcome. As such the goals of the GLWQA regime seem to parallel with the goals 
necessary for an ecosystem approach to governance. 
The second characteristic of the ideal ecosystem approach involves the 
implementation of the goals of an ecosystem-based approach to governance and the need 
to place emphasis on utilizing the base values of power and wealth to obtain stronger 
inputs of the values of knowledge, rectitude, well-being, and respect. The transition from 
goals to implementation is a bit tricky. 
We have seen that during the early years of the GLWQA regime there was a 
strong esprit de corps that was created by the tradition of binationalism, freedom and 
open exchange of ideas, and the participation of experts and citizens in their personal and 
professional capacities (as opposed to representatives of agencies or institutions), the 
loyalty all shared for the betterment of the GLB ecosystem, strong public participation, 
public outreach and education, and education of local and other government officials. 
These characteristics and more gave participants in the GLWQA the ability to focus on 
the problems of the Great Lakes and a feeling of loyalty and allegiance to a healthy 
ecosystem in the GLB, complete with concern for integrity, justice, and democracy. The 
use of common fact-finding and reliance on transparent and reliable data added 
credibility to the IJC's efforts (Becker 1993; Botts and Muldoon 2005).' 
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The IJC, as has been discussed, acts mainly in an oversight capacity in the GLB. 
True implementation must come from the Parties. In an ideal ecosystem-based approach 
there should be an emphasis on utilizing power and wealth to obtain stronger inputs from 
the values of knowledge, rectitude, well-being, and respect as steps are taken to 
implement activities and policies that further societal goals. 
The behavior of US federal and state agencies is often strongly influenced by 
industrial interests and a desire to minimize or avoid loss of values such as power, wealth 
(i.e. funding), and respect. In decisions involving potential adverse effects on important 
industries (e.g. virtual elimination), agency value losses include decreased budget 
allocations from unsympathetic legislatures so the costs of making decisions that 
adversely affect various industries are often perceived as too great to risk. Agencies rely 
on the support of elected officials and support is often tied to the satisfaction of those 
officials with the agency's contributions to or lack of interference with local or regional 
gains. Backlash against strong conservation methods that may impact economic 
productivity can be severe even at a local level (Kagan 2001; Wallace 2003; Armitage 
and Plummer 2010; Brunner 2010a). 
Despite the differences between the IJC and the Parties to the GLWQA, there is a 
legacy of frequent and often innovative cooperation and collaboration between them. 
There have also been others, including labor unions and NGOs, especially when 
galvanized under the umbrella organization of Great Lakes United, that have often 
applied pressure when necessary to see that the trade-offs in base values were in the 
direction of accumulating knowledge and well-being, as disclosed by this former member 
of the SAB: 
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And so, people kind of didn't know what to do, especially since these 
things crossed so many political boundaries jurisdiction. So, we had a 
whole series of consultations. They had roundtable discussions around the 
basin. They had a series of initiatives to try to get a handle on it. Great 
Lakes United was formed between '78 and '87, to be the activist group, 
because Great Lakes Tomorrow was a facilitation and education group. 
But, we needed some group that was going to hold politicians' feet to the 
fire, and that was Great Lakes United. So, a couple of things happened in 
that period, one of which was Green Peace's zero discharge tour of the 
lakes, where they went about touting the only way to deal with toxic 
contaminants [was zero discharge] but, that occurred after GLU held a 
series of public hearings around the basin to get input from whoever 
wanted to show up and testify. They published a report, which I have on 
the shelf.. .a justification for why that probably needed to be really 
explicit and that there needed to be... Also during that period, and while I 
was on the science advisory board, there was a lot of interest in getting a 
mass balance assessment of the contaminants. It started with PLUARG, 
but then it went on after that. In order to get mass balance, you need to 
know sources, causes, etc. So, there was a lot of that research going on in 
the system at that time. It became very clear that the only way that these 
watershed groups were going to be able to do what had to be done was to 
have a strategic approach. (US NGO/Academic) 
And rectitude was a trait shared amongst many of those involved in the early 
years of the GLWQA agreement, typified by this comment from an individual who was 
one of the leaders within the GLWQA regime for many years: 
Nothing I've ever done has been divorced from justice, so far as I know. 
My deontological ethic ranks higher than my commitment and objective 
interest in policy and science. (Canadian Academic 2) 
Others tried to foster these value trade-offs that sought knowledge and well-being 
rather than wealth and power for power's sake. The Great Lakes Basin Commission, as 
discussed earlier, was a powerful coordinating force. And while it took a while the Great 
Lakes Commission ultimately evolved an active role in filling the gap left when the 
GLBC was shut down. 
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The governance system of the Great Lakes during the time frame of the early 
1970s through the early 1990s was essentially overseen by the UC. The prescriptions, or 
laws and regulations that were in existence were ample to provide base value trade-offs 
that gave priority to well-being, knowledge, respect, and rectitude. The GLWQA and the 
Clean Water Act provide ample justification and enforcement capacity to implement 
these priorities. The problem, as we have seen, is that as interpreted and enforced by the 
Parties, when not receiving pressure from an angry or galvanized public, there is a need 
to guard against the trend to place a premium on activities that procure wealth and power 
for the sake of wealth and power (Caldwell 1993; Dempsey 2004). 
Strategies. Thus far in the analysis of the social process at work in the Great 
Lakes in first two decades of the GLWQA we have examined the participants, their 
perspectives, the situations in which they interact, and the base values that are used to 
achieve the goals of the participants. The strategies employed by the participants will be 
examined next. 
The four basic strategies that were identified in Chapter III may be listed 
as follows: 
• Diplomatic strategies use communication among and between the leaders 
and/or elites of any group or agency; 
• Ideological strategies involve communications to a public that is wider 
than just leaders or heads of agencies and include public talks, newspaper 
and other mass media appeals and, in the extreme, propaganda; 
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• Economic strategies that consist of practices that rely on the production 
and distribution of goods and services. Boycotts and labor actions are 
included in economic strategies (Clark 2002), and 
• Litigation which in this study is defined as disputes that are submitted for 
binding resolution by a third party. 
In Chapter III the need to move toward a governance system that moves 
away from regulatory enforcement efforts geared toward targeted interventions at point 
sources and problem areas in the form of commands to different classes of firms 
mandating change in existing technologies or behavior was discussed at some length. In 
place of coercive command and control regulatory conduct, at least to some degree, 
should be a movement toward cooperation and collaboration in decisions about processes 
and raw materials, sustainability planning integrating environmental goals with other 
social and economic goals using diplomatic and ideological strategies (Table 33). 
Certainly there will always be a need for basic rules backed by the coercive power of the 
state in order to keep firms in line and not give unfair competitive advantage to 
environmentally noncompliant firms (Harrison 1995; Kagan 2001; Kjaer 2004; Fiorino 
2006). The point is that ecosystem-based approach governance would seek to work with 
the regulated public to a greater degree. 
In addition to the need to move away from coercive regulatory conduct and 
litigation, the literature and case studies discussed in chapter III suggest the need for a 
bridging organization that connects, navigates, and/or coordinates the interests of 
different institutions and stakeholders across organizational levels should also be an 
integral part of adaptive governance of social-ecological systems. As was pointed out 
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earlier, such organizations provide social incentives by rewarding and creating space for 
collaboration, value formation, and innovation. The collaboration that bridging 
organizations initiate is strategic, conditional on the goals to enhance the values that may 
tend to promote the sustainability and resilience of the ecosystems (Hahn, Schultz et al. 
2008). 
Table 32 Strategies 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
An ecosystem-based approach would rely 
more on ideological and diplomatic 
strategies, moving away from regulatory 
enforcement efforts geared toward targeted 
interventions at point sources and problem 
areas which take the form of commands to 
different classes of firms mandating change 
in existing technologies or behavior. Instead 
there would be cooperation and collaboration 
in decisions about processes and raw 
materials, sustainability planning integrating 
environmental goals with other social and 
economic goals. 
At the binational level ideological and 
diplomatic strategies are the only strategies 
available to the IJC and the GLFC. Biennial 
as well as relevant special reports are issued 
to raise issues and challenge the Parties. 
NGOs through GLU hold biennial meetings 
to develop an agenda of concerns among its 
many NGO members to take to the IJC 
biennial meetings. Decisions for the Great 
Lakes trains citizen leaders and promotes 
lasting networks. Annual meetings of 
IAGLR provide opportunity for presentation 
and discussion of social, natural sciences, 
economics and related issues. GLIN on-line 
service provides access to basin-wide 
information and data. Interlocking boards. 
Litigation will play a role as there is a need 
for basic rules to be backed by the coercive 
power of the state in order to keep firms in 
line and not give unfair competitive 
advantage to environmentally noncompliant 
firms. Litigation would, however, rely more 
upon alternative dispute mechanisms, 
including facilitation and mediation. 
Litigation is a not the preferred option. 
Diplomacy and ideological efforts should act 
to bring parties together to resolve 
differences in a collaborative manner. 
Litigation is last resort and is conducted by 
the Parties to the GLWQA or stakeholders, 
not the IJC or GLFC. NGO litigation 
conducted or coordinated by NWF. 
The existence of a bridging organization that 
connects and navigates the interests of 
different stakeholders across organizational 
levels should be integral part of adaptive 
governance of social-ecological systems. 
Such organizations provide social incentives 
by rewarding and creating space for 
collaboration, value formation, and 
innovation. The collaboration that bridging 
organizations initiate is strategic-, conditional 
on the goals to enhance the values from the 
ecosystems 
IJC and GLFC act as bridging organizations 
and provide direction, coordination, and 
accountability to actions of the parties. SAB, 
WQB, and other IJC panels and Boards work 
to analyze basin-wide data and advise parties 
as to trends and potential ecosystem 
problems. Also identifies bigger picture 
needs and assists stakeholders and interested 
parties to collaborate, anticipate, and resolve 
issues. Parties with an issue may ask for 
objective investigation and assistance from 
IJC via reference. 
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Thus in a traditional governance scheme, strategies typically are built upon a basis 
laid by formal laws and rules. Reliance is therefore generally upon regulation using 
economic or social intervention to force compliance with uniform rules. Where this 
intervention fails, litigation provides the remedy (Kagan 2001; Fiorino 2006). Thus 
status quo strategies use litigation, and by extension enforcement with the threat of 
litigation, as a principle weapon in the management arsenal (Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 
2004; Walker and Salt 2006; Bardach and Kagan 2010). With no alternatives, litigation 
becomes a tactical and strategic weapon employed by all sides to a policy conflict. It is 
the courts that become another political venue for the losers in prior policy battles fought 
in Congress, or in the agency regulatory process, can launch another assault. In this way 
litigation provides a stalling mechanism to the policy process and creates a bargaining 
chip to be bartered for concessions from opponents (Rosenbaum 2008). 
The strategies employed under the governance regime of the Great Lakes Basin 
vary depending upon the policy level. This section will discuss the binational 
prescriptions that apply to the governance in the basin. These prescriptions include the 
GLWQA, the GLFC, and the Great Lakes Charter (GLC). An examination of the federal, 
provincial and state institutions and their roles in the governance of the activities that 
impact the GLB will be set forth in the decision process analysis which follows later in 
this chapter. 
It is important to understand that the binational governance regime in the Great 
Lakes Basin, with contributions by the IJC, GFLC, and a cast of frequently unified NGOs 
and citizens groups, is designed to stress diplomatic and ideological approaches as 
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opposed to the traditional enforcement/litigation model. Because the consequences of 
preventing ecosystem harm from happening are invisible to the untrained eye, and the 
benefits of an ecosystem approach are not readily discerned, public outreach was critical. 
Great Lakes Tomorrow and others traveled the basin to educate create a knowledgeable 
public (Christie, Becker et al. 1986). The Decisions for the Great Lakes program trained 
citizens to be leaders through a 40 hour course, presented around the Lake Ontario 
watershed, designed to educate the public and build lasting networks between 
government, scientists, regulators, and the public (GLT 1985). The principle governance 
mechanisms, together with their binational boards and supporting casts at work in the 
Great Lakes Basin, had the potential during the relevant time period to channel 
contending parties and groups into less expensive and more efficient ways of resolving 
disputes than litigation. 
The UC is an important bridging organization despite the fact that they lack 
formal powers of enforcement. There is no mechanism by which they can compel 
compliance under threat of sanction. The purpose set forth in the GLWQA, for instance, 
is for the Parties "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity 
of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem." To achieve this purpose the 
Agreement provides that the Parties, defined as the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the United States,. .agree to make a maximum effort to develop 
programs, practices, and technology necessary for a better understanding of the Great 
Lakes Basin Ecosystem and to eliminate or reduce to the maximum extent practicable the 
discharge of pollutants into the Great Lakes System" (1987, Art. II). 
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The GLWQA is overseen and to some degree coordinated by the IJC. As 
discussed, the Agreement gives the IJC no direct enforcement powers. The powers and 
responsibilities of the UC are set forth in the Agreement. Its primary role is to "assist in 
the implementation of this Agreement." In doing so, it may inter alia collate, analyze, 
and disseminate data and information supplied by the Parties and State and Provincial 
Governments "relating to the quality of the boundary waters of the Great Lakes 
System..." It may also ".. .tender advice and recommendations to the Parties and to the 
State and Provincial Governments on problems of and matters related to the quality of the 
boundary waters.. .including specific recommendations concerning the General and 
Specific Objectives, legislation, standards and other regulatory requirements, programs 
and other measures, and intergovernmental agreements relating to the quality of these 
waters." There are a variety of other responsibilities that are crucial to the function of the 
UC, including the ability and discretion to publish any report or statement related to its 
reference, the ability to conduct investigations on subjects related to the Great Lakes 
Basin Ecosystem when referred to it by the Parties, the requirement to make a "full report 
to the Parties and to the State and Provincial Governments no less frequently than 
biennially concerning progress toward the achievement of the ...objectives.. .This report 
shall include an assessment of the effectiveness of the programs and other measures 
undertaken pursuant to this Agreement, and advice and recommendations." 
Significantly, the IJC may "at any time make special reports to the Parties, to the 
State and Provincial Governments and to the public concerning any problem of water 
quality in the Great Lakes System" (1987, Art. VII). Thus the IJC uses its powers to 
assess the state of the ecosystem in the Great Lakes Basin to hold the Parties accountable 
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through biennial reports and public meetings. Other reports and investigations deemed a 
part of their role are also published and challenge the Parties to remedy or further 
investigate perceived threats to ecosystem resilience (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990; 
Becker 1993; Prelli and Becker 2001; Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
In addition to the IJC, ideological and diplomatic strategies may be found nested 
within other bilateral governing bodies. The Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries was 
adopted by Canada and the U.S. in an effort to develop solutions to fisheries issues 
related to the lamprey eel introduction and to other water quality issues that impacted a 
shared fishery. Like the GLWQA, no direct enforcement tools were granted to the Great 
Lakes Fishery Commission, but its preamble stresses that. .joint and coordinated efforts 
by the United States of America and Canada are essential in order to determine the need 
for the type of measures which will make possible the maximum sustained productivity 
in Great Lakes fisheries of common concern" (CGLF 1954; 1956). The institutional 
scheme and procedural mechanisms developed by the Parties to the Convention enabled 
them to by-pass costly and time-consuming international litigation over the establishment 
and division of total allowable catches and related issues. Instead, the Parties were able 
to deliberate and continuously compare the results of their consensus policy decisions 
with findings related to the condition of the entire ecosystem (Prelli and Becker 2001). 
With the CGLF institutional arrangement it became possible: 
... for parties to "find" for the ecosystem over and against parochial 
economic or political interests that might otherwise seep into 
deliberations. Accordingly, they can work to formulate responses to the 
problem of sustainable fisheries that could lead to recovery and long-term 
maintenance of both the ecosystem and of those who depend upon it for 
food and jobs (Prelli and Becker 2001,481). 
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Thus during the years pertinent to this project the IJC and the GLFC shared the 
leadership role in the development and implementation of governance and management 
through the use of diplomatic and ideological strategies. With no ability to bring formal 
enforcement actions to compel environmental compliance, there were few realistic 
alternatives. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, the IJC and the GLFC are 
dependent upon the efforts of the Parties, including states and provinces, for 
implementation of recommendations and policy developed on a binational level. Thus 
potential solutions and policy developed by an impressive array of scientists, citizens, and 
regulators using a transparent ecosystem-based approach can be dashed on the shoals of 
political and regulatory reality at the federal, state, and provincial levels. These entities 
are, of course, bound by formal, fragmented laws, rules, and regulations created by 
political systems on both sides of the "dotted line" that divides the United States and 
Canada. This fragmentation and the problems that are inherent in the current regulatory 
regime will be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter describing the 
decision process and will not be explored further here. 
Before we move on, however, it is important to mention one additional source of 
binational diplomatic and ideological strategies. The GLWQA as it existed after 1978 
not only represented a binational commitment between the governments of the U.S. and 
Canada, but it also spawned a movement toward cooperation and coordinated action by 
the governments of the states and provinces in the Great Lakes Basin. The Council of 
Great Lakes Governors, formed first by six states in the Great Lakes Basin in 1983 and 
shortly thereafter by New York and Pennsylvania, took it upon themselves to negotiate 
various agreements that are extremely relevant to the diplomatic and ideological 
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advancement of cooperative efforts to protect and restore the Great Lakes Basin 
(Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). 
In 1985, the eight governors from the United States and the Premiers of Ontario 
and Quebec signed the Great Lakes Charter. The Charter obligated the states and 
provinces to, among other things.. ."to conserve the levels and flows of the Great Lakes 
and their tributary and connecting waters; to protect and conserve the environmental 
balance of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem; to provide for cooperative programs and 
management of the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin..(CGLG 1985). The 
Great Lakes Charter also included a provision calling for the development of a common 
data base on water resource use. This provision was carried out by the Great Lakes 
Commission and exists today as the Great Lakes Information Network (GLIN), a fully 
operational on-line tool available to researchers, regulators, as well as the general public24 
(Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). 
The Governors and Premiers went further the following year by signing the 1986 
Great Lakes Toxic Substances Control Agreement (GLTSCA). The GLTSCA has been 
described as an . .extremely ambitious document that commits the signatories to 
reducing toxic substances in the Great Lakes basin (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). 
Signed by the Great Lakes Governors in 1986, and endorsed by the Premiers of Ontario 
and Quebec via a memorandum of understanding in 1988, the GLTSCA called for the 
integration of permitting process for discharges to different media, interstate cooperation 
24 The Great Lakes Commission is an interstate compact consented to by the U.S. Congress. In the 1970s 
and 80s it was comprised of representatives from the eight GLB states and focused on collective concerns 
surrounding transportation, economic development, resource management, and environmental quality. As 
was pointed out earlier in this chapter, the GLC evolved to include representatives of federal governments 
and agencies as well as representation from the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. 
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in hazardous waste management planning, development of common health advisories on 
fish contamination, and in general provide for greater consistency between the provinces 
and the states in the GLB (CGLG 1986; Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). 
With help from NGOs and the Great Lakes Governors and Premiers, the 
governance regime under the GLWQA during the 1970s and 80s relied to a great extent 
on ideological and diplomatic efforts. This section has described the strategies mandated 
by the binational instruments. In previous sections, we have discussed how ideological 
and diplomatic strategies were employed by citizens groups, panels, NGOs and others. 
While implementation is left to the Parties, and top/down enforcement and litigation 
strategies have played a significant role at the federal, state, and provincial levels, the 
spirit of cooperation and collaboration promoted by the binational entities in the early 
years of the GLWQA accomplished a great deal without resort to more coercive judicial 
intervention. This will be discussed further in the Decision Process analysis. 
Outcomes. Outcomes, generally short-term but may be medium or long-term as 
well, are the culminating events measured in terms of values that may be seen as 
indicative of progress, or not, depending on the perspective of the participants. Outcomes 
may take the form of changes in process, or institutions, which, at least in terms of a 
transition to ecosystem-based governance, indicate movement toward the creation and 
implementation of the perspectives and institutional structures that are conducive to 
innovation. 
In terms of our ideal system, progress would be indicated by efforts to share 
power with and distribute more values to a greater portion of the public. If analysis of the 
values set forth in our social process reveals that more power and wealth is being 
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accumulated by fewer entities, this would reflect a negative trend to those who seek to 
move in the direction of a more ecosystem-based approach to governance (Table 33). If, 
on the other hand, there are tangible efforts toward creating governance processes and 
structures that encourage public participation, collaboration, the mobilization of local 
knowledge, and more adaptable, accountable, and flexible management, then outcomes 
are headed in a direction consistent with ecosystem-based governance (Brewer and 
deLeon 1983; deLeon 1999; Clark 2002; Clark 2008). 
Table 33 Outcomes 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
Transition toward a more adaptive ecosystem-
based approach to governance. Innovative 
measures are tried that transform current 
governance entities and create new or modified 
value institutions that get beyond scientific 
management and strict command and control 
hierarchy of bureaucracy using local input and 
collaborative processes. 
Negotiation and adoption of the GLWQA in 
1972. Negotiation and amendment of 
GLWQA in 1978 specifically adopting basin 
wide ecosystem approach to governance. 
Board and commission structures that 
encouraged collaboration and problem-
solving without regard to agency or national 
affiliations. Adoption of Great Lakes 
Charter. Adoption of 1987 protocol to 
GLWQA. Strong public involvement and 
transparent collaboration. Negative outcome 
of closure of GLBC met with increased role 
of Great Lakes Commission. 
There have been a variety of important outcomes, both substantive and symbolic, 
associated with the evolution of the GLWQA governance regime. One important 
outcome is the emergence of the ecosystem-based approach to governance and the 
ultimate inclusion of language mandating ecosystem-based governance in the Great 
Lakes Basin in the 1978 Agreement (1987; Becker 1993). The original 1972 Agreement 
laid the groundwork by seeking input and involvement from the public in investigating 
the possibility that water quality was impacted by land-based activities. The innovative 
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educational outreach methods, strong public participation, and compelling local input into 
the UC's reference concerning the impact of land-based activities certainly produced an 
outcome of public and institutional awareness of the value of local input and the need for 
change away from traditional fragmented command-and-control enforcement and toward 
more collaborative processes (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990; Becker 1993; Jackson 
2005). 
There have been many other outcomes that have spun out of increasing access to 
governance under the GLWQA. These include the goal of virtual elimination of toxic 
substances along with a zero tolerance for the release of toxic substances from the 1978 
Protocol to the GLWQ. Perhaps the most important outcome of the early GLWQA 
regime, however, was the development and use of a process that included a far greater 
role for the public and for public education and outreach, greater collaboration between 
government agencies at various levels of government, greater cooperation between and 
among NGO's, and other examples described in this chapter. There is, however, a flip 
side to the outcome component. There are often negative outcomes for some governance 
participants or outcomes that have negative impacts on progress toward the goals of 
participatory ecosystem-based governance. Clark (2008) describes how opening up 
decision-making in the greater Yellowstone region, for example, caused problems among 
some: "For people whose livelihoods are based on the expectation of certain kinds of 
decision-making power over the use of resources.. .In other words, opening up the arena 
to other participants will likely seem very threatening to those few who had previously 
had exclusive power" (Clark 2008,49). 
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One of the most active individuals involved in the governance regime in the early 
years of the GLWQA reflected on the impact that at least some government agencies had 
on the ecosystem-based approach when he was asked about the nature of ecosystem-
based governance: 
The ecosystem approach is maybe like that tapestry with maybe a dozen or 
two dozen different fibers working in different ways. And any particular 
practitioner of the ecosystem approach may have competence or old-
fashioned rationalist expertise, in several of them. And nobody has 
competence on the whole thing. But, in the Great Lakes, until the neocon 
revolution pretty well destroyed remediative measures in the '90s, many 
different people from many different interest groups could operate, could 
contribute to that mosaic and were welcome. Nobody understood it 
rationally. It's not understandable rationally. It's complex. It's not 
understandable in a linear rational way. You can't write a linear 
algorithm, a closed linear algorithm to explain, to define the ecosystem 
approach. It's kind of like a democracy - applied in a particular way. 
(Canadian Academic 2) 
Thus one strategic outcome of collaboration, cooperation, public involvement, 
and ecosystem-based governance, put simply, was the effort to keep GLWQA activities, 
especially those related to public involvement, under the radar of federal agencies on both 
sides of the border, as this example from the former Chair of the Great Lakes Basin 
Commission demonstrates: 
A: Among the things that I did, that I instituted at the Basin Commission 
was, there was a prohibition by OMB of citizen advisory committees, 
because there's been such a proliferation of them with the environmental 
explosion in the early '70s, that OMB had officially prohibited citizen 
advisory committees, so I set up something that we called PIWG—Public 
Involvement Work Group, we called it.. .didn't call it an advisory group, 
but that's what it was. 
Q: Now why did OMB ban.. .how could they ban citizens groups? 
A: They banned official citizen advisory groups to federal agencies as 
a budget concern. 
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Q: So, you set up the working group? 
A: Yes, we set up PIWG, and then I worked with the states.. .1 asked 
all the state members to suggest members, and that's how the State of New 
York suggested Abbey Hoffinan, only we didn't know he was Abbey 
Hoffman. 
Q: Right, right, I've heard the story. 
A: So, we formed this group and it functioned. I never heard any 
feedback from any agencies. Bureaucrats aren't very imaginative.. .most 
of them are, but not all.. .so, the public involvement work group had the 
effect of bringing together people from all the 8 Great Lakes states and 
setting the stage for greater involvement with the GLWQA, so that's what 
I can sum up to tell you. (U.S. NGO 2) 
Negative outcomes were often more direct. The federal governments on both 
sides of the border were clearly threatened by the public involvement and collaboration 
that came out of the GLWQA and especially the PLUARG initiatives in the 1970s, as 
described by this veteran of Great Lakes Tomorrow and the PLUARG process: 
We reported directly to both the Commission and PLUARG.. .the 
collective recommendations of what came up from all of those panels, on 
both about the process of engaging the public and about substantive issues. 
The general consensus was that the process that PLUARG had run, which 
Great Lakes Tomorrow facilitated, we facilitated all the hearings that went 
on around the lakes on both sides. We also reported as an organization on 
what we saw. The public composition didn't matter because the panel was 
really diverse in terms of the representation. They included industry.. .by 
then everybody's at the table.. .the result was that they really liked that 
model of participation and recommended that the Commission empower 
its deference toward another initiative to use similar process. To my 
knowledge it hasn't happened since. Because the outcome of the process 
was a significant change in the report in terms of what ought to be done 
with respect to what the references reported out. It was a very radical 
report in terms of what needed to happen. I don't think that the EPA was 
ready for it. And also it was at the beginning of the Reagan 
Administration. The guys who had worked so hard on that [PLUARG] 
report... who were from the soil conservation service, got sent to Siberia, 
and the chief guy, Robertson, who I think was the head, came from 
Washington, went back one weekend and his office was locked, and he 
suddenly found himself in North Dakota just like that. Just about the time 
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that was ready to really hit the fan in terms of next steps, Reagan took over 
and tried to systematically disembowel the Great Lakes initiative. (U.S. 
NGO/Academic) 
In sum, the outcomes of the GLWQA regime in the early years included 
governance that was innovative, oriented toward problem-solving, and courageous. 
Perhaps most important was that it led to the adoption of participatory ecosystem-based 
governance under the auspices of the UC, its boards and panels, and to some degree, the 
Parties. The educational outreach of Great Lakes Tomorrow, Decisions for the Great 
Lakes, the Lake Michigan Federation, the Great Lakes Basin Commission, Great Lakes 
United, and others led to strong and persuasive public involvement in critical basin-wide 
restoration efforts. Ecosystem-based governance was not only developed and nurtured it 
was ultimately included in the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement as a formal 
binational prescription. For a period of time this outcome meant that the public was 
galvanized and pressure was successfully applied to state legislatures to defeat special 
interests and pass bans on phosphates in detergents. 
The positive outcomes, however, set the stage for other more negative reactions 
and outcomes. As suggested by Clark (2007), those who typically had exercised 
exclusive power over environmental regulation began to "hear the footsteps" and slowly 
began to chip away at the progress made by the innovative and progressive outcomes of 
the GLWQA regime of the 1970s and 1980s. The outcomes, therefore, both positive and 
negative, morphed into more enduring effects discussed in the following section. 
Effects. The effects of decisions and social process must be anticipated. Effects 
refer to the long-term changes in the value positions and institutions in the relevant 
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community. They are outcomes writ large, i.e. long-term outcomes in terms of values, 
processes, and institutional innovation (Clark 2002). 
In essence, effects developed for our ideal system would include innovative 
measures that transform current governance entities and create new or modified value 
institutions that get beyond scientific management and strict command and control 
hierarchy of bureaucracy using local input and collaborative processes (Brunner and 
Steelman 2005; Coe-Juell 2005; Fiorino 2006; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). It 
would allow for softer and more voluntary local or regional regulation of activities that 
impact the ecosystem consistent with community goals and consistent with national 
standards. There should also be evidence of a greater acceptance by regulators of public 
and community input and decision-making (Table 34). 
Table 34 Effects 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
Transition toward a more adaptive 
ecosystem-based approach to 
governance. Innovative measures 
are tried that transform current 
governance entities and create 
new or modified value institutions 
that get beyond scientific 
management and strict command 
and control hierarchy of 
bureaucracy using local input and 
collaborative processes 
Principle effect was the 
acceptance and success of the 
outreach and public education 
efforts culminating in PLUARG 
and related reports. These effects 
led to explicit incorporation and 
implementation of basin-wide 
ecosystem approach into the 1978 
amendments. Other effects 
included the push-back from 
entrenched government and 
private interests threatened by the 
change in governance. 
In the discussion concerning outcomes from the GLWQA the focus was on one 
overall critical outcome: The emergence of the ecosystem-based approach to governance 
applied throughout the Great Lakes Basin. As we know, the original 1972 Agreement 
laid the groundwork by seeking input and involvement from the public in investigating 
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the possibility that water quality was impacted by land-based activities. The innovative 
educational outreach methods, strong public participation, and compelling local input into 
the IJC's reference concerning the impact of land-based activities certainly produced an 
outcome of public and institutional awareness of the value of local input and the need for 
change away from traditional fragmented command-and-control enforcement and toward 
more collaborative processes (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990; Becker 1993; Jackson 
2005). As a result, the ecosystem-based approach was specifically defined and formally 
adopted as part of the 1978 protocol amending the GLWQA: 
(g) "Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem" means the interacting components of 
air, land, water and living organisms, including humans, within the 
drainage basin of the St. Lawrence River at or upstream from the point at 
which this river becomes the international boundary between Canada and 
the United States (1987, Art 1(g)) [Emphasis original]. 
Thus the notion that humans were an integral component of the ecosystem, a 
relative outcome of efforts of PLUARG and the references set forth in the 1972 
GLWQA, became a became a truly lasting effect and legacy via the 1978 language. 
Another related effect was the recognition of the manner in which human activities 
interacted with other components of the ecosystem. Henry Regier, a former 
Commissioner of the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission and key participant in much of 
the GLWQA Science Advisory Board activities in the 1970s and 80s summarized this 
interrelationship in the simplest of terms: 
We recognize two polarities or subsystems within the Great Lakes basin 
ecosystem: the natural and the cultural. These can only be distinguished 
in a general way; we see no clear boundary between them. Abstractly, the 
whole system may be viewed as a dynamic self-organizing network in 
which the human and nonhuman are connected in countless ways. On 
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balance, these two subsystems in and around the Great Lakes are 
interacting adversarially rather than mutualistically (Edwards and Regier 
1988,19). 
Thus the broad primary outcome of the early years of the GLWQA regime, the 
ecosystem-based approach to governance, evolved into a lasting change in the Great 
Lakes Basin. The notion that humans were but one component of a larger ecosystem and 
that their activities needed to be factored into notions of ecosystem health and resilience 
was an effect that required fundamental change in institutional attitudes. Integrity was 
recognized as a complex attribute that was comprised of the individual acts of a multitude 
of actors, with impacts that influenced the welfare of many in ways that are not 
immediately apparent. It was also recognized that ecosystem integrity, including natural 
and cultural ecosystems, could not be assured through the simple intervention by some 
level of government, be it federal, state, provincial, or local (Edwards and Regier 1988). 
This evolution of thought and attitude was and is a primary lasting effect of the GLWQA 
regime evolution. 
There was a progression to this evolution. The whirlwind of change that began 
with public dissatisfaction and demonstrations over social and environmental issues in 
the 1960s and led to legislative initiatives like the National Environmental Policy Act 
(1970a), the Clean Water Act (1972) and the Clean Air Act (1970) in the United States. 
As discussed previously, the deteriorating environmental conditions in the Great 
Lakes led to the adoption of the GLWQA by the United States and Canada in 1972. With 
public involvement and focused efforts of scientists and others on both sides of the 
border, information and data gathered at a variety of scales led to the amendment of the 
GLWQA in 1978. Thereafter, with increasing harm caused by invasive species and the 
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elevated threats posed by persistent organic pollutants often emanating from land-based 
activities, the GLWQA was amended by protocol in 1987 (1987). 
Some argue that the 1978 amendments, and later the 1987 protocol, in some ways 
had the effect of reducing the credibility of the DC process. The argument is that by 
adding the virtual elimination/zero tolerance provisions to the amendments that the 
provisions became too aggressive. As a member of the Science Advisory Board of the 
IJC at the time described it, these were goals that were simply unattainable from the start: 
Q: Does the fact that [the ecosystem approach to governance] made it into 
the 1978 agreement; did it change anything in the approach in reality? 
A: Well, remember, the '78 agreement came right before 1980, of course, 
and you know what happened in 1980. 
Q: Keenly aware. 
A: And the point is what happened the U.S. sooner or later happened on 
the Canadian side. We were in synch. The '78 agreement, especially as a 
substitute, subsequently the '87 protocol, irritated the hell out of industry. 
And the concept of zero discharge virtual elimination was I think just not 
credible. The industry balked. Just to make a point: no chlorine, no table 
salt, end of discussion. I can never understand.. .1 used to say well, okay, 
they're using it as a code word for doing what they want. An unattainable 
idea out here, that if you could do it, then that's what you aim toward. I 
could never understand zero discharge/virtual elimination, other than that 
everybody recognized that this is an unattainable idea. The anti-
contaminant campaign—chlorinated hydrocarbons—as code word for 
chlorinated or brominated, that whole campaign never had support of the 
public health establishment as such. It had individual public health 
experts. But the public health establishment never came to favor it. 
Because they were using chlorinated hydrocarbons all the time for sanitary 
purposes in the house. The public health said you're not going to use 
chlorine to clean up a mess in your sink or something? Give me a break. 
And also, the public health people never got behind it to any extent at all 
and the clinical health people were, of course, sold up to here in 
chlorinated pharmaceuticals. And they weren't about to want to get rid of 
halogenated pharmaceuticals then. And there were all sorts of reasons but 
they irritated the hell out of the chlorine industry, and the chlorine industry 
just got the senior decision makers to turn if off. They got a reprieve. Our 
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side, and I'm fighting chlorinated hydrocarbons right here in Elmira. But, 
Commissioner Durnill when G. H. W. Bush first appointed him to the 
International Joint Commission, he didn't know that guy had a family 
harmed seriously by some halogenated hydrocarbon. So, Durnill had a 
personal stake in getting rid of them. I think if this had been known to the 
Bush Administration, Bush wouldn't have put him on the commission. 
But, they got a breath of life then in the late '80's, early '90's. But that 
faded out and the chemical industry just closed it down. So, effectively, 
the '87 protocol, was never implemented. (Canadian Academic 2) 
So the inclusion of the virtual elimination/zero discharge provisions in the 1978, 
though perhaps popular with the public and with environmental groups, had the practical 
effect of weakening the impact of the entire Agreement. Thereafter, after declining 
support and outright animosity from the conservative national administrations on both 
sides of the border, the 1987 Protocol was negotiated. One of the results of the 1987 
Protocol was the creation a Binational Executive Committee (BEC). Under the new 
Protocol, the BEC was constituted with members from Environment Canada and the EPA 
and tasked with assisting the Parties with meeting the requirements of the GLWQA. 
There is a solid group of activists and veterans of the GLWQA process that believes that 
the creation of the BEC effectively thwarted efforts to continue the strong public 
participation tradition of the GLWQA regime by reducing transparency and placing GLB 
ecosystem decision into the hands of experts within the given federal agencies, by­
passing public and broader community involvement (Krantzberg, Manno et al. 2007). 
Thus the effects of the initial GLWQA of 1972 were powerful. Initially the 
concept of including humans and land use activities within has had a powerful and lasting 
effect - few would question this reality in this day and age. Also important was the 
introduction of the notion that broad public participation, adaptive and flexible 
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governance, transparency, and officials acting in a personal and professional role rather 
than as representatives of nations or agencies, could function to solve problems and 
restore ecosystems damaged by human activity. These are strong and positive effects in 
the realm of ecosystem-based governance. 
Other realistic effects were, though predictable, not advantageous the quest for 
ecosystem integrity, including clean water and air. One effect was that public 
participation waned. In addition there seems to have been a reaction of entrenched 
government agencies and private corporate interests designed to thwart the effectiveness 
of changes in governance. The 1987 Protocol that amended the GLWQA is an example 
of a provision that, while on its face appeared to enlist the expertise of EC and EPA in the 
UC governance scheme, in reality laid the formal basis for the unraveling of the 
participatory governance scheme originally contemplated by the Agreement.25 
25 In fairness, at least one of the interviewees who has been involved in the GLWQA evolution believes that 
public support has not waned but has merely evolved: 
Q: What's happened to the public participation? 
A: What's your point? Is your point that it has diminished? 
Q: Yeah. 
A: No I would say it's evolved. 
Q: Okay. Explain... 
A: Well it's not focused on water quality or the water quality agreement per se; it's focused now on 
aquatic invasive species and Great Lakes restoration.. .And that has less of a direct connection to the water 
quality agreement. The IJC and the water quality agreement haven't been able to adapt and evolve as 
quickly for a lot of reasons that are very obvious to you - going to the Department of State and External 
Affairs. So the movement now and the push from public advocacy standpoint is to do something about 
ballast water and releases from other vectors and make this Great Lakes regional collaboration and 
restoration plan real by providing funding. And that's where the citizen energy is focused right now. 
Q: No more of these meetings though where you actually get the Science Advisory Board in front of 
the IJC with a huge audience. That doesn't happen anymore? 
A: Well, it's evolved. There is a Great Lakes restoration annual conference that's sponsored by the 
Healing Our Waters coalition which is modeled after the Everglades coalition and is focused on the issues 
of the Great Lakes. (U.S. Federal Employee 2) 
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The effects of governance change, therefore, may be positive or negative in terms 
of trends that lead communities and regions either toward or away from their goals. The 
longer term effects of the GLWQA experiment are still playing out - even as those active 
in the coordination and implementation of strategies strive to stay "below the radar" of 
the federal governments on both sides of the border. As one representative of a regional 
compact described it: 
A: The compact that created us gave the Commission the authority to 
advise and consult with Canada and the provinces. That was what the 
states wrote into the compact. Congress said: "Thank you very much but 
we'll take care of the relationship with Canada." 
Q: In what form? 
A: Well they said that they didn't want a regional organization like us 
negotiating or consulting or anything involving direct consultation with 
the Canadian government... 
Q: So can we now understand why the $475 million pot from the 
Great Lakes Restoration Initiative is a total US initiative? 
A: Not exactly. There's a little bit more to the story. So Congress said 
no you can only be a US organization created by the involved States - you 
know the way compacts work - they have to go to Congress under the 
Constitution. We, however, recognize that there's another side to the 
border so we created by resolution a category of membership for the 
provinces called "associate commissioners" and basically treat them just 
like U.S. Commissioners. Technically they don't have a vote but we 
generally operate by consensus. So they sit at the table with our Board of 
Directors. They participate in all deliberations. We just had our annual 
meeting up in Quebec city. Quebec and Ontario are very active but 
technically they're not part of the Compact and technically they don't 
actually have a vote. 
Q: But in all other respects? 
A: It was a way for us to get around what Congress did when they 
took it up. (U.S. Federal Employee 2) 
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Clearly the lasting effects of the GLWQA are a complex and mixed-bag. On the 
one hand, and I believe most importantly, there was once a governance regime that, for a 
time, was characteristic of an adaptive, inclusive, transparent ecosystem-based approach 
to governance. The significance of this fact cannot be overstated. On the other hand, the 
successes of that governance regime created push-backs in the form of entrenched 
interests devising ways to water-down the characteristics of the ecosystem-based nature 
of the GLWQA regime. 
There are lessons here. In the first place it is apparent that the social process for 
an ecosystem-based approach to governance can be created. Meaningful broad-based 
public participation combined with governmental processes that focus on problem-
solving, knowledge, and rectitude can exist with the assistance of courageous actors who 
perceive the value of a resilient ecosystem to be more important than gains in power 
and/or wealth so long as there are government agencies that accommodate these values. 
Another lesson, however, is that even where a social process can be established that 
nourishes and fosters an ecosystem-based approach the participants must be proactive 
and take steps to preserve the processes that led to the initial success. 
Decision Process 
The third and final portion of the policy sciences framework that needs to be 
discussed is the decision process. Much of the information, background, and data 
concerning the decision process has been set forth and absorbed within the prior sections 
involving problem orientation and the social process. Every effort will be made to avoid 
unnecessary duplication. 
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Natural resource policy and management are generally analyzed on the basis of 
the decision process employed in the execution of the agency's mandates. An 
examination of the decision process practiced in a given ecosystem governance regime 
for this study involves the mapping of six interlinked functions of intelligence, 
promotion, prescription, implementation, termination, and appraisal. This systematic 
analysis can turn up flaws in the decision process that cause restoration plans to fail. 
Knowing how a decision process works, or doesn't work, participants can maintain good 
practices or correct a poorly functioning one. A decision process can be a way of 
reconciling or at least productively managing competing interests and policies through 
politics. Politics will always be with us because people seek different policies that reflect 
their particular, or "special", interests. In many cases, however, as in sustainability 
management, people must reconcile interest differences to clarify and secure their 
common interest. Investigation should reveal who establishes what the common interests 
are or should be. In terms of ecosystem-based governance, trends can be determined that 
might indicate whether intelligence data is reliable and linked to the appropriate scales 
within an ecosystem, whether such intelligence is being communicated to policy makers 
in a meaningful manner and, ultimately, whether a structure exists that allows for 
decision makers to react to intelligence in an adaptive fashion. Note that ecosystem-
based governance requires a decision process that is open and transparent, not slanted 
toward special interests and power (Clark 2002). In terms of ecosystem-based 
governance, trends can be determined that might indicate whether intelligence data is 
reliable and linked to the appropriate scales within an ecosystem, whether such 
intelligence is being communicated to policy makers in a meaningful manner and, 
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ultimately, whether a structure exists that allows for decision makers to react to 
intelligence in an adaptive fashion, and whether there is impartial third-party appraisal of 
existing policies that will permit participants to adapt or even terminate programs (Clark, 
Willard et al. 2000; Wilson 2000; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007). Note that ecosystem-
based governance requires a decision process that is open and transparent, not slanted 
toward special interests and power (Clark 2002). 
Intelligence. Intelligence is the process of obtaining and processing information 
and making it available to decision makers, stakeholders, members of the public, and 
others (Clark 2002). It involves the generation of knowledge, the transmission of 
knowledge, the use of knowledge, and the effects of knowledge on the policy process. 
Knowledge relevant to environmental decision making may be generated by scientists or 
it can come from other sources, including local knowledge. Intelligence is simply the 
process used to gather information about the problem(s) at hand and the relevant context 
and should incorporate characteristics like timeliness, dependability, and creativity (Clark 
2008). The purpose of intelligence is to provide reliable data and information that 
permits an understanding of whether conditions in the ecosystem are trending toward or 
away from the goals of the region (Busch and Trexler 2003). Reliability turns on whether 
intelligence is comprehensive and gathered from appropriate scales in order to detect 
trends and changes in ecosystem resilience and function (Lasswell 1971; Gunderson and 
Holling 2002; Gunderson 2003; Reid, Berkes et al. 2006). Data gathering and analysis 
should, in an ideal world, be inclusive and open to honest debate. Policy makers, as we 
have seen in the prior sections, must be willing to put special interests and bias aside and 
make decisions based upon the available data. The data, and the decisions, should be 
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understandable to the public. Intelligence that reveals trend direction should lead to 
policy responses through an adaptable and accountable process (Busch and Trexler 2003; 
Gunderson 2003; Brunner 2010a). 
Earlier in this chapter there was discussion centered on the idea that our current 
status quo of limiting the gathering of intelligence largely to scientists and other experts 
who then confine transmission of research and data to members of their own discipline 
needs some improvement. Knowledge disseminated through peer-review processes may 
help to ensure some measure of reliability and assurance of rigor, but it also has the effect 
of screening out knowledge that policymakers should take into account (Ascher, 
Steelman et al. 2010). 
Intelligence and complex natural science information cannot simply be dropped 
on an uninformed public. The public must be informed and interested and therefore be 
able to understand the data and other intelligence. Thus the groundwork necessary to 
create an informed public is necessary before significant public outreach and capacity 
building can be meaningful (Becker 1993; Fischer 2000; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; 
Weber 2003; Walker and Salt 2006). Local groups able to inventory and sample the 
natural resources with results communicated to a variety of actors, including the general 
public, using a wide range of methods, are preferable to the kind of closed process we 
have now that collects and transfers knowledge only amongst a select group of peer 
review journal aficionados. Information, collected by a range of volunteers under the 
guidance of a blend of scientific and local knowledge and transferred freely provides the 
basis for feedback loops required for the holistic and sustainable management of complex 
systems (Walker and Salt 2006). 
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In the Problem Orientation and Social Process sections of this chapter, many 
aspects of the Decision Process were absorbed and discussed within the analysis. I will 
attempt to limit the discussion, as much as possible, to the time period of the initial years 
of the GLWQA governance regime - meaning from 1970 through the early 1980s. It is 
my view that this was the period in which the major reforms in governance were 
developed and implemented - before they were slowly eroded and discredited by 
unsupportive government administrations on both sides of the border. 
Water quality monitoring began early in the Great Lakes and an alarming 1970 
report by the IJC (IJC 1970) set in motion the process that culminated with the signing of ft 
the original 1972 GLWQA (1972). As discussed earlier, the original 1972 Agreement 
called for enhancement and restoration of "water quality in the Great Lakes System" and 
for the prevention of "further pollution of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem owing to 
continuing population growth, resource development, and increasing use of water..." 
(1987,1). Annex lof the original agreement set forth specific water quality objectives 
covering a broad range of conditions and constituents, including targets for dissolved 
oxygen, total dissolved solids, pH, Iron, phosphorous, radioactivity, along with interim 
objectives for temperature, mercury (and other heavy metals), and persistent organic 
contaminants.26 As has been discussed, the 1978 Amendments to the GLWQA expanded 
on the elimination of the targeted compounds and pollutants and adopted the ecosystem 
approach to the entire Great Lakes Basin (1987). 
26
..persistent organic contaminants that are toxic or harmful to human, animal or aquatic life should be 
substantially absent in the waters" (1972). Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, with Annexes and Texts 
and Terms of Reference, Between the United States of America and Canada: 79. 
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Thus specific goals and targets for the reduction of contaminants in the Great 
Lakes were initially supplied by the original 1972 Agreement (1972). What remained 
was to undertake the task of designing a process designed to provide reliable intelligence 
that would indicate whether enviromhental conditions were trending toward or away 
from the objectives of the Agreement. 
It took time. During the first five years of the GLWQA governance regime, the 
UC, through input from its boards and from those involved in references like the Upper 
Lakes Reference Group and the Pollution from Land Use Activities Reference Group 
("PLUARG"), wrestled with the options for the development of a monitoring plan 
agreeable to the Parties and adequate to cover the Great Lakes. PLUARG, for instance, 
the entity set up by the IJC to research the effects of land use activities on the water 
quality of the Great Lakes, began their work early. A 1973 workshop brought together 
voices from around the basis to discuss their knowledge of problems and monitoring 
issues in the Great Lakes (PLUARG 1973). In February, 1974, PLUARG27 submitted to 
the International Joint Commission a "Study Plan to Assess the Great Lakes Pollution 
from Land Use Activities." The plan set forth four principle tasks: an assessment of the 
problems, an inventory of land use activities, an intensive study of selected watersheds, 
and lake (open water) studies (PLUARG 1974). On the Canadian side, a detailed study 
plan was submitted to the UC designed to determine the extent and sources of 
contamination from agricultural watersheds. These watershed studies sampled waters in 
21A description of PLUARG's inclusive basin-wide approach to the challenges posed by the original 1972 
GLWQA is set forth in the Problem Orientation and Social Process sections of this chapter. 
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the nearshore of the Canadian shoreline as well as sampling near agricultural run-off 
areas and at the mouths of rivers (PLUARG 1975). 
The development and implementation of these various plans was constantly 
monitored by the UC and its Boards. Reports from PLUARG as well as state/provincial 
and federal agencies were provided on a regular basis. The efforts of the monitoring 
groups extended beyond the threats posed by phosphorus and other nutrients. Illustrative 
is the concern expressed by the UC in its 1975 Annual Report to the Parties concerning 
biomonitoring results: 
The Commission again in 1975 expressed its deep concern to governments 
about the concentration of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) in the Great 
Lakes. Contamination by PCB's continues to be extensive and it is 
obvious that a voluntary program by the sole North American 
manufacturer to limit sales has not resulted in a decrease in PCB burdens 
in fish (UC 1975) 
Clearly the UC and its Boards were receiving intelligence relevant to the goals 
and objectives of the GLWQA of 1972. The problem was that data was coming in from a 
broad array of participants, protocols were not uniform, and there were gaps that made it 
difficult to understand the state of the broader ecosystem and often impossible to detect 
trends. One member of the Research Advisory Board at the time described the process 
during those years: 
We had a working group.. .we met regularly over two years, and put 
together our understanding. We started by saying that we were going to 
take every explanation.. .anybody who had any claim to expertise we'll 
take their hypothesis .. .we'll listen to accusations.. .before we bring in any 
of our own personal hypothesis. And we checked out every one of them. 
And to our surprise we found people who were using the same evidence to 
support different kinds of causal claims ... [W]e took.. .all the rest 
seriously. I was also very much struck by the fact that there was evidence 
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out there that wasn't diagnostic of any particular problem. There was 
ambiguous evidence. So we started asking, what kind of evidence is 
diagnostic for a particular causal approach and which evidence was non­
diagnostic. And that is how I got into the ecosystem approach. Even my 
expert colleagues were doing the same thing. People who had expertise in 
eutrophication were blaming all sorts of things on nutrient overload. 
People who knew about fishing like I did were blaming all sorts of things 
on overfishing. The people like Huxley, who knew about erosion were 
blaming erosion for lots of things. And we said well if we take an 
ecosystem approach you're obligated to sort these things out and try to 
attribute the cause where you have evidence, diagnostic evidence. That is 
one way of how I got interested in the ecosystem approach. (Canadian 
Academic 2) 
The UC highlighted the somewhat scrambled intelligence process in its 2nd 
Annual Report (1973): 
.. .progress toward meeting the agreed objectives cannot yet be confirmed 
on the basis of the scientific data and information supplied to the 
Commission. Aside from the difficulties of collecting water quality data 
on such immense bodies of water under variable natural conditions, the 
sampling and analytical procedures employed in the several jurisdictions 
are not consistent and as a result the data made available from these 
sources is not comparable and does not lend itself to "collation, analysis 
and dissemination" by the Commission (IJC 1973, 1). 
It took five years, but in 1975 Great Lakes Surveillance Plan was adopted through 
the Water Quality Board and the IJC (WQB 1975). Figure 9 summarizes the evolution of 
surveillance strategies over those first five years using comments in early IJC reports. 
The Surveillance Plan has not been static. It has evolved as the flow of data 
disclosed new trends or fresh environmental threats. In 1976, with the increasing threats 
posed by toxic contaminants and the development of new technology, the IJC challenged 
the Parties to commit to increased funding to include basin-wide biological monitoring 
(UC 1976). Similar challenges to buttress surveillance monitoring were issued the 
following year in anticipation of the adoption of an ecosystem-based approach to 
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governance for the entire Great Lakes Basin - which would include land-based activities 
due to the findings and recommendations of PLUARG (UC 1978). In 1983 the IJC 
revisited and modified the surveillance plan to reflect additional concerns. 
1972 GLWQA mandates "monitoring, surveillance.. .necessary to ensure compliance" with requirements for 
abatement and control of pollution and substantial elimination of "discharges of toxic persistent organic 
compounds (1972)" 
1973 . .progress toward meeting the agreed objectives cannot yet be confirmed on the basis of the scientific 
data and information supplied to the Commission.. .Moreover, insufficient resources of qualified personnel 
have been assigned by the government agencies to assessment and interpretation of the basic data obtained. 
The Water Quality Board is now endeavoring to develop the basis for the necessary coordination of the 
agencies' monitoring programs so that over-all water quality and trends in the Basin may be assessed on a 
continuing basis (IJC 1973,1) 
1974 Data from labs and state/provincial agencies show levels of mercury, dieldrin, and PCBs detected in fish in 
excess of FDA tolerance levels. DDT levels declining. "Water quality surveillance programs are currently 
being conducted by governments at a level that does not provide adequate information. Surveillance plans 
recommended by the IJC's Water Quality Board and described in its 1974 Annual Report will require 
increased commitments of funds and personnel" (IJC 1974,3). 
1975 Each year since the signing of the Agreement, the Commission has advised governments that it could not 
report accurately on progress, or lack of it, toward achieving the goals of the Agreement because existing 
surveillance programs were inadequate. The Water Quality Board has now developed a comprehensive 
surveillance program which when implemented would overcome the shortcomings of the present programs. 
The Commission fully endorses this program .. .Because of the critical need to launch the program as soon 
as possible and recognizing time constraints of the budgetary cycle in the United States and Canada, the 
Commission has already taken action on this matter. In a separate communication ... to the Parties, the 
Commission has urged them to ensure that fiscal programs over the next 10 years provide ongoing funds at 
the level proposed ($16 million annually), for the Agencies of federal, state and provincial governments 
having responsibility for water quality surveillance and monitoring activities in the Great Lakes. The 
Commission now reiterates its concern and urges once more the recommended actions (IJC 1975a, 4). 
1975 Great Lakes International Surveillance Plan forwarded by the Water Quality Board and adopted by the IJC 
(WQB 1975; IJC 1976). 
1976 The Commission notes with satisfaction the report of the Water Quality Board that 
Governments are now providing adequate funding for point source monitoring within the current Great 
Lakes International Surveillance Plan. It is imperative that efforts by the two Governments should continue 
to support this international surveillance program, at least to the levels presently established, and that 
Governments ensure that funds appropriated for this purpose are fully expended-The Commission also 
believes that there is a need for a greater and early emphasis on biological monitoring and on the 
monitoring of biologically sensitive nearshore areas. While aspects of biological and nearshore monitoring 
are included in the Surveillance Program, their present scope appears to be insufficient to assess the 
effectiveness of the revised Water Quality Objectives... which are based on the protection of the most 
sensitive beneficial use of the Great Lakes, usually aquatic life or human health. This need is also inherent 
in a growing overall concern for the impact of Great Lakes pollution on biological resources and human 
health. While this matter will be subjected to a more detailed study.. .in order to provide further advice to 
Governments, the Commission recommends that Governments undertake to ensure an adequate level of 
funding as soon as possible for the additional monitoring necessary to complement adequately the present 
chemical and physical monitoring programs in the Great Lakes (IJC 1976,3). 
1977 Although the Commission notes that remedial programs have begun to show limited results in the reduction 
of phosphorus concentrations and levels of PCBs, DDT, DDE, mercury and Mirex in some parts of the 
lakes, it is aware that these improvements have not yet reached substantial proportions, nor are they basin 
wide. The Commission .. .recommends:.. .that the International Great Lakes Surveillance Plan be funded in 
full, at least through 1987 
Figure 9: GLWQA Evolution of Surveillance: The First Five Years 
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Given the above it would appear that the first decade or so under the governance 
structure and process of the GLWQA agreements matches well with the characteristics of 
the Intelligence function of the ideal system (Table 35). There was active surveillance 
from a variety of sources at representative scales gathered with the assistance of a broad 
base of participants. The surveillance, while conducted by the parties, was ultimately 
coordinated by the IJC and its Boards. The results of the surveillance activities were 
reported out each year in a various forums, including annual meetings of IAGLR, the 
biennial IJC meetings and formal reports to the Parties, and beginning in the late 1980s 
on-line through the Great Lakes Information Network (GLIN). The active and at times 
raucous involvement of the public at IJC meetings has been described in prior sections. 
Table 35 Intelligence 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
System is facilitated by identification of 
intelligence needs and enabled by 
cooperative agreements among relevant 
entities to assure reliability, compatibility, 
timely analysis and accessibility. 
Intelligence must come from a broad array 
of participants that includes scientists, 
academics, the regulated public, and the 
public at large. 
The original 1972 GLWQA sets out targets 
and objectives for water quality in the 
waters of the Great Lakes. PLUARG uses 
inclusive basin-wide panels to set forth and 
implement activities that include 
monitoring at a variety of scales -- from 
land-based to open lake sampling. Great 
Lakes Surveillance Plan adopted in 1975 
and reviewed and updated periodically 
thereafter provides for coordinated basin-
wide monitoring plan. 
Intelligence must be communicated to an 
accountable entity for analysis and 
coordinated action, i.e. a person, 
partnership, or other entity that has an 
obligation or responsibility to an authority, 
group, standard, mandate or behavior norm 
external to that person or entity. 
Intelligence and information must be made 
readily available to researchers, scientists 
and the public. 
PLUARG data and reports submitted and 
available to IJC, RAB, WQB, and all 
participants and the public. Ultimately all 
documents and information made available 
on-line (late 1980s) through the Great 
Lakes Information Network (GLIN). 
GLWQA library and office in Windsor, 
Ontario provides public information and 
direction until closed in the 1980s. 
In order for the public to be interested and 
be able to understand the data and other 
intelligence, significant public outreach and 
capacity building is required. 
PLUARG, Great Lakes Tomorrow, the 
GLBC, Lake Michigan Federation, engage 
in public education and outreach to develop 
an informed public. 
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The fact that the UC and its Boards continued to alter and amend the Surveillance 
Plan demonstrates both adaptability and accountability. In almost every respect, 
therefore, the characteristics of our ideal ecosystem-based governance regime were met 
in the early years of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement regime - at least as far as 
the intelligence function was concerned. We next look at how well the promotion task 
measured up to our ideal standards. 
Promotion. Using data and information gathered as part of the intelligence 
function, recall that promotion, sometimes called estimation, involves the "thoughtful 
assessment of options and alternatives" (Brewer and deLeon 1983, 83). Promotion serves 
the function of recommending and mobilizing support for policy alternatives and serves 
to define and even limit the possible solutions to a problem. It is the stage where 
information and data gathered as a result of the intelligence task are debated and 
discussed and alternatives and options are recommended and debated (Clark 1997). 
As we have seen, promotion under an ecosystem-based approach to governance 
differs markedly from the status quo-, that is, expert-driven planning models that rely 
almost exclusively on science- and expert-based technology. We have noted that under 
the traditional view, generally only experts are qualified to make and implement sound 
management plans. Promotion is largely the role of bureaucracies - bureaucracies that 
are also responsible for enforcement of uniform rules and regulations (Fiorino 2006). 
Promotion also includes politics, bringing with it an array of political parties, 
lobbyists, pressure groups, people, and powerful organizations of all types (including 
business and environmental groups) working to shape and share values. (Lasswell 1971; 
Brewer and deLeon 1983; Clark 2002; Clark 2008). While it has been noted that the 
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participation of a broad range of promotional actors, many with opposing interests and 
values creates an "agitational intensity to the dissemination of a value demand", it is 
nonetheless preferable to the totalitarian alternative of placing promotion exclusively in 
the hands of a single party that monopolizes and controls debate (Lasswell and 
MacDougal 1992,29). Politics, as was discussed earlier in Chapter 3, need not be 
divisive and polarizing. Indeed, in an ideal world, healthy politics that includes "policy 
relevant science, pertinent local information, constructive public involvement, and 
conflict resolution - can serve to clarify and secure the common interest in knowledge 
generation for environmental decision processes" (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010, 8). The 
politics of promotion should include honest debate about what to do. Further, the overall 
decision process must provide " a means of reconciling (or at least managing) conflict 
through politics in order to find a working specification of a community's common 
interests" (Clark 2002, 57). 
Promotion during the early years of the Great Lakes Water Quality regime 
incorporated many of the aspects thought consistent with ecosystem-based governance 
(Table 37). We have seen that in the early years under the GLWQA, intelligence was 
funneled to the UC from broad-based surveillance, research, and monitoring activities 
conducted under the GLWQA by the Water Quality Board, the Research Advisory Board 
(later the "Science Advisory Board") the GLFC, PLUARG, as well as federal and 
state/provincial agencies on both sides of the border (IJC 1976; PLUARG 1978; IJC 
1980; Regier and Baskerville 1986; Becker 1993; Prelli and Becker 2001; Dempsey 
2004). 
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The approach to problem-solving and policy-making utilized by the IJC in the 
early years had many characteristics of an ecosystem-based approach to governance and 
we have discussed many of those characteristics earlier in this chapter. Consistent with 
the notion of promotion in an ideal ecosystem-based governance regime, during the first 
decade of the GLWQA there was strong support by the IJC and its Boards and panels to 
pursue common interests and the health of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem were 
paramount. The problem-solving approach of the SAB and related UC panels was to 
solicit and listen to all ideas being promoted from multiple interests - a universal 
approach - in order to make sure no potential innovation was overlooked. IJC, SAB and 
other GLWQA participants shared an implicit commitment to the basin and to the equity 
and justice. Equity, fairness, and human health reached the operational levels under the 
GLWQA and were factors in the early years. Also, information and input was gathered 
from broad base of participants, overlapping board members, and knowledgeable 
citizens. 
Of course, any examination of the promotion task in the Great Lakes must 
recognize that decisions and policy making at the level of the UC must consider the 
somewhat limited role played by the UC as the coordinator and overriding organizer 
whose function under the various iterations of the GLWQA is to cajole and informally 
pressure the Parties to meet their obligations under the Agreement (1909; 1972; UC 
1973; UC 1974; UC 1975; UC 1975a; UC 1976; UC 1978; PLUARG 1978; UC 1980; 
1987). Despite differences between the UC and the Parties to the GLWQA, however, 
there is a legacy of frequent and often innovative cooperation and collaboration between 
them. There have also been others, including labor unions and NGOs, especially when 
284 
galvanized under the umbrella organization of Great Lakes United, that have often 
applied pressure when necessary to see that the trade-offs in base values trended in the 
direction of educational outreach and accumulating knowledge and well-being, as 
demonstrated by the comments of a former member of the SAB during the early years 
under the GLWQA: 
And so, people kind of didn't know what to do, especially since these 
things crossed so many political boundaries jurisdiction. So, we had a 
whole series of consultations. They had roundtable discussions around the 
basin. They had a series of initiatives to try to get a handle on it. Great 
Lakes United was formed between '78 and '87, to be the activist group, 
because Great Lakes Tomorrow was a facilitation and education group. 
But, we needed some group that was going to hold politicians' feet to the 
fire, and that was Great Lakes United. So, a couple of things happened in 
that period, one of which was Green Peace's zero discharge tour of the 
lakes, where they went about touting the only way to deal with toxic 
contaminants [was zero discharge] but, that occurred after GLU held a 
series of public hearings around the basin to get input from whoever 
wanted to show up and testify. They published a report, which I have on 
the shelf.. .a justification for why that probably needed to be really 
explicit and that there needed to be... Also during that period, and while I 
was on the science advisory board, there was a lot of interest in getting a 
mass balance assessment of the contaminants. It started with PLUARG, 
but then it went on after that. In order to get mass balance, you n6ed to 
know sources, causes, etc. So, there was a lot of that research going on in 
the system at that time. It became very clear that the only way that these 
watershed groups were going to be able to do what had to be done was to 
have a strategic approach. (US NGO/Academic) 
Under IJC leadership in the early years, therefore, promotion took many forms, 
including a focus on galvanizing public participation and fostering honest discussion and 
debate on issues relevant to the health of the ecosystem28 (Becker 1993; Jackson 2005). 
28 The importance of organizations such as Great Lakes Tomorrow, the Lake Michigan Federation, Great 
Lakes United, Decisions for the Great Lakes, the Great Lakes Basin Commission, and others in their efforts 
to provide outreach and education and build capacity in the form of an educated public has been 
highlighted in the social process section of this chapter. In addition, the importance of the annual and 
biennial meetings of the IJC, with the open reporting of the progress made by the Parties under the 
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Promotion activities under the GLWQA regime allowed for a social process that included 
a wide variety of actors, including government agencies, NGOs, citizens, and related 
institutions. Thus, during the early years, promotion was relatively a "bottom up" effort. 
In recognition of this blossoming process, in 1979 the IJC established a standing 
committee to assist in providing the public information service called for in the 1978 
agreement (GLWQA 1987). 
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Figure 10 Great Lakes Promotion Paths 
The basic concept was that citizens have rights to participate in IJC activities and 
should be encouraged to do so. The policy stressed that information should be provided 
while studies and activities were being carried out, not just after decisions were already 
GLWQA by the SAB and the WQB before an audience that, in the early years, often included an interested 
and actively engaged public that was allowed to pose questions and challenge policy makers, as discussed 
earlier, added to the transparency and credibility of the GLWQA process. The role of the annual meetings 
of IAGLR and, beginning in the late 1980s, the public dissemination of Great Lakes related research and 
events through the Great Lakes Information Network, both fully discussed earlier, also provided valuable 
promotion-related opportunities. 
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made. The aim was to increase the UC's credibility by taking public opinion into account 
(Becker 1993). Figure 10 summarizes the promotion directions extant in the early years 
of the GLWQA governance. 
Thus the task of promotion in the early years of the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement approach was broad-based and relied upon citizen participation, problem-
solving decision processes that welcomed and examined the views of a wide variety of 
scientists and other participants. In this fashion, debate was open and transparent and 
those decision-makers who were either at the IJC or Board-level had access to honest and 
transparent debate from a wide variety of interested parties. This process stands in stark 
contrast to traditional promotional activities and provides us with a worthwhile model for 
honest promotional efforts for use in future problem-solving (Table 36) 
Table 36 Promotion 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
Promotion and politics involve honest 
debate using policy relevant science, 
pertinent local information, constructive 
public involvement, and conflict resolution 
in order to clarify and secure the common 
interests (as opposed to special interests) 
and secure knowledge generation for 
environmental decision processes. Hard 
questions are asked and "difficult" data is 
not neglected. Constructive, honest, debate 
helps to promote trust and cooperation and 
equitable outcomes are pursued through the 
open sharing of knowledge and open debate 
with broad participation. 
By Treaty, Agreement, and Protocol, the 
governments of the United States and 
Canada agreed to undertake mutual 
obligations to protect, restore, and preserve 
the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem 
Promotion efforts are on two levels: 1) the 
pressure of the public on the IJC and the 
Parties to preserve, restore and protect the 
GLB ecosystem, through public 
involvement (e.g. PLUARG) and biennial 
meetings, and 2) the ability of the IJC to 
persuade the Parties to fund and act upon 
their obligations under the GLWQA. IJC 
processes demanded that problems, 
including hard problems and "difficult 
data," and competing interests be openly 
debated with full sharing of knowledge, 
broad participation, and decision principles 
that put the well-being of the GLB 
ecosystem ahead of other interests. Open 
information sharing and debate fostered by 
mandated public participation. Emphasis on 
public outreach and education are an 
integral part of decision process. 
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Prescription. In the prescription, or selection, phase, the data, values, and 
interests distilled from the intelligence and promotion tasks are used to select appropriate 
law, policy, or management options appropriate to the targeted challenge. The activities 
and process used in this phase result in the establishment of new rules or guidelines to 
solve a problem or deal with an environmental conflict or issue (Clark 2002; Clark 2008). 
In the case of the Great Lakes Basin, during the 1970s and 1980s the processes created 
under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement gave extensive authority to the policy 
prescriptions developed by the IJC and its Boards (1972; Valiante 2007) 
The problems inherent in the governance and management of the human activities 
that impact the Great Lakes Basin are many. The GLB is essentially a binational 
bioregion containing the world's largest fresh water ecosystem and accounting for more 
than 20% of the world's available surface water (IJC 1973; Donahue 1988; Becker 1993; 
Caldwell 1993; Valiante 1997; Botts and Muldoon 2005; Valiante 2007). During the 
years pertinent to this project the IJC and the GLFC shared the leadership role in the 
development and implementation of governance and prescriptive management through 
the use of diplomatic and ideological strategies. As has been noted, with no ability to 
bring formal enforcement actions to compel environmental compliance, there were few 
realistic alternatives. 
The IJC and the GLFC are, as we know, dependent upon the efforts of the Parties, 
including states and provinces, for implementation of recommendations and policy 
developed on a binational level. These entities are, of course, bound by formal, 
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fragmented laws, rules, and regulations created by political systems in both the United 
States and Canada. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, however, the processes called for by the GLWQA 
seemed at critical times to trump the fragmentation inherent in the binational domestic 
regulatory scheme. As we have seen, citizens were actively involved and were able to 
help galvanize the IJC and its Research Advisory Board to take meaningful action. 
The initial 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) between the 
United States and Canada was negotiated. It was essentially a water pollution agreement 
but effectively introduced controls on phosphorous discharges and "an extensive set of 
broad studies under the Pollution from Land Use Activities Research Group (PLUARG) 
was initiated" (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990, xxv). As set forth above in the discussions 
about goal clarification and trends in the GLB, the goals for the Great Lakes Basin, have 
largely been articulated by GLWQA and the Clean Water Act. The general goal agreed 
to by the Parties to the GLWQA for the Great Lakes through the 1987 Protocol is to 
"restore, and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the waters of the 
Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem" (1987, Article II). The ecosystem is defined as "the 
interacting components of air, land, water and living organisms, including humans, 
within the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence River" (1987, Article I (g)). As we have 
seen additional goals called for the protection and maintenance of self-sustaining fish 
populations and aquatic organisms and for protection and restoration of habitats vital for 
the support of healthy and diverse communities of plants, fish, and wildlife. Other, more 
particular goals and objectives have been discussed earlier in this chapter (toxic 
chemicals, virtual elimination, etc.). 
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With a strong public outreach effort, an active and informed citizenry, a 
coordinated NGO community and a Research Advisory Board and IJC personally and 
professionally committed to the restoration of a healthy GLB ecosystem, bold measures 
were taken. Striking successes in the reduction of nutrient pollution were achieved 
through cooperative and collaborative deliberations and efforts and, in 1978, the 
GLWQA was amended to mandate an ecosystem approach to governance (Caldwell 
1993; Prelli and Becker 2001; Botts and Muldoon 2005; Valiante 2007). Working in 
conjunction with the GLFC, a healthy fish populations were restored to the waters of the 
basin (Donahue 1988; Prelli and Becker 2001). 
Table 37 Prescription 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
A transition away from adversarial 
methods designed to punish violations 
toward greater emphasis on cooperation 
and collaboration between private and 
public entities to prevent pollution, reduce 
risk, and promote sustainability. New 
relationships, structures, and roles are 
fashioned by careful planning with broad-
based involvement and implemented on a 
trial and error basis in order to facilitate 
learning 
IJC and GLFC promote collaboration and 
cooperation between private and public 
sectors, NGO's, and federal, 
state/provincial, and local governments. 
Key individual and institutional 
participants put public interest of water 
quality and ecosystem health in the basin 
ahead of private interests. Science used to 
suggest problem-solving strategies and 
new strategies (e.g. phosphorous ban) 
implemented and monitored to determine 
suitability. 
Adversarial strategies and deterrence are 
not the only way to influence behavior. 
Collaboration and cooperation with 
partnerships designed to achieve economic 
goals, can promote eco-efficiency, 
innovation, and sustainability. 
Participants and governance, led by IJC, 
GLBC, with help from citizen groups (e.g. 
Great Lakes Tomorrow, League of Women 
Voters) use diplomacy and negotiation to 
collaborate on issues and limitations of 
importance to GLB sustainability. 
Litigation used sparingly and citizen suits 
coordinated by NWF. 
Community and regional involvement in 
the development and enforcement of 
environmental regulations can increase 
learning, inform the public, and lead to 
greater progress towards goals. 
Citizen outreach and participation (e.g. 
PLUARG, GLT, Decisions for the Great 
Lakes, Lake Michigan Federation) creates 
an informed public capable of monitoring 
and advocating together to drive change 
and promote progress toward ecosystem 
restoration. 
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Thus, for a time, prescriptions in the form of binational agreements with no 
intrinsic enforcement authority were instrumental in driving citizens, NGO's, government 
agencies, industry, and others, to cooperate for the good of the Great Lakes Basin 
ecosystem (Table 37). Rather than require compliance, the binational agreements 
relevant to the Great Lakes Basin gave participants the opportunity to collaboratively 
solve problems. It is apparent that the prescriptions were flexible enough to allow 
participants devoted to an outcome consistent with the public interest of a ecosystem 
resilience and sustainability were able to find the will and the authority to implement 
changes for the good of the system. We will next examine the implementation of these 
prescriptions and whether implementation aided or blocked restoration efforts. 
Implementation. As we have discussed, implementation combines the policy 
analysis framework categories of invocation and application. Invocation includes the 
initial actions that communities and institutions to invoke, enforce, or otherwise 
implement a prescription. Application is the process that a community chooses to 
ultimately characterize the subject behavior and determine what behavior violates the 
prescription and how such behavior should be sanctioned(Clark, Willard et al. 2000; 
Clark 2002). 
Table 38 highlights the some of the "ideal" characteristics of implementation for 
an ecosystem-based governance approach. With respect to the processes that were 
developed during the initial years of the GLWQA regime, it is important to remember 
that the Agreements between the parties provided prescriptions, goals, targets, and 
monitoring requirements, but left the implementation of the Agreements to the domestic 
governments and institutions within Canada and the United States. Thus implementation 
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of water quality initiatives under the GLWQA fell to the EPA and the and their state 
equivalents in the United States, largely utilizing the provisions of the Clean Water Act, 
while Canada relied upon Environment Canada and the prescriptions of the Canada 
Water Act and, to a large part, on the provisions negotiated between the federal 
government of Canada and the Province of Ontario under Canada Ontario Agreement 
(COA). 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
Transition is needed to move implementation 
toward more community-driven, more 
voluntary, cooperative systems. Government 
could assist with the identification and 
clarification of community goals as well as 
develop measureable standards. It would be up 
to regional or community efforts to develop 
solutions to bring environmental indicators into 
compliance with those standards 
IJC actively promotes public outreach and 
education. Citizens groups form to demand 
restoration measures. PLUARG and related 
citizen group efforts provide critical push 
resulting in increased monitoring and 
recommendation of standards and indicators in 
1978 amendment and 1987 (zero tolerance for 
persistent toxic substances, etc.), and results in 
inclusion of ecosystem approach in 1978 
amendment. 
Adversarial relationships should give way to 
cooperative and collaborative ones with the 
emphasis on interactions designed to solve 
problems with strategies that are developed and 
shared with the input of scientists, regulators, the 
regulated community, and other interested 
parties. In consultation with industry, citizen 
groups, and government officials, plans created 
through collaboration can look beyond "end of 
pipe" discharges to "identify and change 
activities that cause pollution in the first place. 
Command and control could gradually be 
replaced with incentives and learning through 
trial and error. 
Lacking formal enforcement capabilities, the IJC 
relied upon diplomacy and the cooperative and 
collaborative efforts of federal, state, provincial, 
First Nation, and NGOs, all as an educated and 
interested public pushed for change. The IJC 
and its Boards used operating procedures that 
stressed the good of the Great Lakes Basin over 
private interests. Participants shared an esprit d' 
corps that permitted open sharing of ideas and 
promoted problem-solving. The public was 
educated with the assistance and blessing of the 
IJC and kept informed through transparent 
hearings and related processes. 
More reliance upon facilitation, mediation, and 
other forms of alternative dispute resolution. If 
court necessary there should be specialized 
courts with knowledge of environmental factors. 
Diplomatic processes centered around problem-
solving, collaboration, and cooperation, were 
used as the major tool often in lieu of litigation 
and confrontation. 
Table 38 Implementation 
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It should be pointed out that local governments, at least in the early years, were only 
marginally included in the implementation process under the GLWQA, an unfortunate 
issue which has only recently begun to change (Valiante 2007). 
In the early years the UC was keenly was aware of the delicate nature of their 
task. They are charged with overseeing the restoration of a binational ecosystem with no 
political or policing (i.e. enforcement) authority. The need to use the power of a 
galvanized and educated public as one way to get beyond the fragmentation inherent in 
two federal bureaucratic systems and their subdivisions was recognized by the IJC (UC 
1975; Caldwell 1993). Thus the importance of public participation has been highlighted 
by the UC from the beginning. It has consistently been cognizant of the need for 
meaningful participation by the public and the reality that meaningful participation was 
impossible without education and increased understanding of ecosystem threats. This 
fact was emphasized by the IJC especially after the results of the PLUARG public 
consultation panels and public hearings, when it was noted that".. .the acceptance and 
successful implementation of PLUARG's recommendations would be possible only if 
there were an informed public." The IJC went on to report that "[a]n informed and active 
public would assist Governments in reaching acceptable solutions to nonpoint pollution 
problems and should be encouraged for this reason also" (UC 1980,69). 
As Professor Becker (1993) reminds us: 
Direct citizen participation in the work of the UC under the provisions of 
the 1972 Agreement was relatively limited between 1972 and 1975. 
However, public interest in Great Lakes pollution problems continued to 
be very high, and citizens increasingly demanded access to information 
and a voice in Agreement work. Pressure for direct access to the 
Commission's work was exerted by citizen action groups, such as the Lake 
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Michigan Federation, the United Auto Workers, and the League of 
Women Voters on the United States side of the Basin. Canadian citizen 
groups exhibiting an early interest in direct involvement included the 
Conservation Council of Ontario, the Canadian Environmental Law 
Research Foundation, and various local organizations, such as cottagers' 
associations (Becker 1993,244). 
Other names can easily be added to the list. Great Lakes Tomorrow facilitated 
hearings and public meetings across the basin well into the 1980s. The Lake Michigan 
Federation provided public outreach in connection with the Great Lakes Basin 
Commission. Decisions for the Great Lakes trained leaders around the basin. Clearly the 
early years of the GLWQA governance process demonstrates a marked transition from 
fragmented top-down command-and-control governance to a more community-driven 
and collaborative process that involved the public in a meaningful fashion. The 
accomplishments of PLUARG and other cooperative, problem-solving initiatives have 
been adequately document above and will not be extensively revisited here. They include, 
however, the linking through community and public hearings, pollution from land-based 
activities to water quality in the waters of the Great Lakes Basin. These efforts ultimately 
triggered the decision by the EPA to recommend the banning of the use of phosphates 
throughout the basin (USEPA 1977) as were the incorporation of the ecosystem approach 
in the 1978 amendments to the GLWQA (1987). 
There is more, however, to implementation than the involvement of an active and 
educated public. Our ideal ecosystem governance model requires that there be a move 
away from fragmentation and adversarial relationships toward more cooperative and 
collaborative ones with the emphasis on interactions designed to solve problems with 
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strategies that are developed and shared with the input of scientists, regulators, the 
regulated community, and other interested parties. 
Again we are forced to come back to the point that under the GLWQA scheme the 
UC has no jurisdiction to force a Party to act in any particular way. It is chartered with 
the purpose of resolving disputes and avoiding conflicts. The IJC, and its related Boards 
and panels, have the ability to investigate only "such subjects related to the Great Lakes 
Basin Ecosystem as the Parties may from time to time refer to it" (GLWQA 1987, Article 
VII(l)(g)). Even upon reference, the UC has only the power to hold hearings, make 
recommendations and draft reports and comments. They simply lack the power or 
authority to do anything but attempt through common fact-finding, collaboration and 
diplomatic efforts, to convince the Parties to act in the best interest of the Great Lakes 
Basin. 
Certainly the IJC's public outreach and education initiatives played a role in 
driving the Parties toward processes that resulted in valuable cooperative initiatives. As 
citizen pressure mounted, the UC and its Boards began to recognize the need for public 
support in order to implement the terms of the GLWQA and build infrastructure, it took 
even more affirmative steps to galvanize citizen involvement (Becker 1993). The 
meetings between the boards and the UC began to be made public in 1975 and . .in time 
presentation of the board reports to the IJC in public meetings became a mechanism for 
increased public understanding of Great Lakes problems, as well as for citizen activism." 
(Botts and Muldoon 2005,23). The IJC biennial reports and the publication and 
distribution of documents arid other measures also increased credibility and boosted 
public involvement in agreement-related activities, often in the early stage of 
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implementation (CUSIS 1991; Botts and Muldoon 2005). To help foster this 
l : 
involvement, the IJC hired a professional public relations staff to augment its Great Lakes 
i 
Regional Office (Dworsky 1988; Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990; Valiante 1997). 
The UC also fostered collaboration through its operating principles. The IJC's 
historic insistence on the binationalism of its Commissioners, described in the problem 
orientation section of this chapter, was certainly relevant to the perspective of activities 
by the UC and its Boards and panels. This tradition required independence of IJC 
members from consideration or interference from national interests is found nowhere in 
the treaty, yet it was essential to achieving the goals of the GLWQA (Jackson and Sloan 
2008). As described earlier, Charles Ross, a Commissioner under five presidents, 
explained that the UC acted "as members of a single body," with independence from the 
United States or Canadian government interference, even though appointed by the heads 
of each country (Botts and Muldoon 2005,11). Thus independence and collaboration 
marked the process followed by the UC and its boards. 
Another operating principle that reflects the perspective of the UC and its boards 
and panels was the principle that required each commissioner to operate "in his (or her) 
own professional capacity and expertise" rather than as a representative of an agency, 
NGO, or other special interest (UC 1975; Botts and Muldoon 2005,12). Independent of 
the constraints that might be placed on individuals who might have to act within their 
roles as agency employees, this operating principle helped assure that attention and 
expertise was focused on the challenges of the Great Lakes Basin without worrying about 
their agency interests and limitations. Thus officials of various agencies crossed over and 
served on different Boards and panels within the IJC scheme. 
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It is also worth noting again that those participants who were interviewed for this 
study credited the tradition of independence and binationalism for creating a strong esprit 
de corps that fostered freedom and an open exchange of ideas, and the participation of 
experts and citizens in their personal and professional capacities (as opposed to 
representatives of agencies or institutions), the loyalty all shared for the betterment of the 
GLB ecosystem, strong public participation, public outreach and education, and 
education of local and other government officials. These characteristics and more gave 
participants in the GLWQA the ability to focus on the problems of the Great Lakes and a 
feeling of loyalty and allegiance to a healthy ecosystem in the GLB, complete with 
concern for integrity, justice, and democracy. The use of common fact-finding and 
reliance on transparent and reliable data added credibility to the UC's efforts (Becker 
1993; Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
Looking back at the early years of the GLW.QA regime it is clear that states and 
provinces found ample opportunity to cooperate. Some notable achievements include the 
1985 Great Lakes Charter and the Great Lakes Toxic Substances Control Agreement of 
1986 (GLTSCA). Both are voluntary agreements, initiated by the Council of Great Lakes 
Governors, designed to facilitate the sharing of information and to take a unified stance to 
protect Great Lakes resources. The Charter was motivated chiefly by threats of massive 
water transfers out of the Great Lakes Basin and prevents any diversions that would have 
a significant, adverse impact on lake levels, in-basin uses, or the Great Lakes ecosystem 
(Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). It "commits the parties to develop a common data base 
on water resource use and a cooperative management program that includes an inventory 
of surface water and groundwater resources" (Botts and Muldoon 2005,213) By the late 
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1980s eight states and the provinces of Ontario and Quebec had signed the Charter. The 
data base was established by the Great Lakes Commission by 1988 (Colburn, Davidson et 
al. 1990; Sproule-Jones 2002; Botts and Muldoon 2005). 
The Governors and Premiers went further the following year by signing the 1986 
Great Lakes Toxic Substances Control Agreement (GLTSCA). As noted previously, the 
GLTSCA has been described as an . .extremely ambitious document that commits the 
signatories to reducing toxic substances in the Great Lakes basin (Colburn, Davidson et 
al. 1990). Signed by the Great Lakes Governors in 1986, and endorsed by the Premiers 
of Ontario and Quebec via a memorandum of understanding in 1988, the GLTSCA called 
for the integration of permitting process for discharges to different media, interstate 
cooperation in hazardous waste management planning, development of common health 
advisories on fish contamination, and in general provide for greater consistency between 
the provinces and the states in the GLB (CGLG 1986; Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). 
We have now seen that implementation during the early years of the IJC's 
GLWQA regime was guided by broad and flexible prescriptions and driven by an 
increasingly active public to employ diplomatic efforts, including operational protocols to 
cajole and pressure the Parties, including states and provinces, often guided by the Great 
Lakes Basin Commission and, later, the Great Lakes Commission, to take bold measures 
in order to achieve the goals set forth by the GLWQA. Two other categories of 
collaboration and cooperation that emerged during these early years merit comment. The 
first is the emergence of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission as a binational force and 
the second is the coalescence of NGOs in the basin around common goals and strategies. 
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As we have noted previously, the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission (GLFC) was 
formed through the ratification of a Convention between Canada and the U.S. in 1955. 
Its charter expressly recognized the value of 'joint and coordinated efforts' to address 
fisheries conservation (Convention 1955; Dempsey 2004).. The convention was 
implemented through passage of the Great Lakes Fisheries Act of 1956 (GLFA 1956). 
While the job of the GLFC was initially to formulate a plan to combat the invasive 
lampreys, by the 1980s the Commissioners from both sides of the border, and their staffs, 
had cultivated and begun to practice a protective ecosystem policy by working closely 
with the IJC and its Science Advisory Board (SAB). 
Like the IJC, the GLFC has no formal enforcement authority. Given that state 
borders for state and provincial borders extend to the middle of the border lakes they are 
able assert their authority over federal jurisdiction and control the lake beds, waters, and 
fish of the waters of the Great Lakes (Piper 1967; Gaden, Krueger et al. 2008). Thus the 
GLFC is the binational entity that attempts to integrate and coalesce the separate but 
complementary sectors of the non-federal governments (states, provinces, and two U.S. 
intertribal agencies) and the federal governments, and the GLWQA entities to integrate 
and take a coherent approach to what would otherwise be a hopelessly fragmented Great 
Lakes fishery (Prelli and Becker 2001; Gaden, Krueger et al. 2008). They are able to 
manage this by facilitating Joint Strategic Plans between all involved entities that include 
cooperation, consensus, accountability, information sharing, and ecosystem management 
(Gaden, Krueger et al. 2008). Once again, the prescription provided by the Joint 
Strategic Plans must be enforced through diplomatic collaboration and cooperation. 
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The last form of collaboration and cooperation that strongly influenced 
governance and enforcement in the Great Lakes Basin during the early years of the 
GLWQA era was the relationship that coalesced between and among NGO's. One of the 
many ways that a growing regional consciousness in the early years of the GLWQA 
regime was reflected was in the activities of nongovernmental organizations. Unlike 
some areas, where a seemingly endless list of NGOs attack problems in a fragmented 
and uncoordinated cacophony of disjointed effort, groups in the Great Lakes began to 
coordinate their activities. There has already been some discussion of the role of 
environmental organizations like the League of Women Voters, the Lake Michigan 
Federation, and Great Lakes Tomorrow. In addition, however, it is important to note the 
efforts of a group of non-profits that banned together under the Michigan United 
Conservation Clubs (MUCC). It was largely the MUCC that consolidated these diverse 
constituencies and led the lobbying effort that resulted in a phosphate detergent ban in 
that state (Botts and Muldoon 2005). But more was needed, and citizens needed a basin-
wide organization. It was the joint effort of MUCC and the New York NGO Save the 
River, a combination that had led the fight against an Army Corps of Engineers proposal 
to allow winter navigation on the Great Lakes, that finally got together to form a basin-
wide organization. After lengthy confrontations and spirited meetings discussed earlier, 
Great Lakes United (GLU), emerged. GLU became a united voice for hundreds of 
organizations throughout the Great Lakes in both the United States and Canada dedicated 
to preserving and restoring the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River ecosystem (Colburn, 
Davidson et al. 1990). The organizations that were included under the umbrella of GLU 
when it was formed in 1982 included labor unions, environmental groups, hunters, 
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fishers, community groups, and citizens of the United States, Canada, and First Nations 
(Jackson and Sloan 2008). GLU holds annual meetings that seek the advice of these 
groups to develop by consensus an agenda to pressure Congress, the UC, and other policy 
makers to collaborate and put the common good of a healthy Great Lakes Basin 
(Dempsey 2004; Jackson 2005). 
One other unique aspect of the way that NGOs coordinated their activities should 
not go unmentioned - the role played by the National Wildlife Federation (NWF). As 
was related in more detail earlier in this chapter, the NWF provided the legal resources 
and coordinated much of the litigation under the GLWQA regime. In this manner, 
litigation was designed and utilized in a manner that was consistent with the overall goals 
of the GLWQA. This is in stark contrast to the manner in which environmental groups in 
other regions file piecemeal lawsuits involving various components of environmental 
compliance - often resulting in inconsistent judicial rulings and regulatory confusion. 
Thus we see that the enforcement activities under the UC in the critical early 
years, though lacking formal jurisdiction, proceeded through the coordinated and 
dedicated diplomatic activities of a variety of active participants - including federal, 
state, provincial, First Nation, and NGO representatives. What might be considered a 
weakness, therefore, was turned into strength as the GLWQA prescriptions were pursued 
by an active and informed public and implementation and enforcement efforts coalesced 
through collaborative and cooperative efforts at many levels. 
Appraisal. As discussed more fully in Chapter III, appraisal involves the task of 
assessing whether relevant prescriptions and their implementation have effectively met 
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the goals set by the community and who is responsible and accountable (Lasswell 1971; 
Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). 
Table 39 GLWQA Appraisal 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
Appraisal provides a major opportunity 
for learning and course correction, for 
using the lessons of experience to adapt 
failing practices into future changes. 
The main criteria for appraisals are 
dependability, comprehensiveness, 
continuity and independence 
Despite no formal enforcement 
authority IJC and GLFC able to use 
operational protocols, diplomacy, 
collaboration, and cooperation to 
conduct reliable appraisals. 
Appraisals made public through 
biennial reports to the Parties, special 
reports, biennial public, GLIN and 
annual meetings of IAGLR. 
Trend data from relevant scales must be 
available and transparent. Local 
knowledge and scientific efforts need to 
be combined and included in a periodic 
public assessment of the state of the 
ecosystem. 
Adaptable and inclusive Monitoring 
Plans began in the late 1960s by IJC. 
Data collected from broad range of 
sources and coordinated by IJC and 
Boards. Data easily available to 
public through GLIN, Annual Reports 
and Meetings, and IAGLR. 
It is critical that appraisals be carried 
out by third parties, i.e. not the agencies 
that are charged with programmatic 
responsibilities. 
IJC and its Boards provide 
independent appraisal of the Parties' 
progress toward goals and report 
biennially. 
Existence of a collaborative entity or 
single overarching body that can, 
formally or informally, accumulate the 
knowledge accumulated through 
appraisals and implement change to 
reverse adverse trends. 
IJC, its Boards, and the GLFC 
collaboratively accumulate 
knowledge and through biennial and 
other reports (as needed) give 
recommendations to Parties on ways 
to reverse adverse trends. Trial and 
error efforts not uncommon in early 
years. 
Table 39 sets forth the characteristics for appraisal under an "ideal" ecosystem-
based approach to governance. At its most basic, the ideal model requires that there 
simply be a mechanism for appraisal of policies and actions to determine whether 
progress is being made toward the prescribed goals. Further, appraisal should utilize 
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trend data appropriate to the task and include a periodic public assessment of the state of 
the ecosystem. It is important that appraisal be performed by third parties to enhance the 
dependability and creditability of the conclusions. Finally, appraisal should be 
undertaken by an overarching body with the ability to use the knowledge gained to 
implement change in order to reverse adverse trends. 
As has been discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, particularly in the section 
discussing Intelligence, it is clear that the process set forth under the GLWQA requires 
appraisal. Any appraisal under the GLWQA provisions necessarily involves an 
assessment of the actions of the Parties and whether or not those actions are resulting in 
progress toward the goals of the prescription. 
As we know, the original GLWQA was essentially a water quality initiative. The 
purpose set forth in the GLWQA is for the Parties "to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem." To 
achieve this purpose the Agreement provides that the Parties, defined as the Government 
of Canada and the Government of the United States,".. .agree to make a maximum effort 
to develop programs, practices, and technology necessary for a better understanding of 
the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem and to eliminate or reduce to the maximum extent 
practicable the discharge of pollutants into the Great Lakes System" (1987, Art. II). 
Clearly water quality monitoring is pivotal to any effort designed to accomplish the goals 
of the GLWQA. Indeed, as data has been accumulated by the UC, the scope of the 
GLWQA has had to be expanded. 
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Annex lof the original agreement, as we know, set forth specific water quality 
objectives covering a broad range of conditions and constituents, including targets for 
dissolved oxygen, total dissolved solids, pH, Iron, phosphorous, radioactivity, along with 
interim objectives for temperature, mercury (and other heavy metals), and persistent 
organic contaminants. Following monitoring in accordance with the LTC's monitoring 
plan, 1978 Amendments to the GLWQA expanded on the elimination of the targeted 
compounds and pollutants (more fully explained in the Intelligence section of this 
chapter). Evolving appraisal led to the 1987 protocol which again expanded the scope of 
the initiatives under the GLWQA. 
There is no need to look beyond the four corners of the GLWQA to see that the 
IJC is an appropriate body for the appraisal of the progress being made toward the goals 
of the GLWQA. Under the GLWQA, the primary role of the IJC is to "assist in the 
implementation of this Agreement." In doing so, it may inter alia collate, analyze, and 
disseminate data and information supplied by the Parties and State and Provincial 
Governments "relating to the quality of the boundary waters of the Great Lakes 
System..." It may also ".. .tender advice and recommendations to the Parties and to the 
State and Provincial Governments on problems of and matters related to the quality of the 
boundary waters.. .including specific recommendations concerning the General and 
Specific Objectives, legislation, standards and other regulatory requirements, programs 
and other measures, and intergovernmental agreements relating to the quality of these 
waters." 
The role of the IJC under the GLWQA, therefore, is to continually assess progress 
and recommend policy and action. This role includes the ability and discretion to 
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publish any report or statement related to its reference, the ability to conduct 
investigations on subjects related to the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem when referred to it 
by the Parties, the requirement to make a "full report to the Parties and to the State and 
Provincial Governments no less frequently than biennially concerning progress toward 
the achievement of the .. .objectives.. .This report shall include an assessment of the 
effectiveness of the programs and other measures undertaken pursuant to this Agreement, 
and advice and recommendations." Significantly, the IJC may "at any time make special 
reports to the Parties, to the State and Provincial Governments and to the public 
concerning any problem of water quality in the Great Lakes System" (1987, Art. VII). 
Thus the IJC uses its powers to assess the state of the ecosystem in the Great 
Lakes Basin to hold the Parties accountable through biennial reports and public meetings. 
Other reports and investigations deemed a part of their role are also published and 
challenge the Parties to remedy or further investigate perceived threats to ecosystem 
resilience (Colbum, Davidson et al. 1990; Becker 1993; Prelli and Becker 2001; Botts 
and Muldoon 2005). The IJC, therefore, is tasked not only with monitoring the progress 
of the Parties and making recommendations, it is also obligated to biennially report to the 
public through reports and biennial public meetings and reveal the extent or lack of 
progress made by Parties pursuant to such recommendations. Further, the IJC, at least in 
the early GLWQA years, was an independent body that, as has been discussed, held 
themselves to operational protocols that required them to put the interests of the 
ecosystem of the Great Lakes ahead of national or special interests. 
In sum, the IJC Appraisal process during the early GLWQA years met the 
requirements for ecosystem-based governance. For the first two decades, progress 
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towards limiting nutrient overloads was made and, as we have seen, the waters of the 
Great Lakes showed marked improvement. Further, the monitoring schemes adopted by 
the IJC were able to detect the increasing threats posed by persistent organic pollutants 
and other environmental factors that require attention by the parties. We will now turn 
briefly to the last decision process function: Termination. 
Termination. This is the final activity of the decision process and occurs when a 
problem is either solved by a previously selected prescription or course of conduct or data 
analysis reveals that the prescription or course of conduct has been unsuccessful at 
moving the toward the goals of the community (Clark 1997; Clark 2008). As we noted in 
Chapter III, termination, like appraisal, relies upon the dependable conveyance of 
knowledge from intelligence generation through transmission, including thorough 
monitoring to assess whether the knowledge has proved that the original problem has 
been resolved (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). Thus much of the discussion of the 
Intelligence, Strategies, and Outcome functions earlier in this chapter is relevant to the 
termination task. 
The termination function in an ecosystem-based governance regime requires that 
there be an independent bridging entity with overall knowledge of trend data that 
provides periodic public assessments of the status, progress, and need (or not) for the 
addition or elimination of policies and prescriptions intended to facilitate progress toward 
the goals specified by prescription (Table 40). 
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Table 40 GLWQA Termination 
Ecosystem-based Approach GLWQA Approach 
Ecosystem-based governance requires the 
periodic public assessment of the 
progress, status, and continued need for 
any environmental policy prescription or 
implementation scheme. The decision to 
terminate should be made by a bridging 
entity with knowledge of trend data. 
The GLWQA gives the IJC, as the 
coordinating body, the ability to monitor 
and disseminate data received pertaining 
to the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem and 
recommend Termination by the Parties of 
failed programs and/or prescriptions. The 
Agreement also requires the parties to use 
maximum effort to adhere to measures 
that promote progress toward GLWQA 
goals. 
As we have seen, the GLWQA prescription articulates a broad goal to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes 
Basin Ecosystem (1972; 1987). The powers and responsibilities of the UC are set forth in 
the Agreement. As we set forth in the Strategies section of this chapter, the UC's primary 
role is to "assist in the implementation of this Agreement." In doing so, it is required to 
collate, analyze, and disseminate data and information supplied by the Parties and State 
and Provincial Governments "relating to the quality of the boundary waters of the Great 
Lakes System..." Importantly, the UC must also ".. .tender advice and recommendations 
to the Parties and to the State and Provincial Governments on problems of and matters 
related to the quality of the boundary waters.. .including specific recommendations 
concerning the General and Specific Objectives, legislation, standards and other 
regulatory requirements, programs and other measures, and intergovernmental 
agreements relating to the quality of these waters." There are a variety of other 
responsibilities that are crucial to the function of the IJC, including the ability and 
discretion to publish any report or statement related to its reference, the ability to conduct 
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investigations on subjects related to the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem when referred to it 
by the Parties, the requirement to make a "full report to the Parties and to the State and 
Provincial Governments no less frequently than biennially concerning progress toward 
the achievement of the .. .objectives.. .This report shall include an assessment of the 
effectiveness of the programs and other measures undertaken pursuant to this Agreement, 
and advice and recommendations" [emphasis added]. 
The IJC may also "at any time make special reports to the Parties, to the State and 
Provincial Governments and to the public concerning any problem of water quality in the 
Great Lakes System" (1987, Art. VII). Thus the IJC uses its powers to assess the state of 
the ecosystem in the Great Lakes Basin to hold the Parties accountable through biennial 
reports and public meetings. Other reports and investigations deemed a part of their role 
are also published and challenge the Parties to remedy or further investigate perceived 
threats to ecosystem resilience (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990; Becker 1993; Prelli and 
Becker 2001; Botts and Muldoon 2005). Implicit in this mandate is the role of 
recommending termination of domestic programs or prescriptions when the UC 
concludes from the data that a program or prescription has failed to reverse or moderate 
negative environmental trends. 
It should be noted, that while the GLWQA requires the IJC to act as the bridging 
authority that recommends measures to the Parties, the Agreement conversely requires 
the Parties to respond. Thus in order to achieve purpose of the Agreement, the 
Government of Canada and the Government of the United States made a commitment to 
".. .agree to make a maximum effort to develop programs, practices, and technology 
necessary for a better understanding of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem and to eliminate 
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or reduce to the maximum extent practicable the discharge of pollutants into the Great 
Lakes System" (1987, Art. II). The Agreement, therefore, is a two-way street with duties 
and obligations flowing two ways between the Parties and the UC. Clearly, therefore, the 
IJC has the ability and the authority to recommend termination of programs or 
prescriptions that it deems have failed to produce results. The Parties, on the other hand, 
have committed to use maximum effort to create and, where appropriate, terminate 
programs in order to achieve the goals of the GLWQA. 
It would therefore appear that the prescriptive language of the GLWQA expressly 
gives the IJC the authority to recommend termination of a plan or prescription that it 
deems unnecessary or unsuccessful and that the Parties are obligated to pay attention and 
take measures to terminate programs in accordance with the recommendations of the IJC. 
The failure of the Parties to do so would be addressed by the UC in a diplomatic fashion 
and any recalcitrance by the Parties would be drawn to the attention of the public and 
other interested participants via the UC's biennial report, public meetings, annual IAGLR 
meetings, etc. The role of the IJC, and the measures and accountability afforded by the 
GLWQA process, appear to be consistent with the characteristics for Termination under 
the ideal ecosystem-based approach. 
Conclusion 
Chapter IV has attempted to compare the governance regime in the Great Lakes 
Basin in the early years of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement regime with the 
characteristics of an ideal ecosystem-based approach to governance using the framework 
provided by the Policy Sciences. The case study provides some insight into the difficulty 
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posed by implementing enforceable controls over an ecosystem bounded by two 
sovereign nations and their various bureaucracies and administrative subdivisions. 
Policy development and implementation in transboundary regions are generally 
affected by national political considerations and by problems impacting different regions 
in diverse ways. The interests and concerns of natural sovereignty, jurisdictionally 
fragmented state and provincial governments, and the bureaucratic interests of federal 
agencies have historically limited the effectiveness of transboundary institutions. Therein 
lies the fundamental paradox of binational policy in any boundary water situation in 
general and in the case of boundary waters shared by the United States and Canada in 
particular: The goals of policy that may be best for the health and resilience of the 
ecosystem are only achievable through a significant degree of coordinated action that is 
typically absent in existing institutional arrangements (Regier and Baskerville 1986; 
Becker 1993; Caldwell 1993; Young 1998; Prelli and Becker 2001). 
By using the Policy Sciences framework it is possible to track some of the 
characteristics of the GLWQA governance to help shed light on whether the process that 
emerged from the Agreement has helped the governments, institutions, and residents of 
the region begin to overcome the nationalistic and bureaucratic limitations that tend to 
impede cooperation. Thus this chapter has looked at the problem orientation, social 
process, and decision process in order to better understand the overall context of the 
situation in the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem. 
An examination of the problem orientation function highlighted the deterioration 
of water quality and fisheries in the Great Lakes Basin under the legal scheme prior to the 
passage of the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act (1972) in the United States and 
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the Canada Water Act (1970) in Canada. With Lake Erie declared "dead" and fires 
breaking out on the Cuyahoga River in Ohio, the governments responded to the explosion 
of demonstrations and the demands of an angry public. The GLWQA (1972) was 
negotiated by the parties, and the IJC and its boards responded. The IJC recognized the 
importance of capitalizing on public anger and took compelling measures to assure that 
the public was educated and included in a meaningful fashion in investigations and 
remedies promoted through the GLWQA. 
An examination of the social process reveals the significance of the inclusion of a 
broad range of participants, their values, perspectives, and strategies. It makes 
abundantly clear how important the significant participation of the public was to the 
efforts of the UC and the Parties under the GLWQA. It also shows the importance of 
meaningful public participation, including the pivotal role of PLUARG, as well as 
aggressive public outreach guided by such entities as Great Lakes Tomorrow and the 
Lake Michigan Federation. Further, collaboration and cooperation facilitated initially by 
the Great Lakes Basin Commission caused state and federal agencies in the U.S. to work 
together to achieve water quality goals prescribed by the GLWQA. Finally, it reveals the 
importance of strategies and perspectives by highlighting the courageous efforts of 
individuals who put the public interest and health of the Great Lakes ecosystem ahead of 
special and financial interests. 
Finally, an evaluation of the decision process shows the importance of the IJC and 
how its operating protocols and traditions of the IJC in the 1970s and 1980s perpetuated 
an esprit d' corps that promoted a primary allegiance to the health and resilience of the 
ecosystem over and above nationalistic or bureaucratic agency self-interest. This freed 
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participants to adopt a problem-solving approach with a free and open flow of ideas. It 
also highlights how problem-solving efforts were implemented on a trial-and-error basis 
with participants learning from both their successes and their failures. 
The unique series of factors that coalesced in the early years of the GLWQA 
approach resulted in a wave of reform and innovation. There are few parallels. 
Unfortunately this chapter has also showed that the "Camelot" era began to unravel as 
conservative governments on both sides of the border began to systematically dismantle 
the delicate balance of courageous leadership, public education and involvement, and 
collaboration at all levels. 
As a final, and perhaps personal note, it must be stressed that the success of 
governance under the GLWQA in the early years turned on a relatively few number of 
critical factors. First, despite the fact that the UC had no jurisdiction to enforce the 
mandates of the GLWQA, it was able to get positive results due to the courage and 
leadership of individuals who, buttressed by UC operating principles, were willing to put 
the public good ahead of special or national interests. As the quotes of those interviewed 
for this study reveal, these individuals believed that human dignity and integrity deserved 
equal billing with ecosystem resilience. Further, the IJC recognized the importance of an 
educated public and capitalized on that concept by funding outreach and education and 
then including the public in a meaningful manner (e.g. PLUARG). It was this kind of 
leadership and courage that translated prescription into action in the early years and it is 
unfortunate that the contribution of the many individuals who played pivotal roles in the 
GLWQA scheme in the early years have largely been ignored. We now turn to another 
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ecosystem shared between Canada and the U.S. - the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
watershed. 
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V. THE BAY OF FUNDY/GULF OF MAINE WATERSHED 
Introduction and Background 
There is no way to distill the story of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region into 
one chapter of a dissertation. There are too many stories. Within the pear-shaped bowl 
that is the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine there are multiple habitats with deep basins, calm 
estuaries, rocky coves, and numerous banks and shoals. Shoals and underwater features 
with names like Seal Island Grounds, Browns Bank, and smaller areas like Grand Manan 
Bank, German Bank, Jeffreys Bank, Cashes Bank, Fippenies Bank, Stellwagen Bank give 
hints as to the many cultures and experiences that passed through this region and 
recorded their early presence by filling in the blanks on the charts of their time. These 
banks and ledges also provided the breeding grounds for valuable commercial fish 
species - cod, haddock, cusk, hake, pollock, halibut, and others. "A very striking and 
peculiar body of water is this Gulf of Maine, markedly different in character from any 
other of the bays on the coast line of the eastern United States (Rich 1994,1). 
The Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region (BoF/GoM) is known as one of the most 
biologically productive marine regions on earth. Within the watershed there are an 
extraordinary variety of ecological features that offer habitat diversity for a broad 
spectrum of flora and fauna. The geologic history of the region is rich with mountain-
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building episodes stemming from volcanic activity, tectonic collisions, and the constant 
force of erosion as molten masses cooled and the region was scoured by wave after wave 
of glacial activity (Conkling 1995). 
The present BoF/GoM is a product of the sand, mud, clay, and other sediments 
that made their way toward the ocean as tall coastal mountains fractured and eroded. The 
temporal scale of tectonic collisions, mountain building, and erosion takes us back 
between 600 to about 350 million years ago with the creation of the supercontinent of 
Pangea. The breakup of Pangea left a layer of metamorphic rocks that are considered the 
foundation of much of the present structure of the Gulf of Maine. The finishing touches 
to the current day structure of the basin were provided some 13,000 years ago as rising 
seas from glacial ice melting flooded into the Gulf of Maine basin. These complex 
processes worked in a variety of ways depending on the properties of the bedrock 
ultimately forming an incredible diversity of bays, headlands, islands, and ledges, shoals, 
and basins (Kelley, Kelley et al. 1995). 
This tumultuous geologic history resulted in the formation of a sea within a sea. 
The Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine itself is some 36,000 square miles (90,700 square 
kilometers). Within the Gulf there are 21 deep basins, the deepest being Georges Basin 
at a depth of 1,236 feet (377 meters) The Northeast Channel, a deep trough 38 miles (61 
kilometers) long and 22 miles (35 kilometers) wide running between Georges and Brown 
banks, is the only deep-water connection between the Gulf and the open waters of the 
Northwest Atlantic. 
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Figure 11 The Bay of Fundy/Gulf ofMaine Watershed (USGS) 
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It is Georges and Browns Bank that nearly isolates the BoF/GoM from the 
Atlantic Ocean (Figure 11). Georges Bank is less than 200 feet (60 meters) deep in over 
most of its structure. In some places it rises to within 13 feet (4 meters) of the surface 
(Kelley, Kelley et al. 1995). These prominent banks are thought to serve as nutrient 
trapping barriers. The shape of the basin, narrow in the north and wider in the south, 
drives fast tidal currents (Richert and Incze 2003). The tides combine with upwelling 
currents, strong lunar tides, stable water temperatures and storm activity to create ocean 
circulation patterns that constantly mix deep-water nutrients into the photosynthetic zone, 
resulting in high primary productivity (Jennings, et al. 2001). 
The high tides and cold, nutrient rich waters of the Gulf ofMaine support several 
thriving ecosystems which are both complex and diverse (Conkling 1995). The near-
shore ecosystem is characterized by variety: rocky coasts, salt marshes, fjords, estuarine 
regions, greater temperature extremes, and salinity changes. The near shore coastal 
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system also includes the shallow (< 50 m) coastal waters and well mixed embayments 
found in the U.S. and Canada (Smith 1997). 
The region on the terrestrial side of the land/water interface provides inhabitants 
with a watershed overlaid with soil capable of sustaining lush forests and, in many places, 
agriculture, combined with a coastal sea within a sea. This semi-enclosed body of water 
and its surrounding watershed have nurtured a complex array of valuable hardwoods and 
softwoods and produced a supply of fish that has nourished populations on both sides of 
the Atlantic as well as the Caribbean for centuries (Kelley, Kelley et al. 1995). 
Of course, no study of this region would be complete without mention, however 
brief, of the historic richness of the fishery in the BoF/GoM. From early times 
adventurers from the nations of western Europe have visited the region - Basques, 
Bretons, Northman, Spaniard, French, and English have fished these waters and there is 
no question that the marine resources of the region have played a large part in feeding the 
nations bordering the western Atlantic as well as providing a powerful inducement for the 
exploration of the New World (Rich 1994). 
Cod has been the primary target of fishers and adventures since the first days of 
exploration. John Smith's early reports helped to establish the early fishing pressure in 
Massachusetts Bay and, upon his return to Europe following his first exploration trip, he 
took with him some seven thousand salted cod and forty thousand dried cod that his crew 
had caught off Monhegan Island. The popularity of cod grew and for a period in the age 
before refrigeration sixty percent of the fish eaten in Europe was salt-cured cod 
(Kurlansky 2008). Walter H. Rich, the Commissioner of the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries in 
the early 20th century, recorded in 1929 that the banks that border the Gulf of Maine 
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annually produced 400,000,000 pounds of fishery products landed in the United States 
and, that annually "about 1,000,000,000 pounds of cod are taken on these banks and 
landed in the United States, Canada, Newfoundland, France, and Portugal" (Rich 1994, 
intro). One study that examined 19th century ships logs from downeast Maine and other 
Gulf of Maine ports speaks of steady catches of cod in the 50 - 60 pound range and of 
halibut the size of men. (Alexander, Leavenworth et al. 2009). Of course, cod stocks 
have collapsed repeatedly from fishing pressure, most recently in the early 1990s (Dobbs 
2000; Weber 2002). After various closures and measures designed to rebuild the stocks, 
cod populations have never recovered in the northern gulf and Bay of Fundy, and on the 
U.S. side of the Gulf cod are still overfished as overfishing continues (NMFS 2011). 
While cod may have been king, the stocks of other species were routinely 
exploited. Haddock, cousin to the cod, were fished hard and their population halved in 
the early 1930s when demand exploded due to pressure from a burgeoning market for 
frozen fish. Halibut, the largest flatfish, were abundant in the region until the mid-1800s. 
Full-grown halibut ran 4 - 5 feet long and weighed 200 - 300 pounds. Their populations 
collapsed after demand for the fish developed in Boston and New York in the 1830s. In 
the first years four men with hand lines could catch 400 fish in two days. By 1850 
halibut near the shore or in the nearer parts of Georges were all but gone. By 1890 
practically all of the halibut landed at Gloucester were coming from Ireland (Kurlansky 
2008). 
While for centuries the resources of the BoF/GoM watershed appeared 
inexhaustible, the saga of their exploitation is well known. The human population of the 
watershed increased rapidly. Fish populations have collapsed time after time. The 
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expanding population increased stress on the ecosystem in a variety of ways. To put this 
into perspective, consider that as of 2007 nearly 10.8 million people lived in the Bay of 
Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. This can be broken down between states and provinces. 
In the United States, populations within the watershed can be summarized as of2007 
with Massachusetts at 6.45 million, Maine with 1.32 million, and New Hampshire with 
1.32 million. On the Canadian side, the population of New Brunswick within the 
watershed is .94 million people and, in Nova Scotia, .75 million (CoML 2012). 
Chapter IV provided an exploration of the governance regime encompassed under 
the International Joint Commission's oversight and coordination of the GLWQA, in 
collaboration with the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission, during the early years under 
that regime. In Chapter V we will attempt to gain some insight into the manner in which 
two sovereign nations, three states and two provinces attempt to govern the human 
activities that impact the binational ecosystem of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region. 
Thus we move from an examination of a governance system in a different location and 
during an earlier time to the analysis of the present-day, real world regime in the Bay of 
Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. 
It must be cautioned that this investigation is the product of one person. It is 
simply not possible for one individual to thoroughly examine the social and decision 
processes that include literally thousands of individual actors, most of whom are carrying 
out their functions within well-defined government structures. Thus programs that exist 
and may in fact be valuable to governance are likely to have been overlooked. In 
addition, the last of the interviews that were conducted for this research occurred more 
than four years ago. Although some effort has been made to stay up to date on the 
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programs and processes that have occurred or changed since that time, there have almost 
certainly been advances and retreats in efforts to make governance more responsive to the 
needs of the ecosystem since that time. Finally, the author has been an attorney in the 
United States for over 30 years. Thus in matters of law and prescriptions there is more 
detail about the laws and prescriptions in the U.S. than in Canada. This is because I 
simply have not learned as much about the Canadian legal framework as I have through 
my career about U.S. law and precedent. 
Thus the value of this research should be seen as an effort to raise some general 
questions about the capacity of the governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
region and provide some insight into the direction that governance needs to take in order 
to foster a more sustainable future for the region's ecosystem and, by extension, its 
residents. Like the process used in Chapter IV, I will analyze the governance regime in 
the region through the lens provided by the Policy Sciences analytical framework. Using 
the framework, however, in this chapter results in a bit of front-end loading, meaning 
much of the story is told through the tasks in the first section for Problem Orientation. In 
order to provide context necessary in the first section, much will be said about 
participants, prescriptions, perspectives, and other issues usually set forth in later sections 
devoted to the Social and Decision Processes. I will therefore not try and repeat what is 
said in Problem Orientation in the latter sections but may instead often ask the reader to 
refer back to the Problem Orientation section for information that overlaps with the 
Social and Decision Processes. 
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With those caveats we may now proceed to view examine the BoF/GoM region to 
attempt to determine whether there is the capacity to move to a more ecosystem-based 
approach to governance of this precious shared watershed. 
Problem Orientation 
As a reminder, problem orientation serves as a guide to the learning process 
fostered by the decision and social process inquiries. As such the five tasks within 
problem orientation serve as an overall "strategy to address problems and invent solutions 
(Lasswell 1971; Clark and Willard 2000,9). To begin the examination using the 
framework approach we will look at the characteristics of goal clarification under our 
"ideal" ecosystem-based approach to governance. 
Goal Clarification. Goal clarification involves the process by which goals are 
determined for a given community. The emphasis on the protection and advancement of 
human dignity has historically been a fundamental quest of the policy sciences approach 
(deLeon 1988). When we consider that we are examining the effects of human decisions 
on human lives, which require a healthy, resilient environment capable of sustaining 
human life, commencing any investigation with a goal of human dignity begins to make 
sense. As to the goal of democracy, it is "well-rooted in many cultural traditions 
throughout history.. .for all people to have full opportunity to shape and share power, 
wealth, enlightenment, well-being, skill, affection, rectitude, and respect" (Lasswell and 
MacDougal 1992; Clark 2002, 89). Further it should be clarified that the policy sciences 
strives to achieve an overriding goal of the realization of human dignity for the many, not 
the dignity of the few at a cost of indignity for the many. Since the goal is dignity for the 
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many, decision outcomes must aim at achieving equal opportunity for participation in 
power, wealth, well-being, and the other important values (Lasswell 1971). 
As discussed in chapter III the key goal clarification characteristics of an 
ecosystem-based approach to governance are: 
1) Meaningful community participation in the goal clarification process; 
2) Strong public outreach and education efforts devoted to raising awareness and 
understanding of ecosystem issues and governance options, and 
3) Multiple goals that overall embrace human dignity and equal access to 
governance with a premium placed on maintenance of the integrity and 
resilience of ecosystem functions (Table 41). 
Table 41 Goal Clarification 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
Meaningful public and/or 
community participation and input 
in the goal clarification process. 
National goals may provide 
guidance but community has broad 
input into how to achieve goals. 
Goal choices have broad 
community acceptance 
No meaningful public or 
community participation in goal 
clarification for BoF/GoM. Some 
watershed groups and citizen 
organizations are making inroads 
into defining community 
environmental and/or economic 
goals, e.g. Annapolis River 
Watershed Alliance, ACAP. Nova 
Scotia seeking public input after 
publication of 2009 State of the 
Coast Report 
Strong public outreach and 
education provide ability to 
establish community goals 
inclusive of human dignity and 
democracy and provide basis for 
clarifying common interests. 
Human dignity includes economic 
fairness and sustainability. 
There are some public education 
efforts in the region - cod tagging 
programs through NEFMC, EPA's 
National Estuary Program, 
NOAA's Coastal Program, etc. 
Human dignity and democracy are 
not stressed in any government 
program, but appear to be factors 
in Saltwater Network and ACAP. 
Multiple goals may be integrated 
that embrace human dignity, 
economic fairness for the many, 
and equal access to governance 
with a focus on maintenance and 
preservation of the integrity and 
resilience of ecosystem functions. 
There is no collaborative or 
cooperative mechanism or entity 
capable of embracing the multiple 
goals of human dignity, economic 
fairness for the many, and equal 
access to governance. 
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The governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region has no 
accountable overarching entity coordinating the goals, promotion, implementation and 
evaluation of regulatory efforts (Hildebrand, Pebbles et al. 2002; Pesch and Wells 2004). 
As a result, policy, including the task of goal clarification, is left to traditional, 
fragmented, bureaucratic regulation by two federal governments, three state and two 
provincial governments, and a legion of local jurisdictions. Indeed it has been noted that 
to say that authority is fragmented understates the enormity of the challenge to creating a 
coherent policy in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region (Pesch and Wells 2004). 
This means that policy, including goal clarification, by-passes or ignores the first 
requirement for goal clarification: meaningful public and/or community participation and 
input into the goal process. Goal clarification is determined piecemeal by legislation or 
rulemaking by the relevant regulatory bodies and agencies with jurisdiction over those 
human activities that impact some component of the ecosystem. In the United States for 
example: 
Congress passes laws and oversees their implementation by agencies, 
which in turn prescribe rules and oversee the behavior of regulated firms. 
Agencies are highly specialized, with engineers, biologists, chemists, 
toxicologists, lawyers, economists, and statisticians, among others, in their 
ranks. Elaborate rules, applied as uniformly as possible, define the 
technology, monitoring, and other requirements that regulated entities 
must meet (Fiorino 2006, 39). 
Thus the only way that goal clarification can be analyzed for the BoF/GoM 
watershed is to somehow examine the goals and actions of the agencies that are given 
jurisdiction under law and statute to manage the various human activities that impact the 
ecosystem. While an examination of the missions and goals of each and every agency 
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involved in some management aspect related to the BoF/GoM would be out of the 
question, we can highlight the goals and missions of some of the more important 
governance institutions. 
One example of legislation and rules that supply goals in the region are those in 
prescriptions related to water quality. It would be difficult to deny that water quality 
sufficient to support the goods and services upon which humans and other organisms rely 
is an important goal. National water quality standards in the U.S. are set out in the 1972 
amendments to the Clean Water Act. The CWA institutes uniform technology-based 
standards with the objective to ".. .restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the nation's waters" (1972, Section 101(a)).29 The U.S. 
Environmental Protection Administration is the principle agency responsible, in 
conjunction with state environmental agencies, responsible for the administration and 
oversight of efforts to achieve this goal (Adler, Landman et al. 1993; Plater, Abrams et al. 
2004). 
On the Canadian side, the goals for water quality are generally set forth in the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (1999) ("CEPA"). The goal of CEPA is to 
contribute to sustainable development - development that meets the needs of the present 
generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs. Environment Canada is the agency responsible for the coordination and 
29 It has been argued that the standards under the CWA are better defined in relation to human use by 
Section 101(a)(2): . .it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality 
which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife, and provides for 
recreation in and on the water..." This is the so-called "fishable-swimmable" rule. (1972). Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. U.S.C. 33 U.S.C. §§1251 -1387, Hughes, E., A. R. Lucas, et 
al. (2003). Environmental Law and Policy. Toronto, Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd. 
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enforcement of the CEPA, but their responsibilities go far beyond the CEPA mandates as 
new frameworks have been adopted by the agency: 
Q: Are there goals or objectives that are somewhere within your 
department on how deal with these threats or how to deal with the 
ecosystem threats... 
A: The goals that we have or the desired outcomes at the government 
level are pretty large scale. 
Q: For instance... 
A... protecting an enhanced biodiversity, improve water quality so it's 
safe, healthy and enables competitive industry. 
Q: Is this Environment Canada-wide? 
A: Yes. Actually Environment Canada is going through, I mean we've 
been around since 1971, in the last two years we've got this new results 
framework called Competitiveness and Environmental Sustainability 
Framework. This for the first time is really articulating much more clearly 
the desired outcomes. Before it's kind of been like, we control pollution, 
protect habitats, look out for species, and so on. It was admittedly quite 
vague. We had legislative and policy instruments to do that, but we'd 
been lacking and what we're almost finished putting in place now, is this 
clear results framework. So, at the top, let me just refer to it. This is kind 
of an example of the results. We have... 
JRC: (Looking at a chart).. .so this would be a goal at the top.. .and I'm 
reading "Canada's Natural Capital is Restored Conservation?" 
A: Yes, we have... .there are like six outcomes at the highest level. 
There's a highest order one for the Competitiveness Environmental 
Sustainability Framework, to maintain and enhance environmental quality 
is sort of the basis for . .to protect of human health, well-being, 
environmental assets, and competitiveness in the Canadian economy." So, 
below that, there's about five or six levels of outcome that all relate. So, 
for instance, under that one of the goals under "natural capital is restored, 
protected and enhanced" down below that one of the components is 
".. .biodiversity is conserved and protected," another would be ".. .water is 
clean, safe, and secure," and ".. .Canadians adopt approaches that ensures 
sustainable use in management of natural capital in the working 
landscapes." Then you can drill down further: wildlife, land and 
landscapes, and then getting down further: species at risk, protection, 
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regulation, and so on. So, this is our new framework in terms of what we 
do and the kind of results that we want to achieve. Now while this is still 
Environment Canada framework, the objective is it'll be national. And 
when we say national I mean throughout the federal government and the 
provinces with the territories... (Canadian Federal Employee 2) 
So the goals of the federal agencies responsible for water quality in the watershed 
of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine are relatively comprehensive on both sides of the 
Hague Line. Both have objectives consistent with ecosystem resilience and integrity. 
The fact remains, however, that the goals and objectives have been shaped for the most 
part by Congressional or Parliamentary bodies and federal agencies, with little if any 
meaningful public input. Further, their mandates are pretty much confined to end-of-pipe 
discharges - nutrient and other pollution that run-off from land-based activities are 
generally not controlled by federal regulatory authorities. 
Water quality is but one aspect of the ecosystem in the BoF/GoM region. There 
are many more. There will be increasing pressure on the coastal margin, with resulting 
pressures on the ecosystem. In the United States there has been more than a decade of 
work to develop an Ocean Policy. There has been no lack of high-profile and headline-
grabbing attempts to explore and develop such a policy. Two separate efforts (Pew 
Ocean Commission and the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy) waded into the ocean 
policy debate. The Pew Ocean Commission's report, America's Living Oceans: Charting 
Course for Sea Change (Pew 2003) was released in 2003. The U.S. Commission on 
Ocean Policy released its "Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century in 2004 (USCOP 2004). 
Six years later the President issued Executive Order 13547, establishing the ocean policy 
for the nation (2010). 
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With the issuance of Executive Order 13547, the U.S. had an ocean policy. That 
policy is set forth, in part, as: 
Sec. 2. Policy, (a) To achieve an America whose stewardship ensures that 
the ocean, our coasts, and the Great Lakes are healthy and resilient, safe 
and productive, and understood and treasured so as to promote the well-
being, prosperity, and security of present and future generations, it is the 
policy of the United States to: (i) protect, maintain, and restore the health 
and biological diversity of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes ecosystems and 
resources; (ii) improve the resiliency of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes 
ecosystems, communities, and economies; (iii) bolster the conservation 
and sustainable uses of land in ways that will improve the health of ocean, 
coastal, and Great Lakes ecosystems; (iv) use the best available science 
and knowledge to inform decisions affecting the ocean, our coasts, and the 
Great Lakes, and enhance humanity's capacity to understand, respond, and 
adapt to a changing global environment; (v) support sustainable, safe, 
secure, and productive access to, and uses of the ocean, our coasts, and the 
Great Lakes; (vi) respect and preserve our Nation's maritime heritage, 
including our social, cultural, recreational, and historical values; (vii) 
exercise rights and jurisdiction and perform duties in accordance with 
applicable international law, including respect for and preservation of 
navigational rights and freedoms, which are essential for the global 
economy and international peace and security; (viii) increase scientific 
understanding of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes ecosystems as part of the 
global interconnected systems of air, land, ice, and water, including their 
relationships to humans and their activities; (ix) improve our 
understanding and awareness of changing environmental conditions, 
trends, and their causes, and of human activities taking place in ocean, 
coastal, and Great Lakes waters; and (x) foster a public understanding of 
the value of the ocean, our coasts, and the Great Lakes to build a 
foundation for improved stewardship. 
(b) The United States shall promote this policy by: (i) ensuring a 
comprehensive and collaborative framework for the stewardship of the 
ocean, our coasts, and the Great Lakes that facilitates cohesive actions 
across the Federal Government, as well as participation of State, tribal, 
and local authorities, regional governance structures, nongovernmental 
organizations, the public, and the private sector; (ii) cooperating and 
exercising leadership at the international level; (iii) pursuing the United 
States' accession to the Law of the Sea Convention; and (iv) supporting 
ocean stewardship in a fiscally responsible manner (2010). 
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Thus the U.S. now has an oceans policy with impressive goals and objectives. It 
has yet to take effect, however, as the Draft National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan 
is out for public comment (NOC 2011). In the meantime, existing law and policy march 
on to attempt to manage the many issues confronting the sustainable use of ecosystem 
goods and services, including those in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. 
An example of a pressing problem in the region is the overall issue of biodiversity 
- or how many organisms and what types inhabit and contribute to a healthy ecosystem 
in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. Biodiversity is dependent on a number of factors 
including water quality, harvest pressure, habitat, water temperature, and water 
chemistry. What are the goals? To a large degree the management of the ocean and 
coastal issues in the U.S. falls to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
("NOAA") and, in Canada, to Fisheries and Oceans Canada ("DFO"). Goals for the 
moment are left to them and their state and, to some degree, provincial partners. 
The mission of NOAA is to "understand and predict changes in the Earth's 
environment and to conserve and manage ocean and coastal resources to meet the 
nation's economic, social and environmental needs" (USCOP 2004,75). While NOAA's 
duties are spread across five line offices, the two that are most relevant to this study are 
the National Ocean Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"). 
The National Ocean Service is the home of NOAA's Coastal Services Center 
("CSC"). The vision of the CSC is for coastal communities to become more resilient 
through informed decision-making. The objective is that "[t]hrough collaborative efforts 
and the partnerships that the Center cultivates, managers of the nation's local and 
regional coastal ecosystems are enabled and empowered with the knowledge, tools, and 
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skills needed to make informed and balanced planning and conservation choices, and 
decisions to enhance resilience and adapt to changing climate" (NOAA 2010, 5). As one 
participant familiar with the CSC put it, however, NOAA suffers from a lack of funding 
and, further, there may be a need for the science and knowledge developed through CSC 
and other sources to become more practical and relevant to management needs: 
I'd like to see that whole thing switched so that management is driving the 
science that needs to be done, because we can be doing science until the 
cows can come home and we don't have the resources right now to really 
do a comprehensive job anyways. So that's been my major frustration is 
for NOAA to actually get serious about management driving science. (US 
Federal Employee 4) 
The second NOAA division that has goals particularly relevant to this study is the 
National Marine Fisheries Service. NMFS is responsible for the stewardship of the 
nation's living marine resources and their habitat. It is the responsibility of NMFS to 
manage, conserve, and protect the living marine resources within the United States' 
Exclusive Economic Zone (the maritime zone from three to 200 miles offshore). It's 
goal, to the extent relevant to this study, is set forth in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act, as amended (1996). The Magnuson-Stevens Act 
requires that fishery management plans ("FMP's") be developed by regional fishery 
management councils established under the Act. For the U.S. portion of the Bay of 
Fundy/Gulf of Maine, the New England Fishery Management Council was established 
(1996, Section 302). The Act also sets out goals in the form of "National Standards" for 
FMP's adopted by the Council. Perhaps the most significant for our quest for goals is the 
first requirement that "Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing 
while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the 
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United States fishing industry" (1996, Section 301(a)(1).) As one individual involved 
with the New England Fishery Management Council commented with respect to the 
seemingly conflicting goals of conserving fish stocks while promoting industry to obtain 
an optimum yield from the fishery: 
What's the goal? To make sure that we make good decisions to rebuild 
stocks and have a sustainable fishery. My personal opinion is that the 
Magnuson is both economic and conservation of biological. I'd like to 
keep it that way. I think it's important to have healthy fisheries from an 
economic standpoint. We shouldn't just do away with that. I don't think 
that's a bad thing to look at the economic and social aspects of the 
business. But I think that we paid too much attention to that over the years 
and now we're moving toward the biological conservation part of it. I 
think we need to strike a balance. Once we have the stocks rebuilt we 
need to keep them there. I don't want to see an all-biological act. I like 
this balance rebuilding stocks, healthy stocks and a healthy fishery. (US 
Federal Employee 3). 
Thus the one of the key goals of the NEFMC under its mandate from Magnuson-
Stevens is to balance the needs of the fishing industry to harvest an "optimum yield" 
from the territorial waters of the United States with the need to sustain fish populations. 
In Canada, with the passage of the Oceans Act in 1996, the nation made a legal 
commitment to conserve, protect and develop the oceans in a sustainable manner (1996). 
Canada's Oceans Act provides a unified national oceans policy and relies upon three 
important principles: sustainable development, integrated management, and the 
precautionary approach (1996, Section II). Canada's Oceans Strategy (DFO 2002) and, 
later, the Ocean Action Plan (DFO 2005), translated the government's vision and 
direction for modern oceans governance into a tangible approach. The overarching goal 
of the strategy is ensuring healthy, safe and prosperous oceans for the benefit of current 
and future generations of Canadians (DFO 2002). 
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Discussing the balance between the economics of exploitation and extraction and 
the value of conservation within the terms of the Oceans Act and the subsequent plans 
and strategies, one person familiar with the practical implications commented: 
Q: The goals that are in the ESM draft plan, and for that matter in... 
Oceans Act, are they pretty much reflective of the goals that you've heard 
that the community wants? Or are there additions that you've discovered 
in your field? 
A: There's been some tweaking. It's useful for you to reference the 
report proceedings of a workshop we had in December 2004, Human Use 
Objectives Workshop, and unfortunately I don't have it in front of me 
right now, but we can get it later. Basically, there's an 
overarching.. .there's almost a vision really that we set out at that 
workshop. It introduced the notion of cultural, social, economic 
sustainability that is not really reflective... those notions are not really 
strongly reflective in the goals that were derived from the Preamble of the 
Oceans Act. The Oceans Act really kind of talks about the integrated 
management plans within measures or the activities in the area, or for 
activities occurring outside the area. And then the second one talks about 
responsible sustainable use or conservation of resources, and also ocean 
space. The third goal relates to maintenance of productivity and 
protection of biodiversity. And then the fourth goal is more the economic 
development side of the Ocean's Act. The first three are kind of the green 
part of the act, if you can imagine conservation, biodiversity, that kind of 
thing.. .but then you've got the fourth one that talks about the sustainable 
wealth generation, economic diversification, as being the primary drivers 
of the act. That's the balance, I guess, of environment and economics and 
economy that are in the Act set out in those four goals, and it's a great 
challenge to achieve that balance. What we're trying to do.. .the plan is an 
objectives-based plan and with conservation objectives to protect the 
ecosystem, but also as users of that ecosystem, human use objectives that 
relate to community well-being, economic well-being, and then 
development of industrial capacity and an aspect that provides the 
economic well-being in a sustainable way. (Canadian Federal Employee 
1) 
The goals, again, are completely provided by parliament or DFO. It is noteworthy 
that the balance between economic interests and conservation seems, valid or not, to 
provide significant tension in efforts to govern the human and economic activities that 
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impact the BoF/GoM ecosystem. Further, both nations sharing the ecosystem are federal 
political systems - the United States more so than Canada as we shall see later. Thus 
while the prerogatives set forth in Canadian federal legislation are valuable, there still 
exists a great deal of reliance upon collaboration with provincial governments for 
consistency with goals and implementation. In addition to the goals and objectives 
expressed at the federal level in Canada and the United States, other goals and objectives 
abound at the state and provincial levels. No attempt will be made to extract the goals of 
every agency at the state/provincial level with management authority over some 
component of the ecosystem. There are a few that deserve attention, however. 
In the U.S. the goals and policies of NOAA Coastal Services Center include 
activities in support of state coastal management plans under the Coastal Zone 
Management Act (1972). The Maine State Planning Office, for example, coordinates 
coastal and environmental policy in that state, including activities funded by the federal 
CZMA. When queried about the goals, one person familiar with the function of the 
Planning Office described both goals and practical limitations: 
Q: So, what's the goal? 
A: The goal of Coastal Zone Management in Maine to.. .it's balance. It's 
really hard to explain to people and it's even harder to measure. How do 
you conserve important coastal resources while having a vibrant, healthy, 
lively coastal zone for people to live in? It's to balance the conservation 
development of the coast and its resources. 
Q: But, primarily, that responsibility falls to the towns? 
A: In Maine, yes. (US State Employee 2) 
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Planning involving one state, however, can only do so much in terms of the larger 
ecosystem. Further, as the above demonstrates, there is a great deal of regulatory 
responsibility that devolves to municipalities and other local government entities. 
In Canada, provinces similarly work with the federal government to develop 
policy consistent with national goals and legislation. New Brunswick, with its newly 
combined Department of Agriculture, Aquaculture, and Fisheries, has a mandate to 
deliver "... public policies and programs to optimize the value of aquatic resources while 
strategically promoting sustainable growth of the fish and seafood industry" 
(New Brunswick 2010). Similarly, in Nova Scotia a Department of Fisheries and 
Aquaculture, a management official described the department's goals in terms of 
promoting development for the good of the province: 
In general the bottom line is that we provide services to industry for the 
betterment for coastal rural communities in all of Nova Scotia. So we 
actually look at development in a practical way. We're trying to 
encourage development, but we want it to be obviously ecologically 
sustainable, but also sustainable in the sense that this is good for Nova 
Scotia. (Canadian Provincial Employee 1) 
With respect to the possibility of conflicts in goals even between departments 
within Nova Scotia, apparently there the potential exists: 
Q: So, there was an issue that each department maybe had different goals? 
A: Oh, yeah. Think about like tourism, right? That is a really good 
concrete example. Tourism is actually led by the Tourism Industry 
Association of Nova Scotia, partnered with our Department of Tourism 
Culture and Heritage. They're developing a coastal tourism strategy 
which is essentially aiming for a goal of doubling tourism in the next ten 
years, most of that focus is coastal, because Nova Scotia is Canada's 
ocean playground. We have to be careful how we develop it because you 
don't want to harm the very thing that people are coming to tour. So 
they're developing this strategy, and I don't really know the details of it, 
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but clearly there is a tourism focus. At the same time, my office, my 
department, is coming up with the aquaculture framework, promoting and 
developing aquaculture, which I assume, and I don't know the details of it, 
will be to grow aquaculture and increase aquaculture. (Canadian 
Provincial Employee 1) 
So conflicts in goals between departments and agencies are real. Still, it seems, 
the scale is tipped toward viewing the ecosystem as a vehicle for economic gain, i.e. 
extraction and harvest for human needs and economic gain. This would run counter to 
the ecosystem-based governance characteristic which requires management with the 
resilience and health of the ecosystem, not human-set economic targets, guide the 
governance of human activities that impact the environment: 
Q: But, again, your chief goal is to help folks get into the [fishery and 
aquaculture] business and do it right. 
A: That's exactly right. (Canadian Provincial Employee 1) 
It would appear that from the governance side, there is federal and state/provincial 
legislation and rules that require regulators to balance the demands of industry against the 
goals of ecosystem health, resilience, and integrity. The fact that the goals set forth in the 
law of both nations requires such balancing means quite simply that decisions on how 
proposed activities are balanced are open to influence from industry interests and political 
persuasion that favor activities that benefit business and industry to the detriment of 
ecosystem integrity. 
In addition to the governmental players in the region, it is worth noting that there 
are numerous NGOs operating within the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. 
Casual observation of their activities over the last several years would seem indicate that 
there is no coordination of the goals or actions of the NGO community. One employee of 
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the local office of a national NGO was asked in October, 2007, about their goals as part 
of this study: 
Q: Are there goals that you have been able to articulate for the ecosystem 
or for the region? 
A: Short answer is no. Part of the purpose of our eco-regional assessment 
is to define conservation goals such as that, including ecosystem-based 
management principles. So, right now we are doing our eco-regional 
assessment for the Gulf of Maine, actually for the whole east coast, and so 
we will be developing more concrete conservation and ecosystem goals 
through that process, which is expected to take another year. So the short 
answer, no. (US NGO 3) 
When asked about the impact of NGOs and Foundations on governance in the 
region, another state employee familiar with the BoF/GoM governance regime has an 
interesting take on the role they play in the region: 
A: The difficulty is that long term governance has to have a long term 
stable funding source. I would say that the NGOs and the Foundations are 
as much a special interest as anybody else involved in this process. I 
mean they have their goals. They have their milestones. 
Q: And why can't they work together? 
A: Because they compete as much as we do. I have a colleague who was 
in an intern position and he was in a room, this was a long, long time ago, 
where a number of the leaders of the major ocean groups were getting 
together, the proverbial smoke-filled back room although I doubt they 
smoked, where they divided issues up based on income generation and 
member retention. That's their return for unit effort. (U.S. State Employee 
1) 
There are numerous other players in the BoF/GoM region. There are watershed 
groups and citizen alliances. There are organizations of agencies like NROC and the 
Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment, which will be discussed later. The 
point is, however, that the goals that drive the various governance participants in the 
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region are fragmented and, at times, conflicting. From the vantage point of a casual 
observer, there is a certain amount of distrust between the players in the region. One of 
the reasons may be that all are competing for increasingly scarce dollars - whether from 
members or donors as in the case of NGOs, or from government budgets, which are 
increasingly trimming the agencies and functions that are discretionary in nature. 
Regardless of the reason, however, there are too many goals that drive regulators and the 
public in different directions. This is not conducive to the kind of collaborative and 
cooperative effort required of ecosystem-based governance. 
It would appear that governance in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine is based on a 
series of acts and regulations promulgated by lawmakers and regulators that share the 
purpose of compromising between resource conservation and economic interests. Our 
ecosystem-based goals clarification characteristics call for meaningful public and/or 
community participation in the goal clarification process. There appears to be little 
attention paid to public or community participation in the region. Further, our ideal 
model calls for strong public outreach and education efforts devoted to raising awareness 
and understanding of ecosystem issues and governance options. Other than some of the 
examples discussed later in this chapter, there is little indication that there is either the 
desire or the funding for truly strong public outreach or education. Finally, our model 
calls for multiple goals that overall embrace human dignity and equal access to 
governance with a premium placed on maintenance of the integrity and resilience of 
ecosystem functions. In the BoF/GoM there is certainly evidence of multiple goals. 
Unfortunately they are agency-by-agency goals and may or may not be related to the 
maintenance of the integrity and resilience of ecosystem functions. As we have seen, 
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often the language of the legislation or regulation speaks to "sustainability" or 
"restoration" but, in practice, are often interpreted or implemented to promote economic 
or private interests to the detriment of the integrity and resilience of ecosystem function. 
Having examined at least some of the goals in the region, we will now move to 
look at the trends. 
Describing Trends. The trends task in an ideal ecosystem-based approach to 
governance has been discussed and may be characterized by: 
1) Collaboration and the use of reliable methods and data in order to measure 
whether socioecological variables are moving closer to, not away from, goals, 
and 
2) The open and transparent communication of the progress and trends data to 
policy makers and to an informed public with significant opportunities for 
community members to be involved with scientists in the assessment of trends 
using local knowledge and local preferences (Table 42). 
In other words, trends are examined in terms of the movement of governance 
toward a more participatory and holistic ecosystem-approach; and whether the 
socioecological trends are moving toward more sustainable and resilient ecosystem 
functions. With this in mind, therefore, this section must explore collaboration and the 
reliability of methods being used to determine trends. It must also examine at least some 
of the important ecosystem processes or components and determine whether they are 
trending toward or away from the goals. Finally we will examine whether there is a 
process in place to openly and transparently communicate the trend information to the 
public and policy makers and if such communication opens the door tq significant 
opportunities for community members to be involved with scientists in order to assess 
trends with local knowledge and preferences (Table 42). 
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Table 42 Trends 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
The use of reliable methods to 
measure whether a suite of 
socioecological variables are 
moving closer to, not away from, 
goals established with significant 
input from community. 
Goals are fragmented. The 
methods used to measure whether 
variables are moving closer to or 
away from goals are difficult to 
determine because there is no 
overarching authority or uniform 
reporting process. Evaluations of 
trends, to the extent they are 
performed, are generally done by 
separate agencies and involve only 
matters in their jurisdiction. 
Ecosystem processes and 
components appear to be trending 
away from the various goals set by 
responsible agencies. 
Open and transparent 
communication of the progress and 
trend data to policy makers and to 
an informed public through 
frequent meetings, accessible 
information, and other techniques. 
# 
There are a variety of separate, 
often fragmented, sources of 
information. There are no annual 
or regular meetings designed to 
inform the public and policy 
makers about trend data. There is 
no accessible website or source of 
information available to the public 
and policy makers that contains 
comprehensive trend data or 
opportunities for input or 
participation. GoMCandBoFEP 
websites are helpful but not 
comprehensive. 
The first issue in the examination of trends is the characteristic that an ecosystem-
based governance regime needs to use reliable methods to measure whether a suite of 
socioecological variables are moving closer to, not away from, goals established with 
significant input from community. This issue presents problems in the Bay of 
Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed for a variety of reasons. It might be recalled from the 
Goal Clarification discussion above, for example, that there are no overriding goals for 
the region and certainly none that were established with significant input from , 
community. The goals in the region are largely set forth in the missions, goals, and 
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objectives of a variety of federal, state/provincial and local governments and agencies. 
Similarly, the methods used to accumulate data are generally department or 
agency-specifip. There is no universal, standardized, monitoring or surveillance plan. 
There is no annual conference where scientists, regulators, policy makers, and members 
of the public could share information and data. Indeed, data and information relevant to 
trends in the BoF/GoM region are often stove-piped in agencies or published in peer-
reviewed journals safe from the eyes of the general public. As one author lamented: 
The situation in the Gulf of Maine is further complicated because the 
region is controlled by hundreds of municipalities, dozens of counties and 
metropolitan regions in two countries. To say that authority is fragmented 
understates the enormity of the challenge to creating a coherent.. .policy. 
The difficulty inherent in collecting Gulfwide data for this report, alone, is 
an illustration of the complexity of the task without taking into 
consideration differences in land use law, culture, and traditional use 
(Pesch and Wells 2004). 
The only entity that has the potential capacity to provide a consistent and reliable 
platform for collaborative work between and among the fragmented array of geographic 
and subject-matter jurisdictions in the region is the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine 
Environment ("GOMC")- The GOMC was formed by a small group of middle-level state 
planners and provincial resource managers who had, essentially, become frustrated at the 
slow pace of federal response to regional threats during the Reagan administration in the 
U.S. and the Mulroney Government in Canada. This group morphed into the first Gulf 
of Maine Council Working Group and meets were held around the basin beginning in 
Portland in June, 1988, to negotiate a binational agreement (Springer 2002). 
Drafted largely by members of the Maine State Planning Office and negotiated in 
working group meetings, the "Agreement on the Conservation of the Marine 
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Environment of the Gulf of Maine" was signed by the premiers of New Brunswick and 
Nova Scotia and the governors of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Maine in 1989 
(Young 1998; Springer 2002; Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011). Since both Canada and the 
United States have constitutional prohibitions that prevent provinces or states from 
entering into international agreements, the 1989 agreement is in essence a compact to 
cooperate. But it is a political agreement that requires little of the parties (Ricketts and 
Hildebrand 2011). Indeed, there is consensus within the Council that "whatever authority 
the Council currently has flows from the powers of the individual agencies which 
participate in it" (Springer 2002,29). 
The Council's ability to serve as the principle forum to employ reliable science to 
credibly inform the public, regulators, scientists, and regulators is not without limitation. 
The original agreement, while employing phrases like "sustainable development" and 
"ecological integrity" ended where the water hit the shore - land masses and the land-
based ecological systems were beyond the scope of the agreement. Further, there is no 
mention of fish or fisheries in the original agreement. Despite the fact that fishing is the 
economic center of the regional economy and overfishing and regulatory conflict are 
hallmarks of life in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, political reality has forced the 
Council to generally avoid issues related to the "f-word" (Springer 2002). 
The Council is now working under its recently adopted its 5th Action Plan. It is at 
first blush very similar to its 4th Action Plan. An excellent summary of the development 
of the Council from the 1990s to the current 2007 - 2012 Action Plan may found 
elsewhere and will not be repeated here (See Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011). Pursuant to 
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its 4th, and carried through with the 5th Action Plan, the GOMC has essentially articulated 
three goals: 
1. Coastal and marine habitats are in a healthy, productive, and 
resilient condition. 
2. Environmental conditions in the Gulf of Maine support ecosystem 
and human health. 
3. Gulf of Maine coastal communities are vibrant and have marine-
dependent industries that are healthy and globally competitive 
(GOMCc 2007,17; GOMC 2012). 
The Action Plans also set forth the four principles that the Council and 
participating agencies adhere to in their decisions involving the Gulf of Maine ecosystem: 
1. Ecologically sustainable development 
The Council seeks to meet the region's current social, cultural, and 
environmental needs without compromising the needs of future 
generations. Working in partnership with others, it strives to sustain 
ecological processes and enhance the region's quality of life. 
2. Ecosystem-based planning and management 
The Council supports collaborative management that integrates 
economic, social, and ecological values and objectives, emphasizing 
natural rather than political boundaries. 
3. Environmental protection through precaution 
The Council supports conservation of the coastal and marine 
environment, and urges its members to proceed with caution to avoid 
environmental degradation. 
4. Public information and participation 
The Council is committed to a participatory process that informs and 
engages the public in setting priorities. (GOMCc 2007,5; GOMC 
2012) 
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Thus the language of the 4th and 5th Action Plans articulate goals and principles 
consistent with ecosystem-based governance. The issue, though, is whether there are 
reliable methods to measure whether a suite of socioecological variables are moving 
closer to, not away from, goals established with significant input from community. Often 
indicators of ecosystem resilience and integrity are helpful. Since at least 2003 the 
GoMC, through its Ecosystem Indicator Partnership ("ESIP"), has been working on 
establishing indicators that would provide a web-based reporting system encompassing 
coastal development, contaminants, eutrophication, aquatic habitat, fisheries and 
aquaculture, and climate change (Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011). ESIP's core principles 
are set forth below: 
The core principles established for the gulf-wide indicators and reporting 
program ensure the production of a high-quality product that is relevant 
for its users and is developed through a transparent, science-based process 
that engages a wide group of partners. 
Partnerships. This effort will build on existing monitoring, indicator, and 
reporting programs within and encompassing the Gulf of Maine. Strong, 
robust partnerships between these programs and other organizations will 
be vital for a region-wide indicators and reporting program to succeed. 
Science-based. Indicators will be selected based on the best natural and 
social scientific understandings of the structure and functions of the 
ecosystem, including its human components. 
Audience-relevant. Indicators will be responsive to audience needs, and 
information will be presented in formats that are clearly understood by the 
target audiences. 
Necessary and sufficient. This effort will track the minimum set of 
indicators necessary to determine whether ecosystem goals and objectives 
associated with specific management issues are being achieved. 
Transparent. The selection, development, and interpretation of the 
indicators will be conducted and documented in a manner that ensures 
transparency such that each indicator can be evaluated by users and 
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replicated by other programs or in future iterations of this initiative. 
(GOMC 2011) 
Thus there is adequate language within the mandate of ESIP in particular and 
GOMC in general to use reliable methods to gather data by way of meaningful 
monitoring and evaluation and, once the data is obtained, to have processes whereby the 
results are transparent and shared with the public. While the language may be adequate 
to permit these activities, it is unclear how much the structure of the GOMC, once 
described as "fragmented incrementalism" (Springer 2002,29), acts as a practical barrier 
to credible, comprehensive, and collaborative measurement. There may also be nagging 
questions of funding that prevents monitoring and the evaluation of the data gleaned from 
monitoring effort. Funding, which has been "a serious and perennial challenge for the 
Council" (Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011, 371) may also prevent the creation and 
implementation of a reliable monitoring program: 
The lack of long-term funding and consequent budgetary uncertainty has 
made life difficult for Council committees, who are unsure whether to plan 
for a worst-case situation or to continue generating new and potentially 
costly ideas... Overall... the tight budget has forced member 
governments and agencies to re-examine Council priorities and recommit 
themselves to the work of the organization... The tight budget has also 
encouraged greater emphasis on the development of inexpensive, cost 
effective approaches to both monitoring and management, which may be 
crucial to the organization's long-term success. In addition, it has 
reminded the Council of the need to remain sensitive to the priorities of 
state and provincial agencies in the way it defines problems to be 
addressed in the action plan. (Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011, 372-73) 
Put another way, a participant familiar with regulatory efforts in the BoF/GoM 
interjected a bit of practical experience into the relationship between funding and 
monitoring in the region: 
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A:. . .  when there are budget cuts, historically, monitoring is often among 
the first things to go. It's viewed as somewhat of a luxury. Considering 
how much emphasis there is on accountability and getting environmental 
results, it doesn't make sense. But, it's.. .if you're a regulating agency, 
you're regulating. If you have money to monitor, great, but if you don't, 
well you're still going to regulate and assume that you're doing some 
good. But, you can see all the things that we do, but hardly any of them 
do we do entirely by ourselves, in fact, none of them. (US Federal 
Employee 1) 
It appears, therefore, that there may be real obstacles along the way to a reliable 
and credible monitoring scheme for the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region. First there is 
a problem with the fragmented nature of the Council and, second, there are funding 
issues. This may explain why the Council has been operating for some two decades and 
there is still no basin-wide monitoring or surveillance plan. Then again, ESIP is 
progressing and there may be sufficient collaboration such that, even without funding, 
member agencies will cooperate on a region-wide surveillance plan with costs being 
absorbed within each agency and results shared and communicated to the public and 
policy makers. Overall, however, governance presently falls short of the goal of 
collaboration and use of reliable methods and data in order to measure whether there has 
been progress in moving toward goals. 
We have seen that there is an overall lack of cooperation and collaboration in the 
governance regime in the region. But are trends in the BoF/GoM moving toward the 
goals of the agencies that govern the various components of the ecosystem? Without 
going into great detail, the trends can be summarized. 
Trends are by definition driven by the threats to the regional ecosystem. To help 
put threats into context we must remember that the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine provides 
valuable services and resources to the region. Some of these services are visible, others 
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are not so apparent. Commercial and recreational fishing industries in the Gulf of Maine 
employ many thousands and provide the social and economic lifeblood for a significant 
number of towns and villages along the Gulf coast of Canada and the United States. The 
Gulf also provides an outlet for tourism and recreation, shellfish harvesting, marine 
transportation, cultural identity, coastal economic development and other important and 
tangible products. The land around the Gulf is sought after for valuable agriculture as 
well as for residential, commercial and industrial value. There is abundant evidence that 
human population will continue its migration to the coast for a host of reasons, not the 
least of which is the intrinsic appeal of many coastal landscapes and habitats (NHEP 
2000; M.S.P.O. 2001). Further, as climate change impacts make life in urban centers 
south of the Gulf less and less pleasant, the Gulf region will come under increasing stress 
from those desiring to "escape" from those densely populated regions. 
Q: But, going back to the four threats that we mentioned earlier, what are 
the trends? Are we getting better or are we moving further away from our 
goals? 
A: Well, that depends on how good your indicator systems are and that's 
an issue. I think you have a lot of different groups that are trying to 
understand the state of the environment and Gulf of Maine Council is one 
through their Ecosystem Indicator Partnership. Every office, again, looks 
at its own indicators. I don't think that anyone.. .1 know that NOAA 
doesn't have a system in place where we actually understand a whole suite 
of indicators. So, for instance, coastal development wise, we know that 
the Northeast is the most highly populated region of the US and it's 
getting more populated, so that trend is going up. The non-point source 
pollution is getting worse due in large part to increased development. 
Now fisheries has their set of indicators where they're measuring fishery 
stocks and it's very difficult to put that picture together in terms of an 
ecosystem where some stocks are going up, some stocks are going down, 
and where you have trophic cascades going on. You might not be able to 
speak for the entire ecosystem but they're trying to put that picture 
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through individual stocks or suites of stocks. Again, that's not in an 
ecosystem context. (US Federal Employee 4) 
It seems we know trends are moving away from the goals, but we really don't 
know a lot of specifics in terms of the health of the overall ecosystem. If, however, 
environmental trends are not moving toward the goals of the agencies that manage the 
various components over which they have jurisdiction, then all of these valuable services.. 
are in peril. We should first recall the primary threats to the health and resiliency of the 
GoF/GoM ecosystem. Those threats appear to be posed by overharvesting, pollution, 
shoreland development, invasive species, and global climate change (Steneck 2001; Clark 
2002; Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 2004). 
With respect to the harvesting of living marine resources, decades, some say 
centuries, of resource extraction and exploitation by humans has taken a toll on Gulf of 
Maine (Pauly, Christensen et al. 1998; Jackson, Kirby et al. 2001; Steneck 2001). While 
there was marginal improvement with rebuilding some stocks, continued harvest pressure 
stocks are again down30, and landings of key commercial species generally continue to 
suffer and continued overcapacity perpetuates the paradigm of too many fishers chasing 
too few fish (Hanna, Blough et al. 2000). Diversity in the Gulfs marine ecosystem has 
been markedly reduced over millennia and historic food webs have been transformed into 
food chains due to the serial targeting and depletion of finfish and other top consumers. 
Some commentators have asserted that the cascading consequences of overfishing have 
30Data and conclusions from the 2005 Groundfish Assessment Review Committee ("GARM"), a regional 
review peer-review process designed to provide stock assessment updates for the 19 stocks managed under 
the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan ("Multispecies FMP") demonstrate the mixed results 
of multispecies management efforts since 2001. Of the 19 stocks assessed, for instance, only 6 showed an 
increase in stock biomass over the last four years. GARM (2005). More recent data from the Study of 19 
Northeast Groundfish Stocks through 2007 shows further stock deterioration with 13 of the 19 groundfish 
stocks overfished, with overfishing occurring in 11 of those stocks. NEFMC (2008). Report of the 
Groundfish Assessment Review Meetings (GARM III). Gloucester, NMFS. 
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resulted in a phase shift that has replaced cod with European green crab as the apex 
predator in the Gulf of Maine (Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 2004). Others warn that without 
the restoration of ecosystem food webs and improved water quality marine ecosystems 
will lose resilience and become increasingly vulnerable to global climate change and 
other unforeseen future threats (Pandolfi, Jackson et al. 2005). Despite the continued 
threat of overfishing, stock rebuilding timetables and restoration efforts are under siege 
from both Congress and the judiciary (Safina, Rosenberg et al. 2005). Recent evidence 
reveals that populations of cod, a keystone species in the gulf ecosystem, are again 
overfished, that overfishing is continuing31, and that the populations are perilously low: 
"Currently, the Gulf of Maine cod stock appears to be at a very low biomass, which will 
likely affect harvests of other groundfish stocks from the nearshore Gulf of Maine" 
(NMFS 2011,1). 
All is not bad news, however. Viewed from the perspective of someone involved 
with the New England Fishery Management Commission, and looking at the full suite of 
stocks managed by the NEFMC, there have been positive trend indications: 
Q: How are we doing? What are the trends? 
A: We're doing better. The trends are all up. Scallops are doing very 
well. Monkfish and herring are doing very well. Groundfish, of the 19 
stocks, 13 are rebuilding, 3 are staying the same, and 3 are declining. 
Overall, if you look in aggregate there's definitely an increase in the 
groundfish complex stocks. For the first time probably in New England 
history in 2005 we stayed under our TACs. And I think in 2006 we were 
31 An overfished stock or stock complex is one whose size is sufficiently small that a change in management 
rules is required in order to achieve an appropriate level and rate of rebuilding. The Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act currently mandates that overfished stocks be rebuilt as soon as 
possible and within a timeframe not longer than 10 years. 
Overfishing relates to the rate at which a stock of fish is harvested and occurs when that rate exceeds an 
acceptable level, eventually resulting in the stock becoming overfished. 
347 
under on all of them except one, and I think that was Gulf of Maine cod. 
So things are moving in the right direction on ground fish and there are a 
number of success stories in other stocks. So we're doing better. (US 
Federal Employee 3) 
It should be noted that this interview occurred before more recent data on 
groundfish stock rebuilding became available. The conclusions of GARM III report 
published in 2008 entitled Assessment of 19 Northeast Groundfish Stocks through 2007 
paints a bleaker picture: 
• Four stocks were classified as not overfished and not experiencing 
overfishing. 
• Thirteen stocks were overfished and six were not. 
• Eleven groundfish stocks were both overfished and experiencing 
overfishing. (NEFMC 2008) 
Thus more recent trend information indicates that there may be as many as 13 of 
the 19 groundfish subject to the regulation via the New England Fishery Management 
Council's Northeast Multispecies or Groundfish Plan are showing significant signs of 
decline - 11 of those so seriously that action must be taken to rebuild stocks immediately 
(1976; NEFMC 2008). 
Stresses impacting the Gulf of Maine extend beyond the pressure put on it by the 
fishing industry. Toxic contaminants found in the waters of the Gulf region, for instance, 
have been linked to endocrine system harm in humans and wildlife (De Guise, Shaw et 
al. 2001). Commercial fish that are harvested from the Gulf are increasingly subject to 
Fish Consumption Health Advisories because of their high burdens of mercury, PCBs, 
dioxins, and other toxins (Rich 1994). Trends in some of the persistent organic pollutants, 
endocrine disruptors, pharmaceuticals, are unknown because there is no monitoring for 
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the presence of these types of constituents (Wells 2010). This was driven home by an 
employee familiar with existing monitoring efforts for pollutants on the U.S. side of the 
gulf region: 
Q: One of the concerns also is that we don't know about this next 
generation of pollutants—endocrine disruptors, the pharmaceuticals, the 
things that might be out there—but right now are posing problems in the 
Great Lakes because they're being looked at. We don't know what's out 
there. Is that a fair statement? 
A: I think that's a fair statement. On the other hand I think that at the 
ORD sort of level, at Offshore Research and Development, that those 
things are being looked at, but the information generated by this research 
hasn't reached a point yet that it can used to guide management 
decisions.. .regulatory decisions. We still are having a hard.. .with the 
resources we have at our disposal having a hard enough time controlling 
sources of pollution that we know about, like nutrients, never mind 
worrying about.. .1 mean yea, we think about it, we're concerned about it, 
do we do anything about it? No. But, like I said, we barely have the 
resources to deal with the problems we know about, never mind the ones 
we don't really know about. (U.S. Federal Employee 1) 
In addition to the point source and air deposited pollutants that impact the 
environment in the BoF/GoM region, there is an additional problem with nutrients. These 
pollutants are a result of increasing population pressure and development in the coastal 
margin. Contaminated shellfish beds, loss of eelgrass, reduced water clarity, coastal 
development, habitat loss, hazardous waste and pollution have been present with varying 
intensity along the coast for decades and are a direct result of the population growth in 
the region. Contaminants include microorganisms from storm water runoff and other 
nonpoint sources, nutrients (point and nonpoint sources), improperly treated sewage, 
legacy pollutants (and sediments), and emerging toxic contaminants (NHEP 2000; 
Sowers 2010; Washburn 2010). 
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The situation in the Great Bay, located in the southern gulf bordered by New 
Hampshire and Maine, is an example for many of the environmentally important 
estuaries and salt marshes in peril around the region. A 2009 Piscataqua Regional 
Estuaries Partnership ("PREP") Report sets out the negative trends in the Great Bay. 
Total nitrogen load (N) in the estuary increased by 42% in the last five years due largely 
to greater storm water runoff and non-point source pollution loads during recent high 
rainfall years. Dissolved inorganic nitrogen, a major component of total N, has increased 
by 44% in the last 28 years. Water clarity has declined as a result of increasing nutrient 
loads and increasing concentrations of suspended solids and chlorophyll-a. Eelgrass 
habitat in the estuary has disappeared from tidal rivers, Little Bay, and the Piscataqua, 
and is in steep decline in Great Bay, Portsmouth Harbor, and Little Harbor. Dissolved 
oxygen concentrations consistently fail to meet water quality standards in the tidal rivers. 
Anadramous fish returns to the estuaries are limited by water quality, passage around 
dams, and flooding. Oyster and clam populations remain depressed compared to historic 
abundance. Toxic contaminants affect nearly one-quarter of the estuarine sediments and 
concentrations of compounds associated with petroleum products are increasing in the 
tissues of shellfish from the Piscataqua River. Bacteria concentrations are no longer 
declining but water quality standards for swimming and shellfishing are not being met in 
all areas. Increasing pollutant loads are clearly a problem (PREP 2009). 
It also bears mentioning that increased nutrients in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
Maine region have been implicated in the increasing outbreaks of Alexandrium 
fundyense, or red tide as well as increased beach and shellfish area closures (Jones 2011). 
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In the U.S. the regulation of non-point source pollution is difficult because it 
normally involves regulations impacting land use - a regulatory area usually reserved to 
municipalities. Thus land use measures require municipalities that understand the 
cumulative impact of their actions - and work together rather than compete with one 
another to bring in additional businesses. As one federal regulator put it: 
A: But the federal government's never going to get explicit with land use 
regulation. The states are even leery of it. Connecticut is one state that, 
the only state I think in the country that has ground water.. .all states have 
surface water quality standards, Connecticut has ground water 
standards.. .pretty advanced. They also have aquifer protection area 
regulations that are in effect.. .land use regulations for areas that overlay 
their drinking water aquifers. 
Q: You're talking about where? 
A: In Connecticut. It took them over ten years to get the regulations from 
start to finish. So, there's a lot of resistance to that. And then you know 
the story here in New England with home rule... what are those territories 
in the North... 
Q: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont 
A: Every one of them acting pretty much independently of each other for 
their own interests, and there's usually economic interests.. .bring in more 
business and with it more people, and you just keep piling it on and 
eventually there's nowhere else to develop, and I don't know what you do 
then. (U.S. Federal Employee 1) 
The ecosystem processes and properties in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
region are clearly trending away from the goals espoused by the agencies responsible for 
regulating the human activities that impact the environment. Despite the gains of the in 
the 1970s under Clean Water Act and CEP A, water quality in the region still suffers. 
Coastal development and concomitant nutrient overloads are increasing and there is 
really very little data on the proliferation of many of the modern emerging persistent 
351 
organic pollutants. Overharvesting may have been slowed or even turned around for 
some species, but overfishing continues and some long depleted fish stocks are showing 
little sign of recovery. Further, the rapid introduction of invasive species in the Gulf of 
Maine has "profoundly changed the structure and functioning of.. .coastal marine 
communities" (Steneck 2001). To date at least 64 marine invasive species have been 
documented in the Gulf of Maine (Pappal 2010). It may be that society will have to cross 
their collective fingers and recognize marine invasions as the cbst of doing business in a 
global market with related shipping and transportation vectors. 
The final environmental trend that we will examine is the threat to the BoF/GoM 
region posed by global climate change. The functioning of the Gulf of Maine, however, 
and the ability to provide the services asked of it are jeopardized by the impacts of global 
climate change. The Earth's climate has warmed by @ 0.6 degrees C over the past 100 
years with two main periods of warming, between 1910 and 1945 and from 1976 
onwards. The rate of warming during the latter period has been approximately double 
that of the first and, thus, greater than at any other time during the last 1,000 years. There 
has been a 10% decrease in snow cover and ice extent since the late 1960's (Walther, Post 
et al. 2002). 
Despite its topography, the Gulf of Maine is a connected westward extension of 
the North Atlantic Ocean, and problems detected and foreseen for the North Atlantic have 
relevance for the Gulf region. Signals of change due to climate change are being detected 
in the waters of the North Atlantic. One of the impacts of climate change, for instance, is 
that the water of the higher latitudes, including the North Atlantic, is freshening (the 
impact has been detected at higher i.e. over 50° N and 60% S) or becoming less salty 
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while salinity is increasing at lower latitudes. This is thought to be a sign that the Earth's 
hydrologic cycle is changing (Curry, Dickson et al. 2003). Another factor that might 
signal a decrease in salinity for the North Atlantic is the revelation that the volume of 
fresh water discharged into the Arctic Ocean from rivers is also increasing (Peterson, 
Holmes et al. 2002). When this is added to the additional fresh water likely to enter the 
Gulf from melting ice via the Labrador Current and the increasing amounts of fresh water 
likely to flow from the major river systems due to the escalating rate of moisture received 
from the tropics via the hydrologic cycle it is clear that salinity changes are likely in the 
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. 
These trends could conceivably affect the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine marine 
ecosystem at all trophic levels and spell more bad news for a commercial fishing industry 
already reeling as a result of overfishing. Fish recruitment has been known to be a key 
process strongly influenced by climate variability. In one example from the Bering Sea, 
variations in atmospheric circulation, though interactions with ocean currents, influenced 
transportation of juvenile Pollock away from adults, increasing the intensity of 
cannibalism and, ultimately, year class strength (Walther, Post et al. 2002). It is 
unknown what impact these changes will have on the ultimate abundance and distribution 
of fish species in the Gulf of Maine, but it is disturbing to think of the magnitude of 
change the may lie ahead. Fish are simply not that good at acclimation to new or even 
gradual changes in temperature (Stillman 2003). To make matters worse, commercially 
significant groundfish species in the Gulf of Maine, especially cod, have evolved to live a 
long adult lifespan in order to buffer the impact of recruitment failures. Overfishing, 
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however, has shortened the age structure of the population and rendered some groundfish 
species vulnerable to the adverse effects of global change. 
The news for other trophic levels is not good either. The direction and flow of 
water into the Gulf of Maine is controlled to a significant degree by the location of the 
North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO). The position of the NAO determines whether inputs 
into the Gulf come more from the cold, nutrient-poor Labrador Current or the richer, 
warmer Scotian Shelf slope water. It now appears that human-introduced greenhouse 
gases are influencing sea level pressure by increasing it over the subtropical North 
Atlantic and decreasing it in the higher latitudes. This may lead to an upward trend in the 
North Atlantic Oscillation index (Gillett, Zwiers et al. 2003). Such positive anomalies of 
the NAO have modified marine primary and secondary production, meaning that the 
availability of planktonic food for fish larvae may be diminished, resulting in reduced 
recruitment (Walther, Post et al. 2002). Whether from NAO influence, or from 
increasing intermediate flows of reduced nutrient-laden fresh water from increasing rates 
of glacial melting, the phytoplankton assemblage is being altered (Balch, Drapeau et al. 
2007; Townsend, Rebuck et al. 2010). Changes at the bottom of the food chain cannot be 
good for secondary and tertiary consumers. Other species important to New Englanders, 
like blue fine tuna and striped bass, may change their migration patterns due to climate-
induced changes in prey abundance. 
Climate change is influencing the abundance and distribution of species. Whether 
the influence has started in the Gulf is unknown. There is just too much "noise" because 
of the overfishing issues that have taken the time and attention of marine scientists and 
policy makers. The influences that might be anticipated include changes in the density of 
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species as they shift their ranges either poleward or up in elevation (terrestrial or tidal) in 
order to occupy areas suited to their metabolic temperature tolerances. In addition, 
because many natural history traits are triggered by temperature-related cues, changes 
could occur in the timing of events, such as breeding, migration, and seasonal 
phytoplankton blooms. Changes in temperature can also lead to changes in species 
morphology. Thus body size or even behavior may be affected (Root, Price et al. 2003). 
Temperature, for example, was found to be the primary factor in the differences of 
weight-at-age of cod sampled from 17 stocks across the North Atlantic (Brander 1995). 
Extinction may be the ultimate price that some species pay for human-induced climate 
change (Thomas, Cameron et al. 2004). 
One other possible impact of global climate change is a change in the currents and 
upwelling in the Gulf. Temperature (air and sea surface) and salinity changes could have 
a negative impact in the physical movement and vertical mixing of water in the Gulf 
region. The ecosystem dynamics of the Gulf depend greatly on the physical mixing 
mechanisms that continually serve to bring nutrients up from deeper water to the 
shallower water where light is available for photosynthesis. Some of these mixing 
mechanisms are driven by the difference between the temperature of the water and the 
air, e.g. winter convection, thermohaline circulation, etc. Others depend upon mixing of 
fresh and salt water. If the air warms in the winter to a more moderate temperature it 
could restrict coastal ocean circulation, vertical mixing and upwelling. The result would 
be few nutrients delivered to the photic zone, with a concomitant reduction in primary 
productivity and the cascading consequences that would follow through all trophic levels. 
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It has also been suggested that climate change could impact the timing of the 
spring phytoplankton blooms both inshore and on the Banks. Spawning success for many 
commercially valuable species in the Gulf is thought to be linked to the delicate timing of 
the seasonal phytoplankton blooms (Townsend, Rebuck et al. 2010). Fish larvae need 
available plankton on which to feed as they emerge and begin their lives. Warmer 
climate conditions may cause phytoplankton to bloom earlier in the season. The 
organisms that graze on these primary producers might develop at their normal seasonal 
times, cued by the length of daylight that is thought to control their natural cycles. Such 
a mismatch could lead to significant disruption for the Gulf of Maine ecosystem up and 
down the trophic levels (Root, Price et al. 2003). The difference in timing between 
phytoplankton blooms and the natural cycles of primary consumers could also change the 
pattern, timing, and amount of the exchange of carbon dioxide. The mismatch could lead 
to a higher fraction of organic carbon being recycled by bacteria and through 
photooxidation, resulting in a greater fraction of photosynthetically-fixed carbon 
returning to the atmosphere as carbon dioxide (North and Duce 2002). 
Focusing on the near-coastal environment, the impact of climate change on the 
coastal ecosystem could also be drastic. Things could be made worse if the offshore 
component of the Gulf of Maine ecosystem begins to show sustained loss of function and 
fishing and related harvesting effort moves inshore. Extinction risk is a real possibility 
for those creatures that live in the tidal and estuarine areas of the coastal margin. 
Although many terrestrial plants and animals and marine organisms might be able to shift 
their ranges and distributions poleward, extinction risk might impact most heavily on 
those species of fauna (chiefly ectotherms) and flora that form part of salt marsh and 
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coastal ecosystems in the Gulf of Maine. Species adapted for this peculiar environment 
simply may not be able to compensate for the rate of increase in temperature and salinity 
changes. 
These systems play a key role in the ecosystem by filtering out sedimentation and 
run-off, serving as a buffer between land and sea, and as a productive habitat and nursery 
for a broad spectrum of species. Seagrasses are a critical component of these ecosystems. 
Short and Neckles (1999) have suggested that increased atmospheric temperature will 
alter growth rates and other aspects of these species' physiology. Air temperature rise 
could also increase disease in these systems (Dionne 2002). 
Another threat to the coastal estuaries and salt marshes in the Gulf of Maine is the 
rise in sea levels that results from temperature increase (Karl and Trenberth 2003). The 
global average sea level rise is thought to be in the neighborhood of 1.2 mm/yr. While 
salt marshes and tidal wetlands have managed to keep up with the gradual sea level rise 
that has occurred over the last 3,000 years, they are reaching the limit of their ability to 
accrete peat and thereby gain elevation at rates to match the modem rate of rising water 
(Dionne 2002). Furthermore, intensification of the hydrologic cycle may increase 
precipitation in the Gulf region (due to increasing evaporation at low latitudes and 
redistribution to higher latitudes), leading to decreased salinity in estuarine regions and 
salt marshes. Increased precipitation could lead to increased run-off and the possibility of 
nutrient overload on these fragile coastal systems. If run-off causes an increase in 
nitrogen in the system, for instance, algal blooms could develop and deny needed 
sunlight to sea grasses and related organisms. An uptick in eutrophication would likely 
result. This has definite implications for the continued productivity of these systems. 
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In addition to the above, many coastal areas around the Gulf will be affected by 
increased erosion, flooding, and sea water intrusion into fresh water systems (DPCCa 
2001). Coastal communities are threatened. Significant ports in the region may have to 
retreat. Those whose structures might be safe because of elevation may still be impacted 
as the intrusion of salt water into fresh water aquifers will present particular problems for 
the thousands of human residents around the coast who rely upon fresh water from wells, 
municipal and private, that are located near the coast. 
The situation in the coastal estuaries and salt marshes is exacerbated by the fact 
that development of marsh-upland perimeters means there's no way for wetland species 
to expand their range by migrating inland. We know that between 1780 and 1980 the 
Northeast lost nearly 40% of its wetlands (USEPA, NOAA et al. 2001). Coastal species 
confronting the increased stresses of temperature and salinity change have no place to go 
- their migration increasingly blocked by coastal roads and shoreline development. 
Unimpeded retreat, the best mechanism to replace inundated wetlands with the creation 
of new ones inland, is rapidly becoming unavailable as an option (IPCCa 2001). 
A great deal of time has been spent exploring the nature of the collaboration and 
reliability of methods and data that are used to determine whether socioecological 
variables are moving closer to, not away from, goals, Even more time has been spent 
tracing trends toward or away from goals that can be described as good water quality, 
healthy and diverse fish populations, and smart development. As we have seen, 
ecosystem conditions are not trending toward the goals. 
Given the magnitude of the threats to the BoF/GoM ecosystem it is important to 
look at whether there is a positive trend toward the open and transparent communication 
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of the progress and trends data to policy makers and to an informed public with 
significant opportunities for community members to be involved with scientists in the 
assessment of trends using local knowledge and local preferences. It would seem fairly 
obvious that unless the public and policy makers are aware of the nature and extent of the 
threats to the system there will be little public pressure or policy innovation to turn the 
trends around. 
We have already seen that there is no overarching accountable entity that has the 
capacity to coordinate, evaluate, and act upon data. Further, there is no regular process 
for reporting data to the public. While there is a web site for each agency, and for the 
Gulf of Maine Council where interested parties who know where to look can find a great 
deal of information related to the health of some components of the ecosystem, no 
common, publicly accessible web site exists that could provide a forum for all data and 
information for the watershed and/or an opportunity for comment and input. "A linked 
network of the many existing and developing repositories is required to offer direct 
searching capability and retrieval of information" (Wells 2010,13). 
More and more information about the regional ecosystem has been forthcoming. 
The Gulf of Maine Council, for instance, has been publishing the first ever "State of the 
Gulf of Maine" report beginning in 2010. It appears that it is being written chapter-by-
chapter by authors selected by the GOMC. The information contained in the report is 
generally well-documented and extremely helpful. There is no indication, however, that 
the public was involved in any meaningful way in the preparation of this valuable report 
(Thompson 2010). Further, there is no indication that the report is being used as an 
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outreach tool to help form a base of an educated public. It is, at this point, available to 
those who are interested. 
Given the above, and despite the best intentions of the many hard-working 
employees of governments and agencies, the jurisdictional fragmentation seriously 
impairs the ability of governance in the BoF/GoM to provide an ecosystem-based version 
of developing information related to overall trends or, when information is available, 
getting that information out to the public or to communities in a manner that would be 
consistent with the development of a public that is knowledgeable about the 
environmental threats to the region. 
Conditions, hi an ideal system, condition analysis should be part of an 
iterative effort by scientists and community members to determine the causes or factors 
influencing trends. Resources should be available to permit scientists and others to sort 
out the various environmental signals and determine what conditions are factors in any 
negative ecosystem trends. The inquiry, however, should not be limited to ecosystem 
factors. Trends can be affected by the individual and institutional effects of economic 
activity. Thus special interest activity that detracts from the common interests of resilient 
ecosystems may give rise to conditions that need to be investigated and, if necessary, 
abated (Table 43). 
From the previous section describing the environmental trends in the region we 
know that the CWA goal of restoring the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the waters in the region is threatened by nutrient overloads along the coastal margin and, 
to an unknown extent by industrial pollution and persistent organic pollutants to some 
extent not clearly understood. We also know that the goal of a sustainable and resilient 
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ecosystem is threatened by overfishing, shoreland development and related habitat 
destruction, and by invasive species (Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 2004). In order to put these 
threats into context there is a need for at least a limited understanding of the current 
conditions extant in the BoF/GoM. Thus, as we did in Chapter IV, this section will 
begin with a description of the physical and biological characteristics of the region. 
Table 43 Conditions 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
Conditions analysis is iterative 
with collaborative efforts by 
scientists and community to gain 
and share knowledge necessary to 
determine the conditions that are 
factors in any negative trends. 
Conditions analysis explores more 
than ecosystem factors and 
examines social and economic 
factors in order to understand 
whether economic or other special 
interests are overriding common 
interests and the public good. 
Collaboration between scientists, 
regulators, and citizen participants 
jointly work to identify causes and 
conditions responsible for negative 
trends. 
The natural biological components 
of the GoM/BoF ecosystem appear 
to be weakening due to 
anthropogenic factors. There 
doesn't appear to be any 
meaningful iterative conditions 
analysis done through the 
collaborative efforts of scientists 
and community. Information about 
conditions is generally published 
by scientists in peer-reviewed 
publications or used within their 
respective agencies. Some articles 
make it onto the GOMC web site. 
There is no mechanism for 
collaborations between scientists, 
regulators, and citizens that would 
enable them to jointly work to 
identify causes and conditions 
responsible for negative trends. 
The Gulf of Maine is a semi-enclosed sea extending from Cape Cod to the Bay of 
Fundy and southwestern Nova Scotia. It is bordered to the South and West by the United 
States, to the North and Northeast by Canada, and to the East and Southeast by prominent 
underwater Browns Bank and Georges Bank. Georges and Browns Banks effectively isolate 
the Gulf from the open Northwest Atlantic Ocean, forming a semienclosed continental shelf sea 
(Table 12). At depths greater than 100 m, the exchange of waters between the Gulf and the North 
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Atlantic is confined to the deep (>300 m) Northeast Channel separating Georges Bank from 
Browns Bank and the Nova Scotian Shelf (Hildebrand 2009). 
As discussed in prior sections, strong tides combine with upwelling currents, 
strong lunar tides, stable water temperatures and storm activity to create ocean circulation 
patterns that constantly mix deep-water nutrients into the photosynthetic zone, resulting 
I 
in increased primary productivity (Jennings, et al. 2001). 
Morphological 
Features of the 
Gulf of Maine and 
Georges Bank 
•Jordan Basin —J 
•Georges Basm J^ 
•Wilkinson Basin, 
Isolated from Open 
North Atlantic by: 
Browns Bank 
Georges Bank —•" 
Figure 12 Morpholgical Features of the Gulf of Maine. Used with Permission of David 
Townsend. 
Cold, relatively fresh water from the Labrador Current flows into the Gulf over 
Browns Bank. Fresh water also flows into the bank from river systems around the Gulf. 
Finally deeper, saltier Atlantic Slope Water seeps into the Gulf basin along the bottom of 
the Northeast Channel (See Figure 13). The dense, cold, deep slope water tends to lay at 
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Figure 13 Morphology Important to Water Mass Flows into and out of the Gulf of Maine. 
Used with permission of David Townsend. 
the bottom of the deep basins. Cold intermediate continental slope water lies between the 
deep slope water and the warmer surface water in the summer and is the layer that is 
generally loaded with nutrients (See Figure 14). On the surface, there are a variety of 
currents that are active in the Gulf of Maine and the Bay of Fundy. The Eastern Maine 
coastal current moves surface water south along the Maine coast. Above the deep basins 
baroclinic currents move in a counter clockwise direction, while surface water over the 
banks moves clockwise (Figure 15). The coastal current system in the Gulf of Maine is 
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Figure 14 Cross-section of Gulf of Maine with typical summer water density fields (Used 
with Permission of David Townsend) 
likely the most important for the overall nutrient budget of the Gulf. Vertical nutrient 
fluxes driven by tidal mixing in the northeastern Gulf, especially via the eastern Maine 
coastal current, create an offshore plume feature of nutrient-rich water critical to species 
composition and abundance of plankton in the offshore waters of the Gulf (Kitthananan 
2006). 
It is important to understand that at any moment the source of water surging into 
the Gulf is dependent upon a variety of environmental factors, including the location of 
the NAO, Gulf Stream and the amount of fresh water flowing out of the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence (Hildebrand 2009). 
It is the morphology and current movement that help make the waters of the Bay 
of Fundy/Gulf of Maine well known for their productivity. Although it was discussed in 
the preceding section, it bears repeating that productivity is dependent upon a variety of 
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other factors, including light and nutrients (Valiela 1995; Mann and Lazier 1996; 
Jennings, Kaiser et al. 2001; Apollonio 2002; Norse and Crowder 2005). 
NOVA SCOTIA 
Figure 15 Residual Surface Circulation (Used with permission of David Townsend) 
Nutrients in this system come from a variety of sources. The five significant river 
systems that empty into the Gulf collectively supply an estimated 100 million gallons of 
» 
fresh water and nutrients daily, lowering the salinity of the Gulfs waters. These 
characteristics contribute to enormous amounts of primary producers fueling the bottom 
of the food chain, leading to an abundance of life that drives the growth and development 
of the food chain's tertiary consumers. The principal source of nutrients supporting this 
production, however, has been generally thought to be the influx of nutrient-rich deep 
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slope water from beyond the Gulf through the Northeast Channel (Townsend 1998; 
Apollonio 2002). Once delivered to the Gulf, those nutrients are mixed into the surface 
(photic) layers by way of various physical mechanisms including winter convection and 
tidal mixing (Townsend 1998; Apollonio 2002; Townsend, Rebuck et al. 2010). As 
Figure 15 demonstrates, the surface water currents can then deliver nutrients and other 
constituents around the Gulf. 
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Figure 16 Simplified Gulf of Maine trophic process (NOAA) 
Thus the physical processes of the BoF/GoM set the stage for the biological 
forces and living resources that comprise the ecosystem in the region. As depicted in 
Figure 16, light energy from the sun is essential for photosynthesis necessary for primary 
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production. But phytoplankton need more than photosynthesis, they need growth. For 
growth you need nutrients. Nutrients like nitrogen and phosphate are needed to convert 
the glucose to form a higher energy molecule, like ATP. Nutrients are therefore 
necessary in order to have a high level of biomass that can fuel upper trophic levels 
(Mann and Lazier 1996; Jennings, Kaiser et al. 2001). 
There is, however, a conundrum in the marine ecological processes. Sunlight 
comes down and its impact decreases with depth. Nutrients increase with depth. 
Phytoplankton die near the surface in the photic zone after stripping the available 
nutrients, then die and sink. At depth, bacteria work to restore nutrients from dead 
phytoplankton. Hence there is a need for nutrients to get mixed back into the photic 
zone. When sunlight and essential nutrients like phosphorus, nitrogen and silicates 








Figure 17 Simplified Gulf of Maine food web (NOAA) 
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Phytoplankton is consumed in the water by zooplankton. Energy is transferred to 
the next level by organisms that feed on other animals (carnivores) or those that feed on 
both plants and animals. As depicted in Figure 17, the food chain in the Gulf of Maine 
supports adult cod as a keystone species with humans, pinnepeds, and birds also at the 
top of the food chain (Mann and Lazier 1996; Jennings, Kaiser et al. 2001). 
The above provides a basic overview of the physical and biological conditions 
that make the BoF/GoM not only one of the most productive ecosystems in the world, but 
also one of the most unique. These unique processes also create a situation that leaves 
the ecosystem in the marine environment vulnerable to a variety of threats. The 
BoF/GoM is a semi-isolated system. Disturbances in the form of overharvesting, 
pollution, habitat destruction, nutrient overloads have impacts that do not simply get 
"flushed away." Residence time for particles introduced into the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
M a i n e  a r e  e s t i m a t e d  t o  b e  a r o u n d  o n e  y e a r  i n  t h e  i n t e r m e d i a t e  w a t e r  l a y e r ,  a n d  2 - 4  
months in surface waters before exiting over Georges Bank (Personal Corres Townsend). 
So pollution deposited in the basin from the land or the atmosphere does not 
simply disappear. And the warning signs of degradation around the watershed have 
resonated throughout the research for some time now (Hildebrand and Chircop 2010). 
Perhaps Hildebrand, et al. (2002) describes it best: 
The growth of human population and concomitant development in the 
Gulf region have resulted in a series of stresses that impinge upon the 
regional environment. Although limited data exist to fully assess the 
trends in environmental quality in the Gulf of Maine, and this ecosystem 
appears to remain healthy overall, the warning signs of degradation 
throughout the Gulf are clear in the research results of the last two 
decades. Tons of raw and partially treated sewage are discharged into the 
Gulf each day, resulting in several hundred thousands of acres of 
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productive shellfish habitat being closed to harvesting and serious loss of 
livelihood. Industrial discharges, urban runoff, and agricultural practices 
all introduce toxic contaminants and bacteria to marine and estuarine 
waters on a chronic, sometimes acute basis, with the result that certain fish 
and shellfish exhibit liver lesions, fin rot and other signs of environmental 
stress. Health advisories have been issued in several nearshore regions of 
the Gulf to protect the public from the hazards associated with swimming 
in polluted waters and eating contaminated seafood. Increased fishing 
effort has reduced fish stocks to all time lows and populations of some 
commercially valuable fish species now depend upon an increasingly 
limited number of year classes, and some may not be reproducing 
themselves at all. Coastal habitat has been altered and destroyed by land 
development ever since European settlement several centuries ago and 
development in the coastal zone continues to encroach on environmentally 
significant marine wetlands. The right whale, piping plover and other 
species of wildlife are endangered or declining, and accidental spills of oil 
and other toxic material place additional stresses upon the Gulf 
environment (Hildebrand, Pebbles et al. 2002,424) 
Unfortunately, with so much literature published decrying the threats posed to the 
health and resilience of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem, we still don't seem 
to 'get it'. There is no need to revisit the disturbing trends described in the previous 
section. There are indications, however, that current conditions and governance input 
continue to pursue the failed policies of the past. In 2004, for instance, the Gulf of Maine 
Council on the Marine Environment identified sewage, nutrients, and mercury as the 
three contaminant problems of greatest concern to the region (Pesch and Wells 2004). 
Sewage remains an issue and contributes to bacterial contamination, nutrient 
loading, and, even with secondary treatment, chemicals that are endocrine disruptors, 
persistent organics, and pharmaceuticals. Yet in New Brunswick's largest urban area, 
Saint John, only 58% of the population's sewage is treated - the remainder discharged 
raw into the Bay of Fundy. The systems of many smaller communities are in need 
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upgrading. In Nova Scotia there are still towns that discharge untreated sewage. In the 
U.S., most communities have at least secondary treatment. The exception is Portsmouth, 
New Hampshire, which historically has had a waiver allowing them to discharge sewage 
with only primary treatment (Thompson 2010). 
Mercury is still likely the heavy metal of most concern because of its ubiquitous 
presence in the regional ecosystem and its tendency to bioaccumulate. Mercury enters 
the ecosystem largely through atmospheric deposition from combustion-related sources, 
including utility and non-utility fuel combustion (Pesch and Wells 2004). Even if there is 
limited information on the contaminant levels in the Gulf of Maine, other indicators exist 
that tell us that there may be problems. One indicator is the number of current fish 
consumption advisories in the United States due to bioaccumulative pollutants contained 
in the fish we eat. New Hampshire has 9 current fish advisories, Maine 20 and 
Massachusetts 122. The advisories apply to marine fishes as well as to fishes from all 
lakes and streams in the region. The 2002 EPA advisories for five primary 
bioaccumulative contaminants nationwide showed disturbing trends: 
• Mercury = 2,140 advisories in 45 states active in 2002 (up 11% from 2001, up 
138% from 1993) 
• PCBs = 813 advisories active in 2002 in 38 states (up 6% from 2001, up 155% 
from 1993) 
• Chlordane = 97 advisories active in 2002 (down from 99 advisories in 2001) 
• Dioxins = 74 advisories active in 2002 (down 2 from 2001) 
• DDT and metabolites = 48 advisories active in 2002 (up 2 from 2001) 
(EPA 2002) 
The Gulf of Maine Council, or those who participate in the GOMC, has clearly 
sounded alarms over the threats posed by sewage, nutrients, and mercury. There are 
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additional threats posed by the overharvesting of marine resources that, for reasons 
discussed before, are not able to be addressed by the GOMC. The latest data shows that 
cod, a keystone species in the regional ecosystem, is overfished and that overfishing is 
continuing. By law, when a stock is overfished and overfishing persists, there is an 
obligation for the relevant regional fishery management council to take immediate action 
(MSFCMA 1996). As we know from the discussion in the Trends section of this study, 
the NMFS has determined that their population estimates from prior years were overly 
optimistic and that cod populations are now at new lows. Quoting from the report: 
• Currently, the Gulf of Maine cod stock appears to be at a very low 
biomass, which will likely affect harvests of other groundfish stocks from 
the nearshore Gulf of Maine. 
• Management measures have not yet been formulated, but could include 
reductions in other fishing opportunities, including recreational catches. 
• NOAA is taking immediate and responsible steps now to work with 
fishery leaders, scientists, and managers in the Northeast to make sure the 
assessment results are understood and responded to as quickly and 
effectively as possible 
Preliminary Results 
• Stock is overfished and overfishing is occurring 
• Rebuilding by 2014 is not possible; under the best conditions it could get 
there by around 2018 but under worst, it will be later than 2020. 
• From 2007 onward, recruitment (the number of fish born each year) has 
been below the long- term (1982-2010) average. 
• There are few fish older than age 9, in a stock with potential lifespan of 
roughly 20 years 
• Fish weights-at-age in recent years are generally lower for older fish 
(ages>5) than those in the early 2000-period. 
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• Recreational catches (both landings and discards) have increased 
substantially over the last 15 years. Over the past ten years recreational 
catches have exceeded 30% of the total catch of Gulf of Maine cod. 
• As stock abundance has decreased over time, the distribution of the stock 
has contracted to a much smaller area compared to its distribution in the 
1970s. 
• Similarly, the fishery has also undergone a general contraction over the 
past twenty years and is now operating primarily in the western Gulf of 
Maine in the same area now occupied by the contracted stock. Because of 
this contraction, catch per unit effort in the fishery has remained high, 
despite a large decline in overall stock abundance. (NMFS 2011,1). 
Thus the most recent data from NMFS tells us that their prior estimates of cod 
populations were, frankly, wrong. Cod stock abundance is precariously low and the 
distribution of cod has contracted into the western Gulf of Maine. Decades of 
management by NMFS and the NEFMC have done this fishery few favors. 
It should be clear by now that conditions in the BoF/GoM ecosystem are 
threatened from a number of directions. But an examination of conditions must not be 
limited to the natural physical and biological processes. We have discussed in these last 
few sections some of the most significant physical and natural processes in the region, 
their susceptibility to further deterioration, and presented some of the more relevant law 
and policy that have attempted to control and alter the behavior of humans toward their 
environment. It is important, however, to briefly examine the more general 
socioeconomic situation extant in the Gulf. 
We have discussed the contaminants and pollutants that infect the region. There 
are also ample sources that can give a better history than I can about the boom and bust 
nature of the fisheries in the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine. Numerous books and 
articles detail the environmental tragedies and administrative incompetence that typify 
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overfishing and the collapse of one stock after another (Harris 1999; Dobbs 2000See, e.g. 
; Hanna, Blough et al. 2000). The fact remains that our regulatory system has still not 
figured out how to deal with overcapacity - or too many boats chasing too few fish. It is 
not surprising that the hands of our government regulators are tied not only with 
jurisdictional limitations but their ability to reduce fleet size is hampered by political 
pressure: 
Q: Okay. Your goal is sustainability. What would have to change from a 
governance standpoint to make this a manageable, achievable goal? 
A: I think one of the hardest things for the Council and government to 
deal with is the issue of capacity. It's very difficult, and with political 
pressure, to say "okay, we have 1400 boats fishing and there's only room 
for 400." There's a certain aspect of social engineering, a certain aspect of 
designing how many permits each state gets, and this and that. The 
Council knows it has to reduce capacity. There have been a number of 
plans that have gone through in terms of buy-backs. The industry had a 
buy-back program. The goal of the program, including the goal of the 
Council, is to maintain the general diversity and make-up of the fleet. So 
same percentages, same numbers of owner-operator boats, that's always 
been the goal. Some people fish offshore for the day, some for a week. 
You have inshore boats, draggers, gill netters, hook boats. Some boats 
need 40 days, some need 80, some say they just want 10 days, that's all. 
But none of them can have what they want. There's just not enough for all 
these boats who just want ten days so that they can supplement their catch. 
They just want 10 days. So capacity is just a huge issue. In fact, there's a 
number of things we do that in my opinion we should be addressing 
capacity first. Once you get it down to a manageable number then you 
don't have all the pressure to be flexible and be easy on them. That's a 
huge reason why tilings in the past didn't work very well, because we had 
open capacity and the amount of pressure on the council, on the agency, 
the National Marine Fisheries Service, on the politicians. The amount of 
pressure from this huge group was just too much to put in there what was 
needed. You've got to get the numbers down to manageable numbers by 
matching the sustainable harvest with the capacity of the fleet to catch 
them. (US Federal Employee 3) 
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So our conditions analysis must include the very strong influence of special 
interests and the politicians that promote them. 
But enough about the fish; the region has a land-based side and those activities 
should be examined if only briefly. The fact is that along with our abundant fish, the 
forests of this watershed have been one of the true sources of wealth. Since the arrival of 
Europeans settlers in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region pushed deep into the 
material, clearing forests for farms and harnessing the power and energy of swift rivers to 
mill old-growth timber. The first lumber boom began in earnest two centuries ago in the 
heart of the region. Between 1840 - 1880 thousands of lumber schooners sailed to the 
head tides of the Penobscot, the Merrimack, the Androscoggin, and many others to load 
the logs that had been driven downstream from the far reaches of the watershed. Scores 
of lumber mills ringed the basin producing clapboards, boards, and timbers. To facilitate 
the transportation of logs the ecosystem was essentially "remodeled." Rivers were 
straightened, splash dams installed, and ponds and lakes were raised, thus enhancing 
spring water flows and rendering brooks drivable (Conkling 1995). 
There were environmental impacts, of course, that persist to this day. Fish 
spawning habitats were destroyed, dams blocked fish migration, and heavy 
accumulations of bark and sawdust were left behind in the streams and estuaries or 
flushed down rivers to settle in bays and estuaries. Together with sediment from lands 
where trees had been cleared for lumber or farms caused coastal rivers, bays, and shallow 
harbors to silt up. Spawning and nursery areas were destroyed. Trout and salmon 
abandoned many of these streams or failed to reproduce (Pesch and Wells 2004). 
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The exploitation of forests and land-based resources continued and took a variety 
of forms. The industrial revolution began to drive the region in the 1790s. Shoe making, 
clothing, wool and cotton textiles, tanneries, and ultimately pulp and paper were powered 
first by water and then by steam. As small mercantile towns developed into mill towns, 
dams were enlarged and more were built. Wood was needed to supply the heat to create 
the steam. By 1920 the harvesting of Maine's remaining2 million acres of "virgin 
forests" were being harvested at a rate 3.5 times faster than replacement. Chemicals, 
dyes, and other pollutants were dumped into the rivers. These constituents, together with 
raw sewage from growing mill towns flowed into the receiving waters of the Bay of 
Fundy and Gulf of Maine. Electrification and better technology enabled mills to flourish 
and there was seemingly no end to the chemicals and toxic effluent dumped into the 
rivers and bay. Clear-cutting techniques scarred the landscape of the northern forest 
(Conkling 1995; Pesch and Wells 2004; CoML 2012). 
The conditions that stem from this serial exploitation show no signs of abating. 
While federal and related state and provincial environmental laws and regulations 
enacted in the 1970's have had an undeniable positive impact in the form of cleaner air, 
lakes, and rivers, locally and regionally rapid population growth, coastal development, 
and increasing user conflicts have degraded natural resources and led to declines in both 
environmental integrity and general productivity (Ullsten 2003). Historic and on-going 
human activities in and around the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed and beyond 
have led to increasing ecosystem alterations in a variety of forms due chiefly to 
overextraction of marine organisms, invasions of nonindigenous (exotic) species, 
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chemical pollution, eutrophication, toxic phytoplankton blooms, alteration of physical 
habitat, and the consequences of global climate change (Steneck 2001). 
Thus the coastal areas that provide services necessary for human existence as well 
as essential habitats for a significant portion of commercially valuable marine species are 
reeling from the effects of habitat loss, pollution, and overfishing that have reduced 
populations of coastal fish and other species to historically low levels of abundance and 
diversity (VanderZwaag 1995; Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000). Further, larger coastal 
population leads invariably to larger sewage treatment facilities, expanded solid waste 
landfills, increased recreational use, and other environmental pressures (Cicin-Sain and 
Knecht 1998). Future conflicts will for sure include new challenges, like competition for 
and threats posed by ports and increased shipping (Portland, Maine is the largest oil port 
on the east coast, for instance), aquaculture, energy needs, including wind, tidal, LNG 
exploration, transportation, and storage, and oil and gas exploration, not to mention 
continued overharvesting and climate change (CoML 2012). 
So for centuries exploitation, and frequently horribly excessive exploitation, of 
the natural resources in the region have been allowed to continue seemingly unabated. Is 
this simply another case where ".. .the same governments have always done only what 
the public permitted, or pressured, them to do" (Dempsey 2004,4). So where is the 
public - the residents of the region who are witnesses to the exploitation or are victimized 
in some way by it? 
The public, those who live and work and play around the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
Maine are, largely, absent. In the previous chapter it was stated that common or public 
interests only prevail over special interests when the voice of the people collectively 
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demand that the 'powers that be' rise in the face of pressure from single or special 
interests to act for the public good. The silence of the public in this region confronted 
with a legacy of ecosystem plundering is almost deafening. With respect to the damaging 
logging practices of the 19th century described above, Conkling (1995) even seems a bit 
stunned when he laments: 
It is a striking fact that during the logging era almost no voices were raised 
for retaining any areas of the coast, lakeshores, forests, or mountains in a 
pristine condition. This was true as well in New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia, where extensive forests remain in public ownership even today. 
Most people of the nineteenth century would have found preservation of 
virgin forests a strange and even antisocial notion. Progressive people of 
the first half of the nineteenth century believed the forest was a useful but 
temporary resource, which would be cleared to make way for farms. As a 
result of this history, the Gulf of Maine watershed contains only tiny, 
accidental remnants of forest in a primeval condition, the scarcity of which 
makes it difficult to gauge the degree to which the biological diversity of 
the region may have been compromised (Conkling 1995,179-80). 
And today - where is the public? An ecosystem appears to be unraveling around 
the basin and there is hardly a whisper of protest from those who are most affected. 
Without an educated and active public movement, what chance is there to overcome the 
pressures from single or special interests in order to act for the public good? 
Recall that our model ecosystem-based approach requires conditions that are 
iterative with collaborative efforts by scientists and community to gain and share 
knowledge necessary to determine the conditions that are factors in any negative trends. 
What we have seen is that collaboration is accomplished chiefly through the Gulf of 
Maine Council on the Marine Environment. While that forum is apparently a valuable 
tool for discussion and interaction between agency heads from both Canada and the U.S., 
it does not appear to impact the decision-making of any of the participating agencies. In 
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a discussion of the data generated by Gulfwatch, a GOMC backed project that funds the 
collection and analysis of mussel tissue collected from around the BoF/GoM. It is 
generally considered a "signature" activity by the Council. But do the results have any 
impact on decision-making within the agencies that participate in the Council? 
It's a good thing to do together, and we know that knowing the levels of 
contaminants in sentinal species is a good thing that will inform decision­
making. Okay, we've been doing it for all of these years, we have great 
data, we know what the trends are, but we haven't yet gone that next step 
to say, okay, how significant? And what do I and others have to do about 
it. So, that's our next step and I think sometimes in the Gulf of Maine, we 
do things because we know that we've agreed that they're the right thing 
and we have shared interest, but either we haven't gotten to it yet, or we 
haven't had the mindset to make the link into decision-making. Because, I 
can't, frankly, John, point to anything, quite frankly, that information 
generated through the Gulf of Maine process that's changed decision­
making. Maybe that's unfair to say not anything. I know that actually 
Gulfwatch data, I think, in New Hampshire is being used for shellfish 
harvesting area. So, there are some examples, I just don't have the 
information to know all of that. But, overall, if we think of Gulfwatch and 
all the data that we've generated and so on these various analytes and 
contaminants, okay, how significant is it, and do we have to do anything? 
I don't know. (Canadian Federal Employee 2). 
There is no doubt that the Gulf of Maine Council provides an excellent forum for 
discussion, but does it represent a true collaboration? Do its activities result in decisions 
that are implemented through its members? It appears that this is not the case - certainly 
not because the individuals who are part of the Council aren't trying. I have observed 
them in action repeatedly over the years. They are, simply, jurisdictionally bound and are 
unable to go outside the interests and mandate of their respective agencies. As a result, 
true collaboration is not possible. 
I think, John, it's hard for the council to be in this decision making, 
dictating, leading role when everything is so disparate from jurisdiction to 
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jurisdiction. The Gulf is not managed as a gulf. Not everybody is using 
the same standards for water quality, for health of the ecosystem, for 
what's a functioning estuary, to you name it. There isn't a standard there, 
and I think until you have an agreement on what is acceptable, it's very 
difficult to have a decision-making process that manages a whole system 
like that that spreads across three states and two provinces. (US NGO 4) 
And what if there is a problem detected by members of the Gulf of Maine Council 
that is negatively impacting the health and resilience of the Gulf. Will the GOMC act? 
Q: Okay, let's assume that there's a suite of indicators and that there's a 
problem that's been detected, be it contaminants in St. John or 
contaminants in Portland, and it's brought before the council by a 
member. 
A: You mean by someone outside of New Brunswick, for instance? 
Q: What in reality can happen? 
A: Decision-making wise, getting back to your original theme on this, 
honestly, I don't think anything is going to happen. I think it will be an 
informal kind of thing where it will be brought to the council's attention, 
and the New Brunswick person sitting at the table is probably already 
aware of it, and if they aren't they sure will be after that particular council 
discussion, but I don't think the council is going to do anything itself with 
it. I think the council is leading, or participating in the process so that it 
can give that information to those jurisdictions. I don't think it's going to 
become a Gulf-wide regulatory system. I think that if there's even a 
breath of that intent it would kill ESIP. I think it's just providing objective 
information about what's healthy and what's not. And if New Brunswick, 
for instance, if St. John Harbor isn't meeting that particular measure or 
standard, then I guess it's still is going to ultimately fall on New 
Brunswick as to what they're going to do with it. (US NGO 4) 
Thus our examination of the natural physical and biological conditions extant in 
the region tends to indicate that the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem is under 
stress from a variety of sources. Overfishing, chemical pollution, nutrient overloads, 
shoreland development, habitat destruction, and climate change are all actors in a 
scenario that can only serve to weaken the resiliency of the ecosystem. Further, the 
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socioeconomic conditions that we have looked at seem to indicate that there is no one 
body that has the ability to accumulate data pertinent to these various threats and act to 
counter the trends. The only entity that provides a forum for discussion among the 
various responsible government agencies on both sides of the border is locked into a 
pattern that limits their collaborative efforts mostly to talk, not necessarily action. 
In the governance of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, the Gulf of Maine Council 
could conceivably act as the lead or overarching institution with the ability to guide the 
adaptation of government responsibilities in the region. Although many members 
indicate that it is not the role that the GOMC was created to play, it has played a similar 
role in the past. There have been times when members of the Gulf of Maine Council 
would challenge each other to do a better job with their environmental management 
functions: 
I mean the goals that we've set are pretty ambitious. We do some stuff. 
We do a lot of stuff. But, I think in terms of our mandate as one of those 
agencies around the table, who's not a signatory, by the way, they are fully 
signatory in spirit, we should go back within EC and say, look, coastal 
habitat in the Gulf of Maine is a real priority, it's shared by lots of others, 
what we're doing now is contributing toward it, but we've got to double 
up our investment of money and people and designating more protected 
areas, etc. For little brief periods in the Council's history, we had that 
kind of challenge function, and where councilors would come to the table 
and say, we agreed we were going to do more on coastal habitat, so, rep 
from New Hampshire, what have you done? Uh.. .we only have twenty 
miles of coastline, so go away. But, I think that's what's really missing 
and I think we need to get back at, because it's gotten too nice.. .The fact 
is that we all recognize that we need to all work together to achieve our 
own selfish objectives and those shared goals, but I think we do need to go 
more aggressively at upping the ante. It's only moral persuasion and/or 
embarrassment. There's definitely a role for that, but I don't want to 
necessarily embarrass the Minister of Environment from Nova Scotia, but 
I want him or her to be challenged to come to the table and say, looking at 
those goals and objectives, Nova Scotia is going to put in a stronger 
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sewage management system. We commit to that, investing in it... 
(Canadian Federal Employee 2) (Emphasis added) 
As we have seen, however, the overall feeling of the members of the GOMC is 
that its role is as a forum. There is simply no initiative to play a larger role. Of course, 
without participation by fishery management it is still questionable whether the Council 
could play an effective role as an overarching institutional entity. 
The conditions examination has also failed to turn up any significant involvement 
with the public or with communities in order to educate them about the potential threats 
to the ecosystem. There doesn't appear to be any mechanism to overcome the influence 
of special interests that seek to use the natural resources of the region for their private 
gain. All in all, then, it is fair to conclude that the overall conditions in the BoF/GoM are 
not consistent with the ecosystem-based approach ideal. 
Are these conditions likely to be turned around? Is there hope that a new regime 
can develop that can counter the negative environmental trends and provide a mechanism 
for the public good to take precedence over special interests? This will be examined in 
the nest section. 
Projecting Developments. In our ideal system, reliable knowledge must underpin 
the projection of developments. If trends and conditions are such that projected 
developments appear to take a community away from its goals, away from progress 
toward human dignity, and toward a weakened, less resilient ecosystem, there needs to be 
a system that will reward those who bring these issues to the attention of policy makers. 
There also must be a way for policy makers to make adaptive changes in an attempt to 
reverse negative trends without fear of retribution from a system more concerned with 
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power and wealth than long-term environmental viability. Strong public and community 
participation is a requirement for reliable assessment and projection of developments 
(Table 44). 
Table 44 Projecting Developments 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
Through regular public 
education and outreach, an 
involved public collaborates 
with academic institutions, 
scientists, and policy makers to 
understand reliable data and 
project developments. 
Public education rare and 
outreach even more rare. Other 
than the fisheries, where fishers 
play active role in development 
of FMP's, there is little in the 
way of public collaboration with 
scientists and policy makers to 
understand data and project 
developments. 
With the input of 
knowledgeable public, scientists 
and policy makers can 
acknowledge mistakes or policy 
failures, learn from them, and 
make adaptive changes, to 
reverse negative trends without 
fear of retribution from the 
governance system. 
There is no pool of 
knowledgeable public due to 
lack of basin-wide or even 
community outreach. Adaptive 
change occurs only after long 
periods of research of 
departments and experts. Fear 
of retribution from public 
(especially fishers) or from 
political sources for failed 
policy is not uncommon. 
In Chapter III we learned that projecting developments requires regular public 
education and outreach, meaning that an involved public collaborates with academic 
institutions, scientists, and policy makers to understand reliable data and project 
developments. We have thus far examined the physical and natural conditions that drive 
the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region and described the apparent threats to the 
resilience of the natural processes that combine to furnish the region with valuable goods 
and services. The trends, we have seen, appear to be trending away from the goals of the 
various agencies that control activities from sector to sector. Yet in the previous sections 
of this chapter this study we have failed to turn up any significant consistent involvement 
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with the public or with communities in order to educate them about the potential threats 
to the ecosystem. There is always the danger, however, that government agencies will 
insist that they are in control - that they have the expertise and resources to reverse the 
trends. 
An exchange highlighted by Brunner and Lynch (2010) as part of a discussion 
about the need to move away from scientific management toward a more adaptive and 
community-assisted governance regime, might prove helpful. Their example centers on a 
debate about climate change that took place more than 20 years ago. As they describe it, 
the exchange began with an editorial Introduction that was written for a September, 1989, 
single-topic issue of Scientific American entitled "Managing Planet Earth." The 
Introduction acknowledged that "changes in individual behavior are surely necessary but 
are not sufficient" responses to climate change. The Introduction went on to emphasize 
the need to expand the issue: 
It is as a global species that we are transforming the planet. It is only as a 
global species - pooling our knowledge, coordinating our actions and 
sharing what the planet has to offer - that we have any prospect for 
managing the planet's transformation along pathways of sustainable 
development. Self-conscious, intelligent management of the.earth is one 
of the great challenges facing humanity as it approaches the 21st century. 
(Brunner and Lynch 2010b, 13) 
Hendrik Tennekes, the Director of Research for the Royal Netherlands 
Meteorological Institute picked up on the liberal use of the term 'management', and all 
that it means to the status quo, and also took a shot at EPA's newly launched program 
"Stabilize the Climate System" in a letter published in Weather in 1990: 
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I am terrified by the hubris, the conceit, the arrogance implied by words 
like these.. .Who are we to claim that we can manage the planet? We 
can't even manage ourselves. Who are we to claim we can run the 
planetary ecosystem? In an ecosystem no one is boss, virtually by 
definition. Why are we, with our magnificent brains, so easily seduced by 
technocratic totalitarianism? (Brunner and Lynch 2010b, 13) 
This exchange highlights the message of Chapter III that there is seeming 
consensus that the way we are managing the human activities that impact the ecosystem 
is not working. We have discussed Dryzek's explanation that there may simply be too 
much on the government's agenda - that it no longer has the support, resources, or 
expertise necessary to take on the more complex problems created with population 
explosion, global trade, and increasing resource exploitation pressures. This is the 
"implementation deficit" that saddles government agencies with more work as problems 
increase and responsibilities expand - all with shrinking economic support (Dryzek 
1997). With limited public outreach and education, and no overarching and accountable 
entity working with scientists, managers, educators, communities, and the public to teach 
them about the threats and learn from the perspectives of all participants, the chances of 
overcoming the influence of special interests that seek to use the natural resources of the 
region for their private gain. 
Chapter III, and to some extent Chapter IV, attempt to explain why strong public 
participation needs more than just lip service. It is in fact an imperative that: 
.. .abounds with allusions to democratic ideals and principles and the good 
things assumed to result from stakeholder exercise. Implicit throughout is 
the notion that broad public involvement is the principal route to improved 
decision making, especially where the risks are controversial and disputed. 
Outcomes to be expected, it is claimed, include increased trust in experts 
and decision makers, greater consensus among publics and between 
science and politics, reductions in conflict and controversy, greater 
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acceptance of preferred solutions, and increased ease in implementation 
(Hildebrand 2009,31). 
Given the degradation of the natural environment in the BoF/GoM, and the threats 
that peck away at it from many directions, our exercise in projecting developments is 
primarily a search for the development of improved governance process. Governing is not 
necessarily the exclusive preserve of government; to govern means to influence, shape, regulate, 
or determine outcomes, and in this sense there are many other agencies and institutions that are 
involved in governing a social order (Kitthananan 2006). 
For purposes of this study, developments in governance must begin to trend toward 
the goals espoused in the ideal ecosystem-based governance model. More citizen 
involvement, public participation, and more collaboration involving scientists, policy 
makers, academic institutions, and the public is a possible way to permit governance to 
act and for the public to understand the importance of action. It is a device for decision 
making to trend more toward the public interest. Again, any trend toward greater 
community involvement should not be a threat to traditional governance. The role of 
government simply must begin to shift. It doesn't need to disappear or shrink. A 
reshuffling of government tasks and a greater awareness of the need to cooperate with 
other societal actors does not render traditional government interventions obsolete. 
It merely implies a growing awareness, not only of the limitations of traditional public 
command-and-control as a governing mechanism, but also as responses to societal 
problems which require broader sets of approaches and instruments (Kooiman 2003; 
Hildebrand 2009). 
There are meaningful collaborative efforts that either exist or at least have been 
attempted around the region that have included some combination of scientists, 
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regulators, citizens, and, at times, industry. They should not be discounted. I will 
discuss some examples of developments from which we can learn. 
One organization that promotes collaboration is, of course, the Gulf of Maine 
Council on the Marine Environment. We have discussed the work of this group 
previously and will return to it again in future sections so there will be no further 
discussion of the GOMC in this section. 
Another group that provides a forum for collaboration and cooperation in the 
region is the Bay of Fundy Ecosystem Partnership. Its mission is two-fold: 
. Promoting the ecological integrity, vitality, biodiversity and productivity of the 
Bay of Fundy ecosystem, in support of the social well-being and economic 
sustainability of its coastal communities 
• Facilitating and enhancing communication and co-operation among all citizens 
interested in understanding, sustainably using and conserving the resources, 
habitats and ecological processes of the Bay of Fundy (BoFEP 2011). 
While much of the proceedings of BoFEP centers on the Bay of Fundy - the 270 
kilometre (167 mile) northern extension of the Gulf of Maine, its influence spreads 
throughout the BoF/GoM region. Membership in BoFEP is open to ".. .all interested 
citizens who share the general Vision, including community groups, resource harvesters, 
scientists, resource managers, coastal zone planners, businesses, government agencies, 
industries, shipping interests and academic institutions" (BoFEP 2011) (Figure 18). 
The Vision of BoFEP is both comprehensive and inclusive: 
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• Conservation, protection and management of Bay of Fundy resources and their 
habitats should be ecosystem-based and reflect an holistic understanding of 
ecosystem structure, processes and interactions. 
• Resource development and other coastal zone activities should be based on 
ecologically sound integrated coastal planning and management. 
• Coastal planning and management should be transparent and open to participation 
by resource users, coastal communities, industries, scientists, governments, 
managers and all other individuals and groups with interests in the Bay of Fundy 
ecosystem. 
• Effective communication and active co-operation among all citizens with an 
interest in the Bay of Fundy, and linkages with groups and programs that share 
similar objectives are vital to this enterprise. 
BoFEP also sponsors a biannual Science Proceedings that is generally well-
attended by scientists, regulators, watershed groups, and other interested parties from 
around the BoF/GoM region. I have attended two of these multi-day forums and was 
impressed by the diversity of the participants. Presentations were by scientists, 
regulators, and even watershed group representatives. Discussion was promoted. BoFEP 
also frequently hosts Citizens' Forums with "learning circles" designed to inform diverse 
groups that include community and other organizations about topics important to the Bay 
of Fundy ecosystem and publishes an e-magazine called the "Fundy Tidings" as a tool to 
inform the community (BoFEP 2011). 
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Tha Structure of BoFEP 
A "Virtual Institute" 
Figure 18 The BoFEP Structure (BoFEP 2011) 
BoFEP also partners with DFO and others to promote citizens' groups and 
watershed organizations around the Bay of Fundy. One example is the Minas Basin 
Working Group which, as we can see below, has had success and struggles, as related by 
an individual involved with its formation and operations: 
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A: So that's a working group of BOFEP, which is the Bay of Fundy 
Ecosystem Partnership. Basically, that group the Minas Basin working 
group was formed around 1998, and the ultimate goal of the group has 
changed over the years, and it's now to develop integrated management 
plans for the Minas Basin watershed.. .It's a collaboration of industry to 
some extent, primarily government and academia, some citizens, and non­
government organizations. 
Q: And by industry are we chiefly talking fishing? 
A: We've been trying, they've been trying to get industry at the table, and 
some of it's aquaculture, but for obvious reasons it's difficult to get them 
at meetings, etc. 
Q: What about any attempts at pulp and paper, forestry? 
A: No. Nothing directly land-based. No. 
Q: And the goal of BOFEP would be? 
A: The goal? It would be increased communication, increased 
effectiveness of work with the goal of more comprehensive management 
in marine resources. And it's well recognized that land use and land 
activity is a big part of that. Even if you go to the website and not see a lot 
of land-based references, people at the table are aware that it's a big 
issue.. ..Shoreline development is really not an issue, and it's... 
Q: By agriculture you're talking about erosion, chemical runoff... 
A: Yeah, runoff. There are other types of agriculture. Blueberries for 
example rely a ton on chemicals. 
Q: The actors that participate in those activities, do they show up at the 
table? 
A: Nope, they don't. The Minas Basin is primarily, it's touted as being a 
community group, or community-working group, but it's really not. It's a 
bunch of government people. There are a couple of citizens that come 
occasionally, but it's primarily government and academic people at the 
table. ... I guess it's been a really long process. A couple of years ago we 
had community workshops and we had four community workshops all 
around the Minas Basin to identify what the major issues are. If you want 
I can give you a report. And so from there the idea was that we were 
going to develop action plans and get the community involved. We asked 
for volunteers who would be willing to work on this issue with others in 
the area, and we had hoped to develop action plans for all these issues, 
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such as water quality came out number one, agriculture came out number 
two, and then forestry came out I think number three. But we didn't get 
funding for a full-time coordinator, so it's really a resource deficiency 
problem. Right now we have lots of things we could do, and lots of 
direction from the community directly to where they want to see change 
happen, and it's primarily land use and land-based activities. But, there's 
just no money there now for a coordinator. 
It's interesting, actually. I mean, we've gone really far, but we lost the 
momentum, and now people are starting to go ".. .oh why bother because 
they don't do anything" because we didn't get to take that next step. It's 
unfortunate. We do have a lot of good background information. We have 
the socioeconomic overview of the area. We have the community 
workshop reports, and we have a draft ecosystem overview. The material 
is there, but there's no crisis, so there's no funding. Primarily, Gulf of 
Maine/Bay of Fundy funding will go toward Gulf of Maine broader issues, 
making of the counsel, and all that stuff. (Canadian Federal Employee 3) 
So the Minas Basin group appears, at least as of this 2007 interview, to be 
struggling chiefly because of lack of funding. The point may be that people are at least 
trying, government/citizen partnerships are being tested and, if there are failures, lessons 
should be learned. 
The region is certainly not without successful efforts at community partnerships. 
There are at least two examples of community governance initiatives that are impressive. 
The Saltwater Network is one such example. Saltwater Network was created in 2001 to 
enable and support community-based management and conservation for the health of our 
communities and the resources of the Gulf of Maine. 
Since the Saltwater Network was created it has helped support two marine support 
centers and started four other centers. Their goals include: support for capacity-building, 
working with existing and new civil institutions involved in community capacity-
building, helping groups and individuals to access learning opportunities that support 
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community-based management, provide opportunities for diverse groups and 
communities around the Gulf of Maine to meet, in order to share their knowledge, skills 
and awareness about community-based management (Saltwater Network). Indeed, the 
principles articulated by the group reflect a strong bias toward an ecosystem- and 
community-based approach to governance and public participation (Figure 19). 
Saltwater Network Principles 
The principles provide fundamental guidance to all operations of Saltwater Network. This includes its 
governance and all actions of the core part of the organization. It is not binding on members except in 
those aspects of their activities that involve participation in the network. 
The principles illuminate one another and should be considered as a whole. 
1. The Saltwater Network recognizes that the health of our communities, our economies, and the 
environment are inextricably linked. 
2. The Saltwater Network works to achieve health and quality of community and resources for 
many generations into the future. 
3. The Saltwater Network recognizes, respects, and encourages diversity of people, perspectives, 
and approaches. 
4. The Saltwater Network works to resolve opposing interests and opinions in a creative, 
cooperative and constructive manner, and to achieve results through dialogue. 
5. The Saltwater Network enables its participants to share knowledge, skills and awareness. 
6. The Saltwater Network protects privacy and confidentiality of personal information, sensitive 
geographic information, or information that materially diminishes competitive position. 
7. In all the Saltwater Network's activities, collaboration and negotiation will be used in order for 
authority to be vested in, functions performed at, and resources used by the smallest or most 
local part that includes all relevant and affected parties. 
8. The Saltwater Network values the work involved in community capacity-building by providing 
funding that matches the organizational capacity, preparedness required for the proposed work, 
and by drawing on the knowledge and skills within the network whenever possible. 
9. The Saltwater Network gives high value and priority to people's unique historical attachment to 
resources, places and communities. 
10. The Saltwater Network recognizes citizen participation as an inherent and necessary good, not 
merely a means to an end. 
11. The Saltwater Network promotes, supports and facilitates collaborations among diverse 
organizations and institutions, based on mutual respect and clearly articulated principles, 
practices, and outcomes worked out between all involved parties. 
12. The Saltwater Network implements responsive and accountable processes in all its activities 
including fundraising, grantmaking and fund development. 
(Saltwater Network) 
Figure 19 Saltwater Network Principles 
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How did the Saltwater Network get started? What role does it play? How did it 
spread from the Canadian side of the Bay of Fundy to downeast Maine communities? 
One of those involved in the founding of the network spoke to me about the Network, 
and its evolution: 
A: It's like a community based civil institution. It's not a government 
thing. It wasn't set up like.. .it's never really been supportive in this 
operation.. .the government. We rent offices for the GIS center. We 
actually sell maps to DFO now. We do contract work for the government. 
More or less sustainable with a good deal of support from private 
foundations. So, that's going along. And while we're doing that, we find 
out there's another center across the Bay at Eastport that's very similar. 
At the same time we're starting to talk to people.. .And they came 
up.. .their grand opening was the same day as ours, by chance. We started 
doing this and people came up from Stonington, and people from NAMA, 
people going back and forth.. .the fishermen's forum, and all that. We 
started to say, we're getting a lot out of this stuff. This is a really 
interesting approach. That's when we started talking about actually trying 
to support that kind of work.. .community based management, and support 
peer learning. We started with some support again from Campbell to talk 
about some kind of bioregional community foundation. Everyone we 
talked to said don't just send checks out. This should be something people 
are engaged in and supports capacity ability and convening and education. 
So, we started Salt Water Network.. .there's a brochure there.. .and that 
essentially supports community based management around the Gulf of 
Maine through grant making, convening, learning opportunities, and some 
peer.. .(Canadian NGO 1). 
So given the principles of the Saltwater Network, combined with the Marine 
Resource Centers supported by the Network, there appears to be at least one meaningful 
community participation effort in existence in the BoF/GoM watershed. There are others 
that should be noted. 
The Atlantic Coastal Action Program (ACAP) is another example of a successful 
community-based government effort is the. ACAP is a model of community-based 
ecosystem governance. Began in 1991, Environment Canada initiated ACAP as a way to 
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empower local communities to take the lead and address their environmental and coastal 
restoration challenges. Seed money was given the community organizations sufficient to 
provide them with core funding for their work. Beginning in 1998, though continuing to 
provide some funding, the groups were conducting education and outreach, establishing 
key partnerships, and working with busy, industry, and the government collaboratively in 
scientific work as well as direct community action. The work resulted in substantial 
improvements in water quality, reduction in toxic substances, habitat restoration, and 
climate change adaptation measures. There are at least 14 ACAP organizations now in 
communities throughout Atlantic Canada working toward a collective goal of 
"developing capacity to take responsibility for their own futures"(Gardner_Pinfold 2002, 
0-
There are economic implications to the success of ACAP as well. In 2002 it was 
determined that the services delivered by the ACAP groups resulted in a cost savings in 
excess of $65 million over the period (GardnerPinfold 2002). A later study, again 
examining the cost to Environment Canada of its annual contributions to the ACAP 
programs and comparing those costs with the value of the services provided by the ACAP 
groups for the six-year period between 2001/02 to 2006/07. This second study 
demonstrated that the 14 ACAP groups had cost Environment Canada 7.0 million dollars 
over the period and that the value received by EC through the activities of the ACAP 
organizations was assessed at $79 million - a net gain of over $70 million 
(GardnerPinfold 2008). 
Another benefit of community-based groups like ACAP is that they can help to 
bridge jurisdictional gaps between federal, provincial/state, and local governments: 
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Municipalities have the responsibility for land use planning. 
Unincorporated areas are usually the responsibility of the province. It 
varies from Nova Scotia to New Brunswick. Again it sort of broadens our 
outlook. We all try to influence each other, I guess, with our various 
instruments, so through our Atlantic Coastal Action Program, ACAP, 
where we're enabling these community-based organizations, they are 
pretty effective in terms of working together. They have municipalities as 
part of their structure, so they work in terms of, "okay, we know that a 
lack of sewage treatment or adequate sewage treatment is a real issue let's 
make sure that we do the science, that we do the public understanding, we 
build the case for getting sewage treatment." And this is still a real issue 
here where we have a lot of our major municipalities, and a lot of minor 
ones, with no sewage treatment. (Canadian Federal Employee 2). 
There are other examples of public and community involvement around the Bay 
of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, but the Saltwater Network and ACAP stand out by virtue of the 
scope of their success. These initiatives, however, started in the 1980s or early 1990s -
are not new. They certainly cannot be said to represent any growing trend toward 
increased public participation. 
We have seen that recent legislation in Canada under its Oceans Act, Plan, and 
Strategy, call for increased collaboration, public participation, and citizen involvement 
(1996; 1999). The same emphasis on integration, collaboration, and public participation 
is called for under the new Ocean Policy in the U.S. (USCOP 2004; 2010). The 
momentum set by the Canadian government toward integrated coastal management has 
seemingly flagged (Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011). And, in reality, how much difference 
did the language of the Oceans Act make to the development of the Saltwater Network: 
Q: Along comes the 1996 Oceans Act, which tends to put into statutory 
form in Canada a lot of the ecosystem-based principles that you have 
already been working with, basically. What change has it made in your 
ability to carry on or accomplish any of the functions that you're working 
on? 
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A: Well, I think.. .1 don't want tp be negative here.. .1 think the positive 
thing of it is that it was there, and so when we started the marine resource 
center, I wouldn't say.. .there may have been other people doing this 
work.. .I'm relatively new to it compared to others.. .1 would say that 
knowing it was there, when we started the marine resource center for 
example, we said, well at least we're going the same way our federal 
government is going. At some point they'll turn around and support what 
we're doing, because we're doing what they're talking about. We're 
bringing everybody together, we're looking at integrated management. 
Q: Here we are we're actually doing it? 
A: We're doing the stuff, so at some point they'll turn to us and say let's 
partner in this. That was.. .you know it never happened ... the partnering 
thing never happened, but the fact that it was there probably was an 
incentive to that kind of community-based civil society. Quite a bit has 
happened. So, I suppose in an odd way it's been a kind of an incentive 
just having those words on paper. The fact that you could say here is an 
act of parliament, you know? It was passed years ago that says this stuff is 
real.. .not only is it real, it's the law of the land, although we know the 
regs were never written and that there was no policy around it or anything, 
but still it does have weight. But, the actual substance of a commitment to 
this work hasn't made any difference to our work. We're on our own up 
here. I mean we're getting funded by Boston foundations to do work that 
is described in the Ocean's Act. Or Montreal foundations, or whatever, 
it's not all.. .and that's fine. We just went ahead and said okay we'll just 
go ahead, and when the time comes, we know we're going to have to 
engage with the federal government. And so we sort of said well, we'll 
just keep building, and at some point they'll sit down with us and say okay 
let's build this together. But, in the meantime, there's just been no 
substantial communication... (Canadian NGO 1) 
What is clear from the experience of our two community-driven examples is that 
meaningful public participation and integrated community governance at a local or 
regional level is possible with determined public involvement and the assistance of 
funding. Environment Canada saw the possibilities in its partial funding of ACAP - and 
reaped the rewards. For the Saltwater Network, more toward the marine side of the 
land/water interface, funding or other support has been difficult to obtain through 
government or agency sources, but help has come through private foundations and other 
395 
non-governmental sources. Regardless of the source, with financial assistance there can 
be meaningful public participation as part of an ecosystem-based governance regime. 
The experience of Saltwater Network and ACAP as community-based groups 
whose efforts were devoted to public education, outreach, and integrated community 
management may indicate a developing positive trend. They also, including Minas 
Basin, raise questions about the willingness or ability of government agencies, or those 
entities dependent upon government agency funding to fund true citizen participation 
initiatives. 
We have now viewed a lot of information that should put the governance situation 
in the BoF/GoM region into some context. We now to turn to the next and last section of 
Problem Orientation: the task of Inventing, Evaluating, and Selecting Alternatives. 
Inventing. Evaluating, and Selecting Alternatives. As we learned in Chapter III, 
and again in Chapter IV, this component is the essential real-world method for the 
implementation of adaptive governance. Governance, and the ability to invent, evaluate, 
and select alternatives, must be adaptive (Regier and Baskerville 1986; Francis and 
Regier 1995; Straussfogel and Becker 1996; Costanza, Low et al. 2001; Kjasr 2004; 
Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Fiorino 2006; Whiteside 2006; Armitage, Berkes et al. 
2007; Steelman 2010; Brunner 2010a; Brunner and Lynch 2010b). 
Under an adaptive governance regime, policy choices and interventions are 
treated as experiments (NRC 2009), relying explicitly on monitoring, evaluating, 
expanding successful interventions and terminating failed policies instead of expert-
driven planning that relies primarily on science-based technology rather than trial and 
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error (Francis 1993; Costanza, Low et al. 2001; Gunderson 2003; Brunner, Steelman et 
al. 2005; Fiorino 2006; Steelman 2010). 
The characteristics inherent in this broad function are scattered throughout and 
nested within the components of the framework. Rather than risk excessive redundancy 
by setting forth the basics of adaptive management in a separate table, we will, as in 
Chapter IV, move on to the Social and Decision processes where the broad public 
participation, rapid feedback, reliable intelligence, transparent promotion, and appropriate 
value trade-offs capable of creating a process capable of coping with multiple, complex 
systems may be found. 
Social Process 
In this section the social process extant in the BoF/GoM region is explored. This 
chapter is rather front-end loaded and much of the story has been set forth in the Problem 
Orientation section. I will make every effort to avoid unnecessary repetition of issues 
and items that have been set forth above. I should reiterate that this study is an attempt 
by one person to sketch a high altitude view of the social participants in the governance 
process in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. 
It is again important to be reminded that in the social process we must be 
cognizant that every participant in the use of resource services and every player with a 
potential say in the governance of the human activities that impact the ecosystem 
employs strategies in order to pursue particular values and/or outcomes. People tend to 
improve their well-being by acting in ways that they perceive will leave them better off 
than if they had acted otherwise and therefore engage in an interplay of human value 
trade-offs. Generally no amount of "cold, hard facts" collected by "neutral objective" 
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scientists, no amount of "education," or "transparency" can completely neutralize basic 
inherent value differences or perceptions among people. Certainly, however, this 
realization should not take away from the fact that there are common interests and the 
need to attempt to clarify and secure them (Lasswell 1971; Clark, Willard et al. 2000; 
Clark 2002). To the degree possible we will now turn to an examination of the 
participants in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine governance regime. 
Participants. As a reminder of the participant characteristics in ideal ecosystem 
management regime, discussed in Chapter III, there is an expectation or at least the 
opportunity for meaningful participation and input of a broad segment of the regulated 
population in decision making processes (Costanza, Norton et al. 1992; Pauly and 
Maclean 2003). Significant, meaningful public participation is required (Becker 1993; 
Francis 1993; Francis and Regier 1995; Cortner and Moote 1999; Clark 2002; Jackson 
2005; Fiorino 2006; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Participation must be open to 
almost any person or group with a significant interest in the issue (Becker 1993; Kjasr 
2004; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Jackson 2005; Brunner and Lynch 2010b). 
Regulatory agencies must participate in coordinated and integrated fashion and 
allow softer local and regional input into governance (Regier and Baskerville 1986; 
Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Citizen involvement 
and partnership designed to build "civic science" is needed, not public information 
programs to inform passively (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). Better governance and 
enhanced accountability can come through grass roots ecosystem management i.e. the 
ongoing, collaborative governance arrangement in which inclusive coalitions of the 
unalike (citizens, government regulators, small businesses, environmentalists, commodity 
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interests, and others) come together to resolve policy problems affecting the environment, 
economy, and communities of a particular place (Brunner, Colburn et al. 2002; Weber 
2003; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Walker and Salt 2006; Clark 2008; Steelman 2010) 
(See Table 45). 
Table 45 Participants 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
Significant, meaningful public 
participation is required. The expectation 
is for significant meaningful participation 
and input of a broad segment of the 
affected population in decision making 
processes. Participation must be open to 
almost any person or group with a 
significant interest in the issue. Active 
outreach to develop citizen involvement 
and partnerships and build "civic science" 
base 
This is largely a region of top-down, 
traditional government. That said, there 
are some organizations that provide for 
collaboration and public input. GOMC 
provides forum for agency collaboration, 
but membership open only to designated 
agencies. BoFEP has biannual basin-wide 
programs supplemented by other outreach, 
educational, and scientific forums. Other 
citizen groups have managed to develop, 
some with more success than others. Few 
examples of true citizen/government 
partnerships designed to build an educated 
public base. 
Regulatory agencies must participate in 
coordinated and integrated fashion and 
allow softer local and regional input into 
governance. 
There are few discernible examples of 
regulatory agencies participating in softer 
local and regional governance efforts. 
Compliance is generally still enforced 
through formal enforcement and litigation. 
ACAP and the Saltwater Network are two 
notable exceptions. 
Through personal observation and participation, it is my view that there are few 
opportunities for meaningful public participation in the governance regime in the Bay of 
Fundy/Gulf of Maine. In the United States the regulation of activities that impact the 
environment in the region is left to traditional top-down regulation by federal and state 
officials that use the threat of enforcement action in order to induce compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations. 
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Figure 20 U.S. Maritime Boundaries (NOAA) 
With some key variations that will be highlighted in the section on the Decision 
Process devoted to prescriptions, this appears to be relatively similar to the Canadian 
experience. So fragmentation of government jurisdictions is the name of the game in the 
BoF/GoM watershed. 
Figure 20 details the meticulous lines drawn in the sea by U.S. law. In brief, the 
U.S. absolute sovereignty over its territorial land extends to its internal waters and territorial sea, 
including the airspace above and the seabed below. The contiguous zone extends to 24 nautical 
miles. In this zone the U.S. allows the boarding of foreign flag vessels. Finally, the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) was established by presidential proclamation for a variety of purposes, 
including the protection of U.S. fish stocks and the extension of U.S. sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring, exploiting, and managing natural resources in the seabed and subsoil 
(NOAA 2012). 
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U.S. agencies dealing in the coastal margin have very definite geographic lines 
within which to stay. The New England Fishery Management Council, for example, 
knows precisely where they have jurisdiction to regulate U.S. fishing efforts (MSFCMA 
1996): 
Q: NEFMC essentially has jurisdiction over federal fisheries? 
A: Federal fisheries 3 to 200 miles from the coast. We manage species 
throughout their range, so we can manage monk fish from Maine to North 
Carolina. We can manage red crab from Maine to North Carolina and we 
do. Primarily the voting members are from New England, from 
Connecticut to Maine. We don't have a federal region like NMFS does. 
We manage throughout the range. 
Q: The fisheries that are regulated are in federal waters. If I'm in state 
waters I don't need to worry about your regulations? 
A: If you're completely in state waters and only have a state permit 
you're not regulated by the Council or the federal government. If you fish 
in state waters and have a state permit to fish in state waters and have a 
federal permit as well for that same species, then you are bound by the 
federal permit and usually, well all the time, the federal laws are more 
stringent then the state rules. So if you have a federal permit you must 
abide by the more stringent federal permit. That has created problems 
over the years because fishermen are very smart and they find loopholes. 
So what they do is they forfeit their federal permit for a certain period or 
don't renew it for a certain period, fish under their state permit, fish their 
quota in state waters, then apply for their federal permit, because it's a 
yearly federal permit, don't ask me why. So they've been able to get away 
from the federal law because they forfeit their federal permit then get it 
back again. 
Q: Does that happen even in groundfish? 
A: Especially in groundfish. And we don't allocate certain amounts of 
fish to state fisheries. So that they have open access to groundfish. 
Massachusetts, for instance, to my knowledge has an open access 
program. You can still get a permit to catch cod in state waters. 
Q: So you can take your 200 pounds or whatever in federal waters... 
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A: You can take I think it's 800 pounds of Gulf of Maine cod in federal 
waters. When you're done fishing your days, you forfeit your permit you 
can go fish the same cod stock under the state permit, because you 
forfeited your federal. That was going on for years until I sent a letter to 
the state directors and asked them to stop this because in Massachusetts, 
for instance, while we were going down on federal cod landings, we found 
out state landings of cod were going up during the same period three and 
four fold. So we put an end to that. I wrote some letters and Maine came 
down very hard on their partner in Massachusetts because none of the 
other states are going to have the phenomenon where the cod would go in 
shore like they do in Massachusetts state waters. And as soon as they 
came in they would be pounced upon. It was mostly the Gloucester fleet 
and we had public hearings all up and down the coast for two or three 
years and finally they put in some closed areas and NMFS has worked 
over the last couple of years with state folks to address the loopholes in the 
permitting. 
That whole thing that we just talked about in my opinion shows how there 
can be difficulties managing fish, state waters only 0-3 miles, then having 
a different governance policy system 3 - 200. There are problems 
associated with that. There are problems now, and they're only going to 
get worse, as we start regulating recreational fishing. I see in the future 
huge problems with recreational fishing, trying to get that under control, 
and huge problems with state fisheries that are under different governance. 
There laws are not near as strict as the federal laws for rebuilding. And 
that's going to create problems. 
Q: But the stocks are related? 
A: The same stock. (US Federal Employee 3) 
From the perspective of a fisheries manager in a U.S. state marine resource 
agency, however, the 3 mile jurisdictional rule may have some exceptions: 
Q: It seems when we talk about the United States, or even your 
jurisdiction, we're talking about the zone between the low water mark and 
three-miles out. Do you have any authority over anything on the land side 
of that land/water interface? 
A: Limited authority over some anadromous fish species. And then when 
we go beyond three miles because Maine fishermen are bound by state law 
regarding where they fish we have jurisdiction beyond three miles. 
Q: Say that again? 
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A: Maine fishermen are bound by state law regardless where they fish. 
So if they're fishing in federal waters they're bound by state laws still. 
And that came up most recently last week in the context of dragger 
fishermen from Maine landing drag-caught lobsters in Massachusetts. 
Q: I read about that. Now does it make any difference where they land 
the catch? 
A: No. Technically if they landed a load of lobsters in Brazil they'd be 
bound by the conditions of Maine state law. (U.S. State Employee 2) 
The boundaries that are drawn so meticulously in the US impact more than 
fishery management. NOAA was established as a result of the 1969 Stratton 
Commission. Although it was originally envisioned as a cabinet-level twin to NASA, it 
was ultimately placed in the Department of Transportation by then-President Richard 
Nixon. NOAA's broad mandate includes a number of marginally connected divisions, 
including the National Weather Service, federal marine science, marine sanctuaries, 
fisheries managements (beyond state waters) and coastal management (through state 
agencies with approved coastal management plans). 
For purposes pertinent to the ecosystem-based management of the coastal 
margin, NOAA's most recent assessment sets forth a mission statement: "To understand 
and predict changes in the Earth's environment and conserve and manage coastal and 
marine resources to meet our nation's economic, social and environmental needs" 
(NOAA 2004). Among NOAA's five expressed goals is to "Protect, Restore, and 
Manage the Use of Coastal and Ocean Resources through an Ecosystem Approach to 
Management" (NOAA 2004). 
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NOAA is involved at various levels in the BoF/GoM region assisting states on 
coastal issues and with issues related to consistency of state regulation with federal laws, 
but generally only within the federal and state-defined coastal margin: 
Q: In these roles or capacities, do you directly play a role in any of the 
activities that impact the ecosystem? 
A: No I do not. I move money to states. The state coastal programs are 
the regulatory arm here. Neither OCRM nor CSC has any regulatory 
authority to actually make changes on the ground. We partner with the 
states and enable them to do that. 
So the states want to review an activity happening in state waters or just 
outside of state waters where they've designated that they have a real 
interest in the stewardship of those resources they have the ability to block 
or challenge any kind of activity, whether it's a federal or non-federal 
activity, in those areas. Federal consistency is the teeth of the Coastal 
Zone Management Act. 
Q: The geographical region that you work within is pretty much confined 
to the coastal region? 
A: Correct. The state waters are 0-3 miles so in terms of my relationship 
with the states, that's the geography. 
Q: What about inland? Are there different jurisdictional lines in different 
states? 
A: Yes there are. Coastal boundaries were set in place when the 
programs were approved and they can be changed over time. For instance, 
New Hampshire just expanded their coastal boundary a couple of years 
ago to include Great Bay and include some of the tributaries of major 
fresh water flow coming in - so it's more of a watershed approach. Do all 
these coastal program boundaries go up to the top of the watershed? No. 
Most of them, if you look at a national map, tend to stay closer to the 
coastal county line so they'll include all of the coastal counties and maybe 
a county inlet. But that's usually the extent of it so they do not go up to 
the top of the watershed. That is not part of the decision making process 
in terms of setting the boundary and perhaps it should be. (U.S. Federal 
Employee 4) 
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NOAA is also concerned with another important participant in the governance 
regime in the BoF/GoM watershed: municipalities and local governance. The following 
exchange with an employee knowledgeable of NOAA coastal activities tends to show 
that the geographical limitations imposed upon NOAA's Ocean Coastal Service may also 
an impediment to the assistance of watershed-wide community support: 
Q: And yet the states are often handcuffed somewhat by local 
governments when it comes to land use, zoning and these kinds of non-
point pollution factors? 
A: Yes. Particularly in this region in the Gulf of Maine and in New 
England in general a lot states operate by home rule and the state/local 
relationship becomes dicey in terms of local governments really want to 
do things their way and a lot of the land use decisions that are setting 
precedent and are very important in terms of set backs or any kind of 
mitigation for coastal hazards, sea level rise, or erosion or any of those 
types of issues are all made at the local level. So NOAA then is two steps 
removed from that real decision making and it's really up to us to give the 
state the capacity to then work with the local government on making real 
change whether it's helping with their master plan or providing technical 
to local folks through protocols or model ordinances or things that can 
actually help them on the ground. 
Q: Can NOAA provide funding to watershed groups that would help 
mitigate some of that local influence? 
A: That's actually up to the states. When we give money to the states if 
they have enough cash to then move some of those funds, like New 
Hampshire for example, in the past has moved $100,000 out of the state 
office to exactly what you're saying - to watershed groups, to regional 
planning commissions. Then you're really building capacity of watershed 
groups. But there is a problem in that those funds need to be spent within 
the coastal zone boundary that's been set and approved by the program. 
So if you have a watershed group that's way up stream you'd be hard-
pressed to actually get that approved. The fluids really are meant to be 
spent within the coastal boundaries. You might be able to get a project 
approved that's in the next county in if you make a case that non-point 
source pollution or there's some issue that's heavily influencing the 
coastal zone and work needs to be done in that region to have an impact 
on the coastal zone. The sticking point is that we hold a pretty firm line in 
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terms of NOAA funds being spent within that coastal zone boundary 
which may not extend up into the watershed. (US Federal Employee 4) 
From the above we have learned something about participants like the NEFMC, a 
state fishery management employee, and NOAA. Through them we learned about 
municipalities and local governance whose participation in governance in the coastal 
margin is critical. Simply put, participants have limited authority, fragmented 
jurisdiction, and often lack funding. We next look at the water quality in the US which, 
as we learned earlier, is the responsibility of the Environmental Protection Administration 
(EPA). 
The Environmental Protection Agency was created in 1970 during the 
administration of President Richard Nixon as the product of a groundswell of 
environmental activism. The EPA administers a variety of environmental laws and 
regulations. Its overall mission is to protect human health and the environment. Perhaps 
most relevant to the subject matter of this summary are various commitments that the 
EPA has made with respect to water quality and watershed management. The EPA has 
committed to the protection of human health by reducing exposure to contaminants in 
drinking water (including protecting source waters), in fish and shellfish, and in 
recreational waters. It has also committed to protecting the quality of rivers, lakes, and 
streams on a watershed basis and to protect coastal and ocean waters (EPA 2003)32. In 
practice, however, an interview with a federal employee familiar with EPA's coastal 
efforts in the region, pointed some potential jurisdictional conflicts: 
32 The EPA's obligations under the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act are discussed in the Decision 
Process section of this study. 
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A: To get back to the jurisdictional point. In a nutshell, you know, we 
were largely concerned with stuff that's fairly close to shore, near coastal 
area. Obviously when we have dredging and remediation sites that are in 
federal waters, we have jurisdiction over those. But, NOAA.. .1 think of 
NOAA as really more of an ocean agency and EPA as sort of more a 
coastal.. .if you had to really make some sort of distinction. But, then you 
have the Coastal Zone Management Act, and the fact that NOAA 
administers the Coastal Zone Management program with states. There are 
definitely areas where.. .there's probably inefficiencies in there, and I 
think the Ocean Action plan itself, but a court recommended either 
merging or that certain programs like the National Estuary Program be 
moved from EPA to NOAA. We didn't like that recommendation... (US 
Federal Employee 1) 
No discussion of water quality in the U.S. would be complete without mention of 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Not actually a branch of the armed services, much of 
the mission of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("US ACE") involves providing 
engineering, design and construction pertaining to national infrastructure, homeland 
security, war preparations and combat support. It is included in this analysis because of 
its statutory mandates related to environmental and water resource matters relating to 
dredging, wetlands activity permitting, and ecosystem restoration efforts. The 
Environmental Operating Principles of the USACE provide insight into the agency's 
emphasis and include the need to achieve environmental sustainability. The principles 
expressly recognize that an environment maintained in a healthy, diverse and sustainable 
condition is necessary to support life and stresses the need to assess and mitigate 
cumulative impacts to the environment (USACE 2002). Further, Section 306 of the 
Water Resource Development Act 1990 made environmental restoration one of the 
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primary missions of the Corps of Engineers, permitting the Corps to undertake studies 
and build projects which restore habitat.33 
The BoF/GoM watershed extends upland from the coastal margin. There is no 
longer any debate that land based activities have serious impacts on the coastal and 
marine ecosystem. The USFWS is an agency within the U.S. Department of Interior. Its 
mission is to work ".. .with others to preserve, protect and enhance fish, wildlife and 
plants and their habitats for the continuing benefit of the American people" (USFWS 
2000). To help with its mission the USFWS has adopted an ecosystem approach to the 
management. It describes its ecosystem approach as comprehensive and based on all of 
the biological resources within a watershed. Consistent with this approach, its field 
offices have been geographically aligned to conform to watershed boundaries.34 It also 
provides additional services and data including the National Wetlands Inventory.35 
Further, the USFWS is involved with enforcement, implementation and conservation on a 
number of fronts pertinent to the Gulf of Maine region. 
The Coastal Program, for example, focuses the USFWS efforts in bays, estuaries 
and coastal regions of the United States. The purpose of the Coastal Program is to 
conserve fish and wildlife and their habitats in order to support healthy coastal 
ecosystems. The program is guided by 4 explicit goals: (1) Serve coastal communities 
by providing assessment and planning tools to identify priority habitats that should be 
protected and restored; (2) Conserve pristine coastal habitats through support of locally-
33 33 USC § 2316; See also Appendix A. 
34 htto ://www. fws. gov/ecos vstems/ 
35 http://wetlands.fws.gov/statusandtrends.htm 
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initiated conservation efforts; (3) Restore degraded coastal wetland, upland, and stream 
habitats by working with partners to implement on-the-ground projects, and (4) Focus 
resources through conservation alliances that leverage the financial and technical 
resources of our partners and multiply the impact of the taxpayer's dollar.36 The Coastal 
Program currently provides funding to 21 high-priority coastal ecosystems including the 
Gulf of Maine.37 
Finally, at least at the U.S. federal level, the U.S. Department of Agriculture is an 
important participant in regulatory efforts that have the capacity to impact the region's 
ecosystem. The USDA is the cabinet level department ultimately responsible for the 
regulation of two important categories of activities that impact the Gulf of Maine 
ecosystem: agriculture and forestry. The U.S. Forest Service expressly adopted an 
ecosystem-based approach to forest management in 1992 in conjunction with the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development ("UNCED") Earth Summit in Rio 
de Janeiro.38 Since that time USDA agricultural regulation has increasingly supported 
funding for farmers to adopt practices designed to reduce non-point source run-off of 
pesticides and fertilizer and encourage open space preservation. 
No discussion of participants in the regulatory regime on the US side of the 
BoF/GoM region would be complete without discussion of the role of the states that are 
included within the watershed. Frankly, given the federalist nature our the U.S. 





that impact the Gulf of Maine ecosystem through the exercise of police power authority 
to protect the health, safety and welfare of their citizens as well as through the delegation 
of enforcement and implementation responsibilities in accordance with federal 
legislation. Although an exhaustive review of applicable state statutes and pertinent state 
agencies is beyond the scope of this report, what follows is a brief survey of some of the 
agencies and statutes that underpin state regulatory activities for those states that directly 
border the Gulf of Maine. 
Starting with Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Office of Environmental Affairs 
("MOEA") is the umbrella administrative agency responsible for the coordination and 
oversight of a host of Massachusetts environmental initiatives and agencies. Included 
within its oversight are the Office of Coastal Zone Management, the Massachusetts 
Environmental Protection Act, the Division of Conservation Services, the Smart 
Conservation strategy, the Office of Technical Assistance for Toxic Use Reduction, the 
Massachusetts Conservation Trust, and others. Set forth below are summaries of a 
variety of statutes and administrative offices coordinated by the EOEA pertinent to the 
Gulf of Maine region.39 MOEA also is charged with authority for the implementation of 
the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act ("MEPA").40 MEPA requires project 
proponents file an Environmental Impact Report for projects that meet certain threshold 
requirements that trigger state agency action. It mandates the gathering of information by 
project proponents and provides an opportunity for input by the public and other involved 
agencies and stakeholders. 
39 http://www.mass.gov/envir/ 
40 M.G.L. c. 30 ss 61-62H and 301 CMR 11.00 
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In Massachusetts, the office of Coastal Zone Management administers the Coastal 
Zone Management Act41 and for the administration and implementation of its federally 
approved Coastal Zone Management Plan ("CZMP"). Its mission is . .to balance the 
impacts of human activity with the protection of coastal and marine resources..."42 The 
CZMP articulates policies and permitting procedures affecting marine habitat, water 
quality, protected areas, public access, energy, ocean resources and coastal growth 
management in the coastal zone.43 In addition to assuring that projects comply with the 
CZMP, the Office of Coastal Zone Management conducts federal consistency reviews to 
determine whether federal activities undertaken or authorized by the federal government 
are consistent with the state CZMP. 
The Massachusetts Ocean Management Initiative and Task Force was created in 
recognition of the increasing array of coastal and ocean challenges and conflicts. The 
Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management became the central coordinator and 
facilitator of the Ocean Management Initiative. The Initiative was one of the first 
attempts by a state to develop a comprehensive plan for multiple ocean uses. The 
initiative created a Management Task Force in June of2003 and charged them with 
investigating ocean use trends and existing governance mechanisms; drafting 
recommendations for administrative, regulatory, and statutory changes; and developing 
ocean management principles that address complexities of present and future multiple use 
41 16 use §§1451 etseq. and 15 CFR 930; M.G.L. c 21A §§ 2,4 and 301 CMR 20.00 
42 http://www.mass.gov/czm/ 
43 The Coastal Zone in Massachusetts is that area bounded by the outer limit of the Commonwealth's 
jurisdiction as established by the United States from time to time; the northern and southern lateral seaward 
boundaries of the Commonwealth as established by interstate compact, agreement, judicial decision, or as 
otherwise provided by law; and 100 feet inland of the roads, rail lines, or rights of way delimited in the 
CZM Coastal Atlas. 301 CMR 21.00; http://www.mass.gOv/czm/fcrczrnregs.htm#5 
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planning. The task force conducted public meetings and received input from 
stakeholders over a 10 month period. The efforts of the task force resulted in the release 
of its final report and recommendations entitled Waves of Change: The Massachusetts 
Ocean Management Task Force Report and Recommendations. Recommendations of the 
task force include the strengthening of state agencies to better address environmental, 
planning, and public trust issues in both state and federal waters; establishing an 
ecosystem-based protocol to improve management of federal waters; and initiating ocean 
education and stewardship initiatives.44 Legislation intended to implement the 
recommendations of the task force was introduced into the Massachusetts legislature in 
March, 2005.45 This effort developed the foundation for ongoing mapping and planning 
activities and the Oceans Act of 2008, which was signed by Governor Deval Patrick on 
May 28,2008. The Act required Massachusetts to develop a comprehensive plan to 
manage development in state waters. The Massachusetts Ocean Management Plan was 
released on December 31,2009. 
The Oceans Act of 2008 that resulted from this process specifically directs that the 
Massachusetts Ocean Management Plan: 
(i) set forth the commonwealth's goals, siting priorities and standards for 
ensuring effective stewardship of its ocean waters held in trust for the 
benefit of the public; and (ii) adhere to sound management practices, 
taking into account the existing natural, social, cultural, historic and 
economic characteristics of the planning areas; (iii) preserve and protect 
the public trust; (iv) reflect the importance of the waters of the 
commonwealth to its citizens who derive livelihoods and recreational 
benefits from fishing; (v) value biodiversity and ecosystem health; (vi) 
identify and protect special, sensitive or unique estuarine and marine life 
44 httD://www.mass.gov/czm/oceanmanagement/waves of change/index.htm 
45 http://www.mass.gov/czm/oceanmanagement/orca/index.htm 
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and habitats; (vii) address climate change and sea-level rise; (viii) respect 
the interdependence of ecosystems; (ix) coordinate uses that include 
international, federal, state and local jurisdictions; (x) foster sustainable 
uses that capitalize on economic opportunity without significant detriment 
to the ecology or natural beauty of the ocean; (xi) preserve and enhance 
The Division of Marine Fisheries is the Massachusetts agency charged with a 
mission to provide benefits to the public by managing .. the Commonwealth's living 
marine resources and the harvesting of those resources by the commercial and 
recreational fisheries, while maintaining a diverse number of self-sustaining fish 
populations at healthy levels of abundance in balance with the ecosystem."46 The DMF 
is responsible for the management of living marine, estuarine, and anadromous resources 
within the waters of the Commonwealth. In doing so, it works closely with NOAA 
Fisheries, the New England Fisheries Management Council, the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries 
Management Council, and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission to craft 
regulations that create sustainable, healthy fisheries in compliance with applicable 
Fishery Management Plans. 
The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, by virtue of Article 
XCVII of the Massachusetts Constitution, underpins the constitutional commitment to 
help guarantee the people's right to "clean air and water", as well as "the natural scenic, 
historic and aesthetic qualities of the environment."47 DEP is the state agency 
responsible for protecting human health and the environment by ensuring clean air and 
water, the safe management and disposal of solid and hazardous wastes, the timely 
46 http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/dmfyinformation/mission.htm#x: Massachusetts Marine Fisheries 
Regulations are codified at 322 CMR; http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/dmfycommercialfishing/cmr index.htm 
47 Massachusetts Constitution, Article XCVII 
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cleanup of hazardous waste sites and spills, and the preservation of wetlands and coastal 
resources.48 The DEP is headed by a Commissioner with three deputy commissioners 
(including the Deputy Commissioner for Operations and Programs), a general counsel, 
and two directors reporting directly to the commissioner. DEP's programs are divided 
between three programmatic bureaus: The Bureau of Resource Protection, the Bureau of 
Waste Prevention and the Bureau of Waste Site Cleanup. The responsibility for 
responsible for identifying critical inland and coastal water resources and devising 
strategies for protecting and preserving them fall within the Bureau of Resource 
Protection. Permitting for groundwater discharges, surface water discharges, estuary and 
watershed programs and other media regulation also fall within the Bureau of Resource 
Protection. Air and water planning units fall within the Bureau of Waste Prevention.49 
Further, under Massachusetts General Law Chapter 91 the state legislature has charged 
the Department of Environmental Protection with the responsibility for the protection of 
the Commonwealth's interests in its harbors, tidelands, and waters and with acting as a 
steward of the public's interest in the those lands.50 It is the basis for the 
Commonwealth's waterways licensing program. It is also designed to protect traditional 
maritime industries from displacement by modern development. 
The Waterways Regulation Program, the section of DEP that oversees Chapter 
91, is the primary division charged with implementing this codification of the traditional 
48htto://www.mass.gov/dep/about/missionp.htm 
49 http://www.mass.gov/dep/about/contacts.htm 
50 M.G.L.c. 91 § 2; 310 Code Mass. Regs § 9.01 (2) (2000) 
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"public trust doctrine."51 The DEP Waterways Regulation Program is intended to protect 
access to the water's edge for fishing, fowling and navigation, protect navigation rights, 
protect and promote tidelands as a workplace for commercial fishing, shipping, passenger 
transportation, boat building and repair, marinas and other activities for which proximity 
to the water is either essential or highly advantageous, and protect Areas of Critical 
Environmental Concern, ocean sanctuaries and other ecologically sensitive areas from 
unnecessary encroachment by fill and structures. Its provisions apply to any project 
located in, on, over or under tidal waters seaward to the three mile Commonwealth 
territorial limit. It also applies to filled tidelands, Great Ponds (ponds in excess of 10 
acres), many non-tidal rivers and streams. The basic activities subject to Chapter 91 
authorization include structures, regardless of size, filling or placement of unconsolidated 
materials including material placed for purposes of shoreline protection or beach 
nourishment, dredging of any materials or bottom sediment and sand in any waters of the 
Commonwealth, any change in use of a structure for a purpose unrelated to the 
authorized or original use, and any change in the dimensions or demolition/removal of a 
structure as originally approved.52 
In Massachusetts, air pollution controls and regulation are the responsibility of the 
DEP's Air Program Planning Unit using powers delegated to it by the EPA. The program 
concentrates on controlling ambient emissions of air pollutants, including emissions of 
toxic compounds, from stationary sources (e.g., industrial) and mobile sources (e.g., 
automobiles) that contribute to violations of federal ambient air quality standards. In 
51 At its core, the public trust doctrine stands for the proposition that certain resources are held in trust by 
the government for the benefit of the public. 
52 http://www.mass.gov/dep/brp/waterway/about.htrn 
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addition to controlling the federally CWA priority pollutants and hazardous air pollutants 
("HAPS"), additional programs provide some increased levels of regulation and air 
pollution prevention in Massachusetts, including participation in a Zero Mercury 
Program in furtherance of the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers 
Regional Mercury Action Plan of 1998 (NEG/ECP 1998).54 
Under the Massachusetts Clean Water Act the responsibility for water pollution 
control and the prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution rests with the 
DEP.55 Pursuant to the EPA's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) Program, all point source discharges of pollutants are prohibited unless a 
NPDES permit is procured. Since Massachusetts is a non-delegated NPDES permit 
states, all permits are jointly issued by EPA and DEP and are equally and separately 
enforceable by both agencies. Permits regulate discharges with the goals of: (1) 
protecting public health and aquatic life, and (2) assuring that every facility treats 
wastewater.56 The department's TMDL strategy contemplates the completion of 
impaired water classification by 2012, after which an implementation plan allocating 
allowable pollutant loads by watershed will be developed.57 
53 http://www.mass.gov/dep/bwD/daac/files/airtox.htm 
54 http://www.mass.gov/dep/bwp/daac/files/airtox.htm 
55 M.G.L.C. 21, §§ 27, 53 
56 40 CFR 122: EPA Administered Permit Programs: National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System; 
M.G.L. Ch. 21 §. 26-53: Massachusetts Clean Waters Act; 314 CMR 3.00: Massachusetts Surface Water 
Discharge Permit Program; http://www.mass.gov/czm/envpermitnpdes.htm 
57 http://www.inass.gov/dep/brp/wm/files/tmdlfs.pdf 
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The DEP manages wetland issues through its Wetlands Program. The statutes 
underpinning the program include the Wetlands Protection Act as amended by the Rivers 
Protection Act.58 The purposes of the program are the protection of private or public 
water supply, protection of groundwater, flood control, prevention of storm damage, 
prevention of pollution, protection of land containing shellfish, protection of wildlife 
habitat, and protection of fisheries. The Rivers Protection Act establishes a state policy 
for protecting the natural integrity of the Commonwealth's rivers and to establish open 
space along rivers. The Act also sets aside funds for the acquisition of lands bordering 
streams and rivers. 
Moving now away from Massachusetts to the state of Maine, we will first 
examine the institutional arrangements proscribed under the Coastal Zone Management 
Act (1972). While the Maine Coastal Zone Management Plan received formal federal 
approval in 1984, the Maine Coastal Program ("MCP") was established in 1978 as an 
initial response to the passage of the federal CZMA. The CZMP, together with other 
coastal and land use programs, are administered through the Maine State Planning Office 
("MSPO"), which facilitates a variety of partnerships among state, regional and local 
agencies. Under the Maine Coastal Program, the MSPO expressly recognizes that 
although coastal resources must be protected and conserved, residents must be able to 
thrive economically. The Maine Coastal Program strives to achieve a balance between 
resource protection and human uses.59 With a coastal zone that extends for 5,300 miles 
58 M.G.L. c.131, § 40. 
59 The legislative policy applicable to the Coastal Program is set forth at 18 M.R.S.A. § 1801: 
The Legislature finds that the Maine coast is an asset of immeasurable value to the people of the 
State and the nation, and there is a state interest in the conservation, beneficial use and effective 
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and includes municipalities that border the coast, tidal waterways and territorial waters 
out to the three mile territorial limit the MSPO's Coastal Program undertakes or supports 
projects that promote sustainable economic development, encourage environmental 
stewardship and education, conserve and manage marine fisheries, reduce coastal 
hazards, and improve public access. The Maine State Planning Office is also the state 
agency designated to conduct federal consistency reviews of federal actions impacting 
the Maine coastal zone (MSPO 2002). Finally, Maine voters have made their priorities 
known by voting for bond issues designed to fund the acquisition and protection of land 
with "exceptional natural or recreational value." Thus among its other duties, the MSPO 
administers the "Lands for Maine Future" Program, identifying and facilitating the 
purchase and protection land identified under this program. To date, MSPO has assisted 
with the purchase of at least 139,000 acres from willing sellers, with an additional 53,500 
acres protected through conservation easements.60 
Maine's Department of Environmental Protection ("MDEP") is the primary 
agency responsible for protecting and restoring Maine's natural resources and 
implementing and enforcing environmental laws. Its mission is straight forward: To 
prevent, abate and control the pollution of the state's air, water and land and to preserve, 
management of the coast's resources; that development of the coastal area is increasing rapidly and 
that this development poses a significant threat to the resources of the coast and to the traditional 
livelihoods of its residents; that the United States Congress has recognized the importance of 
coastal resources through the passage of the United States Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 
and that in 1978 Maine initiated a coastal management program in accordance with this Act which 
continues to be of high priority; and that there are special needs in the conservation and 
development of the State's coastal resources that require a statement of legislative policy and 
intent with respect to state and local actions affecting the Maine coast. 
1985, C .  794, Pt. A, § 11 
60 http://www.state.me.us/spo/lmfy 
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improve and prevent diminution of the natural environment of the State. MDEP is also 
directed to protect and enhance the public's right to use and enjoy the State's natural 
resources. Organizationally, three separate bureaus administer the department's 
environmental programs: Air Quality, Land and Water Quality, and Remediation and 
Waste Management. All three bureaus report to a Deputy Commissioner who reports to 
the Commissioner.61 In addition, the Maine legislature created a 10 member appointed 
Board of Environmental Protection citizen "to provide informed, independent and timely 
decisions on the interpretation, administration, and enforcement of the laws relating to 
environmental protection and to provide for credible, fair, and responsible public 
participation in Department decisions." The Board shall fulfill its purpose through 
rulemaking decisions, decisions on selected permit applications, review of the 
Commissioner's licensing and enforcement actions and recommending changes in the law 
to the Legislature."62 
Maine's air quality regulation falls within the jurisdiction of the DEP's Bureau of 
Air Quality. The mission of the Bureau is to coordinate a statewide program to control 
present and future sources of air contaminants to assure the continued health, safety and 
general welfare of the people of Maine, to protect property values, and to protect plant 
and animal life. To fulfill this mission, the Bureau implements a two-pronged strategy 
focused on the improvement of air quality in those areas where air quality has degraded 
and the prevention of deterioration of air quality in areas where the air quality is 
61 http://www.maine.gov/deD/overview.htm 
62 38 MRSA § 341-B; http://www.maine.gov/dep/bep/purpose.htm 
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acceptable.63 Maine's Air program was created in response to Federal requirements under 
subsection 110 of the Clean Air Act and its State Implementation Plan ("SIP") has been 
approved by the EPA.64 In addition to the regulation of priority and hazardous air 
pollutants mandated by the CAA, Maine's SIP also includes other toxic chemicals such 
as dioxin, furan and PCBs. Maine has also adopted a program to reduce mercury 
emissions, recognizing the link between mercury exposure and human health and the 
threat posed by human consumption of mercury-tainted fish and shellfish. In 1998 the 
Land and Water Council adopted a multidisciplinary approach Mercury Reduction 
Strategy for Maine that has resulted in an estimated reduction of overall mercury 
emissions by more than 75% from 1991 levels. Further, Maine participates in the 1998 
New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers Mercury Action Plan.65 
Maine's DEP also manages water quality pursuant to the Natural Resource 
Protection Act, 39 M.R.S.A. §§ 408 et seq. The policy articulated by this 1987 
legislation provides: 
The Legislature finds and declares that the State's rivers and 
streams, great ponds, fragile mountain areas, freshwater wetlands, 
significant wildlife habitat, coastal wetlands and coastal sand 
dunes systems are resources of state significance. These resources 
have great scenic beauty and unique characteristics, unsurpassed 
recreational, cultural, historical and environmental value of present 
and future benefit to the citizens of the State and that uses are 
causing the rapid degradation and, in some cases, the destruction of 
these critical resources, producing significant adverse economic 
63 38 M.R.S.A § 581: http://www.maine.gov/dep/air/overview.htm 
64 40 CFR Part 52, Subpart U.; Maine statutes specific to the air program are codified at 38 M.R.S.A. §§581 




and environmental impacts and threatening the health, safety and 
general welfare of the citizens of the State.. .The Legislature 
further finds and declares that the cumulative effect of frequent 
minor alterations and occasional major alterations of these 
resources poses a substantial threat to the environment and 
economy of the State and its quality of life. 39 M.R.S.A. § 408A 
Under the Act a permit is required66 whenever any "activity" is proposed on or 
over any protected natural resource or in an area located adjacent to a coastal wetland, 
great pond, river, stream, wetland or significant wildlife habitat. "Activity" includes 
dredging, bulldozing, removing or displacing soil or vegetation, as well as the 
construction, repair or alternation of any permanent structure.67 Thus the NRPA provides 
the fundamental statutory protection for Maine's wetlands, estuaries and other areas of 
environmental significance. Rules and regulations promulgated by the MEPA and other 
state agencies provide specific permitting requirements for activities proposed in 
significant areas.68 
Maine's application to administer the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System Program of the Federal Clean Water Act was approved by the EPA on January 
12,2001. Pursuant to the Waste Discharge Permitting Program a license must be 
obtained from MDEP for the point source discharge of pollutants to a stream, river, or 
lake of the state, or to the ocean.69 
66 The MDEP is the permitting authority within the organized territory of the State of Maine. Permits for 
activities in the unorganized territories, i.e. land not in organized municipalities or townships, are obtained 
from Maine's Land Use Regulation Commission ("LURC"), 
67 39 M.R.S.A. § 408-C 
68 http://www.maine.gOv/dep/blwQ/docstand/nrpapage.htm#stat 
69 38 M.R.S.A. § 413 
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Maine has also acted to address the threat posed by invasive species. In 2001 
Maine's Legislature adopted An Act to Prevent Infestation of Invasive Aquatic Plants and 
to Control Other Invasive Species.70 The Act provided for the establishment of an 
interagency task force to study the risks and potential responses of invasive species 
infestation. The resulting Invasive Aquatic Species Program Report was released in 
2002. The task force recommendations included the designation of MDEP and the Maine 
Department of Inland Fisheries to jointly head an intergovernmental effort to educate the 
public on the existence and threats posed by invasive species, the ways to prevent their 
introduction and spread, and put in place a largely-volunteer monitoring effort to track 
the progression of invasive species in the land and coastal regions of the state. Strategies 
for interagency coordination, monitoring plans, rapid identification and eradication, and 
other measures for invasive species control are set forth the report (Interangency Task 
Force 2002).71 
In recognition of the importance of municipal and local government to the 
governance of the human activities that impact the environment, in Maine municipal 
zoning ordinances along the coast must conform to certain minimum requirements 
determined by the MDEP.72 Developments that qualify for MDEP-mandated 
requirements are those that may have a substantial impact upon the environment, 
including those that occupy more than 20 acres, oil and terminal facilities, and other large 
70 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 7791, etseq. 
71 Invasive species have also been a focus of the Casco Bay Estuary Partnership and other National Estuary 
Programs within the Gulf of Maine. A forum sponsored by the CBEP was held in November, 2004 and the 
threat of marine invasive species has been added to the list of priorities for the CBEP and other programs. 
http://www.cascobav.usm.maine.edU/habitat.html#Habitat%20Protection 
72 38 M.R.S.A. § 438-A 
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structures and subdivisions. Also subject to MDEP permitting requirements are projects 
in shoreland areas subject to zoning and land use controls. Shoreland areas include those 
areas within 250 feet of the normal high-water line of any great pond, river or saltwater 
body, and within 250 feet of the upland edge of a coastal wetland.73 
Finally we come to the manner in which Maine, through its Department of Marine 
Resources, manages the activities within the state's maritime zone. The purpose of the 
Maine DMR, as set forth in its enabling legislation, is to conserve and develop marine 
and estuarine resources; to conduct and sponsor scientific research; to promote and 
develop the Maine coastal fishing industries; to advise and cooperate with local, state and 
federal officials concerning activities in coastal waters; and to implement, administer and 
enforce the laws and regulations necessary for these enumerated purposes, as well as the 
exercise of all authority conferred by this Part.74 In the exercise of its functions, the 
Department is empowered to adopt and enforce fisheries management plans (within the 
three mile territorial limit) as well as to adopt emergency measures for resource 
protection when confronted with unusual damage or imminent depletion. It also has 
jurisdiction to manage and regulate the inshore recreational fishing and aquaculture 
sectors. Finally, DMR has policy and regulatory responsibilities to prevent the 
introduction and spread of unwanted marine organisms into Maine waters.75 
Moving now to our final U.S. state, New Hampshire, we can discuss the 
participants within that state's jurisdiction. First it should be noted that the vast majority 
73 38 M.R.S.A. § 435 
74 12 M.R.S.A. § 6021; 
75 http://www.cascobav.usm.maine.edii/invasilaw.html 
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of responsibility for statewide environmental policy, regulation and enforcement in New 
Hampshire has been consolidated within the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Environmental Services ("DES") since 1987.76 Its duties include water quality and 
supply, shoreland development, recreation, ecological balance, air quality and 
monitoring, and municipal and industrial waste management. These functions are carried 
out through the department's three divisions: Air Resources, Waste Management, and 
Water. A Senior Leadership Team comprised of the three division directors and two 
commissioners coordinate policy making and implementation for the department. In 
addition, a several commissions have been created by statute to advise the departmental 
directors on matters related to their jurisdiction and to hear appeals of final agency 
administrative decisions. These include the Air Resources Council, Water Resources 
Council, Water Council, Waste Management Council, Water Council, Wetlands Council, 
and Well Board. The mission of the department is ".. .to help sustain a high quality of 
life for all citizens by protecting and restoring the environment and public health in New 
Hampshire."77 
New Hampshire's coastal zone is comprised of the 17 municipal communities that 
border on the coast of New Hampshire or its tidal bays, estuaries and rivers. The New 
Hampshire Coastal Program ("NHCP") received federal approval under the CZMA in 
stages, with approval for the current NHCP obtained from the federal ORCM in 2004. 
The New Hampshire Department of Environment Services ("DES") has administered the 
NHCP and federal consistency reviews through the NHCP since 2004 (NHDES 2005). 
76 RSA 21-0 (1987) 
77 http://des.state.nh.us/alook.htm 
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The mission of the New Hampshire Coastal Program includes a reference to 
intergenerational equity by declaring that NHCP seeks to "balance the preservation of 
natural resources of the coast with the social and economic needs of this and succeeding 
generations." To accomplish this mission, the Coastal Program pursues goals that include 
the prevention and abatement of coastal pollution, fostering community stewardship and 
awareness of coastal resources, and protection and restoration of coastal natural 
resources. The NHCP is active in other aspects of coastal land and habitat protection 
through its participation in NOAA's Coastal and Estuarine Land Conservation Program 
("CELCP") NHCP has contracted with The Nature Conservancy to develop a draft 
Coastal and Estuarine Land Conservation Plan (CELCP). The CELCP will assess and 
prioritize conservation needs in the Great Bay Watershed.78 The NHCP is also attempting 
to qualify for funding to help restore coastal wetlands through the CZMA's Enhancement 
Program.79 The New Hampshire Estuaries Project, a program funded by the EPA's 
National Estuary Program and administered by the University of New Hampshire, plays a 
vital role in research and planning for the state's coastal estuaries, including Great Bay 
and Little Bay (NHEP 2003). 
With respect to air quality issues, the New Hampshire Department of 
Environmental Services, Air Resources Division, with guidance from the New 
Hampshire Air Resources Council, seeks to promote cost-effective, sensible strategies 
and control measures to address complex and inter-related air quality issues. The issues 
addressed by the Air Resources Division include ground-level ozone, particulate matter, 
78 http://www.des. state.nh.us/Coastal/CoastalEstuarine.html 
79 CZMA § 309; http://www.des.state.nh.us/Coastal/Restoration/ 
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regional haze (visibility), mercury emissions, increasing concentrations of greenhouse 
gases, acid deposition, and air toxics. Like the other New England states, New 
Hampshire recognizes that its direct impact is limited since many problems that the states 
in the Northeast U.S. can only be solved on a regional or national basis. The express 
considerations set forth for the Air Resources Division include guidance that Actions 
should be supported by the most recent scientific and health effects data available, while 
at the same time recognizing that new information will emerge in the future. Many 
ongoing state, (e.g., NH Comparative Risk Project), regional and national research efforts 
will provide better scientific data and improved understanding of ways to achieve 
multiple health and environmental benefits at lower cost. Further, the importance of 
public education and outreach activities is emphasized ".. .because they transcend all 
programs and because the pollution contributions of individual citizen's activities 
represent an increasing share of air pollution emissions." The DES also recognizes that 
alternative approaches to the "command and control" approach to regulation are needed 
to face current issues and to develop solutions that provide better environmental and 
public health outcomes faster and more cost-effectively.80 New Hampshire DES has also 
promulgated rules that recognize the link between mercury emissions and mercury-
tainted fish consumption and has joined with Maine, Massachusetts and Canadian 
Maritime Provinces Maine to participate in the 1998 New England Governors and 
Eastern Canadian Premiers Mercury Action Plan. The DES has also implemented a 
80 http://www.des.state.nh.us/airdiv.htm 
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statewide New Hampshire Mercury Reduction Strategy to help reduce more localized 
mercury releases.81 
The Water Division of DES, with guidance from the Water Council, the Water 
Resources Council and the Wetlands Council, is responsible for the variety of programs 
that draft and implement water quality and waste water regulations, including Safe 
Drinking Water, wetlands, coastal water issues, groundwater, safe beaches and other 
programs.82 The mission of the Water Division is . .to ensure that New Hampshire's 
lakes and ponds, rivers and streams, coastal waters, groundwater and wetlands are clean 
and support healthy ecosystems, provide habitats for a diversity of plant and animal life, 
and support appropriate uses." Water quality standards under the CWA are used to 
protect the state's surface waters. Accordingly, New Hampshire designates uses for water 
bodies, such as fishing or swimming; establishes numerical or narrative criteria to protect 
the designated uses; and an establishes policies intended to maintain water quality that 
exceeds the criteria.83 NHDES has recently completed its surface water quality surveys 
in accordance with the Clean Water Act, including a TMDL inventory (or "303d list").84 
New Hampshire's permitting requirements for the discharge of pollutants into surface 
and ground water are set forth in its Water Pollution and Waste Water legislation.85 
81 http://www.des.state.nh.us/nhppp/intro20.pdf 
82 http://www.des.state.nh.us/waterdiv.htm 
83 R.S.A. § 485-A; http://www.eencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/L/485-A/485-A-8.htm 
84 http://www.des.state.nh. us/wmb/swQa/2004/default.asp?go=summarv 
85 R.S.A. § 485 etseq. 
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The management and protection of New Hampshire's rivers are subject to the 
provisions of the Rivers Management and Protection Act.86 The act established the River 
Management and Protection Program ("RMPP") and is administered by the NHDES. Any 
interested individual or group may nominate a river for inclusion under the RMPP based 
upon the river's values and outstanding natural or cultural characteristics. If the 
nomination is accepted the river is deemed a "designated river" by the DES 
Commissioner the legislature may approve the designation if it finds sufficient local 
support and important river values. The designation is final upon signature of the 
governor. Once a river has been designated for protection a management plan must be 
developed designed to protect the river for future generations. Any such plan is 
developed and implemented by a volunteer local river advisory committee. Plans 
generally identify goals and propose actions necessary to protect the designated river. 
NHDES assists with the development and implementation of the plan and enforces 
o*j 
regulations governing quality and quantity of flow in the protected river segments. 
Invasive species are the task of the New Hampshire DES Exotic Species Program 
which coordinates activities associated with the control and management of exotic 
aquatic plants; as well as activities associated with the implementation of education 
programs and volunteer plant monitoring programs. 
Finally, the New Hampshire Office of Energy and Planning plays a role in 
planning, land protection and municipal assistance in New Hampshire. Through 1993 the 
Land Conservation Investment Program acquired over 100,000 acres of land in New 
86 R.S.A. § 483 
87 See generally: http://www.des.state.nh.us/rivers/ 
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Hampshire in partnership with the private Trust for New Hampshire Land. Since the end 
of its acquisition phase in 1993, the Conservation Land Stewardship Program has been 
responsible for the monitoring and protection of state-acquired land. 
Before we shift gears and move into a description of the participants on the 
Canadian side of the BoF/GoM watershed, it might be helpful to recall the maritime 
jurisdiction figure (Figure 20) that defined the various lines drawn in the sea under U.S. 
law. For reasons that will be explored more closely in the prescription task in the next 
section on the Decision Process, the governance approach on the Canadian side is a bit 
less fragmented and more collaborative to a large part due to their failure to draw such 
tight jurisdictional lines in the Canadian coastal region and territorial seas. 
Simply put, there are few firm boundaries to confine agency activity. When 
questioned, a Canadian federal employee who has been dealing with environmental 
issues in the Canadian Maritimes for nearly three decades explained the jurisdictional 
situation along the coastal margin in Canada this way: 
Q: Does the [federal agency] jurisdiction stop at the water's edge? 
A: We don't know where the jurisdiction stops, quite frankly, in the 
Canadian coastal zone, [laughter] It's one of those questions we just kind 
of never resolved. It's unclear. I work with some constitutional lawyers, 
law of the sea experts, at Dalhousie and they don't even know. It is 
uncertain. We don't have, as in the U.S., with the states with 3 mile and 
so on. It's felt, generally, that jurisdiction between federal and provincial 
jurisdiction is somewhere around the land/water interface. (Canadian 
Federal Employee 2). 
It turns out, however, that this murky jurisdictional grey area may not be such a 
bad thing: 
88 RSA 162-C:6; http://nh.gov/oqj/programs/CLSP/index.htm 
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A: With the uncertainty of where the line is and where the division of 
legal mandates and roles and responsibility, and the Canadian way of just 
avoiding the question, where we've come and the way we've been 
operating for years is by saying look, do both levels of government have 
an interest in this coastal area. Yes, absolutely. Will trying to resolve this 
and say someone wins and someone loses or someone gets A and someone 
gets B, going be helpful and productive? Not really, because we realize 
that you need at least both levels of government working together. So in 
the absence of that clear definition, we say they both have an interest in 
the near land and the near shore, and so let's just work together. 
Q: So.. .the grey area does actually play a role in... 
A: It's been quite helpful; not really forcing us, but instead enabling us or 
inspiring us to work together. 
Q: With no permit needed from federal... 
A: Correct. With the uncertainty of where the line is and where the 
division of legal mandates and roles and responsibility, and the Canadian 
way of just avoiding the question, where we've come and the way we've 
been operating for years is by saying look, do both levels of government 
have an interest in this coastal area. Yes, absolutely. Will trying to 
resolve this and say someone wins and someone loses or someone gets A 
and someone gets B, going be helpful and productive? Not really, because 
we realize that you need at least both levels of government working 
together. So in the absence of that clear definition, we say they both have 
an interest in the near land and the near shore, and so let's just work 
together. 
Q: So.. .the grey area does actually play a role in... 
A: It's been quite helpful; not really forcing us, but instead enabling us or 
inspiring us to work together. (Canadian Federal Employee 2) 
From a federal agency perspective in Canada, jurisdictional questions promote 
cooperation and collaboration between all levels of government. Is the view the same 
from perspective of a provincial agency? 
Q: And when you're talking about the coastal zone, how do you define 
the coastal zone? 
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A: That's kind of a "what's the meaning of life" question. You can give it 
definition almost anywhere along the coastal drainage area, but that would 
be all of Nova Scotia. That's a challenge we have here is defining what 
we call our coastal zone. Intuitively you know what a coastal area is. I 
think everybody does. I think someone would say 60 kilometers inland 
may not be considered a coastal area where it drains into the ocean, but it 
is. But, on the other end of it, to the nearest road, which some 
jurisdictions have as their coastal zone, is not inclusive enough, either. So, 
that's one of the challenges that we're facing provincially is in defining 
what we would consider our coastal zone. 
Q: Has it been defined either federally or in any legislation.... 
A: No, and that's a problem with Canada is the jurisdiction issues around 
the coastal zone. Larry might have touched upon this a little bit but the 
coastal zone is really poorly defined. We've all agreed to disagree. And a 
lot of what's interesting is you hear from my colleagues at 
Intergovernmental Affairs, they're our agency who work directly for the 
Premier, and their job is to basically deal with Provincial government 
interactions internal, but more importantly the external related provinces, 
federal government, other countries. And their issue is that when they do 
a coastal issue they spend all their time in making sure that the jurisdiction 
issue doesn't become an issue. Basically, making sure that how things are 
phrased, how decisions are made, that we don't start going down the path 
having to deal with that jurisdictional issue. 
Anyway, in short, coastal zone management is not defined in Nova Scotia. 
I think everyone has a personal interpretation of what it is. I've tried not 
to really nail it down and try to figure it out like to me it's two kilometers 
inland. I think it shifts depending on issues, whether you're looking at 
environmental or social or economic. 
Q: Just out of curiosity, in your opinion, does that gray area, for instance, 
that one.. .definition of coastal zoning.. .does that tend to force more 
collaboration between federal, state and local? 
A: I don't know. I think it's both. It can force it in the sense that "look, 
we have to work together because we don't want to deal with that gray 
issue." But, it also makes collaboration more difficult because on the one 
hand you have folks saying "well, it's not really defined so I'm not sure 
it's our jurisdiction, so therefore, why should we be a part of it?" And on 
the other hand you say,".. .well it's not defined and we think it's been 
more ours than theirs, so why do they want to do work there?" We deal 
with this federally and provincially. Why are you doing coastal 
management? That's our coastal land base. That's our stuff. Feds have 
from the water down. So I don't know if it actually helps. I would 
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actually say that it in some issues .. .it actually makes it more of a struggle. 
I think, though, I would add as a condition say that there has been a 
history, at least, of working collaboratively to deal with that issue, in terms 
of ignoring it or figuring a way to get around it. The feds and the province 
don't want to deal with that issue. I think it's one of those things that the 
CNO folks think is a quagmire they don't want to step into. So, there is a 
history of collaboration. Sable Island is a good example of seabed rights. 
Instead of getting constitutional or funding, let's just create MOU. Let's 
just come to a formal agreement that it's Canadian, but we reserve 
jurisdiction on how to say how it's going to be used, but it's still a national 
region. So, I think there is some history there, but when it comes down to, 
that's at a higher level, but when it actually comes down to doing stuff, I 
think there it becomes more of a hindrance to opportunity. (Canadian 
Provincial Employee 1) 
So from the perspective of at least one provincial employee, jurisdictional 
vagueness is a mixed bag. Curiously, the difference in governance approaches and the 
way in which Canada divides its duties between provinces and states, which will be 
covered in more detail below, appears to mean that there are relatively fewer but better 
connected participants in the Canadian governance scheme. 
In summary fashion we will run through some of the more important Canadian 
governmental participants. On the Canadian side, the goals for water quality are 
generally set forth in the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (1999) ("CEPA") 
and are the responsibility of Environment Canada (EC). The goal of CEPA is to 
contribute to sustainable development - development that meets the needs of the present 
generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs. EC also has responsibilities for pollutants under the Fisheries Act (1985) as well 
as the other duties and responsibilities set forth in the Goal Clarification section above. 
With respect to the fisheries regulation in Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada is 
the counterpart to NMFS in Canada - responsible for developing and implementing 
432 
policies and programs in support of Canada's scientific, ecological, social and economic 
interests in oceans and fresh waters. Aside from the Coast Guard, DFO's mission is to 
integrate environment, economic and social perspectives to ensure Canada's oceans and 
freshwater resources benefit this generation and those to come. 
The Department's guiding legislation includes the Oceans Act (1996), which 
charges the Minister with leading oceans management and providing coast guard and 
hydrographic services on behalf of the Government of Canada, and the Fisheries Act 
(1985), which confers responsibility to the Minister for the management of fisheries, 
habitat and aquaculture. 
Other notable Canadian federal participants include Industry Canada and Natural 
Resources Canada. Industry Canada offers support for aquaculture in the region and 
provides support for continued development of oceans mapping. Natural Resources 
Canada contributes knowledge and expertise related to geoscience for oceans 
management and other data collection, management and related services relevant to 
sustainable development through knowledge integration (CoastLands 2005). 
Moving away from the federal Canadian agencies, we can begin to sketch out the 
provincial agencies that participate in the governance regime in the BoF/GoM. The New 
Brunswick Department of Environment is active in the Gulf of Maine Council and has 
numerous environmentally-critical responsibilities. Their historic mission, back when it 
was the Department of Environment and Local Government, was "Healthy Environment 
- Strong Communities," effectively capturing the integrated nature of a department that 
combined environmental quality with community well-being (CoastLands 2005). Now 
that they are simply known as the NB Department of Environment it appears that they are 
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taking dynamic steps on a local and province-wide to tackle important issues. The 
division is now responsible for the administration of all community planning and 
environmental programs. Its main goal is to connect and integrate the decision making 
process for all of the department's regulatory programs. 
Further, the branch has the responsibility to monitor current environmental 
conditions, provide scientific testing services, and interpret, evaluate, and report on the 
state of the environment in NB. It also has a responsibility to provide interpreted data, 
forecasts, and advice to assist in informed decision making throughout the Department of 
Environment. Recent accomplishments include: 
• In 2010-2011 the department implemented its first year under a pesticides 
management strategy. The Department announced a ban on the sale and use of 
more than 240 over-the-counter lawn care pesticide products, and the use of all 
2,4-D products, on domestic lawns in the province. 
• The Province signed a collaborative agreement with all three Atlantic provinces 
on climate change adaptation strategies. The three-year initiative, called the 
Atlantic Climate Adaptation Solutions Project, is aimed at helping the Atlantic 
provinces target local issues such as coastal and inland erosion and flooding, and 
groundwater resource management. 
• New Brunswick recorded the largest percentage reduction in greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions in Canada in 2008 according to Environment Canada's 2010 
National Inventory Report. 
• In January 2011, the Department launched the Neighbourhood Eco-Challenge. 
The challenge highlighted the importance of families taking action to reduce their 
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carbon footprint. It was a partnership between the Department of Environment, 
Efficiency NB, the New Brunswick Lung Association and the New Brunswick 
Environmental Network.89 
The New Brunswick Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture is also 
active in the Gulf of Maine Council. The department plays a pivotal role in the 
promotion of aquaculture in New Brunswick. It receives applications for non-repayable 
strategic assistance in the aquaculture and fisheries sector with an objective to enhance 
the competitiveness and innovation of the fishery, aquaculture and seafood processing 
sectors in New Brunswick and to create new economic development opportunities.90 The 
department also has the objective of fostering the development of the wild marine 
resources industry in the province. It is a strong advocate of provincial fisheries interests 
and provides a variety of extension services to help ensure that maximum value is derived 
from the harvesting of fisheries resources. Simultaneously the department promotes 
responsible fishing, sustainable development, and habitat and resource enhancement 
activities.91 
Moving from New Brunswick to the province of Nova Scotia we will next 
examine the two provincial agencies that are active in BoF/GoM governance through the 
Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment. The first participant that we will 
look at is the Nova Scotia Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture. This department is 
89 2010-2011 Annual Report: Departnwnt of the Environment. htto.V/www. enb. ca/0009/0374/0013/2010-
2011.pdf 
90httD://www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/en/services/services renderer.201271.Aquaculture and Fisheries Strate 
gic Assistance Manual.html 
" http://www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/en/services/services Tenderer. 18937.html 
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no small player in the activities that it governs that impact the ecosystem. The Nova 
Scotia Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture provides services to the province's 
agriculture and fishing sectors — two of the biggest economies in the province's coastal 
and rural regions. Combined, these industries contribute almost $2 billion annually to the 
provincial economy and create over 20,000 jobs. Its mission statement expresses its goal: 
To foster prosperous and sustainable fisheries, aquaculture and food industries through 
the delivery of quality public services for the betterment of coastal communities and of 
all Nova Scotians.92 The goals were expanded on by someone familiar with the goals of 
the department as well as the implicit need to work with the federal agencies: 
Well, as an agency, ignoring agriculture for now, looking at just fisheries and 
aquaculture we deal with aquaculture, obviously, which is leasing of 
aquaculture areas, we do the monitoring, we do promotion. We service the 
industry. But we also regulate it in a sense. We don't deal with onsite 
enforcement as such, that's federal, but we work on that issue because we 
want to see this industry thrive, so we work with industry to make sure we 
meet its needs. We also process leases for rock weed, so for some marine 
plants we do that as well. That's it in terms of the marine environment what 
we do. We also, for inland fisheries, we have MOU's for the federal 
government over management of inland fisheries. Because the feds retain the 
rights over all water courses and the fish in them. But we have signed and 
MOU with them so that we have management responsibilities for inland 
fisheries. But, when it comes down to our actual management of actual 
activity, that's it for our part. (Canadian Provincial Employee 1) 
The last Canadian provincial department that will be looked at is the Nova Scotia 
Department of the Environment. Nova Scotia Environment is responsible for delivering 
effective and efficient regulatory management for the protection of our environment. 
With a staff of more than 250 employees working from offices throughout Nova Scotia, 
92 http://www.gov.ns.ca/fish/department/mission.shtml 
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Almost 70 per cent of the department's resources support inspections and monitoring 
activities. Among the items the department is responsible for are air quality, drinking 
water and many other facets of everyday life. Thus the department regulates coal bed 
methane extraction, natural gas extraction, municipal solid waste landfills and waste 
transfer stations, storm drainage, municipal groundwater source water facilities, drinking 
water standards, and a host of other significant responsibilities.93 
So in Canada, the lack of formal jurisdictional lines may act as a vehicle that 
forces increased collaboration among the regulatory agencies at all levels. There may be 
a trend to include the public more in governance issues, but if there is it is not very 
significant at the moment. 
We have now examined most of the government participants that play a role in 
the governance scheme of the BoF/GoM watershed. Certainly we have already said a 
great deal about the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment. They are a 
critical participant in the governance process with the chief function of providing a forum 
for ideas to be discussed and debated among the key regulatory agencies in the region. 
To get a more complete picture of the Gulf of Maine Council, it may prove helpful to 
show their organizational chart, which gives a good idea of the broad spectrum of their 
activities (Figure 21). 
From Figure 21 it is interesting that there is a "box" for every function necessary to 
provide guidance and even accountable oversight for nearly every issue threatening the 
regional ecosystem - except overfishing. The other critical element missing - input by 
communities and by an active, knowledgeable public. The vast number of 
93 http://www.gov.ns.ca/nse/dept/nse.policies.asp 
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Figure 21 Gulf of Maine Council Organization Chart (GOMC) 
responsibilities falls to the Working Group - the mid-level agency management 
personnel who give of their time to take on tasks for the GOMC, including its committees 
and subcommittees well in excess of their normal employment. 
In the fall of 2005 with funding from the GOMC I conducted a phone survey of 
Council members. Basically it was my task to obtain the insights of each council 
member by asking them nine questions drafted by representatives of the Council's 
working group (Coon 2005b). Rather than use any more space talking about my 
impressions of the Council, what follows are quotes from Council members themselves 
which I believe are representative of their different views of the Council's role: 
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The purpose is to provide a forum primarily for representatives of our 
state, provincial and federal governments to focus on common resources 
and issues that affect the common body of water that we all reside on. 
[The purpose is to] [coordinate regionally on issues of transboundary 
importance that we can't attack on our own and to work to improve 
environmental quality in the region. 
I always go back to the original cooperative agreement that the states and 
provinces signed. The GoMC is a consortium of state and provincial 
jurisdictions that creates a dialogue to discuss issues that impact the Gulf 
of Maine environment and that may resonate because they are of mutual 
concern between two or more of the jurisdictions. Those issues can be 
discussed in a forum that is not driven by some of the things as the 
individual jurisdictions, i.e. it is less encumbered by the issue of the day. 
It is more prescriptive and broader in its focus on the overall health of the 
GoMC. In a sense they have their organizational entities able to 
participate openly without the jurisdictions being put on the spot. The 
Council has done a good job of getting those ideas out in the open and 
discussed. 
The main strength is that it provides a forum to discuss issues with 
counterparts. It also is a priority for my department's leadership. The 
main weakness is that you have so many different points of view and there 
are so many complexities. Individual agencies often have their hands tied 
and they are therefore unable to enter into regional commitments. Another 
weakness is our public relations program. Only people in the scientific 
community or agencies of government know what the GOMC is or does. 
We need to get the word out to a broader constituency. 
I'm not the biggest fan of the Gulf of Maine Council although I'm a 
member. I do believe the communication function is worthwhile. In 
addition, because of mission creep I participate to make sure I know what 
actions the organization is taking. 
It's part of the mandate of the office of the premier to participate. The 
motivation comes from my love of the ocean and my prior involvement 
with individuals who are striving to protect the Gulf of Maine. Thus there 
is a need for good information and the GOMC provides good information 
and reliable science that we can use in the department. 
From my perspective there is value in getting decision makers together to 
talk. I don't need a lot of show and tell time, however. I think that we end 
up with so much structure that we are ignoring the real issues that are 
impacting the Gulf of Maine ecosystem, for example issues related to 
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LNG citing. For example we spend so much time revising the action plan 
that we lose opportunities to provide a forum for leaders to discuss the 
threats in our Gulf of Maine region and talk about our common interests 
and how to face challenges. That shouldn't all be public meetings with 
reporters present. There should be time or a way to have executive 
sessions to discuss sensitive issues. (Coon 2005b) 
The quotes excerpted from the survey help demonstrate the diversity of the views 
held by Council members and may help explain why there is no apparent movement by 
the Council to play a bolder role in the governance regime of the BoF/GoM region. 
There are, of course, other participants. Industry, for instance, plays a role. 
Commercial and industrial enterprise is essential to the regional economy and they often 
rely upon the natural resources of the region either for fuel, or as commodities to be 
incorporated in a product, or to absorb their wastes. This study only peripherally looked 
at industrial participants. There is one trend of increased industrial activism and that is in 
the management of the region's fisheries: 
Q: Industry trade groups, what role? 
A: I think that you'll find that industry trade groups are becoming more 
organized lately as they were when I first took over. So when I first took 
over you might have 400 angry fishermen and not very organized, maybe 
all saying the same things, or all saying different things. Their message 
didn't come across too clearly. Now I think you have some very key 
industry groups like Associated Fisheries of Maine, the Cape Cod Hook 
Association, the one in Gloucester, the Northeast Seafood Coalition, the 
Fisheries Survival Fund for scallops, the Herring Alliance. The industry 
groups are very well organized to the point where you see fewer people at 
the meetings but you see the representatives paying close attention at 
every meeting. I've seen that change. (U.S. Federal Employee 3) 
Other industry and trade associations play roles, and these will examined in 
connection with their impact on the Decision Process. 
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There are also participants from the world of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). As we have discussed, the NGOs in the region have no umbrella organization 
and do not appear to work together on the factors that pose threats to the regional 
ecosystem. 
The Nature Conservancy ("TNC") is an example of an international 
environmental non-profit that has offices in every state bordering the Gulf of Maine. 
Their Gulf of Maine program has helped protect thousands of acres of coastal habitat in 
the Gulf. They have launched an oyster reef restoration project in Wellfleet Bay with a 
goal of revitalizing populations of the American Oyster. In New Hampshire, TNC is 
working in the Great Bay to control invasive species like common reed grass. TNC likes 
to use "market-based" approaches - meaning land conservation through the purchasing of 
easements, and the leasing or purchasing of resource rights.94 In addition, TNC has 
significantly added to the knowledge base of the Gulf of Maine regional community by 
making available Phase One of its Northwest Atlantic Ecoregional Assessment. The 
Ecoregional Assessment is a survey and compilation of literature and data relevant to the 
physical and biological components of the ecosystem (Green, Anderson et al. 2010). 
The Conservation Law Foundation works in all states as well. Its Mission is 
stated as follows: 
CLF protects New England's environment for the benefit of all people. 




our natural resources, build healthy communities, and sustain a vibrant 
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economy. 
CLF's work in New England has four focus areas: Clean energy and climate 
change, ocean conservation (including fisheries management and estuary restoration), 
clean water (including nutrient and stormwater pollution), and healthy communities 
(livable cities and transportation). In my experience, CLF has been one of the most 
effective conservation advocates in the region. It was a named plaintiff in the 1991 
litigation that helped for a while to stop overfishing of the depleted groundfish stocks in 
the Gulf of Maine. CLF is also taking a lead role in efforts in rivers and estuaries in New 
England to tackle issues related to nutrients overloads from wastewater treatment plants 
and agriculture as well as contaminated storm water. CLF's main strategy seems to be 
using the law and their web site touts their "tenacious legal advocacy."96 
There are literally hundreds of separate NGOs scattered around the BoF/GoM 
watershed. Indeed the web site for the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine 
Environment states that there are more than 600 organizations with a declared interest in 
the Gulf of Maine and its waters in its NGO directory.97 It would appear, however, that 
the NGO movement around the watershed is fragmented as the governmental efforts. I 
selected TNC and CLF because they are two of the more prominent NGOs in the region 
and because of the contrast in their strategies. The CLF is noted for its chief strategy of 





on the other hand, appears to favor market and economic measures, including the 
conservation of critical lands through the purchasing of easements as well as the 
purchasing or leasing of harvesting or permitting rights. 
The participants in the governance regime in the region include government 
federal, state, and provincial agencies, as well as local governments. We have examined 
the major government players, including the legislation that guides them and their 
perspectives. We also looked at the growth of industry trade groups in the fisheries 
management area. Finally two prominent NGOs were briefly examined along with their 
goals, mission, and principle strategy. 
What is missing, unfortunately, is mention of any notion of collaborative 
partnerships between governments, industry, NGOs, and communities. Significant public 
participation appears to be largely missing from any examination of the participants in 
the regional governance regime. At the beginning of this discussion of the participants it 
was noted that an expectation or at least the opportunity for meaningful participation and 
input of a broad segment of the regulated population in decision making processes 
(Costanza, Norton et al. 1992; Pauly and Maclean 2003). This means that significant, 
meaningful public participation is required (Becker 1993; Francis 1993; Francis and 
Regier 1995; Cortner and Moote 1999; Clark 2002; Jackson 2005; Fiorino 2006; Folke, 
Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Finally, participation must be open to almost any person or 
group with a significant interest in the issue (Becker 1993; Kjaer 2004; Brunner, Steelman 
et al. 2005; Jackson 2005; Brunner and Lynch 2010b). 
As this section demonstrates, public participation and community involvement are 
largely missing in the BoF/GoM. Without this important aspect of ecosystem-based 
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governance, the region is destined to continue the management of human activities that 
impact the environment in the same manner as in the past. If past is prologue, nothing 
good can come from that. 
The discussion of participants also included many of the perspectives held by the 
participants examined above. Thus the framework look at perspectives will be summary 
in nature. 
Perspectives. As we have seen, all participants have perspectives. Such 
perspectives can include conflicting ideas, feelings, and beliefs about a problem and often 
rest on basic beliefs. Social groups may coalesce around a perspective, but participants 
are individuals with their own beliefs, interests, loyalties, and faith. The way they see 
themselves, or their identifications as members of some group, are important to explain 
their actions. In our ecosystem-based approach model, governance would be open to new 
ideas and experimental approaches. Participants would reject their traditional adherence 
to processes that are parochial and resistant to innovation. They would also place the 
good of the BoF/GoM ecosystem, the resilience and integrity of the natural processes 
necessary to sustain ecosystem and structure ahead of other more parochial interests and 
would share a belief in collaboration, cooperation, and citizen empowerment. Finally, the 
ideal of human dignity would no longer be ignored, and citizen access to democratic 
processes and an overall commitment by participants to the common interests should 
prove more important than the preservation of bureaucratic turf. (Table 46) 
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Table 46 Perspectives 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
Perspective requires a governance structure 
that looks to find common ground on 
policies that advance common interests. In 
addition, the perspective necessary for 
ecosystem-based governance should be 
more universal and open to new ideas and 
experimental approaches rather than 
parochial and institutionally resistant to 
innovation. 
Governance in the BoF/GoM watershed is a 
bureaucracy with participants unable to 
move beyond jurisdictional restraints 
imposed by law. Overriding perspective is 
to maintain the status quo. Agency 
employees who seek to advance common 
interests are unable to do so because of 
parochial resistance to significant 
innovation. 
Problem solving should be viewed as a 
flexible process with broad participation and 
a variety of perspectives and should be 
cognizant that environmental, social, and 
economic systems are related with problems 
that overlap and need to be approached with 
a concern for human dignity and a respect 
for democratic access. 
Problems are dealt with by agencies with 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
problem. Uniform general rules or laws are 
applied to specific problems. Concern for 
human dignity and respect for democratic 
access are seldom factors. 
Common interest in ecosystem-based 
governance is to enable management to 
focus on the natural processes necessary to 
sustain ecosystem structure and function 
while recognizing the need for human and 
institutional involvement at every level of 
the ecosystem. The common interest of 
maintaining and supporting ecosystem 
integrity should outweigh parochial interests 
in preserving bureaucratic turf or command 
and control hierarchy. 
The parochial interests in preserving 
bureaucratic turf and traditional rules take 
precedence over the common interest of 
maintaining and supporting ecosystem 
resilience and integrity. Innovative efforts 
are approached by GOMC but true gulf-
wide governance focused on the natural 
processes necessary to sustain ecosystem 
structure and function is not a realistic 
prospect at present. 
It should be apparent at this point that governance in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
Maine region is executed through decisions made by agencies charged by law with the 
authority over some segment of the ecosystem. For the most part, the same agencies 
have been performing the same services for 30 or 40 years. The beliefs, loyalties, and 
interests of the participants in the government regime appear to be aligned firmly with the 
goals and limitations of the agency. While frustrating to many, it is a paradigm by 
default in the region. 
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Writing about his experiences and observations gleaned from the spotted owl 
controversy, natural resource analyst Steven Yaffee wrote about how comfortable it is for 
bureaucracies to act in standardized ways: 
Traditional ways of doing things have been tested by the realities of time, 
agency staff are accomplished at carrying out their tasks, and longstanding 
patterns of individual and organizational behavior create a predictable and 
energy-conserving reality for agency staffers and leaders alike. 
Organizations generally do what they do because they are administratively 
comfortable, politically and fiscally feasible, and legally allowable Like 
all organisms, bureaucracies define, find, and protect a decision space - a 
niche - in which they are comfortable and can thrive (Yaffee 1995, 
402).402 
Or as expressed by a state employee familiar with management efforts in the 
region: 
Government right now, whether it's federal or state, is unwilling to grow. 
When you talk about with ecosystem-based management is that the 
management system has to grow and the science system has to grow 
before we can do that. It's not a function of taking my urchin 
management person and making them an ecosystem person. In fact you 
need to have both functions going on. (U.S. State Employee 1) 
Thus perspectives of the governance participants in the BoF/GoM watershed tend 
to center around the maintenance of the fragmented regulatory regime in place now for 
decades. While certainly some individual participants are, again, frustrated with this 
perspective, there remains little that can be done to overcome the jurisdictional restraints 
imposed upon them by current law and regulation. Anything more added at this point 
would be redundant. We turn, therefore, to the task of Situations. 
Situations. Participants to an ecosystem governance process may interact in 
formal or informal settings, on a number of levels, and regularly or only during crises. 
Thus the examination of the situations in which participants interact may have temporal 
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elements depending upon how often the participants interact. It may also have spatial 
issues determined by the geographic boundaries represented by the participants. There 
may be institutional issues that depend upon the degree that power is centralized or 
decentralized in the region and whether regimentation is increasing or decreasing. 
Finally the issue is whether it takes a crisis for participants to mobilize participants to 
alter their perspectives and discourse-related practices in order to resolve the crises (Clark 
2002). 
Table 47 Situations 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
Collaboration, communication and cooperation 
between government, stakeholders, and the 
public allow for governance that works more 
with participants than on them. This means 
more frequent collaborative interaction 
between government and participants at all 
levels. Further, agencies need to be less geared 
toward enforcement and more willing to be 
used as resources for local involvement and for 
solving problems where they arise. 
There are few opportunities for frequent 
collaboration, communication and cooperation 
between government, stakeholders, and the 
public. Traditional agency government 
implementation requires enforcement of 
uniform laws, applying laws to specific 
situations. Some progress has been made in 
public involvement in fisheries management 
with the advent of sector management, but it 
may backfire as permits are bought up by 
wealthy fishermen and local small-boat 
fishermen are forced out of the industry. 
Decision-making and other collaborative 
processes are iterative and ongoing, not simply 
single-play problem-solving efforts. The need 
for passive formal public and adversarial public 
hearings can be reduced through citizen 
involvement and partnership, not just public 
information programs to inform passively. 
There are few opportunities for meaningful 
public participation opportunities in 
governance. Enforcement of regulatory laws 
are still basically through penalties and 
citations for non-compliance. 
In an ecosystem-based approach we would expect that there would be ample 
opportunity, or situations, for participants to communicate and collaborate (See Table 
47). In the BoF/GoM region, however, there are generally limited opportunities for 
communication, collaboration, and citizen involvement. There have been attempts, 
447 
including the Gulf of Maine Summit sponsored by the GOMC, but these are infrequent 
and relatively rare. The GOMC also provides opportunities for its working group to meet 
four times a year, and the actual Council to meet twice a year. These meetings often are 
devoted to developing their five year Action Plans. While various approaches have been 
tried for each plan, the public has not been a huge factor in any one plan - at least 
through 2008, as one member of the Council's Working Group relates: 
Yes, we've used a different process for each of the four action plans. The 
first one came out of the big Gulf of Maine conference in 1989. It sort of 
identified the issues and established a general plan around that. The 
second and third plans were, we thought, okay we need to have more 
specific objectives, so to fine-tune our actions, and this one's getting more 
results-based. The second action plan, I don't think, 2001/2006,1 don't 
think had much of a public engagement process. We'd just done a big 
workshop, we know what it is, we can just make a more specific plan. 
The plan after that had a lot more outreach: Surveys, engagement, 
workshops, and some gathering the input. Here's what we've known over 
the last five or six years, here are the goals we're shooting toward, what do 
you think our priorities should be, what role will counsel play? So, it was 
quite active. We did the summit and everything leading up to this one. 
The decision here is this is probably more internal. We sort of know the 
lay of the land, we did some outreach, some engagement. But, I wouldn't 
say that was the real emphasis of this current action plan for 2006/2011. 
It's really, let's look internally to what the priority is. (Canadian Federal 
Employee 2) 
One example of a group that exemplifies ecosystem and community-based 
governance in the region that takes advantage of situations and uses them to encompass 
frequent opportunities for cooperation and collaboration among a broad-based coalition 
of the public, scientists, and policy makers 
The ACAP model is very much about leadership at the local level. We 
don't tell them what they have to work on. What we did in the early years 
was that we helped them come together and they went through a visioning 
process, setting the goals and objectives, and each of them developed a 
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comprehensive environmental management plan. We gave them the first 
five years to do that. Nothing existed in these areas before, so helping a 
group come together, letting them determine what they actually wanted to 
achieve, and helping them do that. So those comprehensive management 
plans were real touchstones for them. Throughout that process we've said, 
look here are Environment Canada's goals, which they align with local 
interests. We hope there is some alignment or we're going to have 
difficult times working with you. By having those shared goals and the 
way they developed it, it wasn't just a couple of people sitting in a room 
doing this. It very much involved broad engagement of the citizenry, all 
levels of government, the private sector, that's who represents, who forms 
these ACAP organizations. (Canadian Federal Employee 2) 
BoFEP as we have seen provides periodic gatherings of scientists, experts, and 
citizens from around the basin as discussed previously. But, as we have seen, efforts 
that go beyond the legal boundaries limiting agency jurisdictions are rare. There has 
been little indication of movement towards a governance system that is heading toward 
partnerships with innovative techniques for working with industry other than the 
traditional confrontational methods. Thus situations in which participants in the region 
interact are generally controlled and relatively choreographed. 
Base Values. In Chapter III it was pointed out that environmental policy disputes 
are almost always "contests over values" despite the fact that they are often masked in 
economic or environmental jargon or appear to revolve around technical issues (Layzer 
2006). 
The values that we will discuss in terms of the BoF/GoM governance regime 
include the typical assets or resources that participants use in their efforts to achieve their 
goals. All values, including authority, can be used as bases of power. Brewer and 
deLeon (1983) have listed the values pertinent to this inquiry: 
Power is to make and carry out decisions 
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Enlightenment is to have knowledge 
Wealth is to have money or its equivalent 
Well-being is to have health, physical and psychological 
Skill is to have special abilities. 
Affection is to have family, friends, and warm community relationships 
Respect is to show and receive deference 
Rectitude is to have ethical standards 
The characteristics of an ideal ecosystem approach to governance include a heavy 
reliance on significant public participation, vertical and horizontal collaboration, 
resilience, and learning through trial and error. The values necessary for the 
implementation of an ecosystem-based approach must move away from the traditional 
goals of power and wealth as ends in themselves. In order for implementation of an 
ecosystem-based approach to governance to have a chance there needs to be much more 
emphasis on utilizing power and wealth to obtain stronger inputs from the values of 
knowledge, rectitude, well-being, and respect. A trial-and-error approach to management 
solutions, for example, requires a strong commitment to the gathering and sharing of 
knowledge together with an ability to acknowledge failures without the fear of 
punishment or the loss of funding. In addition, collaboration and significant public 
participation will require a focus on the values of respect, affection, rectitude and well-
being. There is simply no way to gain the trust, credibility, and respect necessary for 
problem-solving and planning collaboration and public and broad-based community 
support without a shift more in the direction of these important values. 
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Thus our ideal system must first be characterized by resource sharing and 
collaborative efforts designed to bring a broad base of the public and regulated interests 
together with regulators to share ideas, develop knowledge, and gain mutual respect to 
identify goals, threats to those goals, and possible actions to take in order to preserve and 
restore ecosystem resilience. In an ecosystem-based approach to governance, base values 
come into play in both the goals for the governance of the ecosystem and in the 
implementation processes that seek to implement the goals (Table 48). 
Table 48 Base Values 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
Values sought should be consistent with 
goals of promotion of broad collaboration 
with emphasis on ecosystem resilience. 
The values of power and wealth should be 
utilized to press demands for common 
interests prioritizing human dignity, 
ecosystem integrity and resilience. 
Knowledge (enlightenment) should be a 
goal that is ideally gained from a variety 
of sources through a process of trial and 
error as much as through traditional 
experimental science. 
Agencies rely on the support of 
elected officials and support is often 
tied to the satisfaction of those 
officials with the agency's 
contributions to or lack of 
interference with local or regional 
gains. With limited exceptions 
(Saltwater Network, ACAP) human 
dignity is not prioritized. Ecosystem 
resilience and integrity, though the 
goal of some participants, limited by 
jurisdictional constraints and agency 
turf concerns. 
In order for implementation of an 
ecosystem-based approach to governance 
to have a chance there needs to be much 
more emphasis on utilizing power and 
wealth to obtain stronger inputs from the 
values of knowledge, rectitude, well-
being, and respect 
The values of power and wealth 
appear to be used to preserve the 
status quo agency set-up as well as to 
promote private economic gain. 
There appears to rarely be trades of 
power and/or wealth to obtain 
knowledge, well-being, or rectitude. 
As we know, the governance regime in the BoF/GoM is fragmented with separate 
agencies each responsible for a portion of the activities that impact the ecosystem. 
Without an accountable overarching entity and a spirit of cooperation, collaboration, and 
significant public involvement it would be difficult to achieve governance "characterized 
by resource sharing and collaborative efforts designed to bring a broad base of the public 
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and regulated interests together with regulators to share ideas, develop knowledge, and 
gain mutual respect to identify goals, threats to those goals, and possible actions to take 
in order to preserve and restore ecosystem resilience." 
Given the existing governance regime in the region, it is not surprising that the 
values of power and wealth tend to trump those of knowledge, rectitude, well-being and 
respect. As discussed in the prior sections, bureaucratic agencies in the region must 
constantly guard their turf. As we learned in Chapter III, the behavior of regulatory 
agencies is often strongly influenced by industrial interests and a desire to minimize or 
avoid loss of values such as power, wealth (i.e. funding), and respect. In decisions 
involving potential adverse effects on important industries (e.g. fishing in New England), 
agency value losses include decreased budget allocations from unsympathetic legislatures 
so the costs of making decisions that adversely affect various industries are often 
perceived as too great to risk. Agencies rely on the support of elected officials and 
support is often tied to the satisfaction of those officials with the agency's contributions 
to or lack of interference with local or regional gains. Backlash against strong 
conservation methods that may impact economic productivity can be severe even at a 
local level (Wallace 2003). 
In contrast to the traditional model of resource management which reduces 
agency and institutional (public institutions and private business interests) behavior into a 
constant quest for power and wealth as capital for the purchase of other values, the policy 
sciences approach has consistently been focused on the intelligence relevant to an 
integration of values derived from interpersonal relations which prizes not the glory of a 
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depersonalized state or the efficiency of a social mechanism, but human dignity and the 
realization of human capacities" (deLeon 1988, 37 - 38) Thus in an ideal society: 
.. .citizens enjoy a full range of values, a state that has also been called 'a 
commonwealth of human dignity.' A healthy society is possible only 
when citizens enjoy a level of all eight values satisfactory to their needs 
(Clark 2008,45). 
In order to begin to achieve the kind of society described above, governance in 
the BoF/GoM region must move away from its administrative rationalist (Dryzek 1997) 
paradigm. Speaking broadly, the values of power and wealth should be utilized to press 
demands for common interests of human dignity, ecosystem integrity and resilience 
(Holling 1995; Holling and Gunderson 2002a; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003). Knowledge 
(enlightenment) should be a goal that, as we have seen, is ideally gained from a variety of 
sources through a process of trial and error as much as through traditional experimental 
science (Brunner and Steelman 2005). 
Certainly given the current governance scheme, there is little likelihood that the 
various jurisdictions represented on the Gulf of Maine Council would move away from a 
purely fragmented system and toward a more accountable, responsible arrangement with 
the GOMC playing the coordinating role. The reluctance of the Council, or more 
appropriate its membership, to evolve into a more accountable governance role can be 
frustrating to some: 
A: Time and time again when we talk to the Council about what they want 
their role to be, whether it's about EBM or anything else, and we give 
them the spectrum, like the chance to give the Council some authority to 
change something, they always gravitate back to the forum role. 
Q: There's been a reluctance to regulate as a group? 
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A: Yes. Definitely. 
Q: Or to give up or share any power in any way, shape or form? 
A: Yes. It's hard enough even to articulate their power. I mean not even 
a challenge... (U.S. Federal Employee 4) 
Others who participate in the Council feel that to maintain their agency's power 
and respect, as well as the credibility of the Council, industry must be appeased: 
Q: Okay, we're almost done here. Gulf of Maine Council. What 
direction would you like to see it take? 
A: Well, it's all over the spectrum, and they probably told you that... 
New Brunswick Agriculture and Fisheries and Aquaculture and I are 
really focused on getting industry. It's our priority. If it doesn't happen, 
we walk. We basically made that very clear because, what's difficult for 
us is that development agencies will come to the table not engaging our 
constituents and being perceived by industry as well, you're just working 
an environmental group. That's not what council is or is about. And, 
really, if council wants to achieve what it wants to achieve and we talked 
about this when we started, you can't do it without engaging industry. 
You can't ignore the biggest users or potentially biggest impact in the 
marine environment. (Canadian Provincial Employee 1) 
Thus while no one can deny that the GOMC provides a valuable forum for the 
exchange of information, the goals of power and wealth seem to be the key drivers for 
governance within the current regulatory system - at least as to many of the agencies 
participating through the GOMC. As we saw above, however, that is often simply the 
nature of bureaucracy. 
The situation is no different with some regulatory agencies that do not participate 
in Council activities. The process set up for the New England Fisheries Management 
Council by the Magnuson-Stevens Sustainable Fisheries Act (1976) appears to allow for 
power and wealth to be the dominant values in some decision-making. One example is 
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the ability of the NEFMC or NMFS to crack down on state fisheries that permit too many 
fish to be caught within waters over which the states have jurisdiction (3 mile limit) - a 
result that violates the duty of states to act consistent with the federal government or 
NMFS regulations: 
Q: It seems to me that the harder the states hammer the stocks, the more 
difficult it will be for the Council and the federal agencies to show a court, 
for instance, that you're rebuilding according to the timetables. 
A: Absolutely. And there's one section of the Magnuson Act that I think 
says that if the states are interfering with rebuilding, the federal 
government can preempt the state laws if they're not consistent with 
federal. It has never happened; won't happen. Politics. There's no way 
that the Department of Commerce is going to preempt the states. 
Q: Why the pressure? Why wouldn't Commerce step in? 
A: Political pressure. 
Q: It would be just too unpopular? 
A: Yes. We work closely that they abide by the federal laws but they 
don't want to. The federal laws are far too stringent for the state fisheries 
experts. 
Q: But if we're talking about the same stocks what is the argument that 
the states use to keep laws less stringent? 
A: They just can. States rights. They can do whatever they want zero to 
three miles out. 
A: So to them it's an economic issue? 
A: It's an economic issue and a political issue. 
Q: The fishing industry has enough power to force... 
A: Absolutely. You know you get to Rhode Island, Massachusetts, they 
have in shore commercial fisheries that are, like the flounder fishery, 
black-back fishery, yellowtail in shore fisheries, herring. (US Federal 
Employee 3) 
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Recall that under our ideal view of ecosystem based governance, the values 
sought by participants should be consistent with the promotion of broad collaboration 
with emphasis on ecosystem resilience. The values of power and wealth should be 
utilized to press demands for common interests prioritizing human dignity, ecosystem 
integrity and resilience. Thus whether it involves the regulation of fisheries or the other 
threats confronting the region's ecosystem, the values that tend to drive the regulatory 
process in the BoF/GoM region have little relationship to the ideal model. From what 
we have learned in this study, power and wealth appear to be used often to preserve the 
status quo agency set-up as well as to promote private economic gain. This approach 
differs markedly from our ideal, which would advocate the use of power and wealth as a 
means to obtain stronger inputs from the values of knowledge, rectitude, well-being, and 
respect. 
Strategies. Thus far in the analysis of the social process at work in the Great 
Lakes in first two decades of the GLWQA we have examined the participants, their 
perspectives, the situations in which they interact, and the base values that are used to 
achieve the goals of the participants. The strategies employed by the participants will be 
examined next. 
The four basic strategies that were identified in Chapter III may be listed 
as follows: 
• Diplomatic strategies use communication among and between the leaders 
and/or elites of any group or agency; 
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• Ideological strategies involve communications to a public that is wider 
than just leaders or heads of agencies and include public talks, newspaper 
and other mass media appeals and, in the extreme, propaganda; 
• Economic strategies that consist of practices that rely on the production 
and distribution of goods and services. Boycotts and labor actions are 
included in economic strategies (Clark 2002), and 
• Litigation which in this study is defined as disputes that are submitted for 
binding resolution by a third party. 
In Chapter III the need to move toward a governance system that moves 
away from regulatory enforcement efforts geared toward targeted interventions at point 
sources and problem areas in the form of commands to different classes of firms 
mandating change in existing technologies or behavior was discussed at some length. In 
place of coercive command and control regulatory conduct, at least to some degree, 
should be a movement toward cooperation and collaboration in decisions about processes 
and raw materials, sustainability planning integrating environmental goals with other 
social and economic goals using diplomatic and ideological strategies (Table 49). 
Certainly there will always be a need for basic rules backed by the coercive power of the 
state in order to keep firms in line and not give unfair competitive advantage to 
environmentally noncompliant firms (Harrison 1995; Kagan 2001; Kjaer 2004; Fiorino 
2006). The point is that ecosystem-based approach governance would seek to work with 
the regulated public to a greater degree. 
In addition to the need to move away from coercive regulatory conduct and 
litigation, the literature and case studies discussed in chapter III suggest the need for a 
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bridging organization that connects, navigates and/or coordinates the interests of 
different institutions and stakeholders across organizational levels should also be an 
integral part of adaptive governance of social-ecological systems. As was pointed out 
earlier, such organizations provide social incentives by rewarding and creating space for 
collaboration, value formation, and innovation. 
Table 49 Strategies 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
An ecosystem-based approach would rely 
more on ideological and diplomatic 
strategies, moving away from regulatory 
enforcement efforts geared toward targeted 
interventions at point sources and problem 
areas which take the form of commands to 
different classes of firms mandating change 
in existing technologies or behavior. Instead 
there would be cooperation and 
collaboration in decisions about processes 
and raw materials, sustainability planning 
integrating environmental goals with other 
social and economic goals. 
Strategies differ between Canada 
and the U.S. although both are still 
based largely on traditional 
command and control governance 
and enforcement. Canada shows 
more willingness to use softer 
intervention using diplomacy rather 
than punishment as inducement to 
change behavior and foster 
compliance. 
Litigation will play a role as there is a need 
for basic rules to be backed by the coercive 
power of the state in order to keep firms in 
line and not give unfair competitive 
advantage to environmentally noncompliant 
firms. Litigation would, however, rely more 
upon alternative dispute mechanisms, 
including facilitation and mediation. 
In U.S. litigation is the principle tool 
used for enforcement and penalties. 
There may be recognition of a need 
for greater voluntary compliance 
efforts, especially as funding is 
diminished and costly litigation loses 
attraction. 
The existence of a bridging organization 
that connects and navigates the interests of 
different stakeholders across organizational 
levels should be integral part of adaptive 
governance of social-ecological systems. 
Such organizations provide social incentives 
by rewarding and creating space for 
collaboration, value formation, and 
innovation. The collaboration that bridging 
organizations initiate is strategic-, 
conditional on the goals to enhance the 
values from the ecosystems 
There is no bridging organization in 
the region currently capable of 
connecting and coordinating 
different stakeholders across 
organizational levels. GOMC plays 
role of a forum to provide discourse 
between and among regulatory 
agencies. The goals of the GOMC 
are broad and ecosystem-based, but 
are not shared by all participants. 
Jurisdictional constraints of 
members also are barriers to 
change. 
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The collaboration that bridging organizations initiate is strategic, conditional on the goals 
to enhance the values that may tend to promote the sustainability and resilience of the 
ecosystems (Hahn, Schultz et al. 2008). 
In the final analysis strategies in an ecosystem-based approach should be more 
goal-oriented and should have institutions and processes that enable and incentivize more 
diplomatic and ideological strategies and discourage the use of more adversarial and/or 
litigious strategies (Table 49). 
The current regulatory regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region appears 
to adhere to a more traditional governance scheme. Activities are regulated by federal, 
state, or provincial agencies. Strategies have to be built upon a basis laid by formal laws 
and rules. Reliance is therefore generally upon regulation using economic or social 
intervention to force compliance with uniform rules. Where this intervention fails, 
litigation provides the remedy (Kagan 2001; Fiorino 2006). Thus status quo strategies 
use litigation, and by extension enforcement with the threat of litigation, as a principle 
weapon in the management arsenal (Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 2004; Walker and Salt 2006; 
Bardach and Kagan 2010). 
There is a clear difference between Canada and the United States regarding 
enforcement strategies. In Canada, with vague jurisdictional lines, federal and provincial 
agencies tend to work together and compromise with resource users. The strategy is 
principally diplomatic. Indeed, while formal enforcement responses like criminal 
prosecution and administrative notices are important tools in Canada, they are typically 
viewed as mechanisms of last resort. Administrators in Canada more often utilize 
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informal mechanisms to bring about compliance (Abbot 2009). As one Canadian federal 
official pointed out respect to environmental enforcement strategy in Canada: 
Q: So, your principle strategy, is it safe to say, is basically.. .and I can 
give you a choices.. .there's diplomatic, there's litigation or does that 
include that from the outside, there's economic, and there's ideological, 
meaning trying to achieve goals through education on scientific, social, 
economic, research, etc., education. It seems to me if I were pick 
strategies, you're using chiefly diplomatic and ideological, would that be 
fair? 
A: Yes. That's fair. Diplomatic...I'm not sure you're 
interpretation.. ..certainly ideological... 
Q: Let's say negotiations... 
A: Yes. Okay. Finding consensus, if you will. The legal stuff is always 
there. Everyone says their legal obligations have to be met, meet them. If 
you need to educate, enforce, whatever, so if Environment Canada is 
responsible for enforcing certain regulations, just do it. Meet the letter of 
the law. We expect that. And industries and so on, meet your obligations 
on that end. But, in terms of anything legal beyond that, no, it's what are 
our common interests? (Canadian Federal Employee 2) 
Despite the existence of alternatives, litigation has become a tactical and strategic 
weapon employed by all sides to policy conflicts - at least in the United States (Fiorino 
2006). In the US, the courts have also become a political venue for the losers in prior 
policy battles fought in Congress, or in the agency regulatory process, to launch another 
assault. Litigation also provides a stalling mechanism to the policy process and creates a 
bargaining chip to be bartered for concessions from opponents (Rosenbaum 2008). 
The management of groundfish stocks in New England is one example of the use 
of litigation as a strategy that has resulted in the courts playing a significant role in 
fisheries management in the Gulf of Maine. It was largely the litigation in Conservation 
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08 Law Foundation v. Evans that forced NMFS and the NEFMC to take tough measures in 
order to stop the overfishing of groundfish stocks in the Gulf of Maine following their 
collapse in the early 1990s. Another result of the New England groundfish collapse was 
the establishment of the political will to pass amendments to the Magnuson Stevens 
Fishery Management Act. These amendments, known in short form as the Sustainable 
Fisheries Act ("SFA"), include mandatory rebuilding provisions as well as a section 
designed to protect essential fish habitat ("EFH") (1996a). The EFH provisions of the 
Sustainable Fisheries Act may open up the possibility of more litigation aimed at 
controlling the destruction of marine benthic habitats, corals, and other structures caused 
by bottom trawling and other destructive fishing practices (Bilsky 2006). 
Litigation is also beginning to play a role in efforts by the EPA to reduce the 
nutrient levels in the region's bays and estuaries. In a recent opinion by the 
Environmental Appeals Board of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in Upper 
Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement District," the court ruled that EPA had an 
obligation under Section 303 of the Clean Water Act to require permits to include 
whatever conditions are necessary to "[ajchieve water quality standards under section 
303 of the CWA, including State.. .criteria for water quality." The limitations and 
conditions in any permit under Section 303 "must control all pollutants.. .which the 
[Region] determines are or may be discharged at a level which will cause, have the 
reasonable potential to cause, or contribute to any excursion above any State water 
98 211 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) 
99 NPDES Appeal Nos.08-11 to 08-18 & 09-06; 
http://yosemite. epa.gov/oa/eab_web_docket.nsf7Case~Name/F22DB97558D954F2852578E00070F96 l/$Fi 
le/Denying%20Revie w... .pdf 
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quality standard..." Blackstone at p. 24. Thus the EPA may now impose on any State or 
municipality a requirement that its sewage discharge reduce levels of nutrients, including 
nitrogen and phosphorous, to extremely low levels if there is evidence showing that 
effluent discharged by the state or municipality "contributes" to a violation of state water 
quality standards. This has incredible implications to regions like New Hampshire's 
Great Bay where nitrogen and phosphorus levels exceed water quality standards. No 
longer does the EPA have to prove that the effluent discharged by municipal water 
treatment facilities is the "cause" of the violation - a nearly impossible task given the 
multitude of sources that contribute nutrients to the water. Under Blackstone the EPA 
need only prove that such facilities contribute to the problem. Given that any addition of 
nutrients in waste water discharge necessarily contributes to the water quality standard 
violations, EPA enforcement of new permitting standards is sure to be enforced through 
the courts using the Blackstone precedent. 
In sum, traditional top-down government enforcement and intervention is still the 
main government strategy in the region. When issues arise over compliance with 
uniform laws, litigation is the primary strategy used to enforce legal standards. There 
are, perhaps, more diplomatic and ideological tactics being attempted, but litigation 
remains the main strategy used to achieve compliance with laws, rules, and regulations. 
Outcomes. Outcomes, generally short-term but may be medium or long-term as 
well, are the culminating events measured in terms of values that may be seen as 
indicative of progress, or not, depending on the perspective of the participants. Outcomes 
may take the form of changes in process, or institutions, which, at least in terms of a 
transition to ecosystem-based governance, indicate movement toward the creation and 
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implementation of the perspectives and institutional structures that are conducive to 
innovation. 
In terms of our ideal system, progress would be indicated by efforts to share 
power with and distribute more values to a greater portion of the public (Table 50). If 
analysis of the values set forth in our social process reveals that more power and wealth is 
being accumulated by fewer entities, this would reflect a negative trend to those who seek 
to move in the direction of a more ecosystem-based approach to governance. If, on the 
other hand, there are tangible efforts toward creating governance processes and structures 
that encourage public participation, collaboration, the mobilization of local knowledge, 
and more adaptable, accountable, and flexible management, then outcomes are headed in 
a direction consistent with ecosystem-based governance (Brewer and deLeon 1983; 
deLeon 1999; Clark 2002; Clark 2008). 
Table 50 Outcomes 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
Transition toward a more adaptive 
ecosystem-based approach to governance. 
Innovative measures are tried that 
transform current governance entities and 
create new or modified value institutions 
that get beyond scientific management and 
strict command and control hierarchy of 
bureaucracy using local input and 
collaborative processes. 
There have been positive developments in 
the language used by the GOMC and its 
member agencies indicating their adoption 
of ecosystem-based approaches to 
governance. It remains to be seen whether 
truly collaborative efforts evolve out of 
these pronouncements and whether the 
public and communities will be enticed 
and welcomed into the process to 
contribute local knowledge and 
information. 
In terms of outcomes in the BoF/GoM region, there are some to be found, 
although often they are largely symbolic. One outcome, of course, is the continued 
existence of the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment as a forum for the 
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exchange of ideas and information for regulatory agencies in the region. Another 
positive development are the goals and operating principles set forth in the most recent 
Gulf of Maine Council Action Plan (GOMCc 2007). Discussed at length earlier in this 
chapter, that document clearly embraces the principles of ecosystem-based governance 
and recognizes the need for increased collaboration as well as the desirability of 
increased public outreach and education. In addition, as has been mentioned earlier, 
many of the participants in the Gulf of Maine governance regime, especially those who 
are active within the Gulf of Maine Council, have adopted ecosystem-based approaches 
and public involvement as goals within their agencies. The question is whether these 
symbolic pronouncements will translate into truly ecosystem-based approaches. Time 
will tell, therefore, if agencies begin to partner more with each other and with the public 
and communities to solve problems without regard to jurisdiction. 
Effects. Effects refer to the long-term changes in the value positions and 
institutions in the relevant community. They are outcomes writ large, i.e. long-term 
outcomes in terms of values, processes, and institutional innovation (Clark 2002). 
In essence, effects developed for our ideal system would include innovative 
measures that transform current governance entities and create new or modified value 
institutions that get beyond scientific management and strict command and control 
hierarchy of bureaucracy using local input and collaborative processes (Brunner and 
Steelman 2005; Coe-Juell 2005; Fiorino 2006; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). It 
would allow for softer and more voluntary local or regional regulation of activities that 
impact the ecosystem consistent with community goals and consistent with national 
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standards. There should also be evidence of a greater acceptance by regulators of public 
and community input and decision-making (Table 51). 
Table 51 Effects 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
Transition toward a more adaptive 
ecosystem-based approach to 
governance. Innovative measures 
are tried that transform current 
governance entities and create 
new or modified value institutions 
that get beyond scientific 
management and strict command 
and control hierarchy of 
bureaucracy using local input and 
collaborative processes 
Transition in the region is more 
symbolic than tangible. 
Government agencies are 
increasingly acknowledging the 
need for change. Strict command 
and control is still largely the 
operating premise, but agencies 
are aware of need for transition. 
GOMC Action Plan incorporates 
goals and operating principles 
calling for transition toward EBM 
and greater public outreach and 
education. 
While it is difficult to look around the region and point to tangible outcomes that 
reflect a broader, more holistic, less confrontational, and more community-oriented 
governance regime, there is a very important positive outcome that can be discussed. 
There is, generally, a broader acceptance and understanding of the need to transition 
toward an ecosystem-based approach to governance. There is even some optimism 
within government that transition is possible. Illustrative is this exchange with a veteran 
of U.S. fisheries management efforts: 
Q: There's very little institutional memory of a groundfish industry 
downeast. 
A: Everything is fished out. So maybe some day there will be enough 
fish to allocate some portion there. But right now we've got to get pretty 
smart about how many fish there are left and what do we have in terms of 
capacity to fish them and things like that. But yes there is definitely a role 
for community stewardship within the structure we have now. There's no 
reason why we can't have, as we move towards ecosystem management, 
why can't we have a Gulf of Maine committee, a Georges Bank 
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committee, and a Southern New England committee, all under the Council 
structure and only Massachusetts, Maine and New Hampshire will worry 
about the Gulf of Maine. And then the whole Council can get together can 
get together to decide on the allocations between Georges Bank and Gulf 
of Maine, and Georges Bank and SNE, because the fish go up and down. 
Once you allocate, and you know the numbers of fish you can catch in 
each ecosystem, you have better governance with a smaller scale and you 
can then further break it down to advisory groups, of course we can do 
that. I've been a longtime proponent of that. A Gulf of Maine committee 
with its own advisors in its own space, all other the council structure so 
that we can track how they interact with each other and allocate the 
different species because some of them don't just stay on Georges or don't 
just stay in the Gulf of Maine. (US Federal Employee 3) 
What's impressive is the vision - the mission to rebuild fish stocks so that fish 
will return to places from which they've been long absent and, once that occurs, the 
decisions on how to best manage those fisheries can be made with the meaningful input 
of groups on a smaller scale - perhaps communities. 
Further, there are people in government that care about a transition away from the 
status quo and are increasingly willing to lead a transition towards broader ecosystem-
based approaches to governance. NOAA may be headed that way, despite some barriers, 
as we learn from someone familiar with the situation: 
All these definitions are general and innocuous enough but NOAA has 
dragged its feet a little bit because we don't have an EBM mandate. So 
it's no one's job to do EBM. It's someone's job to do coastal zone 
management, someone's job to do fisheries management, marine mammal 
protection, endangered species, etc., but it's no one's job to do EBM. So I 
think there's just been a lot of rhetoric at the national level to date to try to 
define this and figure out how our activities could be better connected 
through our budget and planning decisions. I haven't felt that it has yet to 
translate to the regional level where these projects and programs could 
actually interact and focus on pilot areas and include agencies and other 
partners. In a data rich place like the Gulf of Maine it certainly could and 
should be done. But the impetus from NOAA has been a need for NOAA 
to get its own ducks in a row before it reaches out to other agencies. In 
conversations with Steve Murawski and other folks at headquarters I have 
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learned that there is definitely interest by FY 09 to start spending money 
up here and actually pulling a NOAA team together, talking about EBM, 
how it would work, how an assessment would work up here. Once we 
understand our approach we could then start to engage other agencies and 
do a concentric circle thing but we have to start with ourselves. I don't 
feel like in this region it has happened yet. There are plans to move that 
way. But it's no one's full time job to do that. Everybody is still 
operating in their own stovepipes. (US Federal Employee 4) 
If all NOAA needed was a mandate, with the President's recent Executive Order 
many of the recommendations of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force are now law. 
The mandate is in place and awaits only implementing regulations. Is this the license that 
NOAA and other pertinent U.S. federal agencies need to move toward integrated 
management and involving the public and communities in coastal and ocean-related 
decisions? Time will tell but as we have seen there is unlikely to be a warm reception for 
significant change at the agency level in the United States. 
In sum then, the social process in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed has 
generally been handicapped by an ability to work outside of traditional agency structures. 
What we have seen, however, is there is some recognition that governance in the region 
must change. It will require a galvanized and educated public to drive any change in the 
direction of ecosystem-based governance, together with government representatives with 
the courage to lead change heading into an uncertain future. 
Decision Process 
The third and final portion of the policy sciences framework that needs to be 
discussed is the decision process. Much of the information, background, and data 
concerning the decision process has been set forth and absorbed within the prior sections 
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involving problem orientation and the social process. Every effort will be made to avoid 
unnecessary duplication. 
Natural resource policy and management are generally analyzed on the basis of 
the decision process employed in the execution of agency mandates. As we have seen, 
there is no one agency that oversees the myriad of threats posed to the ecosystem of the 
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem. Thus an examination of the decision process for 
this region involves the mapping of six interlinked functions: intelligence, promotion, 
prescription, implementation, termination, and appraisal. 
As we have seen, the decision process in the BoF/GoM is a crowded field. 
Understanding the collective decision process, however, can be a way of reconciling or at 
least productively managing competing interests and policies through politics. There are 
inevitable agency turf battles and politics plays a role in their outcome. Politics will 
always be with us because people seek different policies that reflect their particular, or 
"special", interests. The ideal, of course, is for participants to reconcile interest 
differences in order to clarify and secure their common interest. In the BoF/GoM 
governance regime, we have seen that it is not really clear who establishes what the 
common interests are or should be, and even what the community believes is in their 
common interests. 
In terms of ecosystem-based governance, trends can be determined that might 
indicate whether intelligence data is reliable and linked to the appropriate scales within 
an ecosystem, whether such intelligence is being communicated to policy makers in a 
meaningful manner and, ultimately, whether a structure exists that allows for decision 
makers to react to intelligence in an adaptive fashion. Note that ecosystem-based 
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governance requires a decision process that is open and transparent, not slanted toward 
special interests and power (Clark 2002). In terms of ecosystem-based governance, 
trends can be determined that might indicate whether intelligence data is reliable and 
linked to the appropriate scales within an ecosystem, whether such intelligence is being 
communicated to policy makers in a meaningful manner and, ultimately, whether a 
structure exists that allows for decision makers to react to intelligence in an adaptive 
fashion, and whether there is impartial third-party appraisal of existing policies that will 
permit participants to adapt or even terminate programs (Clark, Willard et al. 2000; 
Wilson 2000; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007). We have largely examined the trends in the 
region earlier in this chapter. We now examine the task of intelligence. 
Intelligence. Intelligence is the process of obtaining and processing information 
and making it available to decision makers, stakeholders, members of the public, and 
others (Clark 2002). It involves the generation of knowledge, the transmission of 
knowledge, the use of knowledge, and the effects of knowledge on the policy process. 
Knowledge relevant to environmental decision making may be generated by scientists or 
it can come from other sources, including local knowledge. Intelligence is simply the 
process used to gather information about the problem(s) at hand and the relevant context 
and should incorporate characteristics like timeliness, dependability, and creativity (Clark 
2008). The purpose of intelligence is to provide reliable data and information that 
permits an understanding of whether conditions in the ecosystem are trending toward or 
away from the goals of the region (Busch and Trexler 2003). Reliability turns on whether 
intelligence is comprehensive and gathered from appropriate scales in order to detect 
trends and changes in ecosystem resilience and function (Lasswell 1971; Gunderson and 
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Holling 2002; Gunderson 2003; Reid, Berkes et al. 2006). Data gathering and analysis 
should, in an ideal world, be inclusive and open to honest debate. Policy makers, as we 
have seen in the prior sections, must be willing to put special interests and bias aside and 
make decisions based upon the available data. The data, and the decisions, should be 
understandable to the public. Intelligence that reveals trend direction should lead to 
policy responses through an adaptable and accountable process (Busch and Trexler 2003; 
Gunderson 2003; Brunner 2010a). (Table 52) 
Table 52 Intelligence 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
System is facilitated by identification of 
intelligence needs and enabled by 
cooperative agreements among relevant 
entities to assure reliability, compatibility, 
timely analysis and accessibility. 
Intelligence must come from a broad array 
of participants that includes scientists, 
academics, the regulated public, and the 
public at large. 
Intelligence is largely a function of member 
agencies of the GOMC. There are NGOs 
that perform intelligence functions as well. 
In both cases, results of intelligence is 
generally accessible via the web sites of the 
agency or NGO. Information is shared 
with GOMC which makes data and reports 
available on its web site. Public is rarely 
meaningfully involved in the gathering of 
intelligence. 
Intelligence must be communicated to an 
accountable entity for analysis and 
coordinated action, i.e. a person, 
partnership, or other entity that has an 
obligation or responsibility to an authority, 
group, standard, mandate or behavior norm 
external to that person or entity. 
Intelligence and information must be made 
readily available to researchers, scientists 
and the public. 
Intelligence on many topics is 
communicated to the GOMC. The GOMC, 
however, is powerless to act upon the 
information received. It is a forum for 
discussion and it may foster discussion 
related to intelligence, but no authority to 
compel action. With respect to fisheries, 
GOMC plays no role and all intelligence 
performed by agencies with jurisdiction 
over fisheries on either side of the border. 
In order for the public to be interested and 
be able to understand the data and other 
intelligence, significant public outreach and 
capacity building is required. 
There is little in the way of significant 
public outreach. Intelligence may be 
available to the public through web sites, 
etc., but very few meaningful efforts to 
inform public as to why they should seek 
out the information. 
Intelligence and complex natural science information cannot simply be dropped 
on an uninformed public. The public must be informed and interested and therefore be 
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able to understand the data and other intelligence. Thus the groundwork necessary to 
create an informed public is necessary before significant public outreach and capacity 
building can be meaningful (Becker 1993; Fischer 2000; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; 
Weber 2003; Walker and Salt 2006). Local groups able to inventory and sample the 
natural resources with results communicated to a variety of actors, including the general 
public, using a wide range of methods, are preferable to the kind of closed process we 
have now that often collects and transfers knowledge only among a select group of peer 
review journal aficionados. Information, collected by a range of volunteers under the 
guidance of a blend of scientific and local knowledge and transferred freely provides the 
basis for feedback loops required for the holistic and sustainable management of complex 
systems (Walker and Salt 2006). 
Examining the factors set forth above, and in Table 52, how does the governance 
process used to obtain reliable intelligence in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed 
compare with our ideal model? The answer is that historically the fragmented 
governance system in the region has generally conducted research institution-by-
institution and agency-by-agency. 
Q: Are you comfortable that you know the status quo of the environment 
of the ecosystem, whether it's functioning, whether it's not? 
A: I think the council would probably be happier getting a better handle 
on that. I think first breaking it up into the pieces that make sense like, are 
the harbors clean, do we have functioning estuaries, do we have salt 
marshes, are we addressing tidal barriers? Things like that. I think if we 
could articulate those areas of concern for those particular resources, then 
it would be easier to answer that question. 
Q: And as I understand it, most of the data, most of the monitoring, is 
done by staff of the members of the council members. 
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A: The monitoring of the outputs from the action plan, or the actual 
conditions? 
Q: Actual conditions. 
A: Yes. Absolutely. 
Q: So, you're relying on data from your members and their employees. 
A: Absolutely, and it's not always comparable, which is why that whole 
ecosystem initiative that David's been working on, I think it's been taking 
flight. I mean they're looking to come up with indicators that everyone 
can use to measure the health of the particular system. And not just the 
health of the environment. Probably one of the things that I remember 
talking about, and I don't know if it's on the ESIP agenda, which is 
Ecosystem Indicator Partnership, but the just health of a community, 
because if a community isn't healthy then we get into the whole land 
conversion issues and there's no stewardship anymore, and so it just 
makes it vulnerable to all kinds of exploitation and change. (US NGO 4) 
Results of these the diverse intelligence efforts are often shared with interested 
parties via the web site for the Gulf of Maine Council, BoFEP, or the web sites for the 
responsible agencies, like NOAA, DFO, the EPA, and New England Fishery 
Management Council. 
The first requirement for the intelligence function under the ideal model is that 
there be a system in place that facilitates the identification of intelligence needs that is 
then enabled by cooperative agreements among relevant entities to assure reliability, 
compatibility, timely analysis and accessibility. Intelligence must come from a broad 
array of participants that includes scientists, academics, the regulated public, and the 
public at large. 
Q: Is the health of the ecosystem a factor in the policy process? And I 
can define that further if you want. 
A: I'd say that's the basis for environmental laws that make up the coastal 
program.. .evaluate the impacts, minimize the impacts, mitigate.. .avoid, 
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minimize, mitigate. But, my biggest concern when looking at our 
effectiveness is that we don't know ... whether the functions that we're 
intending to preserve are actually preserved, or a process, because we're 
not doing the early enough monitoring, and we don't understand the 
systems well enough to really... 
Q: Know when you get official... 
A: Exactly. 
Q: How can you make it better? What would it take to understand better 
what the human impacts are and what the impacts of decisions are? 
A: I think we need to do a whole lot more monitoring and have 
understanding of how some really basic systems work, and we need to, in 
addition to a site by site review and development permitting, we need to 
have some sort of.. .a design of regulations with the system in mind. (US 
State Employee 2) 
From the perspective of a U.S. Federal employee familiar with the governance 
scheme in the watershed and with much of the data that is being gathered: 
Q: But, going back to the four threats that we mentioned earlier, what are 
the trends? Are we getting better or are we moving further away from our 
goals? 
A: Well, that depends on how good your indicator systems are and that's 
an issue. I think you have a lot of different groups that are trying to 
understand the state of the environment and Gulf of Maine Council is one 
through their Ecosystem Indicator Partnership. Every office, again, looks 
at its own indicators. I don't think that anyone.. .1 know that NOAA 
doesn't have a system in place where we actually understand a whole suite 
of indicators. So, for instance, coastal development wise, we know that 
the Northeast is the most highly populated region of the US and it's 
getting more populated, so that trend is going up. The non-point source 
pollution is getting worse due in large part to increased development. 
Now fisheries has their set of indicators where they're measuring fishery 
stocks and it's very difficult to put that picture together in terms of an 
ecosystem where some stocks are going up, some stocks are going down, 
and where you have trophic cascades going on. You might not be able to 
speak for the entire ecosystem but they're trying to put that picture 
through individual stocks or suites of stocks. Again, that's not in an 
ecosystem context. 
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Q: Here's the ultimate question. Do we really know the status of the 
ecosystem in the Gulf of Maine? 
A: I think we can generally say thumbs up or thumbs down but not in an 
ecosystem context. It's still stove piped in terms of the way we measure. 
(US Federal Employee 4) 
From the series of interview segments above it appears that at least as of when 
these interviews were taken in 2006 and 2007 some questions remained as to the status of 
the ecosystem in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. It is my view that a complete picture 
of the current state of the system is still missing. 
In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine governance regime there has never been an 
identification of intelligence needs that was then then enabled by cooperative agreements 
among relevant entities to assure reliability, compatibility, timely analysis and 
accessibility. Further, what intelligence that exists has not been the product of a broad 
array of participants that includes scientists, academics, the regulated public, and the 
public at large. 
We perhaps need to break the monitoring needs down. Let's at least say that 
monitoring should be sufficient to give governance and the public notice of a problem or 
even indications that a policy change has helped or harmed. In this study we have 
focused primarily on the threats posed by overharvesting, shoreland development, 
pollution (chemical and nutrient), climate change and, to a lesser degree, invasive species 
(Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 2004). 
Let's pick a couple of these threats and see if the status of the region's ecosystem 
is such that it has the resilience and integrity to either survive the threat or to bounce back 
from the harm caused by the threat. First we'll examine the threat posed by overfishing. 
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Are our intelligence efforts reliable, compatible, with timely analysis and accessibility? 
Is the intelligence the result of collaboration between a broad cross section of participants 
including scientists, academics, the regulated public and the public at large? Here are the 
views of someone active in fisheries management: 
Q: Do you think that with the technology that we have now we know the 
status of the catch as we go? 
A: I think we have a pretty good handle on landings. I don't think we 
have a good handle on catch, which includes discards. I think we have 
better monitoring, observer coverage, to really figure out what's being 
caught out there. 
Q: And what do we have now percentage-wise for observer coverage. 
A: Not near enough. I'd say five to 20% depending on the fishery. The 
amount of funding needed for observer coverage is not there. 
Q: Hasn't been for awhile? 
A: Hasn't been for a long time. 
Q: And you keep asking for it and it doesn't come? 
A: Hight. It doesn't come. 
Q: Does industry or the Council support observer coverage? 
A: Well, we've asked for a national program that appropriates the funding 
so we can get a good handle on catch. Observer coverage will also help 
stock assessments. You know those fish are primarily dead if they're 
caught. If you're catching more fish than landings show and that gets built 
into the scientific survey, stock assessment, there may be more fish than 
the science is saying. Or there may be less, I don't know. But they're not 
including a critical element, the total catch, the total mortality, it's not 
being included in every fishery. In some of them we do include discards 
because there has been sufficient observer coverage to give you the 
accuracy and precision that scientists say they can use. I think that our 
new, we just passed a standard by-catch reporting plan, and it lists the 
different percentages of boats that should have an observer that would 
give you that accuracy and precision to quantify discards based on the 
sample size of observer coverage. But most of us know that if you've got 
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an observer on the boat you change your behavior and that's a problem. 
My goal would be 100% observer coverage and 100% dockside 
monitoring. That to me will give you the best available science. It's 
expensive but it's where I'd go. Stop spending money in other places and 
100% observer coverage and 100% dockside monitoring. Then you'd 
have real time data. (US Federal Employee 3) 
Thus without 100% observer coverage, NEFMC data can only tell us something 
about how many fish are landed i.e. brought to port and sold. Due to bycatch100 and other 
issues, we simply don't know the total mortality of fish caused by fishing. Given the 
amount of fishing activity in the region, this is a rather frightening gap in our ability to 
monitor fish populations. 
Fishery management also relies on data from bottom trawl surveys conducted by 
the National Marine Fishery Service. Making estimates of fish populations, and then 
proscribing total allowable catch limitations on a species-by-species consistent with the 
National Standards set forth in the Sustainable Fisheries Act (1996a) is no easy task. As 
P.A. Larkin said in his 1976 keynote address to the American Fisheries Society: 
No one can deny that hypothetical animal populations can produce 
hypothetical maximum sustained yields, but the same cannot be said of 
real animal populations that are really being harvested (Larkin 1977,3) 
No one can seriously argue that the monitoring and assessment of the status of the 
fishery in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine is not an endeavor fraught with uncertainty. 
To use one example already touched on in this study, the status of the cod stock in the 
Gulf of Maine was assessed using a peer-reviewed assessment process along with other 
100 National Standard 9 of the Sustainable Fisheries Act states "Conservation and 
management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (A) minimize bycatch and (B) to the extent 
bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the mortality of such bycatch." The SFA defines bycatch as 
"fish which are harvested in a fishery, but which are not sold or kept for personal use," and 
includes regulatory discards - or the discarding of fish caught but unable by law to be kept or 
landed. (1996a). Sustainable Fisheries Act Amendments of 1996. USC. US. 16. 
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groundfish species managed under the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan 
in 2008. That assessment resulted in a determination that the cod stock was rebuilding 
and that prospects for a full recovery by 2014 were good. Annual catch targets and total 
allowable catch ("TAC") were adjusted upwards as a result. 
The peer-reviewed 2008 study turned out to be wrong. The 2010 data suggests 
that Gulf of Maine cod recruitment (the number of fish bom each year) has been below 
average. Rebuilding by 2014 is no longer possible. Within the stock, there are few fish 
older than age 9 in a stock with a lifespan of over 20 years. Finally, what's left of the 
stock has contracted into an area in the western Gulf of Maine which is where the last 
vestiges of a cod industry is located. Why is the 2008 assessment wrong and 2011 
assessment correct? It is apparently because the 2011 assessment does a better job of 
dealing with uncertainty. 
Thus stock assessments for commercial fish, or for any fish for that matter, have 
inherent uncertainties. Do we know the status of the Gulf of Maine ecosystem without 
truly having a handle on fish stock abundance and distribution? Maybe. If we learned 
from our 2007 mistakes and are now better able to factor uncertainties into the 
assessments. Of course, there are no guarantees that uncertainties won't increase and 
become more complex. The water temperature in the Gulf is increasing. The water 
chemistry is changing and salinity is decreasing as more fresh water from glacial melting 
surges into the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine bringing with it a changing nutrient regime 
(Townsend, Rebuck et al. 2010). Further, the composition of the phytoplankton - the 
bottom of the food chain - community is changing (Balch, Drapeau et al. 2007). Clearly 
uncertainty will remain a factor in future stock assessment. 
477 
Fish stocks and stock assessments are tricky. But what about indicators that tell 
us about water quality. Is it getting better or worse? What do we have as indicators? If 
so, is their existence the result of a system designed to facilitate the identification of 
intelligence needs that is then enabled by cooperative agreements among relevant entities 
to assure reliability, compatibility, timely analysis and accessibility? Does our water 
quality intelligence come from a broad array of participants that includes scientists, 
academics, stakeholders, and the public at large? 
As we see from a Canadian federal regulator, the stove pipes are still a problem 
when it comes to monitoring and indicators for, among other things, water quality: 
Q: The status quo right now is, separate departments, separate indicators, 
separate monitoring? 
A: Largely. Largely. Now there are good examples of collaboration, a 
few departments working together. I think, when we talk about our 
priorities, there's always the need for more consistent set of indicators, 
collaborative monitoring, sharing of the data, joint interpretation, feeding 
into more than one body for decision making. (Canadian Federal 
Employee 2) 
Contamination continues as a persistent and perhaps growing problem within the 
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. The GOMC has identified sewage, nutrients and mercury 
as the three contaminants of greatest concern to the BoF/GoM. There has already been 
discussion of all of the above, including the problem of un- or under-treated sewage, 
nutrient overloads (not unrelated to the sewage issues), and mercury, particularly the fish 
consumption advisories involving mercury burdens in fish tissue. 
Mercury burdens, nutrient overloads, and sewage contamination are, of course, 
monitored by the appropriate federal, state/provincial, or local government charged with 
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that responsibility under law. The water quality issue gets murkier when the discussion 
turns to the emerging threats posed by persistent and bio-accumulative chemicals making 
their way into the pelagic food chains and their risks. 
The Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment sponsors a valuable and 
vitally important monitoring program involving the collection and testing of mussels 
from around the basin for the presence of a range of chemical contaminants. Mussels, of 
course, are filter feeders. Thus contaminants in the water column accumulate in their 
tissues through feeding and surface contact. Obviously, tissue concentrations of 
chemicals are indications of the presence or absence of chemical constituents in the 
water.101 Thus environmental concentrations their tissue contains a wealth of information 
as to the presence, or not, of a variety of contaminants. With the collection of mussel 
tissue on an annual basis conducted mostly by volunteers, the Gulfwatch program is 
charged with: 
... the assessment component of the GOMC's 2007-2012 Action Plan 
Goal 2 (of 3): Environmental conditions in the Gulf of Maine support 
ecosystem and human health. Two monitoring goals were established to 
help meet the goals of the current Action Plan and the mission of the 
Gulfwatch Program: 
(1) Conduct regional contaminant monitoring using the blue mussel 
(Mytilus edulis) as an indicator of exposure to organic and inorganic 
contaminants 
(2) Assess the status and trends of chemical contaminants in coastal 
habitats of the Gulf of Maine and Bay of Fundy. (LeBlanc, Krahforst et al. 
2011) 
Thus the GOMC has sponsored, over time, a valuable monitoring program that 
has tracked the presence of ten heavy metals (Ag, Al, Cd, Cr, Cu, Fe, Hg, Ni, Pb, Zn) and 
101 http://www.gulfofmaine.org/gulfwatch/mussels.php 
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a number of organic compounds, including aromatic hydrocarbons, chlorinated 
pesticides, as well as a range PCB congeners102 in the water column around the 
BoF/GoM since the mid-1990s. 
While it is somewhat comforting that the Gulfwatch program sponsored by the 
GOMC has monitored to some degree heavy metals and some PAHs and PCBs in the 
water column and designated regions around the basin, there is still a fundamental issue 
with respect to what is done with these results. The results of the Gulfwatch indicate that 
the regional ecosystem remains exposed to low levels of PCBs, DDT, and residues, long 
after their use was banned. Further, many bioaccumulative industrial chemicals in the 
Gulfs ecosystem have yet to be characterized for risks to human health and biota in the 
region. These include nanomaterials, platicizers, toxaphines, and fire retardants like 
PCDEs. Further, endocrine disrupting chemicals including pharmaceuticals, estrogens 
and personal care products, many the common constituents of normal wastewater 
discharges, are present in the waters of the BoF/GoM (Wells 2010). 
The list could go on. Emerging chemicals from point and non-point sources that 
threaten ecosystem resilience and integrity include the common herbicide atrazine, 
bisphenyl (think plastics), and other dioxin-like compounds, non-ionic organics, the 
antimicrobial agent triclosam, and other unfortunately ubiquitous chemicals that are part 
102 A PCB congener is any single, unique well-defined chemical compound in the PCB category. The name 
of a congener specifies the total number of chlorine substituents and the position of each chlorine. For 
example: 4,4-Dichlorobiphenyl is a congener comprising the biphenyl structure with two chlorine 
substituents, one on each of the #4 carbons of the two rings. In 1980, a numbering system was developed 
which assigned a sequential number to each of the 209 PCB congeners. 
http://www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/tsd/pcbs/pubs/congeners.htm 
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of the hundreds of household, industrial, and other chemicals in common use (Wells 
2010). Many of these "new" chemicals of concern are being increasingly detected in the 
Great Lakes (Figure 22). Despite the harm posed by their present in the water column 
and tissue of fish, pinnipeds, and humans, there is no monitoring for these substances in 
the Bay of Fundy or Gulf of Maine (personal communication S. Jones). 
Chemical/Group Comments 
Perfluoro carboxylic acids and related perfluoro PFOA found with PFOS; terminal residues of 
alcohols perfluorinated alcohols? 
Chlorinated naphthalenes Contribute to TCDD/ planar PCB TEQs; fish and 
fish eating birds 
Pharmaceuticals e.g. ibuprofen, clofibric acid, ng/L in tributary waters and MWTP effluents 
diclofenac, carbamazepine 
Current use pesticides 
(e.g. atrazine, metolachlor, endosulfan) 
Atrazine persistent in oligotrophic waters 
Figure 22 "New" Chemicals of Concern" adapted from (Suzuki 2000) 
Certainly there is a need to monitor for the presence of these substances, but 
perhaps a bigger question looms: aimed with the knowledge of the presence of these 
compounds in our water and the food chain, what can be done under the current 
governance scheme? Do we need to wait for an outbreak of disease or some other tragic 
consequence before the governing agencies around the BoF/GoM decide to roll up their 
sleeves and get to work to solve problems? 
These examples are merely representative of the many issues and conflicts that 
confront our current fragmented and egocentric governance system. The intelligence 
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mechanisms that exist under the current regime are sufficient to put us on notice that 
there are threats - some more tangible at the moment than others. Yet there is no 
movement to change, no educated public driven to stand up and say "enough." Thus the 
status quo of intelligence in a piecemeal, agency-by-agency fashion will inevitably 
continue. 
Which brings us, however briefly, to another characteristic of intelligence in our 
ideal model: Intelligence must be communicated to an accountable entity for analysis 
and coordinated action, i.e. a person, partnership, or other entity that has an obligation or 
responsibility to an authority, group, standard, mandate or behavior norm external to that 
person or entity. Intelligence and information must be made readily available to 
researchers, scientists and the public. 
In the case of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine governance regime, most 
intelligence is performed by the agencies with responsibility to manage activities within 
their jurisdiction or by NGOs that have conferred upon themselves some portion of the 
overall picture. The information gathered via such intelligence is generally used within 
each agency or NGO in order to help achieve the mission and goals of the respective 
institution to satisfy the expectations of government overseers or, in the case of NGOs, to 
gather information relevant to their mission and make a case for increased donations. 
Intelligence, as exemplified by the data generated by Gulfwatch, is often made available 
by members to the GOMC. Unfortunately, as we have seen, the GOMC has no authority 
or responsibility to act upon whatever intelligence it might receive from Gulfwatch or 
any of its member agencies. Further, it is absolutely powerless to act upon anything 
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concerning the fishery, as this exchange with a veteran member of the Council's working 
group illustrates: 
Q: You haven't got fish. 
A: No, that's an explicit decision taken by the Council years ago. The 
effort, just don't go there. I think that's a practical reality of these 
initiatives. There's some things that you just can't tackle. Either you 
don't have the capacity or they're going to be divisive, or they're felt to be 
handled reasonably well elsewhere. 
Q: Would it be a good thing to bring the fishery into this? 
A: From an ecosystem governance perspective, in the definitional level, 
yes. To be that sort of comprehensive, I mean it's a pretty significant 
impact on the ecosystem, so yes, obviously. Practically given fisheries 
management in Canada and the U.S. and its history and current activities, I 
would say no. So, I think any ecosystem initiative will always fall short of 
the full ideal definition. There are some things practically you're not 
going to deal with. (Canadian Federal Employee 2) 
So the requirement of our ideal model calling for intelligence to be turned over to 
an accountable authority, which translates into an entity that has the ability via 
enforcement or coercion to try and implement change in the face of challenge, is absent 
in this region. Furthermore, while a great deal of information is available to interested 
parties, there exists little reason for the public to seek out such information. There is little 
in the way of dedicated and aggressive outreach that might be capable of creating a 
knowledgeable citizen base capable of speaking for the public good. 
The need for public pressure and political persuasion from the perspective of the 
integrity and resilience of the Gulf has never been more apparent. The question of what 
can be done brings us to the task of Promotion. 
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Promotion. Using data and information gathered as part of the intelligence 
function, recall that promotion, sometimes called estimation, involves the "thoughtful 
assessment of options and alternatives" (Brewer and deLeon 1983, 83). Promotion serves 
the function of recommending and mobilizing support for policy alternatives and serves 
to define and even limit the possible solutions to a problem. It is the stage where 
information and data gathered as a result of the intelligence task are debated and 
discussed and alternatives and options are recommended and debated (Clark 1997). 
As we have seen, promotion under an ecosystem-based approach to governance 
differs markedly from the status quo; that is, expert-driven planning models that rely 
almost exclusively on science- and expert-based technology. We have noted that under 
the traditional view, generally only experts are qualified to make and implement sound 
management plans. Promotion is largely the role of bureaucracies - bureaucracies that 
are also responsible for enforcement of uniform rules and regulations (Fiorino 2006). 
Promotion also includes politics, bringing with it an array of political parties, 
lobbyists, pressure groups, people, and powerful organizations of all types (including 
business and environmental groups) working to shape and share values. (Lasswell 1971; 
Brewer and deLeon 1983; Clark 2002; Clark 2008). While it has been noted that the 
participation of a broad range of promotional actors, many with opposing interests and 
values creates an "agitational intensity to the dissemination of a value demand", it is 
nonetheless preferable to the totalitarian alternative of placing promotion exclusively in 
the hands of a single party that monopolizes and controls debate (Lasswell and 
MacDougal 1992,29). Politics, as discussed earlier in Chapter III and reiterated in 
Chapter IV, need not be divisive and polarizing. Indeed, in an ideal world, healthy 
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politics that includes "policy relevant science, pertinent local information, constructive 
public involvement, and conflict resolution - can serve to clarify and secure the common 
interest in knowledge generation for environmental decision processes" (Ascher, 
Steelman et al. 2010, 8). 
Table 53 Promotion 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
Promotion and politics involve honest 
debate using policy relevant science, 
pertinent local information, constructive 
public involvement, and conflict resolution 
in order to clarify and secure the common 
interests (as opposed to special interests) 
and secure knowledge generation for 
environmental decision processes. Hard 
questions are asked and "difficult" data is 
not neglected. Constructive, honest, debate 
helps to promote trust and cooperation and 
equitable outcomes are pursued through the 
open sharing of knowledge and open debate 
with broad participation. 
The activities that impact the ecosystem of 
the region are governed by separate 
agencies, each responsible for some piece of 
the picture. Although the goals of the 
GOMC require joint action, promotion to 
actually develop and implement policies 
that would benefit the region as a whole and 
require binational action is unlikely. Hard 
questions, like fisheries are ignored and left 
to individual agencies. Constructive, honest 
debate that help to promote trust and 
cooperation is generally absent. No debate 
can be productive if no one takes the side of 
the resilience and integrity of the Gulf as a 
whole. 
The politics of promotion should include honest debate about what to do. 
Further, in our ideal system, the overall decision process should provide " a means of 
reconciling (or at least managing) conflict through politics in order to find a working 
specification of a community's common interests" (Clark 2002, 57). (Table 53) 
In the BoF/GoM region, promotion is largely accomplished through the agencies 
responsible for some component of the activities that impact the ecosystem or NGOs with 
an interest in changing the policies pertinent to some component of the same ecosystem. 
Promotion via fragmented agency and NGO initiatives does not bode well for the 
region's ecosystem. 
485 
There is a fundamental paradox that exists with respect to the goals, objectives, 
and operating principles articulated by the GOMC in their most recent Action Plan. The 
paradox is that the goals and principles to which the membership of the GOMC has 
committed require a degree of coordinated action that existing institutional arrangements 
are unlikely to provide. Promotion of the resilience and integrity of the Bay of 
Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem, and its interacting physical, biological, and chemical 
components, is the job of no one. There is not one overarching entity with the real or 
implicit authority to speak for the health of the ecosystem. Thus promotion is left to the 
individual GOMC members and, to some extent, NGOs who elect to involve themselves 
with issues pertaining to the Gulf. Each is ultimately responsible primarily to its own 
constituencies. So, and here paraphrasing Lynton Caldwell (1993), who speaks for the 
Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine? 
Promotion on behalf of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine is therefore, well, non­
existent. The GOMC is without authority to mediate disputes or to hold member 
agencies accountable. There is no organized umbrella organization of NGOs determined 
to bring sanity to the deteriorating situation in the region. Promotion is therefore a one­
way street with industrial and commercial interests attempting to exploit the resources of 
the region and regulatory agencies trying to enforce laws that require moderation at the 
risk of political retribution. Thus promotion in the BoF/GoM is at present a tool for a 
variety of special interests that include industry, agencies, and NGOs. No one, to my 
knowledge, is in a position to speak for the Gulf. 
Prescription. In the prescription, or selection, phase, the data, values, and 
interests distilled from the intelligence and promotion tasks are used to select appropriate 
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law, policy, or management options appropriate to the targeted challenge. The activities 
and process used in this phase result in the establishment of new rules or guidelines to 
solve a problem or deal with an environmental conflict or issue (Clark 2002; Clark 2008). 
Table 54 sets forth the characteristics of prescription using an ecosystem-based 
approach to governance. Without repeating them verbatim, the common thread is that 
prescriptions should transition to involve greater use of cooperation and collaboration in 
their enforcement and compliance processes. The process doesn't have to be as 
adversarial as they appear to be at present and more and more partnerships between 
industry, government, and communities could issue in an era of "softer" regulation to 
replace the adversarial legalism that marks compliance and deterrence efforts at present. 
As has been discussed, there is no treaty in operation that currently governs the 
activities of the United States and Canada impacting the health and resilience of the Bay 
of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. Each country, as we have seen, regulates activities 
through agencies and entities operating under their respective national, state, provincial, 
or local laws. Many, if not most, of the existing prescriptions were summarized in the 
Participants task of the Social Process. 
Other major prescriptions have been liberally sprinkled throughout this chapter. 
This section will briefly outline the underpinnings of prescriptive development in Canada 
and the U.S. and briefly discuss the more major legislation and how the countries may 
differ in their approach to statutory creation and implementation. 
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Table 54 Prescription 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
A transition away from adversarial 
methods designed to punish violations 
toward greater emphasis on cooperation 
and collaboration between private and 
public entities to prevent pollution, 
reduce risk, and promote sustainability. 
New relationships, structures, and roles 
are fashioned by careful planning with 
broad-based involvement and 
implemented on a trial and error basis in 
order to facilitate learning 
There doesn't appear to be any 
movement to transition away from 
traditional command and control agency 
strategies. There also doesn't appear to 
be the kind of broad-based involvement 
planning required by our ideal model, 
although that may be changing as 
provinces and states begin to plan for 
climate change impacts. 
Adversarial strategies and deterrence are 
not the only way to influence behavior. 
Collaboration and cooperation with 
partnerships designed to achieve 
economic goals, can promote eco-
efficiency, innovation, and 
sustainability. 
Generally adversarial strategies and 
deterrence methods continue to be the 
main methods that agencies use to 
influence behavior. I see no movement 
toward more collaboration and 
cooperation, including public/private 
partnerships, designed with community 
assistance to achieve economic goals. 
Community and regional involvement in 
the development and enforcement of 
environmental regulations can increase 
learning, inform the public, and lead to 
greater progress towards goals. 
With some exceptions, community and 
regional involvement in the 
development and enforcement of 
environmental regulations is largely 
absent. Without this opportunity, we 
lose an important opportunity to build 
capacity and develop an informed a 
public that could promote the public 
good. 
Before any discussion of specific laws in Canada and the U.S. are discussed, 
however, it is incumbent on us to have some understanding of the sources of powers of 
government and rights of individuals. Organic acts, generally constitutions, are the 
painstakingly negotiated documents that define the rights of government and those of 
individuals. In the United States, constitutions created the federal government as well as 
all state governments. Local governments are generally created by charters (Sullivan 
2001). 
The United States government arose out of the smoke and fury of armed 
revolution. Suspicious of power and authority, the U.S. Constitution was carefully 
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negotiated so as to embrace strict separation between the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches of government. No single branch of government may encroach upon 
the powers of another and, as we all learned in bygone days, a system of "checks and 
balances" is designed to keep government honest. Thus the U.S. president may not serve 
in Congress while serving in the office of the presidency. Indeed a U.S. president is often 
unable to control Congress when a majority of Congressional members may be from a 
political party different than the president. The system, the "checks and balances," can 
make it very difficult for a president to implement the very programs that were promoted 
during a political campaign and probably formed the basis for his or her election. Again, 
this process is simply a reflection of the American suspicion and mistrust of the power of 
the state, and the preference for limiting or hobbling government as the best means to 
protect individual liberty (Wilson 2000; Monahan 2002; Plater, Abrams et al. 2004). 
Further fragmenting the U.S. attempts at controlling ecosystem-impacting 
behavior through bureaucratic efforts is the federalism inherent in the U.S. system. 
Federalism is a way of organizing a nation so that two or more levels of government have 
formal authority over the same area and people. In the U.S., the same region and its 
residents are generally subject to several levels of government - federal, state, and local. 
The 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution makes it clear that "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."103 We will now turn to some U.S. 
prescriptions relevant to governance in the BoF/GoM. 
103 U.S. CONST, amend. X 
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The statutes implemented and enforced in whole or in part by the EPA most pertinent 
to the regulation of the human activities that impact the Gulf of Maine ecosystem are 
summarized below. 
• The Clean Air Act of 1970,42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. The focus of the EPA's 
Clean Air Act ("CAA") efforts is the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS). State and federal regulation under the CAA has as its objective the 
attainment of air quality consistent with the NAAQS. Standards are set for 
"criteria" pollutants. The CAA is included in this report because the EPA has 
expressly recognized the nexus between air quality and the health of marine 
ecosystems. Currently many fish consumed in the Gulf of Maine region are 
subject to Food Consumption Advisories due to contaminants, including mercury, 
present in their tissues. Mercury is released into the air from coal-fired power 
plants and incinerators and is deposited onto land and water, working its way up 
the food chain through fish to people. The EPA has committed to a reduction of 
mercury released into the air from coal-fired power plants by 22 tons from their 
2000 level of 48 tons (EPA 2003). 
• Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. Officially known as the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the goal of the Clean Water 
Act ("CWA") is to ".. .restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation's waters."104 The amendments attempt to achieve 
104 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The goals section of the act also provides, inter alia, for elimination of the 
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985 and the absolute prohibition of discharges of toxic 
pollutants (not an enforceable requirement but a rebuttable presumption that pollution prevention is the 
most desirable form of pollution control Plater, Z. J. B., R. H. Abrams, et al. (2004). Environmental Law 
and Policy: Nature. Law., and Society. New York, Aspen Publishers., 626 -627). 
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maximum "effluent limitations on point sources" of pollution as well as achieve 
acceptable water quality standards.,05The CWA contains a broad range of 
regulatory tools designed to attain its regulatory goals and objectives. The statute 
prohibits discharges of any pollutant106 unless authorized pursuant to the permit 
requirements of the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System.107 
Implementation of the permit provisions and other sections of the CWA rely upon 
an express process for federal/state cooperation.108 The EPA or approved State 
(or States if there is an approved interstate compact), and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, in consultation with USFWS, NMFS, and State resource agencies, 
also control the discharge or placement of dredged or fill material.109 
The focus of the EPA's CWA efforts has been the establishment of technology-
based standards for the regulation of point source dischargers of pollutants 
(outfall pipes, municipal sewage treatment plants, vessels, etc.). States are now 
being required to turn their attention on non-point discharges and establish water 
105 The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that States play a key role in the enforcement and 
implementation of the CWA. NPDES permits are secured in the first instance from EPA consonant with its 
policy "to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent, 
reduce, and eliminate pollution." States with an EPA approved CWA enforcement program may issue 
NPDES permits "for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction." Further, States play a key 
role in the determination of acceptable water quality standards, as "effluent limitation' is defined by the 
CWA as".. .any restriction established by a State.. .on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, 
physical, biological or other constituents which are discharged from point sources.. .including schedules of 
compliance." Thus States may determine "how clean is clean" as well as the schedule for the clean-up of 
polluted waters within the state. U.S. Environmental Protection Aeencv v. California. 426 U.S. 200 (1976). 
106 33 U.S.C.§ 1311(a) 
107 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) 
108 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) 
109 33 U.S.C. § 1344; http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/factlO.html 
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quality standards to upgrade waters that remain polluted after the application of 
technology-based requirements.110 
Finally, amendments to the CWA since its enactment have added a variety of 
programs to the EPA's water quality regulatory arsenal. The 1987 amendments, 
augmented by the 2000 amendments, created the National Estuary Program ("NEP") to 
improve the quality of estuaries of national importance. The NEP is designed to promote 
the restoration of estuary habitat, develop a national estuary habitat restoration strategy, 
and provide the funds for the establishment, research and funding for NEP-designated 
estuaries.111 The 2000 amendments also enacted the Beaches Environmental Assessment 
and Coastal Health Act of2000 ("BEACH"). BEACH mandates that states with coastal 
recreation waters adopt water quality criteria and standards for designated pathogens and 
pathogen indicators. States must submit water quality criteria and standards to the EPA 
and demonstrate that the standards are sufficient to protect human health. Funding for 
the establishment of the plan and for monitoring and implementation are available 
through the Act.112 
Thus, in terms of the Clean Water Act, the EPA sets the standard for states in the 
region by regulating point sources Do they have jurisdictional issues? A person 
110 In brief, the CWA requires that states identify waters that are and will remain polluted after the 
application of technology standards; prioritize these waters based on the severity of their pollution; and 
establish 'total maximum daily loads' ("TMDLs") for these waters at levels necessary to meet applicable 
water quality standards. States are required to submit their inventory and TMDLs to EPA for approval. 33 
U.S.C. § 1313(d>: http://www.eDa.gov/owow/tmdl. 
111 33 U.S.C. § 1330; http://www.epa.gov/nep. Estuary programs within the Gulf of Maine watershed 
include the New Hampshire Estuary Program encompassing Great/Little Bays and Hampton Harbor, the 
Casco Bay Estuary Partnership in Maine, and the Massachusetts Bay Program encompassing Massachusetts 
and Cape Cod Bays, http://www.epa.gov/nep. 
112 33 U.S.C. § 1313(i); http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/beaches/act.html 
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knowledgeable about the EPA's efforts in the Gulf of Maine region expressed some 
issues: 
A: To get back to the jurisdictional point. In a nutshell, you know, we 
were largely concerned with stuff that's fairly close to shore, near coastal 
area. Obviously when we have dredging and remediation sites that are in 
federal waters, we have jurisdiction over those. But, NOAA.. .1 think of 
NOAA as really more of an ocean agency and EPA as sort of more a 
coastal.. .if you had to really make some sort of distinction. But, then you 
have the Coastal Zone Management Act, and the fact that NOAA 
administers the Coastal Zone Management program with states. There are 
definitely areas where.. .there's probably inefficiencies in there, and I 
think the Ocean Action plan itself, but a court recommended either 
merging or that certain programs like the National Estuary Program be 
moved from EPA to NOAA. We didn't like that recommendation... (US 
Federal Employee 1) 
And the EPA and NOAA are trying to collaborate on the US side of the Gulf of 
Maine as NOAA tries to funnel federal money into the states for improvement of water 
quality in the coastal margin - when there are funds available - as someone familiar with 
NOAA's efforts in the BoF/GoM relates: 
We don't have any regulatory authority to tell them [states] how to 
manage water quality - that's really EPA. What's interesting is, and this 
sort of gets to the question .. .a portion of the NOAA grant has 
traditionally gone to non-point source pollution. That's been zeroed out 
for the first time this past year. The irony is, the EPA, through their Clean 
Water Act, also has funds coming to the state to do non-point source 
pollution. It depends on the state whether or not they're coordinated. And 
there's some work being done at the national level between EPA and 
NOAA to coordinate these activities that are receiving funds from two 
different agencies. But at the end of the day it's really interesting to pool 
those funds and do something constructive although the funds from the 
NOAA side just dried up. (U.S. Federal Employee 4) 
We started our analysis of the U.S. federal and state prescriptions with a brief 
introduction explaining the governance scheme set up by the U.S. Constitution with its 
insistence on separation of powers and federalism. Before we begin our discussion of 
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some of the more relevant Canadian laws or prescriptions, we should first examine the 
scheme set up by the Canadian Constitutional documents. 
First it should be pointed out that government in Canada has little in the nature of 
separation of powers. Contrary to the U.S. scheme's seeming obsession with limiting the 
power of the executive branch, the Canadian (and British) approach is to concentrate 
political power in the hands of the executive. Under the doctrine of responsible 
government, both the legislative and the executive branch are subject to the control of the 
prime minister. The prime minister controls the executive branch since the governor 
general (the formal head of the executive branch of government) must exercise all of 
his/her powers on the basis of the prime minister's advice. Control of the legislative 
branch flows to the prime minister because the governor general is obliged to appoint as 
prime minister the leader of the party controlling the greatest number of seats in the 
elected House of Commons. In this manner, a Canadian prime minister with a majority 
in the House of Commons has a far greater ability to implement political programs than 
does an American president (Monahan 2002; Hughes, Lucas et al. 2003). 
Federalism, or the division of powers between the federal and provincial 
governments is under the Canadian governance scheme is set out in the Constitution Act, 
% 
1867.113 Rather than following the American 10th Amendment example of simply 
leaving all powers to the states not specifically designated in the U.S. Constitution, 
Canada's Constitution Act sets forth a list of powers in Section 92 dividing powers 
between federal and provincial powers that is meant to be exhaustive. Thus provincial 
governments are to be supreme with their own designated sphere. Pursuant to this list, 
113 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985) 
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provinces can act on pollution that, at the risk of oversimplifying, is local in nature (s. 
92(13); s. 92(16)). Given that a lot of pollution arises as a result of land use, pollution 
regulation is probably of a local and regional nature. Provinces do not, however, have the 
right to regulate out of province companies. Other sources of provincial regulation may 
be found in their control and ownership of their land, mines and minerals (s. 109) and 
non-renewable natural resources, forestry and electrical energy (s. 92A). 
The federal power to legislate over environmental matters is clear where such 
matters have interprovincial and international effects. Parliament's jurisdiction to 
regulate the environment comes from a number of different sources and it is questionable 
that any one source gives Parliament the ability to play a strong role in providing national 
standards and policy. Still, section 92 gives Parliament certain functional powers over: 
• Navigation and shipping (s. 91(10)) 
• Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries (s. 91(12)) 
• Canals, Harbours, rivers and Lake Improvements (s. 108) 
• Federal Works and Undertakings (s. 91 (29) and 92( 10)) 
Parliament was also granted certain conceptual powers giving it general authority 
to legislate over broadly defined activities which could conceivably include 
environmental quality legislation: 
• Criminal Law (s. 91(27)) 
• Peace, Order and Good Government (s. 91) 
• Taxation (s. 91(3)) 
• Trade and Commerce (s. 91(2)) 
• Public Debt and Property (s. 91(1A)) 
It should be apparent that the Canadian governance system, while it consolidates 
power in the hands of the Prime Minister and the executive branch, requires a great deal 
of collaboration, communication and cooperation between parliament and the provinces. 
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To illustrate this point, the following exchange with a Canadian federal regulator speaks 
to the permitting of contaminant discharge in Canada: 
Q: So, when it comes to for instance discharging of contaminants, does 
that require a permit from this agency? 
A: Depending on the type of discharge. We have, under the Fisheries 
Act, we have a series of regulations for a number of industrial sectors. So 
there's the pulp and paper effluent regulations, chloro-alkali plants, a 
bunch of others. Municipalities would regulate sewage discharges on the 
domestic end. 
Q: With no permit needed from federal. 
A: Correct. With the uncertainty of where the line is and where the 
division of legal mandates and roles and responsibility, and the Canadian 
way of just avoiding the question, where we've come and the way we've 
been operating for years is by saying look, do both levels of government 
have an interest in this coastal area. Yes, absolutely. Will trying to 
resolve this and say someone wins and someone loses or someone gets A 
and someone gets B, going be helpful and productive? Not really, because 
we realize that you need at least both levels of government working 
together. So in the absence of that clear definition, we say they both have 
an interest in the near land and the near shore, and so let's just work 
together. (Canadian Federal Employee 2) 
Thus we see that the legal/jurisdictional structure in Canada helps to promote 
dialogue between federal, state, and local governments in order to act on ecosystem-
related prescriptions 
As we did with U.S. laws, we can take a summary glance at the more significant 
Canadian environmental prescriptions. 
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In Canada, the Fisheries Act (1985) is federal legislation dating back to 
Confederation.114 It was established to manage and protect Canada's fisheries resources. 
It applies to all fishing zones, territorial seas and inland waters of Canada and is binding 
to federal, provincial and territorial governments. As federal legislation, the Fisheries Act 
supersedes provincial legislation when the two conflict. Consequently, approval under 
provincial legislation may not necessarily mean approval under the Fisheries Act. 
This Act deemed the Government of Canada responsible for sea, coastal and inland 
fisheries, navigation and migratory birds and fiduciary responsibility to aboriginal people. 
Provincial governments were given the right to make laws governing property, public 
lands and property rights. While the Government of Canada has the authority to manage 
fish habitat, it has essentially no control over the use of inland waters, beds of 
watercourses or shorelines which fall under provincial jurisdiction. Alternatively, the 
provinces cannot make regulatory decisions concerning fish habitat. 
Water quality prescriptions are generally set forth in the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act, 1999 (1999) ("CEP A") and are the responsibility of Environment Canada 
(EC). The goal of CEPA is to contribute to sustainable development - development that 
meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs. EC also has responsibilities for pollutants under the 
Fisheries Act (1985) as well as the other duties and responsibilities set forth in the Goal 
Clarification section above. 
114 July 1,1867, the day that three British colonies were formed into four Canadian provinces. The British 
Province of "Canada was divided into the new Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec, and two other 
British colonies, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, also became provinces of Canada. 
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The federal oceans policy in Canada is bolstered by prescriptions with strong 
language that promote integration, innovation, and collaboration in government of the 
oceans, including the development of Large Ocean Management Areas ("LOMAs") 
(1996). The Oceans Act was followed by the Oceans Action Plan (2005 - 2007), then 
by a 2007 Health of the Oceans ("HOTO") promising five years of funding which 
included cooperation between domestic and international partners as but one of its five 
initiatives. Curiously, the effect of the strong ocean policy in Canada has not been what 
one would have expected. The development of LOMAs under the Oceans Action Plan in 
general has been slow. Even the Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management Plan 
("ESSIM"), a LOMA that was in the advanced stages of formation off the coast of Nova 
Scotia, has stalled.115 As a note of caution, one commentator has drawn attention to a 
2005 Auditor General review of the Oceans Act which found that following its passage 
115 The Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management Plan ("ESSIM") in Atlantic Canada involved over ten 
years of stakeholder involvement to develop a final draft plan. ESSIM was Canada's pilot integrated 
management effort, and drew upon stakeholders to come up with a plan to deal with a coastal margin with 
competitive uses that included a Marine Protected Area (The Gully),. .protected areas of cold-water 
corals, multispecies fisheries including ground fisheries, small and large pelagic fisheries, crab, lobster, and 
an extensive Aboriginal Communal Commercial Snow Crab fisher, dragger, long line, oil and gas 
exploration, works, seismic activities, oil and gas pipelines, other oil and gas development projects, marine 
transport..." GOMC (2012). Action Plan 2012 - 2017, Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment: 
15.. With what I assume was a tail wind from the from the 2005 Ocean Actions Plan, which favored 
"Integrated Oceans Management" as one of its four pillars Ricketts, P. J. and L. P. Hildebrand (2011). 
"Coastal and Ocean Management in Canada: Progress or Paralysis." Coastal Management 39: 4 -19., and 
with the establishment of a 32 member Stakeholder Advisory Council ("SAC") comprised of a diverse 
group of shareholders that agreed to share the responsibility for leadership toward the ESSIM vision, 
ESSIM stalled. Although a plan was drafted with SAC guidance and submitted to the government fir 
approval in 2007, the plan has yet to be approved. A survey of SAC members places blame on lack of 
leadership by the government - and expresses the notion that whereas multiple stakeholders can work 
together, apparently governments cannot GOMC (2012). Action Plan 2012 - 2017, Gulf of Maine Council 
on the Marine Environment: 15. 
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the oceans ceased to be a government priority, and that government had failed to meet its 
obligations under the Act (Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011).116 
With respect to coastal conflicts and issues, we have seen that the provinces work 
with the federal government, chiefly with DFO for aquaculture issues and Environment 
Canada for water quality issues. 
With respect to how well the existing governance regime in the region matches up 
to ideals, let's look at our three model characteristics. First, there doesn't appear to be 
any movement to transition away from traditional command and control agency 
strategies. There also doesn't appear to be the kind of broad-based involvement planning 
required by our ideal model, although that may be changing as provinces and states begin 
to plan for climate change impacts. Second, generally adversarial strategies and 
deterrence methods continue to be the main methods that agencies use to influence 
behavior. Our ideal model requires a transition toward the using more collaboration and 
cooperation, including public/private partnerships, as a means of achieving economic 
goals and promoting innovation. Finally, community and regional involvement in the 
development and enforcement of environmental regulations is largely absent. Without 
this opportunity, we lose an important opportunity to build capacity and develop an 
informed a public that could promote the public good and, perhaps, begin to give a voice 
to the Gulf. 
116 The Canadian experience may have lessons for the U.S. as the new U.S. Oceans Policy evolves. Clearly 
there has been institutional resistance at the various levels of government in Canada to the various 
initiatives under the Oceans Strategy and HOTO. There is no reason to think that there won't be the same 
kind of reaction to the national movement toward an ocean policy in the U.S. The resistance is likely to be 
worse in areas like the U.S. Northeast that never worked with a River Basin Commission and don't have a 
favorable history of collaboration. 
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Given the attention that has been paid to prescriptions in both countries 
throughout this chapter, largely because governance operates on an agency-by-agency 
basis, the significant prescriptions enabling government to attempt to control the human 
activities that impact the ecosystem have largely been covered where necessary 
throughout this chapter. To avoid redundancy, we will move on to discuss the task of 
Implementation. 
Implementation. As we have discussed, implementation combines the policy 
analysis framework categories of invocation and application. Invocation includes the 
initial actions that communities and institutions to invoke, enforce, or otherwise 
implement a prescription. Application is the process that a community chooses to 
ultimately characterize the subject behavior and determine what behavior violates the 
prescription and how such behavior should be sanctioned (Clark, Willard et al. 2000; 
Clark 2002). 
Table 55 highlights the some of the "ideal" characteristics of implementation for 
an ecosystem-based governance approach. They can be summarized as requiring a need 
to move away from adversarial relationships toward more collaborative and cooperative 
processes designed to solve problems with strategies that are developed and shared with 
the input of scientists, regulators, the regulated community, and other interested parties. 
As we are all too aware, implementation, as with enforcement, in the Bay of 
Fundy/Gulf of Maine region is completely the task of bureaucratic agencies. There is 
little in the way of transition away from the seemingly entrenched traditions of 
bureaucratic rationality adversarial legalism. 
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Table 55 Implementation 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
Transition is needed to move implementation 
toward more community-driven, more 
voluntary, cooperative systems. Government 
could assist with the identification and 
clarification of community goals as well as 
develop measureable standards. It would be up 
to regional or community efforts to develop 
solutions to bring environmental indicators into 
compliance with those standards 
Implementation in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
Maine region is completely the task of 
bureaucratic agencies. There is little in the way 
of transition away from the seemingly 
entrenched traditions of bureaucratic rationality 
adversarial legalism. Agencies continue to 
control behavior through a system of rules that 
prescribe uniform standards for diverse 
circumstances. 
Adversarial relationships should give way to 
cooperative and collaborative ones with the 
emphasis on interactions designed to solve 
problems with strategies that are developed and 
shared with the input of scientists, regulators, 
the regulated community, and other interested 
parties. In consultation with industry, citizen 
groups, and government officials, plans created 
through collaboration can look beyond "end of 
pipe" discharges to "identify and change 
activities that cause pollution in the first place. 
Command and control could gradually be 
replaced with incentives and learning through 
trial and error. 
Government sets the requirements that 
regulated rules must follow. Anyone failing to 
meet the requirements is faced with penalties of 
one sort or another. Deterrence is the primary 
motivational strategy Communities and the 
public not meaningfully involved in the 
determination of standards and rules with 
which the community will comply. It also fails 
to permit meaningful community participation 
in the determination of what conduct should be 
considered sanctionable. In essence, the public 
is shut out of the implementation of compliance 
and deterrence standards. 
More reliance upon facilitation, mediation, and 
other forms of alternative dispute resolution. If 
litigation is necessary there should be 
specialized courts with knowledge of science 
and environmental factors. 
ADR is becoming more popular to increasing 
unavailability of judicial intervention due to 
budget cuts. Use of facilitation and mediation 
is increasing. No movement toward specialized 
courts for environmental issues. 
Agencies continue to control behavior through a system of rules that prescribe uniform 
standards for diverse circumstances. Government sets the requirements that regulated 
rules must follow. Anyone failing to meet the requirements is faced with penalties of one 
sort or another. Deterrence is the primary motivational strategy (Kagan 2001; Fiorino 
2006). This scenario is a far cry from our ideal of involving communities and the public 
in the determination of standards and rules with which the community will comply. It 
also fails to permit meaningful community participation in the determination of what 
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conduct should be considered sanctionable. In essence, the public is shut out of the 
implementation of compliance and deterrence standards. 
Our ideal model also calls for more reliance upon facilitation, mediation, and 
other forms of alternative dispute resolution. Perhaps this is a role that the GOMC could 
assist with developing as members might be able to create ways to resolve conflicts and 
differences and resolve disputes involving agency-agency and agency-public conflicts. 
In any event, from personal knowledge and experience, the use of ADR in all its forms 
seems to be on the rise, if for no other reason than the prohibitive costs involved in 
traditional litigation. 
Finally, our model suggests that if litigation is necessary there should be 
specialized courts with knowledge of science and environmental factors. While this idea 
has caught on in a variety of nations, I have seen no movement in either the U.S. or 
Canada to create a specialized environment court. Indeed it appears that existing courts 
are having difficulty getting funding to hold onto the judges and staff that they have. 
Thus there appears to be little movement in the BoF/GoM region towards a more 
ecosystem-based approach to the task of implementation. 
Appraisal. As discussed more fully in Chapter III, appraisal involves the task of 
assessing whether relevant prescriptions and their implementation have effectively met 
the goals set by the community and who is responsible and accountable (Lasswell 1971; 
Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). 
Table 56 sets forth the characteristics for appraisal under an "ideal" ecosystem-
based approach to governance. At its most basic, the ideal model requires that there 
simply be a mechanism for appraisal of policies and actions to determine whether 
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progress is being made toward the prescribed goals. Further, appraisal should utilize 
trend data appropriate to the task and include a periodic public assessment of the state of 
the ecosystem. It is important that appraisal be performed by third parties to enhance the 
dependability and creditability of the conclusions. Finally, appraisal should be 
undertaken by an overarching body with the ability to use the knowledge gained to 
implement change in order to reverse adverse trends. 
Table 56 Appraisal 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
Appraisal provides a major opportunity for 
learning and course correction, for using the 
lessons of experience to adapt failing 
practices into future changes. The main 
criteria for appraisals are dependability, 
comprehensiveness, continuity and 
independence 
No established mechanism for periodic 
appraisals in the region. The GOMC's 
2010 State of the Gulf Report is written 
largely by agency employees, although 
appears to be excellent and 
comprehensive. Independence, 
however, could be questioned and 
impact credibility. Not clear if lessons 
can be learned or course correction can 
occur or is even possible. 
Trend data from relevant scales must be 
available and transparent. Local knowledge 
and scientific efforts need to be combined 
and included in a periodic public assessment 
of the state of the ecosystem. 
Unknown how trend data was 
accumulated for the 2010 State of the 
Gulf Report. If local knowledge and 
scientific efforts were combined to make 
the reports possible it is not apparent 
from the reports themselves. 
It is critical that appraisals be carried out by 
third parties, i.e. not the agencies that are 
charged with programmatic responsibilities. 
There are no third party appraisals in the 
region other than those carried out 
through peer-reviewed stock assessment 
processes by NMFS and the NEFMC. 
Existence of a collaborative entity or single 
overarching body that can, formally or 
informally, accumulate the knowledge 
accumulated through appraisals and 
implement change to reverse adverse trends. 
There is no single overarching body 
that, formally or informally, has the 
jurisdiction or inclination to accumulate 
knowledge from appraisals and 
implement change to reverse adverse 
trends. 
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The appraisal process is particularly confusing in the BoF/GoM region. With an 
ecosystem-based approach to governance, the appraisal process is designed to tell 
participants . .how well the selected alternative has solved the original problem and, in 
larger terms, how well the overall decision process has served in achieving common 
interest outcomes" (Clark 2008, 54). 
In order to accomplish thorough and unbiased appraisals, trend data from relevant 
scales must be available and transparent. Local knowledge and scientific efforts need to 
be combined. One example is a periodic public assessment of the state of the ecosystem. 
This provides opportunity for meaningful public education and involvement. Further, it 
is critical that appraisals be carried out by third parties, i.e. NOT the agencies that are 
charged with programmatic responsibility (Lasswell 1971; Clark, Willard et al. 2000; 
Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). 
It is also important, as was stressed in Chapter III, to view the appraisal function 
as the philosophical and practical home of adaptive governance, which is frequently 
proposed as a tool to frame the management of the human activities that impact 
ecosystems (Holling 1986; Lee 1993; Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). While appraisal is 
about the assessment of the success of prescriptions and implementation schemes, 
adaptive governance goes one step further to recommend that we have governance 
systems that are able to learn from the appraisal process and change course if anticipated 
results fail to materialize. Included in appraisal, therefore, is the need for trend data 
obtained through monitoring and other methods designed to inform governance of the 
status and change in key indicators over time as a result of management actions (Berkes, 
Colding et al. 2003; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007; Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010; Steelman 
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2010). "As a given policy is implemented, information gained is quickly fed back so that 
it can produce midcourse corrections in the specific policy being studied, and the 
experience gained can add to the general stock of environmental knowledge" (Steelman 
2010,202). In short, if society is to insist on a shift from regulatory strategies based on 
bureaucratic control to strategies based on learning and trial and error, appraisal functions 
that involve a broad base of agency, stakeholder, and public monitoring and assessment 
will be critical to the quest to achieve common, as opposed to special, interests (Brunner, 
Colbum et al. 2002; Weber 2003; Fiorino 2006; Brunner and Lynch 2010b). 
In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region appraisal falls mainly to the same 
agencies that have programmatic responsibilities relevant to the activities that impact the 
ecosystem. Information and data, therefore, is collected by a variety of federal, state, and 
provincial agencies, as well as scientists, academics, and others. There is no mechanism 
or linked network where databases and information sources are available (Wells 2010). 
Even if information were readily available and reliable trend data existed from around the 
basin, there are no clear goals against which to measure the trends. Without clear goals, 
it is difficult to determine whether trends are moving in the right direction and, if they 
aren't what type of management or policy change might be needed. 
A lot of the problems with appraisal in the region go back to the reality that there 
is simply no one group with the authority to coerce binational action. There is no one 
entity responsible for the gathering or accumulation and analysis of data from around the 
basin, examining the data to determine status and trends, and making accountable 
decisions to change course or implement new policies or limitations. We have seen that 
the GOMC has no interest in expanding beyond its "forum" status. There are no other bi-
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national groups that have the participation of the agencies responsible for the 
sustainability of many of the components of the ecosystem. Adaptive governance simply 
is not possible in this or any other region without a move toward strategies based on 
learning and trial and error, appraisal functions that involve a broad base of agency, 
stakeholder, and public monitoring and assessment. 
Finally, appraisal must be overseen by a third party - some entity that is not a 
program charged with administrative responsibility over the subject matter of the 
appraisal. The Gulf of Maine Council in 2010 began the publication of its State of the 
Gulf of Maine Report (2010). Despite the existence of many excellent reports over the 
years, this documents . .is the first Gulf-wide synthesis of pressures on the environment, 
biophysical and socio-economic status and trends, and responses to identified issues" 
(Thompson 2010,1). The report provides several informative chapters, each chapter 
dealing with a separate issue of concern to the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. 
Thus there are chapters on socio-economic issues (Thompson 2010), climate change (Nye 
2010), microbial pathogens and biotoxins (Jones 2011), coastal ecosystems and habitats 
(Gustavson 2010), marine invasive species (Pappal 2010), as well as an excellent 
summary and explanation of emerging issues in the Gulf of Maine as of 2010 (Wells 
2010). 
The excellent articles contained in GOMC's State of the Gulf Report are written 
variously by federal, state, and provincial employees as well as a consultant or two. 
There doesn't seem to be any indication that the public was involved in the accumulation 
of information that led to the reports. Further, again many of the problems and issues 
confronting the region are binational - with no mechanism to galvanize a binational 
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strategy and little demonstration of any inclination to act in an accountable binational 
manner. Once again, the night seems to have written a check that the morning couldn't 
cash - or in this case problems and threats are highlighted for which there can be no 
binational response under the current regime. 
Termination. This is the final activity of the decision process and occurs when a 
problem is either solved by a previously selected prescription or course of conduct or data 
analysis reveals that the prescription or course of conduct has been unsuccessful at 
moving the toward the goals of the community (Clark 1997; Clark 2008). As we noted in 
Chapter III, termination, like appraisal, relies upon the dependable conveyance of 
knowledge from intelligence generation through transmission, including thorough 
monitoring to assess whether the knowledge has proved that the original problem has 
been resolved (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). Thus much of the discussion of the 
Intelligence, Strategies, and Outcome functions earlier in this chapter is relevant to the 
termination task. 
The termination function in an ecosystem-based governance regime requires that 
there be an independent bridging entity with overall knowledge of trend data that 
provides periodic public assessments of the status, progress, and need (or not) for the 
addition or elimination of policies and prescriptions intended to facilitate progress toward 
the goals specified by prescription (Table 57). 
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Table 57 Termination 
Ecosystem-based Approach BoF/GoM Approach 
Ecosystem-based governance requires the 
periodic public assessment of the 
progress, status, and continued need for 
any environmental policy prescription or 
implementation scheme. The decision to 
terminate should be made by a bridging 
entity with knowledge of trend data. 
Termination is the responsibility of 
whatever agency charged with carrying 
out a program. There is no periodic 
public assessment of the progress, status, 
and continued need for prescription in 
must agencies with the exception of 
fisheries management.There is no 
accountable bridging entity with the 
knowledge of trend data so no ability to 
terminate 
In order to avoid redundancy I will just point out that agencies within each of the 
jurisdictions have programmatic responsibility in the BoF/GoM. No independent 
bridging authority exists with overall knowledge of trend data that provides periodic 
public assessments of the status, progress, and need (or not) for the addition or 
elimination of policies and prescriptions intended to facilitate progress toward the goals 
specified by prescription. Termination, therefore, must be left to the individual agencies 
as they assess the programs for which they have responsibility. Termination, therefore, is 
not a binational option. 
Conclusion 
Chapter V compared the governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
watershed with the characteristics for an ideal ecosystem-based approach to governance 
using the framework provided by the Policy Sciences. Again as viewed through the lens 
of the framework the difficulties of creating, implementing, and continually appraising 
the policies and decision-making of bureaucracies of two nations and five 
states/provinces, and their results, are apparent. 
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The theme that is emerging through this research is the very real impediment of 
the fundamental paradox at work when trying to commit binational policy makers to 
goals and concerted efforts dedicated to the preservation and/or restoration of a shared 
body of water. Again in Chapter V we how see the interests and concerns of national 
sovereignty, jurisdictionally fragmented federal, state, and provincial governments, and 
bureaucratic interests distributed among all participants tend to limit the effectiveness of 
transboundary institutions. So again, the paradox: The goals of policy that may be best 
for the health and resilience of the ecosystem are only achievable through a significant 
degree of coordinated action that is typically absent in existing institutional arrangements 
(Regier and Baskerville 1986; Becker 1993; Caldwell 1993; Young 1998; Prelli and 
Becker 2001). 
As with Chapter IV, the Policy Sciences framework was used to examine the 
Problem Orientation, Social Process, and Decision Process in the BoF/GoM. Laws, 
rules, and regulations were researched to the extent possible and primary documents were 
consulted. Literature was reviewed. Interviews with key participants in the governance 
scheme were also utilized. 
An examination of the Problem Orientation function highlighted the questionable 
state of the water quality within the BoF/GoM. It also revealed the overharvested status 
of much of the region's valuable commercial fishery. The Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine is 
changing. Overharvesting has changed a food web into a food chain. The waters of the 
basin are freshening as increasing glacial melt waters rush over the banks and through the 
Northeast Passage, displacing nutrient rich deep slope water. Phytoplankton, the base of 
the food chain, are being altered as different species adjust to the changing conditions. 
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Water temperature is rising and the region is beginning to ready itself for eventual sea 
level rise due to global climate change. There is no question that changes are occurring 
and that there will be surprises and serious challenges for managers, scientists, and policy 
makers. There will need to be more than talk to deal with the challenges that are on their 
way. 
An examination of the social process confirmed the importance of including a 
broad range of participants and understanding their values, perspectives, and strategies. 
It also highlighted the key element missing in the governance regime in the region: the 
public. With a few notable exceptions, the social process in the region completely lacks a 
knowledgeable, active public participant. In an ecosystem-based approach to 
governance, or even in a healthy democracy, there should be open participation by 
anyone with an interest in the issues. The social process analysis shows clearly that 
governance in the region is carried out by numerous federal, state, and provincial 
agencies using typical top-down command and control strategies to apply uniform laws to 
a variety of situations. The one institution that exists and brings together regulatory 
agencies from both countries for periodic meetings that allow for the exchange of ideas 
and information is the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment. GOMC 
basically provides a forum for the discussion of gulf-related issues by the heads of the 
responsible agencies. It also publishes and distributes excellent information about the 
Gulf and even the potential threats to the ecosystems of the regions. It has thus far 
declined to take the next step and become an accountable, if informal, overarching body 
with the capacity to accumulate data from monitoring efforts around the region, analyze 
the data, and act through its member agencies be able to change policy and learn by trial 
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and error - scaling up policies that work, scaling back policies that don't. There is really 
no other participant positioned to play this role. 
Finally, the evaluation of the decision process confirmed that governance on a 
fragmented agency-by-agency basis is not doing the ecosystem in the region any favors. 
Participants even at the level of the Gulf of Maine Council have a primary loyalty to their 
agency or employer. They all have constituencies that demand satisfaction and the Bay 
of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem is unable to voice its demands loudly enough to get 
their collective attention. Without the ability to step away from nationalistic or 
bureaucratic self-interest, it is unlikely that participants in the governance regime through 
the GOMC will be freed to adopt a problem-solving approach that includes a free and 
open flow of ideas and the ability to take bold action to address problems without fear of 
retribution if failure results. Problem solving through trial and error, at least 
intentionally, does not appear to be a realistic option in the BoF/GoM. 
The threats to the BoF/GoM are coming at it from all directions. Without a 
governance scheme that can handle the unpredictable surprises that most assuredly will 
occur, the prospects for the resilience and integrity of the region's ecosystem are not 
good. I have had the privilege to observe many of the meetings of the Gulf of Maine 
Council and, more often, its Working Group. I have come away knowing that the people 
who are involved in the Council, certainly in the Working Group, are extremely 
dedicated, hard-working people who care about the BoF/GoM watershed. If left up to 
them, I truly feel they could roll up their sleeves and roll out programs that involve the 
public and that transcend sovereign boundaries for the good of the ecosystem and its 
residents. There is frustration with jurisdictional constraints that tend to rob them of the 
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ability to act in the public interest as often as they'd like, 
running out. 
It can still happen - but time is 
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CHAPTER VI DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
This study has attempted to gather data and information pertinent to the 
governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. As we have seen, 
current governance has failed to reverse ecosystem indications that are trending away 
from goals that may be assumed to include at minimum the need for clean water and 
healthy food, and the maintenance of biodiversity. There are stresses on the Bay of 
Fundy and Gulf of Maine, however, from a number of directions and sources. As we 
learned from Chapter V, overharvesting has turned a food web into a weak food chain. 
Pollution has been absorbed and, and in the case of persistent organic pollutants and other 
chemicals that resist breaking down, passed along to a higher trophic level. Pollution and 
nutrients resulting from land-based activities are harming our estuaries and increasing the 
incidence of harmful algal blooms. Invasive species are essentially treated as a cost of 
business in an increasingly global market. Despite these negative trends, government 
organization and methods are pretty much the same as existed 40 years ago with the 
adoption of many of the environmental statutes in the U.S. and Canada. 
In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine we have seen that there are stresses from 
human activities that are negatively impacting ecosystem resilience. Yet the management 
of those human activities that impact the ecosystem has remained relatively unchanged 
over the last 40 years. The more we manage the activities that cause the harm in the 
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same manner and expect different results, the worse the problems in the ecosystem 
become. And all around us there is a growing body of literature that explains that a new 
way of management, using an ecosystem-based approach, may improve the chances for 
ecosystem resilience. But there are a lot of participants, a lot of powerful interests, that 
rely on the status quo and are therefore aligned with the existing governance system. 
There is fear that the many special interests that stack the current governance system may 
lose power or wealth if a new governance approach is attempted. It seems that the drum 
beat marches on, ignoring reality, and pretending that the existing governance and 
management scheme was good enough forty years ago, so it should be just fine now. 
Thus the goal of this research has been to examine whether the existing 
governance regime of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine has the capacity to implement an 
integrated, adaptable ecosystem approach to restore and sustain, over time, the integrity 
of the respective ecosystems, including the functions upon which the humans in the 
ecosystem rely. Questions related to this principle research question are set forth in 
Table 58. 
Table 58 Related Questions 
Related Questions 
What are the current goals of the governance system (units and subunits) in relation to the human uses 
and anthropogenic threats to the ecosystem in the Gulf of Maine and how do these differ or resemble 
those of similar ecosystem restoration projects? 
What are the barriers that may prevent the current governance regime in the Gulf of Maine and 
comparable ecosystem restoration areas from managing the living marine resources in the region in a 
sustainable manner? 
What measures have been adopted in more veteran regions with more experience implementing 
ecosystem-based governance models to modify and improve the governance and management regime so 
that the critical functions of the ecosystem can be preserved or enhanced while at the same time 
competing interests can be harmonized in a fair and equitable manner? 
How can these innovations be incorporated in the Gulf of Maine, if at all? 
How can the policies, priorities, and actions of local, state, provincial and federal entities be integrated to 
assure a sustainable approach to the management, use and development of coastal ocean resources 
across political boundaries? 
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In order to examine the governance regime in the region, the framework provided 
by the Policy Sciences has been used to distill the various ecosystem-based governance 
and related concepts into characteristics that provides an opportunity to apply the concept 
of the ecosystem-based approach to real world regions. 
Transitioning from traditional sector-by-sector governance to a more ecosystem-
based approach entails change. The critical differences between the traditional approach 
and an ecosystem-based approach were summarized in chapter III. In some ways, the 
ecosystem-approach is basically democracy writ large. In chapter III, however, the 
literature was reviewed and seven characteristics were listed as components of an 
ecosystem-based governance regime: 
• Management for resilience; 
• Significant, meaningful public participation 
• Integrated, collaborative government involvement; 
• Adaptive governance; 
• Mobilizing local knowledge; 
• Overarching lead or joint institution, and 
• A precautionary approach to uncertainty. 
These characteristics do not fit within neatly bound boxes separated from each 
other and there is no precise order or prioritization. There is instead overlap, redundancy, 
and complexity. The characteristics also do not materialize out of the mist. Using the 
framework analysis of the Policy Sciences, we can see how these characteristics are 
formed from the tasks found within the Policy Orientation, Social Process, and Decision 
515 
Process functions laid out in the framework. We will conclude this study by tracking 
through each of the common characteristics of ecosystem-based governance and 
describing how they are nested within the framework. It is important to understand how 
these characteristics emerge out of the framework so that we have knowledge of where 
we can apply leverage for change i.e. where in the Policy Sciences framework, the 
Problem Orientation, Social Process, or Decision Process or some combination. 
Once we understand how the framework components combine to contribute to the 
ecosystem-based characteristics (i.e. management for resilience, adaptive governance, 
etc.), we can look at the comparative case studies of the Great Lakes Basin under the 
GLWQA and the current governance in the BoF/GoM. In essence, the tasks as executed 
by the governance within each case contribute to the existence, or not, of each ecosystem-
based characteristic. If, for instance, we are looking at the characteristic of adaptive 
governance as a necessary component of ecosystem-based governance, the tasks as 
executed within the Problem Orientation, Social Process, and Decision Process, can be 
examined to determine whether the tasks within each case study add up to some version 
of adaptive governance, and if not, what tasks are missing. In this way, we are better able 
to focus on augmenting the tasks that are absent and can make recommendations that go 
further than the traditional literature in this area. 
Discussion: The Framework. Ecosystem Based Governance, and Case Comparison 
Returning to the Chapter III characteristics of ecosystem-based governance, we 
will begin with the need for management for ecosystem resilience and integrity by 
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describing it, assessing what tasks with the Policy Science framework are encompassed 
within the characteristic, and then comparing the cases based upon those tasks. 
Management for resilience. 
Governance must take the perspective that its task is to find common ground on 
policies that advance the common interest (Brunner 2002). The common interest of 
maintaining and supporting ecosystem integrity should outweigh parochial interests in 
preserving bureaucratic turf or command and control hierarchy. The critical component 
of ecosystem-based governance is that management focuses on the relationship between 
people and the natural processes necessary to sustain ecosystem structure and function, 
the life support systems, while recognizing the need for human and institutional 
involvement at every level of the ecosystem (Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000). 
As the analysis set forth in chapters IV and V make clear, the governance regime 
extant in the Great Lakes in the early years of the GLWQA managed for the resilience 
and integrity of the ecosystem. The current governance in the BoF/GoM, despite the best 
intentions and efforts of the Gulf Maine Council, does not. 
The analysis from the framework perspective starts with Problem Orientation. 
The goal clarification task requires: 
1) Meaningful community participation in the goal clarification process; 
2) Strong public outreach and education efforts devoted to raising 
awareness and understanding of ecosystem issues and governance options, 
and 
3) Multiple goals that overall embrace human dignity and equal access to 
governance with a premium placed on maintenance of the integrity and 
resilience of ecosystem functions. 
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Further, goals should no longer be based on single targets or economic need. Conditions 
should be trending toward widely accepted goals. 
In the Great Lakes Basin in the early years under the GLWQA, goals were 
provided by two powerful sources - the GLWQA and the Clean Water Act, after a 
growth of public concern about pollution and an explosion of demonstrations and 
campaigns in the 1960s and 70s. The effect of the GLWQA goals was binational. We 
have seen that public outreach and education, through the Lake Michigan Federation, 
Great Lakes Tomorrow, Decisions for the Great Lakes, and other, promoted and 
advocated for active and knowledgeable public participation. The IJC actively promoted 
public involvement. Further, the word "integrity" as used in the Clean Water Act and the 
GLWQA meant a great deal to those who participated in the governance regime under the 
IJC and encompassed gender and racial integration and justice. 
Conditions and trends in the early years of the GLWQA trended toward the 
binational goals with the construction and improvement of municipal water treatment 
facilities and the banning of phosphorus from detergents. As we have seen, the water 
cleared up, and a fishery was restored. Trends were openly communicated through 
several vehicles, including biennial meetings of the IJC, annual meetings of the 
International Association of Great Lakes Researchers, and on-line through the Great 
Lakes Information Network. 
While public input and ecosystem integrity were important in the early years 
under the GLWQA in the Great Lakes Basin, the story was different in the Bay of 
Fundy/Gulf of Maine region. There is no overarching entity with the authority to 
coordinate the goals, promotion, and implementation and evaluation of regulatory efforts. 
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The Gulf of Maine Council operates as a forum for agency heads to share information 
and ideas, but no consolidated management decisions can come from the GOMC. Thus 
policy is left to fragmented, bureaucratic regulation by two federal and 5 state/provincial 
government agencies. Policy development thus by-passes the first requirement for goal 
clarification - meaningful involvement by the public and/or community participation and 
input into the goal process. Further, goals are set agency-by-agency and rulemaking is 
often the result of compromise between resource conservation and economic special 
interests and not necessarily focused on the Gulf of Maine itself. Conditions in the region 
are displaying stresses from coastal development, pollution, overharvesting, and global 
climate change. Trends are often not moving toward the goals of the individual agencies, 
and transparent periodic communication is frequently absent. 
The Social Process is also critical to management for resilience. Social process 
tasks in an ideal ecosystem approach are largely geared to the building of a 
knowledgeable public capable of meaningfully partnering with government, scientists, 
industry, NGOs, and other participants with the perspectives necessary to secure common 
interests, most critically the common interest of ecosystem integrity and resilience. The 
first requirement is that anyone with an interest in participation may do so. Participants, 
of course, come with values. The base values required by our ideal model to be the 
predominant goals are the values of knowledge and rectitude. Speaking broadly, the 
values of power and wealth should not ends in themselves with an ecosystem-based 
approach, but must instead be utilized to press demands for common interests of human 
dignity, ecosystem integrity and resilience (Holling 1995; Holling and Gunderson 2002a; 
Berkes, Colding et al. 2003). Thus the Social Process in our ideal system is characterized 
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by resource sharing and collaborative efforts designed to bring a broad base of the public 
and regulated interests together in a variety of situations with regulators to share ideas, 
develop knowledge, and gain mutual respect to identify goals, threats to those goals, and 
possible actions to take in order to preserve and restore ecosystem resilience. 
The social process in the early years of the GLWQA demonstrates many of the 
components of our ideal ecosystem governance model. First, public participation is 
mandated by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty (1909). Formal public participation 
blossomed when in 1975 the DC and its Boards began to recognize the need for public 
support in order to implement the terms of the GLWQA and build infrastructure. It then 
took affirmative steps to galvanize citizen involvement (Becker 1993). The meetings 
between the boards and the UC, formerly internal matters, began to be made public in 
1975 and ".. .in time presentation of the board reports to the UC in public meetings 
became a mechanism for increased public understanding of Great Lakes problems, as 
well as for citizen activism" (Botts and Muldoon 2005, 23). Further, NGOs banded 
together to try and bring the full brunt of the binational NGO community to bear on 
issues related to the Great Lakes watershed (Jackson 2005). This study also talks 
extensively about the PLUARG process under the GLWQA, where involvement of the 
public was stressed and there was open and transparent communication by the IJC and its 
Boards to a public made more knowledgeable by extensive and effective outreach efforts. 
There was also laudable opportunity for community members to be involved with 
scientists and regulators in the assessment of trends through panel meetings, regular 
annual (then biennial) meetings of the IJC, and participation of knowledgeable citizens 
on IJC Boards and panels (UCIRG 1978). The Lake Michigan Federation and Great 
520 
Lakes Tomorrow traveled around the basin to educate members of the public about Great 
Lakes and IJC-related issues. Decisions for the Great Lakes was created to deliver 40 
hour courses geared toward creating citizen leaders in the GLB. Collaborators and 
partners in this program included the IJC, the USEPA, Environment Canada (through the 
Canada-Ontario Agreement), the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission, and others. The 
base values among many who participated stressed the values of knowledge and 
rectitude. 
The perspectives of the participants is also important as part of the social process 
and provides perhaps the starkest contrast between governance in the Great Lakes Basin 
versus governance in the BoF/GoM.. The governance regime under the GLWQA 
between the late 1960s and early 1990s thrived on a perspective that included a 
dedication to collaboration, cooperation, inclusion, and a desire to do good for the Great 
Lakes Basin that was stronger than the desire to profit or otherwise drain it of resources 
or resilience. The IJC commissioners took an oath that they would make decisions 
independent from consideration or interference from national interests. Another 
important operating principle was that each member of the IJC, its Boards, and working 
committees was to operate "in his (or her) own professional capacity and expertise" 
rather than as a representative of an agency, NGO, or other special interest. In this 
manner, attention was focused on the resilience and integrity of the Great Lakes Basin 
ecosystem without worrying about agency interests and limitations. The requirement that 
persons serving on the IJC's advisory boards did so in their own capacities as citizens and 
experts, not in the capacity of representing the organizations that employed them, "helped 
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draw the best, least selfish, least compromised advice from its advisors... (Dempsey 
2004,192-93). 
Given the public nature of the IJC and its Boards, and the significant public 
involvement, strategies and situations were relatively straight forward. With strategies, 
the custom and practice of being open to all ideas helped instill a collaborative attitude 
and allowed for diplomatic efforts. Litigation played a role early in the GLWQA years 
on the U.S. side until polluters got the message. Litigation was coordinated by a single 
NGO and targets were often kin key cities involving major corporations (e.g. GE, US 
Steel, Dow Chemical). Situations where participants could interact were frequent in the 
Great Lakes Basin, with public IJC biennial meetings, Great Lakes United, the 
International Association of Great Lakes Researchers, and the Great Lakes Information 
Network. 
In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region, public participation has seldom been a 
priority. Policy-making, as we have seen, often by-passes the first requirement for goal 
clarification: meaningful public and/or community participation and input into the goal 
setting process. Goal clarification is determined piecemeal by the legislative process or 
the rulemaking processes of the relevant regulatory bodies and agencies with jurisdiction 
over those human activities that impact some component of the ecosystem. The goals of 
most of the relevant agencies in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine were examined in 
Chapter V - but there is little evidence that governance participants in the region would 
ever set aside their national or agency allegiances in favor of the public good. Simply 
put, the notion seems substantially at odds with the administrative culture observed in the 
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region. So with little public input with respect to the goals in the binational117 BoF/GoM, 
and with governance participants that are a fragmented collection of federal and 
state/provincial agencies with differing, and sometimes competing, goals, there is little 
about the social process in the region that would likely promote management decisions 
that would favor the resilience of the ecosystem as a whole over the special interests of 
the agencies involved in governance. 
Perspectives in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine governance regime differ 
significantly from those highlighted during the early years of the GLWQA participants in 
the Great Lakes Basin. Frequently it appears that powerful political and economic 
pressures on agencies force them to take special interests into consideration to the 
detriment of the resilience of the ecosystem. In Chapter V comments from a fisheries 
management participant made it clear that reduction of fleet capacity was made very 
difficult because of pressure from industry as well as political pressure. 
The Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment, as we have seen, is the 
only organization that attempts to get as many agencies from both Canada and the U.S. 
involved in a forum within which they may share ideas and exchange information. The 
members of the GOMC have agreed to three goals and four governing principles that, if 
clearly followed by all agencies, would prove beneficial to overall ecosystem integrity. 
But the Council has no authority to bring pressure to bear on its members to step-up their 
efforts or even to adhere to its own principles. It is clearly difficult for the GOMC to 
play a leading role when there is so much difference in goals, values, and perspectives 
117 As an observation, there is little recognition outside of fisheries and the Gulf of Maine Council that the 
Gulf of Maine is a shared binational resource. 
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from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. One of the messages about the Council that came out of 
interviews highlighted in Chapter V was the fact that information generated through the 
Gulf of Maine process rarely changed or impacted the decision-making of its members. 
What we see, therefore, is that the Social Process in the BoF/GoM region is 
jurisdictionally fragmented and that agencies are often so pressured and constrained by 
legal limitation and politics that the goal of ecosystem resilience must often take a back 
seat to nationalistic concerns or agency limitations. The Gulf of Maine Council must 
avoid fisheries issues, and the New England Fishery Management Council must look the 
other way when pollution impacts are on the table. Politics and pressure are brought to 
bear by special interests and, with no reliably consistent overarching body providing 
political cover, the participants in the region must frequently appease both agency politics 
and special interest pressures - sometimes to the detriment of ecosystem resilience. 
There is also a distinct difference in perspectives between participants in the 
GOMC and those from the early days under the GLWQA. In the former, some 
participating agencies have goals, e.g. to get industry, and "if it doesn't happen, we 
walk." In the Great Lakes, as we have seen, participants were obligated to make the 
resilience and integrity of the Great Lakes Basin their primary function, with nationalistic 
and agency constraints checked at the door. Of course, in the Great Lakes Basin there is 
an international treaty that helps to enable federal, state, and provincial implementation. 
Finally, we look at the role that the Decision Process plays in the two case studies 
in order to determine their effectiveness at prioritizing ecosystem resilience. Recall that 
in our ideal ecosystem-based governance model, the Decision Process uses the tasks of 
intelligence, promotion, prescription, implementation, appraisal, and termination to 
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promote human dignity and the fair distribution of values in order to gain the willingness 
of a community to pitch in and become an active part of the effort to clarify and secure 
common interests that can lead to the restoration of our ecosystems to healthy, functional, 
and resilient systems. 
Intelligence is the process of obtaining and processing information and making it 
available to decision makers, stakeholders, members of the public, and others (Clark 
2002). The purpose of intelligence is to provide reliable data and information that 
permits an understanding of whether conditions in the ecosystem are trending toward or 
away from the goals of the region (Busch and Trexler 2003). Reliability and credibility 
of the data matters and it should be collected from appropriate scales in order to detect 
trends and changes in ecosystem resilience and function and it should be open honest 
debate. Public participation in the debate as well as communication of the results to the 
public is critical to the maintenance of a knowledgeable and connected base of citizen 
involvement. 
In the Great Lakes Basin in the early years of the GLWQA governance, water 
sampling began long before the passage of the Clean Water Act - and in fact led to the 
reference that resulted in the negotiation of the GLWQA. Beginning in the early 1970s, 
the IJC and its Boards began work on a basin-wide surveillance plan. With help from 
Pollution from Land Use Activities Reference Group ("PLUARG") and agencies 
working on both sides of the border, 1975 Great Lakes Surveillance Plan was adopted 
through the Water Quality Board and the UC (WQB 1975). The IJC and its Boards 
monitored the results of the surveillance plan, and with increasing evidence of toxic 
contamination challenged the parties to buttress the plan and increase funding for basin-
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wide biological monitoring. The plan was revisited and revised often to keep pace with 
developing threats. The results of the surveillance activities were reported out each year 
in a various forums, including annual meetings of IAGLR, the biennial IJC meetings and 
formal reports to the Parties, and beginning in the late 1980s on-line through the Great 
Lakes Information Network (GLIN). The active and at times raucous involvement of the 
public at IJC meetings has been described in prior sections. It extended to promotion, 
also accomplished under public scrutiny and basically a "bottom up" process involving a 
wide variety of actors, including government agencies, NGOs, citizens, and related 
institutions. 
There was significant appraisal of how the policies were doing. Every two years 
the IJC issued a report that reviewed the progress, or not, of ecosystem factors toward the 
goals of the GLWQA. The report was aired publically every two years at the biennial 
meetings, where from 1975 through the 1990s the IJC publically questioned its Boards 
and working committees on the status of the ecosystems in the Great Lakes. In addition, 
the public had an opportunity to question the IJC and its boards. This is in addition to the 
other public outreach referenced previously. 
The Decision Process in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed is different. 
With no overarching governance entity, the decision process in the BoF/GoM is a 
crowded field. Understanding the collective decision process, however, can be a way of 
reconciling or at least productively managing competing interests and policies through 
politics. There are inevitable agency turf battles and politics plays a role in their 
outcome. Politics will always be with us because people seek different policies that 
reflect their particular, or "special", interests. The ideal, of course, is for participants to 
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reconcile interest differences in order to clarify and secure their common interest. In the 
BoF/GoM governance regime, we have seen that it is not really clear who establishes 
what the common interests are or should be, and even what the community believes is in 
their common interests. 
The intelligence task in the region is carried out by individual agencies. Data 
collected by separate agencies may or may not wind up with the Gulf of Maine Council 
or its working group. There also may still be issues with how data is collected and 
whether the same standards are followed by all agencies. 
While intelligence is collected by various agencies at various times for a variety 
of purposes, we are still not very knowledgeable about the resilience and integrity of the 
BoF/GoM. It became clear in Chapter V that in many ways we don't know the status of 
the ecosystem in the region. The way agencies manage their jurisdictions, data is largely 
stove piped and the overall picture of the health of the system is still relatively unknown. 
There is a real need for more consistent indicators, collaborative monitoring, joint 
interpretation, and data sharing. 
While the "fragmented incrementalism" process persists, the Gulf of Maine 
Council has demonstrated that it can work together to publish valuable and informative 
information about the region - like its Tides of Change report (Pesch and Wells 2004) 
and the new State of the Gulf (Thompson 2010) series. The Gulfwatch Contaminants 
Monitoring Program has been using mussels from some 38 locations around the Gulf 
since the early-1990s to monitor dozens of chemicals and metals in the mussel tissue.118 
There are still gaps, of course. Endocrine disrupting chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and 
118 http://www.gulfofinaine.org/gulfwatch/ 
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some of the more harmful persistent organic pollutants which can be found in the tissue 
of pinnipeds and humans are not monitored (De Guise, Shaw et al. 2001; Wells 2010). 
The bottom line is that we haven't a clue how pervasive these harmful emerging 
contaminants are in the sediments and water column of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. 
So what happens to the information that is collected from the various member 
agencies around the region? To an outside observer, it's not clear. Presumably its 
primary use is to move an agency forward with its mission. Some, maybe most, 
information gets posted on the web site of the Gulf of Maine Council where it is easily 
accessible to the public. Which brings us to the next fundamental problem: Why would 
members of the public in the region ever look on the GOMC web site? There is little in 
the way of dedicated and aggressive outreach that might be capable of creating a 
knowledgeable citizen base capable of speaking for the public good. Promotion, like 
intelligence, is largely done within agency and between agencies and legislators and 
Members of Parliament. Promotion does not tend to involve the citizens, unless you 
consider advertising by special interests as promotion. 
Prescriptions in the region, thoroughly reviewed in chapter VI, are many and 
varied and do little to promote integrity and resilience as the primary driver for 
governance decision making in the BoF/GoM region. Rather, as we know, they focus on 
some component of the ecosystem. Further, concepts like human dignity, economic well-
being, fair distribution, and justice appear nowhere in the lexicon of the BoF/GoM 
prescriptions or governance. 
Thus it would appear that ecosystem resilience is not the highest priority in the 
regional governance regime. It may be that the cumulative effort of all of the agencies 
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enforcing their regulatory interests has a positive impact on the ecosystem. I am unable 
to determine that from the information that I have seen. Ultimately, if ESIP can agree 
upon a meaning suite of indicators, and if the reports and data produced by regulatory 
agencies, NGOs, and others relevant to the ecosystem can be accessed easily and in one 
place, it might be possible to better understand the state of the integrity and resilience of 
the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. 
Significant meaningful public participation. 
Any ecosystem management regime must provide the opportunity for meaningful 
participation and input of a broad representative segment of the population in decision 
making processes (Costanza, Norton et al. 1992; Pauly and Maclean 2003). Significant, 
meaningful public participation is required (Becker 1993; Cortner and Moote 1999; 
Jackson 2005). Participation must be open to almost any person or group with a 
significant interest in the issue (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). Citizen involvement and 
partnership must be sufficient to build "civic science" instead of the traditional public 
information programs designed to inform passively (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). 
Together we must "pay the price of civilization through multiple acts of good 
citizenship..." (Sachs 2011,5) In the Policy Science framework, meaningful public 
participation is called for in Problem Orientation (especially goal clarification), Social 
Process (throughout), and the Decision Process. 
With respect to the degree of public involvement in the Great Lakes Basin under 
the GLWQA, I believe enough has been said. We have seen that meaningful public 
participation and the building of a knowledgeable citizen base was a priority of the IJC in 
the early years. Numerous efforts at outreach and education were sponsored by the IJC 
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and undertaken by the Lake Michigan Federation, the Great Lakes Basin Commission, 
and Great Lakes Tomorrow, through Decisions for the Great Lakes. We've also seen 
how NGOs and other entities from around the basin came together under the banner of 
Great Lakes United. During the early years of governance under the Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreement, the process it sparked was designed to promote significant, 
meaningful, public participation. 
In the BoF/GoM watershed, meaningful public participation has seldom been a 
part of the governance process. This is not by design but instead more a weakness of the 
laws underpinning federal, state and provincial governance in the region - which largely 
takes the form of traditional regulatory legislation. There are many that believe the 
culture of "independence" as characterized by state mottos like that of New Hampshire 
("Live Free or Die") mentally drives a culture of regulatory "hands off' and discourages 
innovation, collaboration, and cooperation. Thus traditional regulatory activity ushers in 
legislation that relies on scientific management which attempts to use the latest scientific 
knowledge and expert, disinterested personnel. This makes the key participants in the 
region's resource management process the experts and scientists, with government 
relying upon their divination and implementation of the best available science. If the 
public is involved at all, it is generally limited to an opportunity for comments or 
participation in a hearing after the experts and scientists have drafted a proposed plan of 
action. Further, the "iron triangle" is alive and well in the region as pressure groups 
concerned with single interests, e.g. navigation, fishing, energy, join with administrative 
agencies in charge of individual programs as well as congressional committees to defeat 
any attempt at an integrated approach. Courts, as we have seen, are common participants 
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in traditional natural resource management and are called upon to provide conflict 
resolution. Although there is evidence that in some parts of the region, Great Bay, NH, 
and Casco Bay, Maine, for instance, there are changes occurring, top-down, command-
oriented, fragmented natural resource and environmental policy management is the rule 
in general in traditional governance and, typically, the rule in reality in the BoF/GoM 
region, leaving little room for meaningful public involvement. 
Integrated, collaborative government involvement 
In an ideal ecosystem-based approach, regulatory agencies participate in a 
coordinated and integrated fashion. The approach is applied within a geographic 
framework determined primarily by ecological, not political, boundaries. Thus the 
process must overcome the fragmentation inherent in both the sectoral management 
approach and the splits in jurisdiction among levels of government (Regier and 
Baskerville 1986; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). In an 
ideal system, government acts less on other actors and more with other actors in a 
collaborative and communicative way. There is, therefore, more frequent, collaborative 
contact (i.e. not just during crisis). Thus government would require less of the local, 
state, or federal governments exerting control over others in society and more of a 
partnership-like interaction among them (Fiorino 2006). 
In the ideal ecosystem-based approach model collaboration is highlighted in a 
variety of areas. It is found in the Conditions task where collaboration between scientists, 
regulators, and citizen participants is required in order to jointly work to identify causes 
and conditions responsible for negative trends. It is also found in a number of tasks 
within the Social Process. A task within the Social Process consistent with ecosystem-
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based governance is that regulatory agencies should participate in a coordinated and 
integrated fashion and allow softer local and regional input into governance. There is 
also a need for collaborative processes to be iterative and ongoing - not simply single-
play problem solving efforts. Collaboration is also called for as part of the intelligence 
and appraisal feedback mechanism, meaning that there needs to be collaborative and 
cooperative partnerships with scientists, regulators, and the public to collect data as well 
as a collaborative entity or overarching body that can accumulate knowledge from 
appraisals and implement change to reverse adverse trends. 
In the Great Lakes Basin, integrated, collaborative government involvement was 
critical to the ecosystem approach built under the UC GLWQA arrangement. 
Interlocking directors, acting on behalf of the good of the Great Lakes and not necessarily 
on behalf of a participant's agency, played a critical role in the ability of the UC and its 
principle boards, together with the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission, to solve problems. 
As some of those who were interviewed for the Great Lakes study related, many of the 
participants in the early years under the GLWQA held offices, served on boards, or 
otherwise participated in several of the management entities. A member of the UC's 
Science Advisory board might also be a Commissioner of the Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission and participate in the Great Lakes Basin Commission. Knowledge was 
freely shared. The point is, collaboration was an important aspect of the Great Lakes 
Basin governance regime. 
Collaboration in the GLB took a number of forms, including commissioners and 
board members who put the good of the Great Lakes, an esprit d' corps, in front of 
allegiance to national government, agency, or special interests. It also came in the form 
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of working with the public and being open to all ideas - the free market of concepts and 
ideas. Biennial IJC meetings provided valuable engagement between the SAB, the 
WQB, and the press with the public present in a very public discourse in open sessions. 
These efforts were buttressed by an interdisciplinary Great Lakes science community. In 
the late 1960s concern about fishery and lamprey eel problems and the reference on 
phosphorus spawned the establishment of the International Association for Great Lakes 
Research (IAGLR) in 1967. Its journal and well-attended annual meetings became 
venues for a greater flow of information within the binational Great Lakes community. 
Although begun by physical and biological scientists, by 1971 academic political 
scientists and others interested in natural resource management issues began to 
participate in earnest. Thus collaboration and cooperation between government agencies 
was common in the early years of the GLWQA. 
In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region, cooperation and collaboration has 
been slower to come. The history of the governance efforts tends to show that 
collaboration and cooperation between government, NGOs, stakeholders, and the public 
has been a bit of a hit or miss story. The Gulf of Maine Council, as we know, provides 
an excellent forum for government agencies from both sides of the Hague Line, but their 
collaborative efforts may extend only as far as the sum of its parts allows, and 
collaboration in the form of the sharing of ideas and exchange of information does not 
often translate into significant cooperative action. 
There have been excellent examples of collaboration discussed in the body of this 
report; namely, the Saltwater Network and ACAP. Another government attempt at 
collaboration in Canada has not fared so well. The Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated 
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Management Plan ("ESSIM") in Atlantic Canada involved over ten years of stakeholder 
involvement to develop a final draft plan. ESSIM was Canada's pilot integrated 
management effort, and drew upon stakeholders to come up with a plan to deal with a 
coastal margin with competitive uses that included a Marine Protected Area (The Gully), 
..protected areas of cold-water corals, multispecies fisheries including ground fisheries, 
small and large pelagic fisheries, crab, lobster, and an extensive Aboriginal Communal 
Commercial Snow Crab fisher, dragger, long line, oil and gas exploration, works, seismic 
activities, oil and gas pipelines, other oil and gas development projects, marine 
transport..." (GOMC 2012, 5). With what I assume was a tail wind from the from the 
2005 Ocean Actions Plan, which favored "Integrated Oceans Management" as one of its 
four pillars (Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011), and with the establishment of a 32 member 
Stakeholder Advisory Council ("SAC") comprised of a diverse group of shareholders that 
agreed to share the responsibility for leadership toward the ESSIM vision, ESSIM stalled. 
Although a plan was drafted with SAC guidance and submitted to the government fir 
approval in 2007, the plan has yet to be approved. A survey of SAC members places 
blame on lack of leadership by the government - and expresses the notion that whereas 
multiple stakeholders can work together, apparently governments cannot (GOMC 2012). 
This result may unfortunately be consistent with the findings of a 2005 Auditor 
General review of Canada's Oceans Act which found that following its passage the 
oceans ceased to be a government priority, and that government had failed to meet its 
obligations under the Act. There may be a cautionary lesson for the U.S. as its Oceans 
Policy gets closer to reality. The Canadian experience may demonstrate that the policy 
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and its various collaborative and cooperative measures may not be welcomed with open 
arms by federal agencies currently responsible for ocean and coastal management. 
The resistance may likely be strongest in areas like the U.S. Northeast that have no 
history of working with a River Basin Commission and that don't have a notable history 
of collaboration. 
Whether it is the lack of a River Basin Commission, the independence and "hands 
off' attitude inscribed by some states on their license plates and which oozes into the 
attitude toward governance in general, there seems to be a culture in the region that 
discourages meaningful collaboration and cooperative problem-solving. There are 
numerous excellent examples of collaboration that are sprinkled around the region, but in 
general collaboration, or the sharing of power in any manner, is hardly on the top of any 
regulator's "to do" list. With some meaningful exceptions described earlier, and others, 
cooperative and collaborative governance is generally not present in the Bay of 
Fundy/Gulf of Maine region. 
Governance is adaptive. 
There must be a realization that stewardship cannot wait on science to achieve a 
full understanding of ecosystem structure and function. Thus an ecosystem based 
approach in any region must be prepared to cope with the uncertainty inherent in complex 
natural and institutional systems (Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000; Sherman, Kane et al. 2002). 
Adaptive governance is a mode of learning that allows for decision makers with a poor 
understanding of the connection between their actions and the consequences to learn by 
doing (Ludwig, Hilborn et al. 1993; Holling 1995; NRC 2009). Ecosystem surprises 
stemming from delay in feedback, and/or rapid feedback, are normal ecosystem dynamics 
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and require adaptive governance. Recall that the purpose here is not to design a flawless 
governance process capable of coping with multiple, complex systems. All that can be 
done is attempt to design a system that operates under rules that allow sufficient 
information to be generated over time to enable participants to learn from their mistakes 
and continually adapt and improve the institutional system to operate within natural limits 
(Costanza, Low et al. 2001). Under an adaptive governance regime, policy choices and 
interventions are treated as experiments (NRC 2009), relying explicitly on monitoring, 
evaluating, and terminating failed policies instead of expert-driven planning that relies 
primarily on science-based technology rather than trial and error (Brunner, Steelman et 
al. 2005). 
Translated to the policy sciences framework, the Social Process tasks of 
"Inventing, Evaluating, and Selecting Alternatives" are requirements of adaptive 
governance. This is where the ability for trial and error is nested. Confronted with 
uncertainty, participants must have the capacity and the courage to invent, evaluate, and 
select alternatives. The Decision Process requires: (1) reliable intelligence, honest 
promotion, prescriptions and implementation that are often experimental, (2) appraisal in 
the form of monitoring and other feedback, and (3) the ability to terminate policies that 
aren't working and scale up policies that are successful in moving the community toward 
its goals. An overarching institutional entity is necessary in order to evaluate the data and 
select policy alternatives when there is a need to try and reverse negative trends. 
Chapter IV taught us that in the early days of governance under the there was an 
effort to coordinate intelligence and accumulate data relevant to the goals set forth in the 
GLWQA. Specific water quality standards were part of the original 1972 Agreement. 
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With the input of the citizen panels from Pollution from Land Use Activities Reference 
Group ("PLUARG") and with recommendations from Canadian agencies, and with 
pressure from the public to understand whether ecosystem conditions were trending 
toward the goals, the Great Lakes Surveillance Plan was approved by the Water Quality 
Board and the IJC in 1975. In 1976, with the increasing threats posed by toxic 
contaminants and the development of new technology, the UC challenged the Parties to 
commit to increased funding to include basin-wide biological monitoring (IJC 1976). 
Similar challenges to buttress surveillance monitoring were issued the following year in 
anticipation of the adoption of an ecosystem-based approach to governance for the entire 
Great Lakes Basin - which would include land-based activities due to the findings and 
recommendations of PLUARG (IJC 1978). The fact that the UC and its Boards 
continued to alter and amend the Surveillance Plan demonstrates both adaptability and 
accountability. 
Consistent with the notion of promotion in an ideal ecosystem-based governance 
regime, during the first decade of the GLWQA there was strong support by the UC and 
its Boards and panels to pursue common interests and the health of the Great Lakes Basin 
ecosystem were paramount. The problem-solving approach of the Science Advisory 
Board and related IJC panels and working committees was to solicit and listen to all ideas 
being promoted from multiple interests - a universal approach - in order to make sure no 
potential innovation was overlooked. IJC, Science Advisory Board, and other Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement participants shared an implicit commitment to the basin 
and to the equity and justice. Equity, fairness, and human health reached operational 
levels under the GLWQA and were significant factors in the early years. Also, 
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information and input was gathered from broad base of participants, overlapping board 
members, and knowledgeable citizens. 
As we learned in Chapter IV, participants in the decision process of the UC and 
its boards made decisions in the face of uncertainty. In terms of prescription, they asked 
both parties to ban the use of phosphates in the basin. The measures ordered by the IJC 
were accepted by the parties with the assistance of a knowledgeable public. As a result, 
the water cleared up. The Great Lakes Fishery Commission also took some courageous 
action when it elected to work with states to begin a new fishery for Pacific salmon in the 
Great Lakes. During this time, of course, the public was kept informed through the 
public IJC biennial meetings, the Great Lakes Basin Commission, Great Lakes 
Tomorrow, annual meetings of the International Association of Great Lakes Researchers, 
periodic meetings and publications of Great Lakes United, and the Great Lakes 
Information Network. 
The story in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region is quite different. Adaptive 
governance is difficult if not impossible without an overarching institutional entity. As 
we know, adaptive governance is a process - and it needs to be a process capable of 
integrating valid and appropriate interests into the policy process to advance the common 
interest. We have seen that the UC in the early years of the GLWQA had a series of 
management principles that enabled the Parties to make decisions for the public good 
without regard to national interests or other interests. Their role was to make decisions 
that were good for the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem. 
Currently there is no equivalent system or process in the BoF/GoM. Recall that 
under an adaptive governance regime, policy choices and interventions are treated as 
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experiments (NRC 2009), relying explicitly on monitoring, evaluating, and terminating 
failed policies instead of expert-driven planning that relies primarily on science-based 
technology rather than trial and error (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). Without an 
accountable overarching entity, there is no entity capable of organizing a monitoring 
design, evaluating the results, or changing policies in order to reverse ecosystem 
components that are trending away from the goals of the community. There is no entity 
tasked with the function of making decisions for the good of the ecosystem. There is also 
no way to learn from trial and error as there is no entity willing to confront uncertainty to 
learn by taking a chance. It also means that processes that work will not be recognized 
and cannot be scaled up for use across the Gulf. A case in point is ACAP, the Atlantic 
Coastal Action Program that has involved the public in meaningful ways and provides the 
opportunity for communities to make decisions about their own future. There are 14 
ACAP communities in the Canadian Maritimes. From the audits that we discussed in 
chapter V, the ACAP program has saved Environment Canada some $70 million by 
performing tasks and functions that would have ordinarily been executed by regulators 
within the agency. Despite the successes of the ACAP model, attempts by Environment 
Canada to get agencies in the U.S. to look at it and perhaps scale up the program and 
adopt it for the United States have been unsuccessful (Personal Correspondence 2010). 
This is not a promising message that would lead to risk-taking and innovation. 
Adaptive governance is clearly not something that can be counted on any time soon in the 
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. While there are many caring, hard-working people 
involved in tasks related to governance, they are for the most part working in 
governmental agencies, institutions, or NGOs that have their own cultures, interests, and 
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values. In this region there is an extremely strong allegiance to traditional expert-driven 
scientific management. With the many threats that are looming over the BoF/GoM 
ecosystem at present, practically guaranteeing changes that will no doubt surprise and 
surpass the coping mechanisms of existing governance systems, there will be no adaptive 
governance process to understand, detect, warn or react when conditions hit a tipping 
point and strange things begin to happen. 
Mobilizing local knowledge 
Social and cultural memory and contemporary local knowledge must be 
mobilized by developing links between key persons and providing a direction for 
adaptive governance. This is a way of building social capacity for resilience in social-
ecological systems (Holling 1995; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Steelman 2010). 
This factor is being used as a separate category that includes more than just public 
participation. This category involved more the intelligence, promotion, and prescription 
tasks of the Decision Process. We saw how citizen panels were used by the DC through 
PLUARG to examine the possible impacts of land-based activities on water quality. One 
important part of those panels was the local knowledge brought to the table by many of 
the farmers and residents of the regions where there were panels. This local knowledge 
helps to round out scientific knowledge and give a more holistic vision to rising problems 
and potential solutions. Further, participation by citizens into the Decision Process will 
inevitably get a better buy-in from the public should citizen action be required for any 
potential actions. There was no doubt that citizen participation in the decision process in 
the Great Lakes Basin helped to get the phosphorus ban through every state in which it 
was introduced over industry objection. 
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In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine there are numerous programs that link fishers 
with scientists for research related to fish populations and distribution. Local knowledge 
is being brought to the table currently in Exeter, NH, as part of the process that is 
ultimately deciding whether a bridge in that town is removed. There are active watershed 
organizations that work hard to maintain and restore riverine systems in their 
communities. The Annapolis River Watershed is home the Annapolis River Guardians, 
one of the longest running volunteer water monitoring programs in Canada. Starting in 
1992 its over 90 volunteers have collected more than 4000 water samples. The group 
annually publishes score cards giving citizens an overview of the status of the river.119 
There are other sources of local knowledge in the many other watershed associations, 
land trusts, and related organizations that surely can be tapped by regulators as sources of 
information for use by future governance. 
Local knowledge, however, is still used on a piecemeal basis. While there are 
excellent examples of local groups in the region empowering themselves and 
participating in decisions that affect their future, more often than not such decisions are 
made in the tradition of scientific management. Government agencies use purportedly 
impartial experts and scientists to make decisions and develop plans, with local 
knowledge generally overlooked until the final comment stages. 
Overarching lead or foint institution 
Governance must have a lead or joint institution able to adapt to new information 
and understanding (Christensen, Bartuska et al. 1996). This requirement is found in the 
Social and Decision Processes and is considered critical to the existence and 
119 http://www.annapolisriver.ca/downIoads/Report_Card_201 l.pdf 
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implementation of adaptive governance. Any overarching lead or joint institution must 
have the authority (formal or informal) and means to carry out systematic scientific 
research to understand system response and status, to track compliance with policy goals 
and objectives as well as to make changes when necessary. The obvious need is for 
transparency and fairness as perceived by the public and regulated community. More 
pertinent, however, may be the existence of informal or voluntary venues for dispute 
resolution that gives the public and stakeholders an opportunity to work together toward 
resolution of local or regional problems. This may be especially important where, as in 
this study area, the problems we are having with environmental degradation are the result 
of the cumulative impact of activities that are entirely (or mostly) legal under our existing 
laws and regulations (Brunner 2002; Fiorino 2006). 
It is important to note that the lead or overarching institutional entity need not 
have formal authority in order to be effective. The IJC and its boards do not have formal 
authority to enforce its decisions and directives with respect to water quality.120 This is 
not uncommon in international law. It simply needs to be able to investigate, monitor, 
and lead or direct any changes required in order to adapt to new conditions as well as to 
make recommendations directly to governments. 
In the governance of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, the Gulf of Maine Council 
could conceivably act as the lead or overarching institution with the ability to guide the 
adaptation of government responsibilities in the region. There have been times in the 
past when members actually challenged each other to put pressure on recalcitrant 
120 Under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty the IJC has regulatory authority over matters related to 
diversions and consumptive use of waterways shared by the U.S. and Canada. (1909). Treaty Relating to 
the Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the Boundary Between the United States and Canada. 
U.S.-Gr.Brit. 36 Stat. 2448. 
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jurisdictions to up the ante and take more effective measures to help achieve the shared 
goals articulated in the Council's Action Plans. Of course, without participation of 
fishery management even if the Council was willing to pressure reluctant jurisdictions 
into better environmental performance there would still be a huge gap in efforts to restore 
and preserve the integrity of the ecosystem. 
Given the above, it should be clear that a key element necessary for effective 
ecosystem-based governance is missing. Thus far in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
there is a lack of will - or lack of courage - to act in the public interest by making some 
arrangement to be accountable to an entity with the authority and capacity to monitor 
developing trends and guide policy change in order to prepare for and react to negative 
trends and surprises. 
A precautionary approach to uncertainty 
Finally, the Decision Process of governance in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
not only needs to have an overarching entity, but that entity needs to have management 
principles that apply flexible principles to its decisions. Certainly it is necessary that any 
lead entity in the region would need to have principles that enables an independence and 
esprit d' corps similar to the spirit that guided the UC, its boards, and working 
committees in the early years under the GLWQA. 
A precautionary decision-making approach must be incorporated into the 
Decision Process and management principles in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine in order 
to account for the great degree of uncertainty inherent in complex natural resource issues 
(Sherman 1994; Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000; Costanza, Low et al. 2001). Principle 15 of 
the Rio Declaration makes it clear that where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
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damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation (Sitarz 1994). Thus ecosystem 
management in the region must be prepared to cope with the uncertainty inherent in 
complex natural and institutional systems ((Sherman, Kane et al. 2002; Whiteside 2006), 
Clay et al. 2000; Sherman, Kane et al. 2002). Rapid feedback and appropriate decision-
selection mechanisms must be in place to compensate for lack of knowledge by decision 
makers - or what we have called adaptive governance (Costanza, Low et al. 2001). This 
becomes a more compelling need as climate change accelerates and adaptive governance 
and management is forced to become increasingly nimble. 
Historically, environmentally harmful activities have only been stopped after they 
have manifested extreme environmental degradation or exposed people to harm. In the 
case of DDT, lead, and asbestos, and commercial fisheries for instance, significant 
regulatory intervention took place only after disaster had occurred. The delay between 
first knowledge of harm and appropriate action to deal with it can be measured in human 
lives cut short or in the serious, often permanent, environmental degradation that has 
occurred. 
In contrast to the traditional management approach of reacting only when human 
health has suffered or environmental harm has occurred, precautionary planning may be 
used to prevent or address problems before they occur. The 1992 Rio Declaration 
specifically laid out the foundation for the precautionary approach in Principle 15: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States, according to their abilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation" (UNCED 1992). 
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While decision making using a precautionary approach recognizes that the 
absence of full scientific certainty must not be used as a reason to postpone decisions 
where there is a risk of serious or irreversible harm, there is a need for some level of 
guidance. Guidance and assurance are required as to the conditions governing the actions 
that will be taken. Guidance and assurance are particularly needed when a decision must 
be made regarding a risk of serious or irreversible harm about which there is significant 
scientific uncertainty. 
Who makes these decisions? How does an agency determine whether a threat has 
the potential for "serious or irreversible" damage? What should the guidelines be for the 
determination of whether a proposed measure is "cost effective?" Finally, who should 
bear the burden of proof for any of these issues? 
What may make the precautionary approach unique (i.e. different from traditional 
risk analysis) is the notion that the burden of proof be on the proponents of any actions 
that might prove harmful to human health or the environment to show that the impacts 
will be benign, or at least that the harm caused will be outweighed by a 'greater good.'. 
It still begs the question of when the actors have to submit such actions to an 
administrative body and what standards should apply to the decision process thereafter. 
One key will be the level of protection that society chooses. The threats can then be 
compared to society's expressed level of protection (e.g. ranging from zero tolerance for 
toxic or persistent organic pollutants to some form of threshold limit values combined 
with monitoring and control rules with prearranged management actions in response to 
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unanticipated monitoring results - for instance if a target Total Allowable Catch ("TAC") 
is hit, by prior agreement the fishery shuts down). 
Involvement of the public in the determination of the desired level of protection, 
through outreach and education, could be developed so that transparency and full public 
input could give credibility to regulatory efforts. The bottom line is the need for 
overarching law that applies the precautionary approach to all relevant aspects of 
regulation. Guidelines and regulations developed in an agency-by-agency fashion would 
have to meet certain requirements as defined by the legislation. I would assume that the 
approach would be flexible, that it would provide a "balancing of interests" approach so 
frequently found in law, that is, the magnitude of the threat of harm or irreversible 
damage would be weighed against the value to society of the actor's planned act. The 
greater the uncertainty, the more conservative would be the criteria before actions are 
permitted. For example, the burden of proof may be difficult for industry to demonstrate 
that the risk of irreversible harm of the release of dioxins by the pulp and paper mills into 
the waters of Canada and the U.S. outweighs the social value of toilet paper that is whiter 
in appearance than toilet paper manufactured without the need to discharge dioxins. The 
test may come out differently if we weigh the benefit of oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation on Browns and Georges Banks against the threat of harm to the ecosystem 
and, by inference, the fishery. Again - who decides? Are these incredibly significant 
decisions to be left to the typical array of scientists and experts or do we establish 
meaningful partnerships with stakeholders, communities, and the public to arrive at 
resolution of these conflicts? 
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It is apparent that governance in the BoF/GoM does not include management or 
rule-making principles that in any way resemble a precautionary approach. It is also 
apparent that future governance must include the precautionary approach to decision­
making as part of a package with other management principles, like independence and 
freedom from agency and national interests when decisions are made that pertain to the 
resilience and integrity of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region. 
Conclusions 
We have seen that all is not well with the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem. 
The Conditions section of Chapter V makes it clear that the stresses that are picking away 
at the ecosystem are not going away - in fact they may be worsening. 
In order to determine whether the existing governance regime of the Bay of 
Fundy/Gulf of Maine has the capacity to implement an integrated, adaptable ecosystem 
approach to restore and sustain, over time, the integrity of the respective ecosystems, 
including the functions upon which the humans in the ecosystem rely, several logical 
steps were followed. From a thorough review of the literature there was the ability to 
learn about the modern manifestation of traditional government and the differences 
between traditional scientific management and the ecosystem-based approach to 
governance. The seven characteristics of ecosystem-based governance developed in 
chapter III and discussed immediately above were gleaned from the literature. 
Obviously, in an evaluation of the existing governance in the study region, the more 
characteristics that can be found in existing institutional and related governance regime, 
the better are the chances that there exists the capacity to implement an ecosystem-based 
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approach to the management of those activities that impact the environment. No 
governance regime is perfect and improved governance or the capacity to implement a 
more ecosystem-based approach to governance does not require that all seven 
characteristics be present. It only requires that there are enough characteristics present 
with sufficient strength to create a process that can foster change that results in 
measurable ecosystem components trending toward the goals of the community. 
To better assess the existence and strength of the ecosystem-based approach to 
governance the framework developed by the Policy Sciences was utilized. Using the 
framework, it was possible to examine the problem orientation, social process, and 
decision process to better understand the differences, task by task, between traditional 
government and an ecosystem-based approach to governance. 
Once the ecosystem-based approach to governance was broken down into its 
functional components with the framework approach, Chapter IV used the framework to 
assess the governance regime under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement in the first 
20 years after the Agreement was entered into between the United States and Canada. 
Using the framework, the governance regime in the Great Lakes Basin between roughly 
1972 and 1992 was compared with the "ideal" ecosystem-based governance framework 
criteria. As demonstrated in Chapter IV and immediately above, the analysis revealed 
that that the governance system in the Great Lakes Basin in the early years of the 
GLWQA compared favorably to the ideal model. Therefore it became evident that the 
characteristics of ecosystem-based governance were present as revealed by the 
framework analysis. 
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Chapter V then used the framework analysis to compare the existing governance 
in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed to the ideal. From the analysis of Chapter 
V and the summary of the ecosystem-based characteristics above, there is no escaping the 
conclusion that the existing governance scheme in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
watershed does not have the capacity to implement an ecosystem-based approach to 
governance. The reasons for this conclusion become apparent when the framework 
analysis is used to examine the existing governance regime and the existing problem 
orientation, social process, and decision process are compared with the ideal framework 
from Chapter III. The conclusions may be summarized using the seven characteristics of 
ecosystem-based governance discussed above. The "related questions" are addressed in 
the summary of conclusions that follow. 
The first characteristic that was proposed for the existence of an ecosystem-based 
approach to governance was the priority that must be place on management for resilience. 
Without repeating what has been already been discussed, the governance regime in the 
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine does not have ecosystem resilience as a priority. The 
framework analysis demonstrated that the basics of problem orientation, which include 
meaningful community participation in the goal clarification process and strong public 
outreach and education efforts combined with multiple goals that embrace human dignity 
with a premium placed on the maintenance of integrity and resilience were not readily 
recognizable in the study area. The goals in the study region are fragmented among a 
diverse array of agencies at the local, state/provincial and federal levels in two countries. 
There is no goal or even multiple goals that all participants strive to achieve. The social 
process analysis disclosed that public participation was not a priority, and that the 
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perspectives and values of government and other institutions in the region appeared to 
focus more on the preservation and/or increase of power and wealth as a way to protect or 
increase agency influence and budget. The integrity and resilience of the region's 
ecosystem seems to be less of a priority than the well-being of the agencies and other 
participants involved in governance. Finally, when the Decision Processes present in the 
region are examined and compared with the ideal, it is clear that they are not supportive 
of the need to prioritize ecosystem integrity in the management of human activities that 
impact the environment. In the ideal ecosystem-based governance model, the Decision 
Process uses the tasks of intelligence, promotion, prescription, implementation, appraisal, 
and termination to promote human dignity and the fair distribution of values in order to 
gain the willingness of a community to pitch in and become an active part of the effort to 
clarify and secure common interests that can lead to the restoration of our ecosystems to 
healthy, functional, and resilient systems. In Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region, 
intelligence is gathered agency-by-agency, with little input from an informed public and 
without significant community or local knowledge. The information that is collected is 
not readily available to the public. Finally, there is no overarching entity in the region 
capable of reviewing the existing data and implementing policy changes based on trends 
reflected by the data. Other, more veteran, jurisdictions have by various forms of 
agreement managed to get past these barriers. The International Joint Commission used 
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement to enable greater collaboration although the 
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty provided the basis for the Agreement. The Great Lakes 
Commission is a compact between states within the Great Lakes watershed, but Canadian 
provinces are included and their votes, though legally non-binding, are treated as binding 
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by the Commission. In any event, there are ways to create an accountable body able to 
oversee and guide policy development in the region - all that is needed is the political 
will. 
In sum, the existing governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
watershed does not demonstrate the ecosystem-based governance characteristic of 
managing for resilience and integrity. 
The next characteristic, the significant, meaningful public participation in the 
governance regime is also, with some exceptions, not generally present in the region. 
The combination of fragmented governance and a cultural bias favoring independent or 
"hands off' regulatory approaches lead to governance by traditional top-down scientific 
management. Government enforces uniform rules across the board using experts and 
scientists to divine the best available science. The public often resents regulation and 
frequently resists implementation or uses courts (at least in the US) and other delay 
tactics to avoid compliance. Thus significant, meaningful public involvement is 
generally not present in the region. This situation is a far cry from the education and 
aggressive outreach insisted upon by the International Joint Commission and others 
during the early years of governance under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. 
Integrated, collaborative government involvement is also characteristic of an 
ecosystem-based approach to governance. While there are examples of integrated, 
collaborative governance efforts in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed, these 
efforts are still the exception. There generally is little if any collaboration between 
scientists, regulators, and citizen public to identify conditions, document scale-relevant 
trends, and cooperating to determine the causes and conditions responsible for negative 
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trends. Again, the fragmented nature of governance in the region is a very high hurdle to 
effective collaboration. There also is no significant history or culture of collaboration in 
the region. Fisheries management, for instance, has ignored the impacts of land-based 
activities just as collaborative efforts to control such impacts have largely been ignored 
by entities that regulate fisheries and ocean-related activities. Agencies within the region 
are generally unable or unwilling to collaborate to any significant degree. Indeed it may 
be the unwavering allegiance shown by participants to their national and agency interests 
that prove to be the biggest barrier to transition to an ecosystem-based approach to 
governance. So long as there are agencies and government representatives who are 
unwilling to put the public interest in the integrity and resilience of the Bay of 
Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem ahead of agency and national power and protection can 
be no significant change in traditional government processes and certainly no capacity to 
transition into a more holistic ecosystem-based approach to governance. 
Adaptive governance, mobilizing local knowledge, an overarching lead or joint 
institution, and a precautionary approach to uncertainty are the final characteristics of 
ecosystem-based governance. The discussion above has already highlighted the 
fragmented governance structure in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine with no overarching 
institution and the lack of meaningful public or community involvement. These factors 
act as barriers to the final four characteristics as much as they did to the first three. Thus 
any further discussion at this point would be redundant. 
Therefore, given all of the above, an examination of the existing governance 
system in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine reveals that it currently does not have the 
capacity to implement an integrated, adaptable ecosystem approach to restore and sustain, 
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over time, the integrity of the respective ecosystems, including the functions upon which 
the humans in the ecosystem rely. 
The capacity to govern the human activities that impact the ecosystem in the 
region using an ecosystem-based approach would be possible with some changes. Some 
of these changes are set forth in the recommendations that follow in the next section. 
Recommendations and Next Steps 
In Voltaire's Candide, published originally in 1759, the young protagonist is 
booted (literally) from the Baron's castle paradise in Westphalia after being discovered in 
an amorous embrace with the Baron's daughter and goes on to encounter a truly dizzying 
series of brutal, calamitous, and unfair adventures. His tutor, mentor, personal 
philosopher, and companion at a young age and at critical junctures throughout the tale, 
Dr. Pangloss, continually teaches his young ward that regardless the situation or danger, 
he must remember that he is always in "this best of all possible worlds." This is so, 
Pangloss explained, because "it cannot be otherwise." (Voltaire 1956, 111). 
Voltaire, however, used the character of Pangloss to poke fun at those who 
espouse impractical speculations on unknown topics. Dr. Pangloss, you see, was an 
expert. His expertise was in metaphysico-theologo-cosmolonigology. He spent all of his 
time theorizing. He talked without doing. When starvation was at hand and all around 
him were tending a garden, Pangloss talked. As Candide lay near death after surviving a 
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shipwreck and crawling into Lisbon only to be injured in an earthquake begged for water 
before losing consciousness, Pangloss talked. 
In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region, there has been enough talk. While 
debate and discussion about environmental threats and possible causes and solutions are 
absolutely critical, there comes a time when action is needed. Given the characteristics 
that we know are generally present for an ecosystem-based approach to governance to 
take hold, the next part of this study will briefly suggest changes that could change 
governance in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine so that is more holistic, adaptive, and 
inclusive. 
Recommendations 
As we know, governance in the region is comprised of various agencies are 
charged with the responsibility of enforcing uniform rules and laws across the wide array 
of circumstances presented around the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. In this 
manner, compliance is thought to be achieved - albeit in piecemeal fashion. However the 
current governance arrangement in the region is described, the fact remains that it is not 
working and is unable to stand up to special interests and clarify and secure common 
interests. Existing governance is simply unable to keep up with the threats that are posed 
to the ecosystem of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. Governance in the region must 
figure out how to navigate the dynamic nature of multilevel and interconnected socio-
ecological systems. In most of the world, this translates into "collaboration among 
heterogeneous actors with diverse interests, institutions that are flexible and nested across 
scales and levels, and analytic deliberation that develops understanding through multiple 
knowledge systems; builds trust through repeated interactions; and fosters learning and 
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adaptive responses through continuous feedback" (Dietz, Ostrom et al. 2003; Folke, 
Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007; Armitage and Plummer 2010, 5). Not surprisingly, these 
recommended requirements are captured in various ways in our suite of ecosystem-based 
governance characteristics, to wit: 
• Management for resilience; 
• Significant, meaningful public participation 
• Integrated, collaborative government involvement; 
• Adaptive governance; 
• Mobilizing local knowledge; 
• Overarching lead or joint institution, and 
• A precautionary approach to uncertainty. 
As we know, and before specific recommendations are presented, it deserves to be 
reiterated that the characteristics itemized above are set forth in no particular order and 
the list is not intended to imply priorities. They are not neatly packaged and there is 
overlap. Redundancy and complexity go with the territory. It is truly unknown how 
many characteristics must be present and to what degree before governance is able to turn 
the corner and begin to reverse negative trends and foster positive trends. 
As this study demonstrates, increasing threats to the region's ecosystem have 
stressed conventional institutional assumptions and arrangements with demands for 
action beyond the competence of existing agencies to respond. Thus these 
recommendations are designed to increase the capacity for governance to respond to 
increasing stress - with a full understanding that there will be many who will be reluctant 
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to change from for a variety of reasons, including those who foresee possibilities for 
binational political embarrassment. 
This study concludes that the region does not have the capacity to implement an 
ecosystem-based approach to governance. It can't be stressed enough that time is 
running out: capacity-building must begin soon and involve the active participation of a 
generally committed and informed public. Hard choices will have to be made, and 
sacrifice by some may be unavoidable (Smil 1993). Given the above, there are steps that 
can be taken that do not involve a major change in legislation but can give Canada and 
the U.S. the ability to implement an ecosystem based approach to governance. The 
measures called for in this paper will not be without cost or sacrifice. 
First it should be clear from this study that our current regime of top-down, 
"leave-it-to-the-expert," administrative rationalism governance is simply not working. 
There is a need for significant change. The recommendations that follow are based on a 
these legitimate conclusions. The recommendations are also designed to help achieve the 
characteristics of ecosystem-based governance. Fundamental to the ecosystem based 
approach are a few basic propositions. As so many commentators have now noted, there 
must be a rational approach to problem solving that involves learning through 
experimentation. Further, the problems we face are so complex that relevant knowledge 
can no longer be centralized in the hands of any government or agency structure but, 
rather, should be accessible to all. The governance process must also be flexible and 
involve many voices and a broad variety of perspectives (Dryzek 1997; Fischer 2000; 
Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Weber 2003; Daly and Farley 2004; Brunner, Steelman et al. 
2005; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Finally, these recommendations contemplate 
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a movement away from centralized, command and control governance toward more 
emphasis on community-based efforts. The task of managing the impacts and threats 
posed across the entire Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed are simply too daunting 
for most of us to understand. The magnitude and complexity of the issues are so 
immense that we feel disempowered - the feeling is often "why bother." That's why 
there is a real need to approach these problems at a local or watershed level - think local 
and act local (Dryzek 1997; Suzuki and McConnell 1997; Fischer 2000; Weber 2003; 
Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Steelman 2010). 
Given the above, we may now set forth some recommendations that, if adopted, 
might help move governance in a direction that is more responsive, democratic, and 
ecosystem-based. The first requirement we will discuss is the need for an informed 
public. There simply needs to be a purposeful and articulate transnational constituency 
with the ability to pressure governments on both sides of the border toward a common 
course of action (Caldwell 1988). It would be easy enough to mandate that K - 12 the 
curriculums taught in schools around the basin include a focus on the resources, ecology, 
and threats in the watershed. In addition, we know that in the Great Lakes Basin an 
informed citizen base was critical to the implementation of measures that were opposed 
by special interests, including Proctor and Gamble and others who objected to the 
phosphate ban. The Joyce Foundation in the United States and, in Canada, the Max Bell 
Foundation and, later, the Center for the Great Lakes/Great Lakes Trust Funds provided 
the financial resources to support the kind of aggressive public education and outreach 
carried out by Great Lakes Tomorrow, Decisions for the Great Lakes, the Lake Michigan 
Federation, and others. Chapter IV discusses the numerous efforts to involve 
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communities and the public. PLUARG was part of the original reference to the UC and 
involved community panels in an attempt to determine the extent that land-based 
activities played a role in water quality issues. It also relates the fact that citizens were 
included in IJC boards and working committees. 
In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, there needs to be funding devoted to the 
establishment of an organization of facilitators, not unlike the efforts of the Lake 
Michigan Federation, Great Lakes Tomorrow and its offspring Decisions for the Great 
Lakes. Facilitators need to have the ability and flexibility to identify individuals around 
the basin and travel to areas that are supported by watershed councils and begin to knit 
together the interests of those in the watershed and prepare them for some level of self-
determination. Facilitators should be recruited from communities and watersheds around 
the region and should be trained extensively in the existing governance of the region, the 
threats to the ecosystem, and the importance of education and outreach as part of a 
program to get citizens involved in decisions that will impact their futures. I would 
envision a first step, after participants are recruited, would be to hold conferences in order 
to use facilitators and other scientists, regulators, and academics to help clarify the goals 
and outcomes for the communities around the watershed. The Gulf of Maine Council 
and Fishery Management officials in both the U.S. and Canada should work closely with 
the chosen facilitators. It would be logical, upon identification and recruitment of 
participants, to develop the ability of groups to work together by first holding regional 
meetings focusing on the development of goals and outcomes. Thereafter conferences in 
each country could broaden the involvement and experience of the participant groups. 
Finally there should be an international conference with all groups from the United States 
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and Canada focus again on goals and outcomes and bring it all together and develop a 
plan that everyone could take back to their communities. Certainly this effort must 
include an effort to identify those groups around the basin who are already involved in 
some part of governance, i.e. Saltwater Network, ACAP, Annapolis Basin, and other 
existing community or watershed groups, and include them and their knowledge in this 
basin-wide effort. Other important participants would be representatives from NOAA's 
National Estuarine Reserve Research System (NERRS), EPA's National Estuary 
Partnerships (NEPs), and other government or NGOs with experience working with 
communities around watershed. 
Another requirement for meaningful change in the existing governance is that 
there needs to be an overarching institutional entity capable of collecting ecosystem-wide 
data, analyzing the data, and deciding upon measures that need to be implemented 
through the agencies on both sides of the border and implementing such measures. The 
ideal system would recognize that uncertainty plays a role in every decision made by the 
overarching institutional entity and that the results of policy decisions and changes must 
be monitored to determine whether policy changes result in ecosystem components that 
begin to trend in favor of goals that buttress the public good. The easiest way to 
accomplish this would be by reference to the International Joint Commission. There is 
no question that the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine are boundary waters within the 
meaning of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty. Through the Gulf of Maine Council 
membership, a reference could be negotiated that leaves the GOMC and Fishery 
Management as jointly coordinating organizations at the operations level (although these 
entities have not worked together in the past, I know of no historical animosity that would 
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prevent them from greater cooperation in the future). The IJC, or a panel or committee 
formed pursuant to the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, could oversee and recommend 
policy measures for the region and periodically appraise and report on trends in the 
region through written report and biennial public meetings. 
It would take both parties to join the reference to the IJC for the formation of a 
Board within the IJC structure devoted to the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. 
Agencies and bureaucracies around the basin need to finally have the courage and 
tenacity to admit that the way that management agencies must deal with the stresses that 
threaten the very health and integrity of the ecosystem no longer works. We simply can 
no longer keep doing the same thing over and over and expect different results. It is not 
going to happen. Yet institutional innovations must be appropriate and responsible to the 
environmental problems of the region and to their qualitative enhancement. There may 
be disagreement over the amount and kinds of power that an overarching institution 
should have, but given the situation in the region currently some agreement should be 
worked out to provide some accountability for the results (or not) achieved by agencies in 
the region. The medicine may taste awful, but it may save our future. 
Management for resilience is another characteristic that needs to be strengthened 
in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. The 'fragmented incrementalism' that is 
the hallmark of management in the region will never be able to manage for resilience. 
Too many substantive and procedural levels and segments of jurisdictions can never 
allow for the collaboration and cooperation required in order to manage for resilience. 
The only way that the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine can turn the management system 
around and manage for resilience is through a reference to the IJC. Even with a 
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reference, care must be taken that the reference requires a Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
Board with management principles that requires participants in Board activities to set 
aside national and agency interests and act solely for the good of the ecosystem. Further, 
all participants must pledge to participate in his or her personal and professional capacity 
and not as a representative of the agency or government that provides his or her 
employment. As part of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine Board there should be a 
Research Advisory Board within the structure that includes scientists, academics, 
regulators, citizens, watershed organization members, and other community members 
who monitor trends in the region and make recommendations to the Bay of Fundy/Gulf 
of Maine Board about potential policies and actions. The management principles 
described above would apply to the Research Advisory Board activities, and 
experimentation with learning by trial and error must be encouraged. 
There is a need for integrated, collaborative governance in the region. The need 
for coordinated scientific work, including research, monitoring, interpretation and those 
aspects of evaluation amenable to scientific inquiry can no longer be seriously 
questioned. There are a variety of measures that could strengthen this characteristic. The 
existence of Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine Board by reference must include integrated and 
collaborative governance that mandates collaboration and cooperation between fishery 
management other ocean, land, and coastal margin-related agencies. To continue to stove 
pipe these critical regulatory functions is simply absurd and needs finally to change and 
begin to communicate and work together. Fishery management trends, already 
monitored, with significant uncertainty, by federal governments in Canada and the U.S., 
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should be accountable to the same overarching institutional entity as other governance 
efforts in the region. 
Adaptive governance is non-existent in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
watershed. The changes recommended here would make it possible. The existence of an 
overarching institutional entity overseeing and guiding the regulatory efforts in the region 
and able to monitor environmental data collected by the various agencies and to make 
recommendations based on that data would be a huge step. Also needed is for closer 
links to communities and watershed residents so that intelligence can be gathered at a 
variety of scales and communities can the public can be involved in an increasingly 
transparent effort to assess community goals, work more with stakeholders than on them, 
and ultimately be able to rapidly implement policy change to react to negative trends or 
unexpected surprises with the help of a knowledgeable public and informed communities. 
This will require the significant outreach and education efforts described above. 
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Figure 23 The Major Watersheds that drain into the BoF/GoM (from The Gulf of Maine 
Environmental Data and Information Management System) 
As depicted in Figure 25 there is no lack of watersheds around the Bay of Fundy 
and the Gulf of Maine. It is somewhat sad that the recommendations of John Wesley 
Powell and others in the late 1800s that the U.S. adopt a watershed-level approach to the 
governance of the expanding West were ignored. Instead the United States continued to 
draw political lines that resulted in the fragmentation of natural functions and the division 
of the governing entities that oversaw them. Governance was further frustrated by 
fragmentation between federal, state, and local as well as between the branches and levels 
within each of the branches at every level. Integration and collaboration was made nearly 
impossible (Steelman 2010). 
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This study has demonstrated that current governance in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of 
Maine watershed is too fragmented and divided to effectively manage the human 
activities that impact the environment or react to surprises that are without doubt on the 
horizon. The only real hope for the region is for communities around the basin to pull 
together, become knowledgeable about the ecosystem and its threats, and assume some 
significant portion of responsibility for the environmental well-being of their watershed. 
Building on a sense of place, the watershed approach replaces expert-driven control and 
command and control agency administration with an arrangement of power sharing 
among public and private actors, collaborative, ongoing, consensus-based processes, 
results-oriented management, and broad civic participation by a knowledgeable and 
interested public (Berry 2000; Berry 2002; Weber 2003; Steelman 2010). 
It will also require agencies responsible for some portion of ecosystem resilience 
or integrity to get out of their offices and get out into the watershed. In both nations, 
more time and effort needs to be expended away from regional or national headquarters. 
Employees should live and work mostly in the field - attending meetings of community 
groups at night and acting more as a resource and partner in the community during 
working hours. Existing watershed groups and community efforts need to be nurtured 
and expanded at the watershed and community levels. Indeed these proposals rely to 
some degree on advancing watersheds as a greater influence for local governance. 
Clearly efforts need to be fostered. This can't be done from Boston, Washington, 
D.C., Halifax, or Ottawa. It also can't be done from state or provincial capitals. It 
requires employees to live and work in the communities they serve. The Oregon Plan 
provides an exceptional example of the success of this approach as regulators moved out 
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of their state capital headquarters and into watersheds around the states to act as resources 
and support for watershed groups attempting to restore habitat after the ESA listing of 
several species of Pacific Salmon (Coe-Juell 2005) 
With the characteristics described above, the door opens further for input by local 
knowledge. As the public becomes more knowledgeable, and communities more 
involved, governance will be more welcoming of local knowledge. With more 
appreciation of local knowledge, there may be a positive feedback mechanism that sets in 
and more citizens may become willing to get involved and bring their knowledge to bear 
on environmental issues that impact the community. 
The final characteristic that must be address is the use of the precautionary 
approach to uncertainty. This concept has been fully explored - what is needed is some 
idea of how it can become a part of the decision making scheme in the region. The 
precautionary approach should be utilized and it could be part of the decision making 
landscape if it is incorporated in the management principles at all levels. Any reference 
to the IJC should, by agreement, include the precautionary approach as a management 
principle. Recommendations of the IJC or Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine Board, whatever 
entity is developed to provide overall guidance and accountability should be implemented 
by existing governance using a precautionary approach to the inevitable uncertainty that 
will be encountered. 
Fortunately, the kind of change that is needed in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine 
governance is not new. Changes away from expert driven scientific management regimes 
are becoming more and more common. The changes proposed above rely upon an 
educated and active public, collaborative governance, coordinated scientific work with 
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input from local knowledge, an accountable overarching institutional entity, all of which 
result in an increasingly adaptive governance process better able to deal with inevitable 
surprise. Given the above, we will now briefly look at next steps. 
Next Steps 
Given the nature of the threats confronting our ecosystem, and the degree of 
change advocated by the recommendations set forth above, there are a few steps that 
should be taken to begin down the road toward meaningful change in the region. 
First there needs to be an assessment of the community outreach efforts, existing 
watershed groups, and other related movements that can be identified and incorporated 
into the first steps of a plan to link such efforts around the basin. As mentioned above, 
those watershed groups and associations, as well as government (e.g. NERRS, and NEPs) 
and NGO- sponsored coastal community partnership efforts, must be consulted and 
included in new governance efforts around the watershed. 
There needs also to be an assessment of funding sources that might be available to 
fund a watershed-wide public outreach and education effort utilizing existing community 
resources wherever they may be found. 
With the assistance of an increasingly educated public that has some knowledge 
of the threats posed to the region's ecosystems, discussions need to be started with 
government agencies at all levels to better understand the needs and willingness to move 
in the direction of collaboration and coordination. The concept of an overarching 
institutional entity needs to be discussed as well. 
Finally, some thought should be given to holding a series of open public 
conferences on both sides of the border that includes watershed groups and communities 
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along with scientists and regulators to present the findings of the GOMC's State of the 
Gulf report to get local and public to review monitoring results and get broad input into 
the findings and the potential directions that governance could take to address the threats 
raised in the report. As discussed above, this will go a long way toward establishing the 
goals and outcomes desired by communities in the watershed. These conferences should 
culminate in a binational conference that brings all groups and anyone with interest in 
watershed governance issues to further explore goals and future directions. 
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has reviewed and approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described In Title 
45, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 46, Subsection 101(b). Approval is granted 
to conduct your study as described In your protocol. 
Researchers who conduct studies Involving human subjects have responsibilties as 
outlined in the attached document. Responsibilities of Orectors of Researth Studies 
Involving Human Subjects. (This document is also available at 
http://www.unh.edu/osr/compllance/IRB.html.) Please read this document carefully 
before commencing your work Involving human subjects. 
Upon completion of your study, please complete the enclosed pink Exempt Study Final 
Report form and return it to this office along with a report of your findings. 
If you have questions or concerns about your study or this approval, please feei free to 
contact me at 603-862-2003 or 3ulie-idmP9ortaunh.edu. Please refer to the IRB # 
above In ail correspondence related to this study. The IRB wishes you success with your 
research. 
For the IRB, 
/jUlyf6)WjHkv\ 
| Ju le F. Slmppon 
Uranager 
cc: File 
Mlml Larsen Becker 
Research Conduct and Compliance Service*, Office of Sponsored Research, Service 
Building, 51 College Road, Durham, NH 03824-3585 * Fax: 603-M2-3564 
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Written Consent Form 
Can We Get There From Here: Toward an Integrated Ecosystem 
Approach to the Management of the Gulf of Maine 
To Participants in this study: 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the institutional capacity in the Gulf of Maine region to 
implement an ecosystem-based management regime in the Gulf of Maine watershed. The goal of these 
interviews is to gain a better understanding of the laws and prescriptions governing the human activities 
that impact the Gulf of Maine ecosystem, the institutions that develop, implement and influence those laws 
and activities, and to evaluate the capacity of the existing institutions, agencies and organizations to 
develop and implement an ecosystem-based approach to management in the region. The information 
gained through the course of this research will be used to evaluate the current capacity of the 
legal/institutional regime in the Gulf of Maine and to suggest options that might lead to a more effective 
ecosystem-based approach to the management of human activities that impact the ecosystem of the Gulf of 
Maine. 
Participants in this research include public officials in the U.S., Canada, and New Zealand. The views of 
officials in professional, regulatory, scientific and administrative capacities in federal, state, provincial and 
local institutions, the regulated community and NGOs will also be sought. 
You are being asked to participate in a focused interview lasting approximately one hour. Further contact 
might prove necessary in order to ensure that your responses have been accurately interpreted. I will take 
written notes during toe interview, but I also request your permission to record the interview by audio 
recorder. You will be free to cease the interview at any time. The information received will be treated as 
confidential, and participants will not be identified in reports or articles without their prior written 
permission. All audio tapes will be destroyed/erased at die conclusion of the study. Please understand that 
you will not be compensated for your participation in this research. 
My advisor, Dr. Mimi L. Becker and I can be reached for future questions and/or clarifications, at the 
University of New Hampshire, Department of Natural Resources, 215 James Hall, Durham, NH 03824. 
We can also be contacted by phone at (603) 862 3950 or email mlbecker@cisunix.unh.edu or 
ircoon@cisunix.iinh.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject you can discuss 
them with us or you may contact Julie Simpson in the UNH Office of Sponsored Research at (603) 862 
2003 or Julie.simpsnn@iinh.eHii. 
I have read the above statement and agree to be interviewed under the conditions stated above. I am aware 
that my participation is voluntary and that I may discontinue participation at any time without penalty. 
Signature Date 
Printed Name 
I agree with the use of audiotape recorder under the condition that I may request that it be turned off at any 
time during the interview. 
Signature Date 
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Focused Interview Questionnaire 
Code 
Background 
1. Background questions to identify the participant? 
a. What is your name, business phone and email address? 
b. By whom or by what agency/institution/NGO or regulated entity? 
c. What are your duties and responsibilities? 
i. Are they set forth in a written job description? 
ii. Is there a difference between the duties described in the job description 
and those that you actually perform? 
Problems and Goals 
2. What role does your agency play in the management of human activities that may 
tend to impact the ecosystem? 
a. Who or what do you regulate? 
b. How have decision makers in your agency/institution identified the 
environmental problems and the significant threats to the ecosystem in your 
region? 
3. Are there goals set out for your agency designed to address the problems identified 
above? 
a. How are those goals determined (who, what, where, how, when)? 
b. Are there additional or specific biological, social, or community goals 
incorporated in the goals of your institution? 
c. Are any attempts made to determine the goals or ends of the community (or 
regulated community, industry, etc.)? 
d. What goals or ends, both biological and social, does the community want? 
e. Are values of the people or regulated community clear? Do the goals of the 
community or regulated community differ from those of your agency? 
4. What anthropogenic factors have the greatest impact or pose the most significant 
threats to the health or integrity of the [GoM, GL, NZ] ecosystem? 
a. What are the goals of your agency in terms of the governance system used to 
regulate the human uses of your region's resources? 
b. What are the indicators that are being used to tell you what progress is being 
made toward those goals? 
c. What are the measurements or indicators that you believe should be used to 
monitor the health of the ecosystem? 
5. Looking back at the history of your institution's efforts, can you identify the key 
resource trends in your area of involvement? 
a. What are the historical trends in terms of management and governance over the 
human activities that impact the ecosystem in your region? 
b. Have events moved toward or away from the goals you specified previously? 
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c. Does trend information help us understand why policy and governance have 
succeeded or failed (e.g. is decreased diversity a result of policy or governance or 
is something else at work)? 
d. How has your approach to governance changed over time? 
6. Does your agency/institution have a view of what a healthy [GoM, GL or NZ] 
ecosystem should provide or what it would look like? 
a. What is needed to restore the ecosystem to health? 
7. What are the desired goals for the future (i.e. the goal being to rehabilitate the 
ecosystem so that it is resilient to human demands)? 
a. Based on current trends and conditions, what is likely to happen in the future? 
b. What scenarios can you project? 
c. Which is most likely? 
8. Are trends moving toward the goals? 
a. If trends are not moving toward the goals (then a problem exists and alternatives 
must be considered), what other policies, rules, norms, institutional structures, 
and/or procedures might cause trends to move toward the goals? 
b. Can we evaluate one or more alternatives in terms of the goals? 
c. How could the alternative be implemented? 
d. Who would need to be involved? 
9. Who or what agencies are the principle participants in terms of the governance of 
human activities that impact the [GoM, GL, NZ] ecosystem? 
a. Are there others who should be participating? 
b. Are there groups that are demanding to participate who have been somehow shut 
out of the governance issues? 
10. Can you describe the perspective of your agency? 
a. By perspectives I mean 
i. What are your demands, or what they want in terms of values or 
organization? 
ii. What are your expectations? 
iii. On whose behalf are demands made (i.e. identifications)? 
11. In your opinion is an "ecosystem approach" different from the traditional approach 
for solving the region's environmental problems? 
a. How have you defined the concept of "ecosystem approach" and what changes 
have been made in your agency on institution to implement an ecosystem 
approach to the way in which you solve environmental problems? 
i. Pollutant-by-pollutant, media/activity or species specific management vs. 
integrated management? 
ii. Increased participatory decision making vs single agency or 
jurisdictional decision making? 
12. In your opinion, does the geographical scope of your institution's jurisdiction 
encompass the major sources of stress to the [GoM, GL, NZ] ecosystem? 
a. Why or why not? 
b. Do you think these limitations will affect the feasibility of making progress on 
ecosystem restoration goals? 
13. In your opinion, does the substantive legal jurisdiction of your institution or agency 
encompass the major sources of stress to the [GoM, GL, NZ] ecosystem? 
a. Why or why not? 
b. Do you think these limitations will affect the feasibility of making progress on 
ecosystem restoration goals? 
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14. Which of the following base values are most important in the development of goals 
and decisions concerning the regulation of human activities that impact the [GoM, 
GL, NZ] ecosystem? 
a. Power - or the ability to carry out decisions 
b. Enlightenment - the quest for knowledge 
c. Wealth - money or its equivalent 
d. Well-being - to have or obtain physical or psychological health 
e. Skill - to obtain special abilities 
f. Affection - the effort to have family, friends, and warm community relationships 
g. Respect - to show and receive respect 
h. Rectitude - to have ethical standards 
15. For each of those you have identified that play roles in governance, which of these 
base values comes most into play or provides the strongest motivation for their 
actions? 
a. What political pressures, values, and motivations must be recognized as powerful 
drivers into the current governance systems? 
b. What values provide the greatest barriers for the implementation of an ecosystem 
approach to governance? 
c. How can these barriers be lowered or shuffled to increase the likelihood of 
greater ecosystem-based decision making? 
16. What is the principle strategy used by your institution or organization to achieve your 
goals? 
a. By strategies, we mean: 
i. Diplomatic (negotiation) 
ii. Litigation (binding resolution by impartial third party) 
iii. Economic (achieve goals through economic power or threats of 
economic harm) 
iv. Ideological (achieve goals through spreading of scientific, social, 
economic or research, ideas and education) 
b. From your experience, what strategies are the most successful? 
17. If you have noted a transition from the traditional sectoral approach to management 
and an ecosystem-based approach, have new institutions emerged in the governance 
efforts? 
a. If so, who are they? 
b. What values do they represent (from the list of 7 above?) 
c. What strategies do they employ (from the list of 4 above)? 
d. Have they been successful? 
i. Why or why not? 
e. Have new practices been put in place? 
f. Is there a resistance to innovation in governance? 
i. Do you have an opinion as to the source of the resistance? 
18. Are you satisfied with the quality, credibility and/accuracy of the data and 
information you receive that pertains to the problems you are facing? 
a. What are principle sources of your information? 
b. Is the public or regulated community involved in any way in the development of 
information? 
c. Do you believe that the information you receive is comprehensive? 
d. Is the information available to everyone? 
600 
19. Have you ever had to build support and capacity in order to implement a desired 
change in the way information is obtained or analyzed? If so, how did you go about 
building support? 
20. How do you communicate your ideas, findings or decisions? 
a. To whom do you pass along your recommendations, findings or ideas? 
b. Do you have the authority to make your ideas binding upon the regulated public 
or other interests? 
c. Do you seek input from the public before your findings, ideas or decisions are 
finalized? 
d. Are stakeholders involved in the decision making process in any way? 
21. Overall, what would you say are the strengths and weaknesses of your institution's 
current approach to the management, of the human activities that impact the health of 
the [GoM, GL, NZ] ecosystem. 
22. What changes would you recommend that might increase the chances for successful 
restoration of the [GoM, GL, NZ] coastal ecosystem? 
23. Do you have any additional specific concerns or comments? 
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